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Abstract 
 
Over the last three decades, within the context of globalisation and intensified inter-
urban competition, we have observed the growing use of market-centred strategy 
such as ‘marketing or branding places’. Despite the worsening of the economic 
situation since the 2008 global financial crisis, the overall trend of expansion of place 
marketing based on marketing science keeps going further in many cities in South 
Korea. Why does this phenomenon happen? How can we interpret it at this time? 
What does this mean for the cities and their residents? In order to answer these 
questions, this thesis attempts to understand the process of place marketing projects, 
and analyse how they were politically formed and what their actual effects were for 
residents. In addition, it develops a critical understanding of the evolution of urban 
place marketing projects from the political perspective in Gwangju, South Korea: the 
Gwangju Biennale, the Asian Culture Complex, the Dome Baseball Stadium, the 
Urban Folly, and the Gwangju Universiade 2015. Through a nation-wide Korean 
expert survey and a case study of Gwangju, this research shows that Korean place 
marketing shares common trends with Western cities as well as having some 
specifically Korean characteristics. In particular, it tries to reveal the evolving nature 
of Korean place marketing by employing a combination of multi-scalar and cultural 
politics approaches. The thesis concludes that some Korean cities such as Gwangju 
have moved toward neo-liberalisation by employing entrepreneurial strategies of 
place marketing.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1 Background to the research 
 
Over the last three decades, as the influence of neo-liberalism has grown in the 
world, it appears cities increasingly think and act like businesses (Harvey, 2005; 
Kalandides, 2006; Theodore, Peck and Brenner, 2011). Within the context of global 
restructuring and intensified inter-urban competition, we have observed the growing 
use of market-centred and managerial strategies like ‘marketing or branding places’ 
to achieve local economic development in contemporary cities. They have become 
more ubiquitous in both developed countries in North America and West Europe and 
developing ones in Asia (Miles and Paddison, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Yeoh, 2005). For 
example, under the context of global economic restructuring, a number of European 
cities have taken advantage of place marketing techniques in an attempt to revitalize 
their depressed inner cities since 1980s.  
 
Place marketing as an entrepreneurial local development strategy has become 
especially widespread in the UK, and recently, some developing or less-developed 
countries such as South Korea have increasingly paid attention to place marketing or 
branding in order to develop their urban economies. The strategy of place marketing 
is probably one of the fastest growing fields of urban policy in South Korea. In this 
regard, there is a very worrying sign in the practice of place marketing in South 
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Korea in more recent years. Many local politicians and policy makers in South Korea 
tend to consider place marketing and branding as a ‘panacea’ to boost their 
weakened economies, to improve citizens’ (including disadvantaged groups) quality 
of life and to change their ambiguous local identity into more clear one. They have a 
passion for learning and imitating advanced (Western and Japanese) cities’ place 
marketing and branding without considering its applicability, or whether their cities 
can follow those cities’ successful myths.  
 
Recently, with the worsening of the economic situation since 2008 global financial 
crisis, large-scale marketing projects might be put on hold in some Western cities. 
Nonetheless, the overall trend of expansion of ‘marketing or branding places’ still 
keeps going in less-developed cities in East Asia such as in South Korea. Why does 
this phenomenon happen? How can we interpret it at this time? These questions are 
closely connected with the topic of this thesis. Throughout this thesis, I argue that the 
expansion of place marketing based on market-centred ideas is inseparably 
intertwined with a political shift towards neo-liberalisation in contemporary cities. 
That is, place marketing policies have been employed as a driving force for the neo-
liberal city, and in this sense, I argue they are very political.  
 
The perspectives of literature on place marketing or branding can be divided into two 
groups. One is the proponent’s view which usually comes from Marketing Science 
and the other is the critic’s, one often originates from more diverse academic 
backgrounds such as Geography, Urban Planning and Cultural Studies, etc. The 
former is to see place marketing and branding policies as very useful and beneficial 
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to urban development. Proponents typically focus on their economic benefits. In 
contrast, people who are in the latter position are usually critical about them since 
they often pay attention to their negative consequences. They typically worry about 
not only socially negative effects but even have doubts as to the long-term economic 
effect of them.  
 
I will critically examine the evolving political process of Korean place marketing by 
adopting the latter perspective. In relation to the general evolution of place marketing, 
Kavaratzis (2007) divides the process of the historical development of place 
marketing into three stages within the context of marketing science. The first stage 
consisted of the fragmented or transitory place promotional activities composed of 
simple advertisements attracting factories and the selling of industrial cities. In the 
second stage, city marketing progressed into systematic place marketing, based on 
management science, such as targeting specific markets and establishing strategy, 
which includes conventional place promotions, financial incentives and tools for 
place products. Finally, he argues that city marketing has developed city branding 
which emphasizes the importance of place image and identity.  
 
However, his argument seems too superficial, technical and value-free. Even if it is 
meaningful as an attempt to show a trajectory of marketing science terms regarding 
place marketing strategies, it rarely describe the wider political contexts of inter-
related changes toward neo-liberalisation at global, national and local scales or 
indeed the micro political interactions and conflicts of many urban actors within the 
place marketing process. The thesis will argue that while such a perspective might 
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show an academic fashion in marketing science over time, it cannot depict the 
changing nature and political mechanisms of urban place marketing. It will be argued 
here that there are many political and social aspects not understood by economic 
over-simplification about place marketing. Furthermore, such a marketing science 
approach cannot link to wider political and economic conditions such as globalisation 
and neo-liberalisation.  
 
Thus, the thesis will approach the evolution of place marketing on a basis of the 
changing political context under wider political and economic conditions. In doing so, 
Gwangju in South Korea was selected as a case city in the thesis. The reason why I 
chose Gwangju is that it is a relatively early city to launch place marketing policy 
compared to others in South Korea, though its background 1  of initiatives is 
somewhat different from that of Western cities. Since the 1960s, the city has been 
established as a political base of the opposition party and has experienced uneven 
economic development on a national scale, and as a severe consequence, the city 
has been politically and economically alienated in the country. In addition, its image 
as a sacred democratic ground of resistance was further confirmed by the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement in 1980. However, since the 1990s, such a historic 
image has been rapidly transformed into a cultural one by a variety of marketing 
projects by Gwangju city authorities. As a result, currently, Gwangju is more 
aggressively reshaping itself towards the more ambitious goal of acting as cultural 
                                    
1 Many Western industrial cities have endeavoured to reimagine their cities from bad images such as 
dereliction, economic decline, and pollution to new post-industrial ones (Short, 1996). By contrast, 
Gwangju has attempted to overcome the image of a city of resistance generated from The Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement in 1980. 
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hub city in Asia. Thus, for me, it offers an appropriate city to examine evolving place 
marketing policy in terms of the political context in South Korea.  
 
1.1.2 Gwangju as a case city and me 
 
I am very involved in this city, Gwangju, in terms of my personal history. Yet, the 
thesis will not employ a phenomenological approach to the research topic. 
Nonetheless, I would start with a very brief story of my personal experiences since 
they are closely connected with my research topic. Thus, I begin my writing with a 
short biography.  
 
Firstly, I was born in Gwangju and grew up in the city until I moved to Seoul for my 
enrolment at Sungkyunkwan University. In addition, I was a policy maker in charge of 
some urban departments in South Korea such as town and community development, 
place marketing, and urban housing provision both in central and local government 
over ten years. These have given me some changing insights into the context of 
Gwangju politics.  
 
Secondly, I saw and felt the important historic event in South Korea, the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement in 1980. The place where I lived was located in the city 
centre and not far from the historic site. At that time, I thought it was like a war. Of 
course, I was a student in elementary school and the school was closed then. I saw 
a group of protesters standing their ground against martial troops at the site. 
However, I could not go there because of my parents’ restraint. A few days later, a 
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number of citizens provided the civil militia in an armed car with something to eat and 
drink and happily cheered and supported them. Though they were armed with guns, 
I did not feel they used violence for bad aims.  
 
Thirdly, I was shocked by broadcast news media at that time. Actually, when I was 
young, I thought TV news reporters always broadcasted the truth. However, they told 
me different stories from the scenes that I saw and heard at that time in the city. For 
example, they described protesters as very dangerous and violent rioters who were 
friendly to North Korea. However, it seemed that they were very kind to local citizens. 
Contrary to usual pro-Pyongyang activists, they always waved a national flag. In 
addition, they warned North Korea shouting ‘North Korea, do not misjudge’. Thus, I 
could easily find out they were not a pro-North Korean communist force. The 
government authorities delivered news about the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement through major broadcasters and newspapers, while the protesters 
distributed printed material in order to report the circumstances of the event. In one 
of the materials which I saw, there were arguments that the new Military leader, Jeon 
Doo-hwan would be the next President and he would be in succession to the 
previous President’s authoritative dictatorship. Then, after several months, the 
arguments came true.  
 
Finally, I heard new stories about Gwangju marketing in my interviews. In 2011, I 
visited Gwangju to investigate and collect empirical data for around two months. 
During that time, I heard some ‘behind the scenes’ stories. Sometimes, they were 
completely different from something that I already knew about Gwangju marketing 
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usually through formal documents, reports, and articles. In the process of 
investigating Gwangju marketing, these experiences led to me a scalar and cultural 
political approach on a basis of social constructivism. These methods enabled me to 
review all the knowledge about place marketing policies in Gwangju that I had.  
 
 
1.2 Research aims and topics 
 
1.2.1 Aims of the research 
 
Many Korean cities have invested heavily in place marketing strategies such as 
mega-events and international festivals, cultural flagship projects and city brands in 
recent years. These strategies are continuously evolving ones within their changing 
urban environments through a variety of political actors’ interaction. Sometimes, they 
seemed successful in giving life to their inner cities and revitalising local economies 
while others contributed to a failure which can be an economic burden to inhabitants. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of rosy views of place marketing or branding in 
municipal authorities in South Korea. It appears a myth of successful place 
marketing or branding (especially related to cities in advanced capitalist countries 
such as North America, Europe, and Japan) is shared between many Korean city 
leaders and policy makers. In this respect, specific questions arise: Where does this 
optimism about place marketing or branding in Korean cities come from? Can a 
successful example in one place secure the same result in other place? What does 
this mean for the cities and their residents? 
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To answer these questions, it is important to consider how we understand the policy-
making process of place marketing. The thesis attempted to recognise the process 
of place marketing projects how they, indeed, were politically formed and what their 
actual effects were for resident’s daily life rather than to list some programmatic 
recommendations and strategies for shaping slick places and brands as just a selling 
and marketing technique. Moreover, the research tried to reveal the essential nature 
and trend of the evolution of place marketing by tracing contextual changes in urban 
politics – specifically in Gwangju within South Korea. In particular, they were 
examined within the wider waves towards a neo-liberal shift. In the process, related 
issues like globalisation, the role of cultural instruments, and policy transfer were 
explored together. 
 
In this context, five research topics are set out as follows: the reason why Korean 
city leaders have a passion for place marketing projects; the characteristics of 
Korean place marketing and its Western- and Japanese-biased view; the existence 
of other people’s perspectives differentiated from dominant people’s on place 
marketing policy; the evolving process of place marketing policy within a political 
context; and the social and political implications of this research for changing 
Gwangju marketing. 
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1.2.2 Research questions 
 
Drawing on these objectives of the research, I want to suggest several research 
questions. The questions, which I will strive to answer throughout the study, can be 
listed as follows:  
 
1. Why is the optimistic view of the capabilities of place marketing projects 
widespread in South Korea? Why do Korean city leaders and policy markers 
ardently follow Western2 place marketing?  
 
2. What are the characteristics of Korean place marketing policy in relation to 
Western place marketing ones?  
 
3. Is there any other view which is different from the formal (or dominant) one in 
place marketing in Gwangju?  
 
4. How has place marketing policy evolved within the political context? What is 
the evolutionary process of place marketing strategy in the context of urban 
politics? 
 
5. What are the social and political implications of evolving marketing policies in 
Gwangju within South Korea? 
 
                                    
2 In the thesis, Western cities include cities in North America and Europe.  
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1.2.3 Significance of the research 
 
This thesis has two wider important meanings.  
 
Firstly, it will enable us to broaden the width of research and diversify approaches on 
place marketing policy. Despite the growing academic attention to place marketing, 
there are few critical studies about ‘its evolution’ of place marketing. Moreover, there 
are fewer attempts to link the issue with the political topic of neo-liberalisation in 
order to critically investigate the relationship between them. Much literature has dealt 
with neo-liberalisation through a global-oriented approach; yet, this thesis will 
attempt to examine the macro phenomenon of neo-liberalisation in connection with 
an individual city’s marketing policies and its economic and spatial restructuring. It is 
very important for us, in an academic sense, to recognise the implications of political 
context within the wider transforming neo-liberalisation by analysing the evolving 
process of place marketing policy. This may enable us to identify whether there is a 
trajectory in the historical development of place marketing policies, given local 
environments. If the past place marketing experiences of advanced cities become 
the present of Korean cities’ marketing policy, we need to explore what the common 
or different features are between them. Less-advanced countries like South Korea 
can avoid various problems by learning from Western experiences and preparing 
expected tasks in the future. In addition, a number of studies, especially in Korea, 
have usually focused on the tangible effects of place marketing such as its economic 
influence.  
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However, this research will also pay much attention to the practical effects of place 
marketing projects from the resident’s perspective beyond such trends. Currently, 
while there is a lot of literature on place marketing or branding available in South 
Korea, what is insufficient or even lacking – and this is the gap I want to fill in the 
thesis – are critical interpretations and explanations of evolving place marketing from 
the political context. The thesis aims to widen the dimension of the evolution of place 
marketing, as there are few studies of this type of approach in South Korea. 
Ultimately, I hope this study will contribute to an expanded discussion of evolving 
place marketing not only empirically, but also methodologically. 
 
Secondly, another application of the study is its actual use for policy professionals. 
Most studies on place marketing or branding in South Korea tend to look on the 
bright side. However, this research will suggest some questions about the practical 
effect and seek to be more critical. I will critically examine the policy practices of 
Korean place marketing which politicians and policy practitioners readily import from 
advanced cities. By doing so, I seek to explore the use of place marketing or 
branding not as a managerial and programmed instrument but rather as something 
to improve citizen’s daily life. In particular, the evaluating criteria of place marketing 
and branding tends to be limited to the economic area. I expect that this thesis might 
help Korean policy makers to adopt a more balanced view, since it should enable 
them to recognise the importance of cultural, social and political criteria. Hence, in 
spite of some concern with the public relevance of human geography (Peck, 1999), 
the empirical studies of the thesis, especially in respect of policy transfer and 
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searching for a recommendable direction for future place marketing, will have a 
strong connection with the urban public policy. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is constructed of ten chapters. It can be divided into three parts: (1) 
introduction and literature review, (2) methodology, (3) analyses of Korean place 
marketing and conclusion.  
 
Introduction and literature review (Chapter 1 to 3) 
 
Chapter one is an introduction to this research. It introduces the background and 
aims of the research. The importance of the study is discussed based on the 
worldwide phenomenon of place marketing strategies within the wider context of 
transforming neo-liberalisation. The chapter outlines research topics and questions 
that lead to subsequent analyses in later chapters. 
 
In chapter two, the literature of place and place marketing is reviewed. Before 
examining the evolution of place marketing, it attempts to approach the essence of 
evolving place marketing by focusing on the meaning of basic words such as place 
and place marketing. Such terms will be compared and examined from the views of 
marketing- and place-centred approaches. Then, the history of place marketing will 
be explored by questioning whether it is new or not. This chapter will suggest the 
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need of a political approach in order to reveal the essential nature of evolving place 
marketing policy. 
 
Chapter three will explore the theoretical backgrounds of place marketing strategy – 
in particular, urban or local political theories. It will concentrate on investigating 
political relations between neo-liberalism and place marketing policy. In the process 
of examining their relation, I will explore not only some issues like uneven 
development and gentrification but also other items such as globalisation, the role of 
cultural means and policy transfer within the context of neo-liberalisation. Through 
this theoretical examination, I will present several crucial factors such as the 
expansion of market, neo-liberal transformation, and global transfer of policy for 
deeper understanding of the evolution of place marketing policy. I will suggest that 
there might be a place marketing which can best be situated at the intersecting point 
between these factors.  
 
Methodology (Chapters 4) 
 
Chapter four will describe the methodology of the research. This study collected data 
related to the research topics in a variety of ways. First was a national expert panel 
survey, which was a preliminary phase for more intensive study of practical place 
marketing projects in Gwangju. It was conducted in order to briefly understand the 
contours of Korean marketing and to map out a way forward - investigating the 
Gwangju case. Secondly, in-depth interviews with many people who were very 
involved in Gwangju marketing projects (such as politicians, central and city officials, 
citizens, and news reporters, etc.) were the main source for my analysis. Third were 
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documentary studies, which were based on national and local press articles, formal 
documents, and the publications of local groups. Finally, internet homepages 
provided me with useful amounts of information. In particular, I gained valuable data 
from the formal sites of Gwangju city government, Biennale Foundation, central 
government’s Asian Culture Complex, and 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement) Memorial Foundation. 
 
Analyses of Korean place marketing and conclusion (Chapter 5 to 10) 
 
In Chapter five, drawing on the theoretical inquiry of previous chapters, some critical 
discussions specifically associated with the Korean context will be suggested 
through documentary analysis. Firstly, a few worries about the marketing science 
approach to place marketing policy will be expressed. These are homogenisation, 
intensified competition, and polarisation. Secondly, I will examine Korean attitudes to 
advanced (e.g. Western or Japanese) city’s place marketing based on Harvey’s 
insights on neo-liberalism. Thirdly, the global transfer of place marketing policy will 
be discussed in connection with the evolution of place marketing. Likewise, this topic 
will be explored along with neo-liberalising urban practices. Finally, the limit of local-
centred theories of urban or local politics will be considered within the Korean 
context. Here, I will discuss the need for a multi-scale approach and inquiries into the 
relation between central government and local one.  
 
In chapter six, the results of the nation-wide expert panel survey are considered as a 
preliminary research for Gwangju marketing in South Korea. This survey will enable 
us to get a picture of the overall tendency of Korean place marketing in comparison 
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with Western place marketing. Another benefit of this investigation is to identify 
whether there is a phenomenon of the transfer of place marketing policy or not. The 
ultimate aim is to gain a broad outline of Korean place marketing. It will provide the 
wider context for the more intensive study of the Gwangju case (chapter 7 to 9). 
 
Chapter seven will describe a brief story of the the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement as an essential historic event in the thesis. Above all, the meaning of 
collective values like ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit will be carefully 
examined in relation to the significance of the Movement. Then, I will depict the 
process of how local business elites and authorities have tried to dilute or cover the 
original image of ‘a city of resistance’ and ‘a sacred ground for democracy’, and as a 
consequence, transformed it into a modern cultural one through ‘Yehayang’ 
(tranditional art of town) and cultural city discourses, and the international cultural 
festival, Gwangju Biennale. 
 
Chapter eight will examine the conflicts and struggles around building the Asian 
Culture Complex as the second example. There were two big disputes. One was the 
conflict about whether the central authorities should make the building a landmark 
like the Pompidou in Paris or the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao or not, and the 
other was the controversy of whether they demolished the old Jenonnam Provincial 
Hall (to make the site of the Asian Culture Complex) or not. It will be suggested that 
the conflict of the varied actor’s can be interpreted as the contestation of different 
visions and meanings or the politics of memory.  
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In chapter nine, a domed indoor stadium project will be explored as the third case in 
Gwangju. In this example, a corporate-led partnership between a pure private 
company, the POSCO and city government was established. In spite of its failure, it 
will allow us to make sense of the nature of evolving governance in Gwangju. 
Moreover, this chapter very briefly depicts other small examples (the Urban Folly and 
Gwangju Universiade 2015). Ultimately, I will argue that these marketing projects 
imply negative symptoms as a result of transformation towards neo-liberalisation in 
terms of the evolution of place marketing in Gwangju. 
 
Finally, in chapter ten, an overview of these research findings will be provided and 
some implications will be suggested. The political approach adopted in the thesis 
can uncover a politically intrinsic attribute of evolving place marketing policy, which 
creates a synergetic effect with neo-liberalism. It also enables us to recognise the 
changing governing structure in Gwangju towards entrepreneurial governance. The 
chapter will suggest that, in the evolving process, employing cultural instruments and 
transferring advanced city marketing partly contributed to neo-liberalisation of 
Gwangju marketing policy. Then, I will summarise the academic contribution of the 
research before making some policy recommendations for Korean policy makers in 
the place marketing field.  
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Chapter Two: Place, Marketing, and Place Marketing 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: two different perspectives on place marketing 
 
The market is increasingly expanding and permeating into the public sphere of states 
and cities. The operation of many public parts such as rail, airline and 
communication services has turned to the principle of the market since the 1980s in 
association with the diffusion of neo-liberal political ideology (Stigel and Frimann, 
2006). In addition, the mind-concept of public organisations has been more and 
more affected by the trend. Due to this, faced with growing competitive pressures, 
cities have a challenge in keeping their locations more progressive and attractive. 
Increasingly, urban authorities have striven to improve their economies. The 
activities that rejuvenate urban and regional economies through urban regeneration, 
especially property- and culture-led regeneration, have become widespread in the 
West. In particular, the improvement of the image of cities such as Baltimore, 
Liverpool, Glasgow or Halifax, through the construction of retail and entertainment 
centres has attempted to renew the whole metropolitan region (Harvey, 1989b). In 
the process of inter-urban competition, localities have also been encouraged to 
become more ‘entrepreneurial’ (Harvey, 1989) since the 1970s as part of a 
competitive pursuit of local revitalization. Simultaneously, urban governance in many 
cities has become far more focused on the provision of a so-called good business 
climate or spectacular tour attraction in order to increase local prosperity. 
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The notion of place marketing lies at the centre of these diverse phenomena in 
contemporary cities. Broadly speaking, there was much discussion of the 
phenomena of place marketing, yet fundamental perspectives on this can be 
classified by two types of literatures (Bitterman, 2008; Braun, 2008; Kavaratzis, 
2007). The first is that on Geography, Architecture and Urban Planning. Basically 
previous discussions on place marketing began in these disciplines, and they have 
concentrated on the differentiation of places (regions and cities) and the 
regeneration of places through cultural strategies. Within this view, the uses of place 
marketing are often examined critically. The second perspective comes from 
Marketing Science and is more recent. These have paid much more attention to the 
aspect of business management such as tourism, marketing and branding. In 
addition, this perspective has usually been devoted to marketing techniques, 
searching for a ‘unique selling point’ like in corporate marketing (Julier 2005:869). In 
relation to this, this chapter’s major concern is to critically examine this latter 
viewpoint of place marketing.  
 
Some authors in South Korea distinguish place marketing from city marketing. 
However, since the place marketing I am discussing is limited to urban areas, the 
term ‘place marketing’ is compatible with ‘city marketing’. Thus, both will be used 
together in the thesis. In the next section, the definition of place marketing will be 
examined, paying very critical attention to marketing science concepts.  
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2.2 What is place marketing? 
 
 
2.2.1 The changing terms of place marketing 
 
As shown in Table 2.1, many terms have developed to cover the marketing or selling 
of places. Authors of marketing science rather than non-marketing science 
researchers (such as Geography and Urban Planning) are likely to consider the 
terminological phenomenon very important (Kavaratzis, 2007; Braun, 2008). From the 
perspective of marketing science, such evolving terminology of place marketing might 
mean the evolving policies of place marketing in practice. However, despite often 
changes in related language, the thesis seeks to give attention to the fact that 
fundamental characteristics of such terms have been changed much less. 
 
According to Braun (2008), even if the term of city marketing is English, its origin is 
Dutch. He suggests Peelen’s claim (1987) that city marketing first appeared in 1981 
in a study of the Dutch city of Apeldoorn as proof. In relation to the term of place 
marketing, the ‘selling of places’ and ‘place promotion’ has been used in the UK to 
cover diverse marketing activities of cities or to warn of problems that might result 
from the phenomenon of place as a commodity (for example Burgess, 1982; Philo 
and Kearns, 1993; Ward, 1998). However, since the 1990s when Kotler used the 
term ‘place marketing’ in his publication (Kotler, Haider and Rein, 1993) it has 
frequently been used to concern the marketing of places in the UK and US (Braun 
2008). In addition to ‘place marketing’, the term of ‘city marketing’ is also commonly 
employed in related literature of western cities. In many cases, ‘place marketing’ is 
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usually different from ‘place promotion’ in that it is a more systematic strategy based 
on consumer oriented marketing concepts. In this context, many authors in the field 
of marketing science tend to use this term, considering the expansion of the 
conventional marketing domain to non-marketing fields such as social marketing. 
However, scholars critical of marketing or selling places have often used the term 
‘place marketing’ and ‘city marketing’ (for instance Goodwin, 1993; Paddison, 1993; 
Griffiths, 1998; Murray, 2001). As described in Table 2.1, another popular term in the 
field of tourism is ‘destination marketing’ or ‘destination branding’ which emphasises 
the meaning of the tourism destination as a visitor-centred approach.  
 
Table 2.1 Concerning Terms for Marketing of Places in the West 
 
 Usually used terms Frequently used field 
 
1980s – 1990s 
• Selling of places 
• Place promotion 
Geography, Urban planning 
 
 
1990s – 2000s 
• Place marketing 
• City marketing 
Marketing discipline, Geography, 
Urban planning, Cultural studies 
• Destination marketing 
• Destination branding 
Tourism 
 
2000s –  
• Place branding 
• City branding 
Marketing discipline, Urban 
planning 
 
 
Since the 2000s, a very frequent mentioned term in the field of place marketing 
changed to the term ‘place branding’ or ‘city branding’ in which places or cities try to 
have positive emotional associations with their customers (Braun 2008). The term 
first came from the British academic Simon Anholt in the early 2000s. His early 
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conceptualisation of it was to apply corporate-style branding to a place such as a 
nation, state, city and parts of a city like a business district or neighbourhood 
(Bitterman, 2008:5-6). Concerning this, Kavaratzis (2004) considers ‘city branding’ 
as the more evolved stage in the development of city marketing and he argues that a 
well made city brand should be the conclusive goal of city marketing. In this respect, 
he believes that ‘city marketing’ should be replaced by ‘city branding’ in the near 
future.  
 
In spite of these evolving terms of place marketing, however, policy practice has not 
always been coincident with theoretical fashion; changes of only the related terms do 
not secure real evolution of policies. Although such terminologies of place marketing 
have been changed, they might not be transformed in their intrinsic qualities. It is 
arguable that their objective such as attracting inward investments and firms is little 
different from that of urban policies in the end (Paddison, 1993). In addition, 
academic trends often reflect theoretical fashion rather than represent actual policy 
practice due to the gap between theory and practice. Furthermore, policy practice is 
much more complicated than theory and it might be different in different cities 
according to their political, economic and societal environment. For instance, in the 
case city of Gwangju in this thesis, many city officials and practitioners often mixedly-
used the marketing terms (such as place marketing, place branding, tourism 
marketing, city branding, branding marketing, and city advertisement, etc) in the 
process of explaining Gwangju marketing projects. They also confused the terms in 
spite of their frequent use of the terms. In this respect, the evolution of marketing 
terms based on marketing science view might not be applied to Korean cities. Thus, 
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it can be argued that mere changes of marketing techniques and terminological 
rhetoric do not mean the evolution of place marketing policy.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I argue that place marketing policy has politically evolved 
within the context of social and power relations between diverse actors. This political 
evolution of place marketing can be identified by the case study of Gwangju 
marketing projects from chapter seven to nine. 
 
2.2.2 The definition of place marketing 
 
To discuss the definition of place marketing in respect to marketing science easily, 
as a working definition for this section, it will be helpful to select one of the most 
frequently quoted. 
 
“Place marketing means designing a place to satisfy the needs of its target 
markets. To succeed in this issue, citizens and business have to be pleased 
with their community and the expectations of visitors and investors have to 
be met (Kotler and Gertner, 2002:57, Cited in Rainisto 2003:11).”  
 
According to Kotler’s perspective, the aspect of place marketing can be divided into 
two parts: ‘place’ and ‘marketing’ (Borg, 2008). The former is related to the trend 
what the city sells as a product. The latter means the programmed management 
process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying customer 
requirements (ibid). Thus, urban place marketing can be recognised as the 
promotional activities of local governments that develop their spaces or improve a 
city’s image in order to meet the demands of tourists and investors. Thus, basically 
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this is an attempt to apply a product marketing approach from companies to places 
in cities. According to this perspective, place marketers have to depend on marketing 
science tools like ‘product life-cycles’, ‘buyer-behaviour’ and ‘brand asset 
management’ (Murray, 2001). 
 
However, as the place marketing policies are more significant in our urban life, we 
need to think carefully whether the above definition of place marketing is desirable in 
terms of the citizen’s view. A product marketing approach starts from the basic 
premise that a place or a city is similar to a product of a company. However, a fact 
that should not be easily overlooked is that the object of corporate marketing is quite 
different from that of a city. Products can disappear if they fail in market competition. 
Yet, places cannot vanish from sight, though they do not succeed in inter-place 
competition. This is the most different thing. From the view of citizens, places in 
cities should not suffer from market failure because they are the economic and social 
bases of people’s lives and attachments. Even though places fail, people still live 
there and the failure only becomes a new history of the place. In addition, places of a 
city are cared for and people feel a sense of intimateness and psychological 
affection for them (Relph, 1976). In this sense, places where we live are not just 
properties for economic profit but are places that are worth caring about for a 
citizen’s daily life. Thus, a product marketing approach has its limit in application to 
cities.  
 
Furthermore, Murray (2001) argues that the difficulties that product marketing 
techniques pose to place marketing override the merits they provide. He argues that 
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‘[t]he central dilemma is that places are multiform, cultural entities and the limited 
product based mindset to marketing them cannot be successfully sustained over 
time. The communicators seem unable to grasp and convey complexity in the iconic 
sense.’ In this respect, city marketing or branding should be arranged along with 
sustainability for the citizen. In other words, if we accept that a city as a cultural and 
complex entity differs from a product, we should take a different approach, which is 
more sustainable, in comparison with product marketing. A company can manipulate 
its product image and sometimes also hide the gritty points of its product to gain a 
temporary rise in a market share. However, a city should not be recommended to 
behave like this as its marketing failure might prove a big burden for people. An 
approach that considers a citizen’s life space as only a tool for money making seems 
to be irresponsible for residents in a city. Thus, to have a more comprehensive 
perception of a city for its inhabitants, we need to consider a city as a cultural and 
sustainable entity, as opposed to a marketing science view of cities as products or 
machines.  
 
On the other hand, there is another definition of place marketing. It is an opinion 
indicating that place marketing is not only an entrepreneurial activity through such 
marketing strategies and techniques but also a cultural approach to improve a city’s 
image in selling places of public organisation. For example, Philo and Kearns 
(1993:2-3) describe place marketing as ‘[t]he practice of selling places entails the 
various ways in which public and private agencies – local authorities and local 
entrepreneurs, often working collaboratively – strive to ‘sell’ the image of a particular 
geographically-defined ‘place’, usually a town or city, so as to make it attractive to 
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economic enterprises, to tourists and even to inhabitants of that place……selling 
places is often a conscious and deliberate manipulation of culture in an effort to 
enhance the appeal and interest of places, especially to the relatively well-off and 
well-educated workforces of high-technology industry, but also to ‘up-market’ tourists 
and to the organisers of conferences and other money-spinning exercises.’ 
Kavaratzis (2004:58) also argues that the practical application of city marketing is 
concerned with the activities of forming, communicating and managing a city image. 
In addition, according to him, ‘the object of city marketing is the city’s image, which in 
turn is the starting point for developing the city’s brand.’   
 
These opinions appear similar with respect to emphasising the cultural in defining 
the concept of place marketing. However, Philo and Kearn’s view is very different 
from Kavaratzis’ because the former is critical of place marketing while the latter 
considers place marketing to be essential in urban policy. Thus, the viewpoint of 
Kavaratzis which is willing to utilise marketing science techniques is much closer to 
Kotler’s one, even though Kavaratzis prefers place branding to place marketing and 
he thinks it more evolved. Philo and Kearns argue that selling the ‘post-modern’ city 
is only to contribute to the economic logic of capital by consciously manipulating and 
creating cultural or historical packages (ibid). Moreover, they add that practices of 
place marketing have been employed in order to reaffirm ideological commitments 
that society’s dominant groups want to be hegemonic by conflating cultural 
components like history and memory to meet customer’s desire and needs (ibid:26). 
It is a very political interpretation of place marketing. Basically, I agree with this 
position since urban place marketing practices have been very often used for the 
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spatial strategy of authority or city elite in demanding a shift to a market-oriented 
world. Indeed, contemporary policies of place marketing have been deployed 
towards broader neo-liberal transformation of cities. This view underpins the critical 
topic of the thesis and will be used to examine multiple examples of place marketing 
in Gwangju in South Korea (see chapter 7, 8 and 9).  
 
Furthermore, one of the most serious problems about the definition of place 
marketing from the perspective of a marketing-centred approach is its view of 
considering place marketing or branding as only a pragmatic tool. For instance, 
Kavaratzis (2007:709) states that “[c]ity marketing and branding do not have an 
inherent ideology,” and Anholt (2006:2) also argues that “branding, like any other tool, 
is itself ethically neutral.” These originated from an idea that a city or its local spaces 
should be developed and managed well by the way of corporate-style marketing 
rather than that of the democratic and collective. Recently, for many marketing and 
tourism professionals, city leaders and, marketing practitioners, it is possible to say 
that the idea has developed into a theoretical belief (as a fundamental faith of 
market-orientation) like a religion far from the city’s reality. Taking the view of 
marketing science, it can be argued that a place is constructed by programmed 
principles and organised techniques regardless of ideology. Thus, such a marketing 
science perception of place marketing is seemingly value-free and non-political.  
 
Its practices, however, are typically represented by very political processes because 
of its intrinsic selectivity. For example, even Kavaratzis (ibid:707) who has strongly 
denied the ideological character of place marketing strategy express his favouritism 
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to firms and investments - which contradicts his previous argument, saying that “[t]he 
main task of urban governance….. is the creation of urban conditions sufficiently 
attractive to lure prospective firms, to attract investment and to safeguard and 
enhance the city’s development prospects.” Indeed, many city authorities have often 
set their aims of place marketing as a ‘good climate for businesses and investors’ 
and a ‘good place for tourism and shopping’ in order to entice prosperous companies, 
well-off visitors, and upscale people as potential residents. It has resulted in political 
activities and consequences to include values and meanings preferred by such 
customers, at the same time, to exclude those which they were unpleasant. Likewise, 
the behaviour of city authorities to set up a certain city brand image or identity as a 
city’s objective is, itself, political. In the process, people who are incongruous with 
such an image, value, and meaning or, according to Philo and Kearns (1993), the 
‘city’s other peoples’ (such as homeless people, beggars, poor workers and 
minorities, and vendors) frequently tend to be marginalised or segregated.  
 
In a broader sense, the political nature of place marketing might have a thread of 
connection with some commentator’s argument that the process of constructing a 
place or a space is political and social (Cresswell, 1996; Lefebvre, 1974; Pred, 1984). 
For instance, according to Pred (ibid:279), place is not only fleetingly observed 
landscape, locale or setting for social interaction but also historically contingent 
process interwoven by time-space specific activities and power relations. We will see 
this clearly in chapter seven, when we examine the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement.  
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Similarly, Cresswell (ibid) believes that the meaning or image of place is not naturally 
given but formed by the political decision-making process, which means actors with 
more power judge what is appropriate or not for the place. Thus, he interprets the 
place that the game of in place/out of place is deployed is always a political realm 
where ‘geography and ideology intersect (ibid:5)’. In this context, place marketing 
might be considered as a strategic process of certain groups that deliberately shape 
or manufacture meanings and images of a city or parts of it – typically in a direction 
for political and economic city elites, which force other peoples to follow or conform. 
As a result, such strategy tends to bring about complaints and the resistance of other 
peoples. In this regard, therefore, the formation and change of place marketing 
policy might be a variety of political processes in which meanings, images and 
discourses of place are contested, conflicted and compromised between the 
dominant and the others. I will examine whether such conflicts have taken place in 
South Korea.  
 
 
2.3 History of place marketing: new phenomenon? 
 
In this section, the historical roots of contemporary place marketing or branding will 
be explored mainly with relation to the US and UK. Here, I attempt to reveal how 
they are very similar in terms of their promotional nature between the roots and 
contemporary practice of place marketing or branding. Then, the history of UK place 
marketing as a Western country and the less-advanced one of South Korea will be 
briefly examined, and finally, the history of place marketing and branding from the 
political perspective will more briefly be considered. 
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The idea of selling or promoting places such as cities is not completely novel. In fact, 
the phenomenon of selling places has a long history. For example, what Leif Ericson 
named ‘Green’ land to attract new settlers, despite its bad climate is suggested by 
Ashworth and Voogd (1994:34 Citied in Kavaratzis 2007:696) as an origin of place 
marketing. Additionally, Harvey (1989) traces the original case of selling of places 
back to the civic boosterism of the Hanseatic League and the Italian City States in 
Medieval Europe. Murray (2001) even considers the original Olympic Games as the 
beginning of promoting places. In relation to the history of place marketing, Ward 
(1998) argues that these cases lack the legitimacy as an origin of place marketing 
since they are quite different from the current place marketing in terms of methods 
and techniques. However, he shows that place marketing started from the promotion 
of waterfront resort developments in the era of Queen Victoria in the UK and he 
dates the earliest place marketing in North America through selling large real estate 
developments, suburban estates and some early industrial cities back to the 
nineteenth century. As a result, we might acknowledge the fact that recent activities 
for place marketing in terms of selling places are nothing new. 
 
Since the late nineteenth century, many cases of selling places could be discovered 
in the US. This was because of an imperative promotional need to settle so much 
frontier land in the West and to draw investments and settlers into US cities. It was 
selling the frontier farmlands and towns and also became a tradition of civic 
boosterism in the US. However, in Britain there was no such tradition. Concerning 
this, Ward (1998) concludes that such background was not required in the UK 
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because there was a longer history of settled land and much earlier developed 
industry and infrastructure in the UK. 
 
In this context, Ward (1998) argues that place marketing in the post-industrial society 
was invented in the US. According to him, though more examined in later chapter 
(chapter 3), urban decline in Western cities due to global economic restructuring also 
started in the US. Namely, the tradition of place boosterism, which almost 
disappeared, was revived, in order to counteract urban decline that was caused by 
the economic recession and global changes. Then, British cities followed the 
entrepreneurial strategies of cities like Baltimore and Pittsburgh facing similar crisis. 
As a result, some cases of cities in the UK such as Glasgow were as successful in 
place marketing terms as US cities’ (ibid). Thus, it is evident that the phenomenon of 
selling places or promoting places for economic purposes in cities has a long history. 
There were similar activities in the past and they are increasing in many countries 
today. Moreover, there are many types and strategies of city marketing because city 
marketing activities, fitted with their surroundings and scales, are needed in urban 
policy every day.  
 
 
2.3.1 Place selling, place marketing and civic boosterism 
 
As observed in the former section, place selling and promotional activities can be 
identified easily from the past. What is the difference between this previous place 
selling and recent city marketing? Much marketing-science literature has paid 
attention to this question. Rainisto (2003) argues that place selling is more 
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operational, distinguishing it from place marketing. Kavaratzis (2007) distinguishes 
various past promotional activities from city marketing and names them ‘fragmented 
promotional activities’. Therefore, place marketing might be set apart from the mere 
place selling and promotional activities in that it is a little more comprehensive and 
systematic. In addition, while early promotional activities are persuasive actions 
based on the seller’s view, place marketing is a consumer-oriented approach, 
emphasising clients’ demand and need. Fretter (1993:163) argues “[place marketing] 
aims to ensure that urban activities and facilities are related as closely as possible to 
the demands and desires of targeted customers and clients. It involves the 
establishment of a new relationship between the local authority… and its customers. 
It calls for a demand-oriented approach rather than the supply-led approach of 
traditional urban planning.” Thus, place marketing might not be a mere fragmented 
blend of advertising and publicity designed for selling places. It may be recognised 
an organised and systematic effort to meet the needs and demand of clients. Why is 
place marketing more organised and systematic than selling and promotion of 
places? This might be understood by considering the process of place marketing 
based on the marketing science approach. Briefly speaking, such place marketing is 
the process that works out a STP (Segmentation-Targeting-Positioning) marketing 
strategy through scientific marketing research, and the selling of a place product by 
the 4P marketing mix (Product, Price, Place, Promotion). Thus, from the perspective 
of marketing science, place marketing is likely to be a strategic and organised 
activity whilst place promotional activity is a temporal and fragmented selling activity.  
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However, in spite of making a strict distinction from the marketing science authors, I 
think that place selling and marketing have many common traits in terms of their 
promotional nature. Firstly, both of them are activities which originated from 
corporate-style marketing and they are operational instruments to attract investment 
and consumption. It is a very important point that the thesis focus on the relationship 
between two. But, there is just a slight difference in their approach: whether we 
concentrate on persuasion or the demands of the customer. Secondly, their aims are 
similar. In the end, they are only managerial activities for economic interest. For 
example, in terms of attracting firms and tourism, they are instrumental tools to 
increase inward investments and tourism income, which both lead to more local 
economic gain. In the case of limiting their promotional qualities, therefore, we might 
conclude they are very much alike.  
 
Meanwhile, civic boosterism, as shown in the previous section, stemmed from the 
US classical boosterism such as for the West frontier. Regarding this, Short (1993) 
argues that it means conventional promotional activities for the positive image and 
the name of a city in order to boost external consumption (Short, Benton, Luce and 
Walton, 1993). According to Short et. al. (ibid), it has played a key part not only in 
urban development but also in urban hierarchy and politics. Firstly, the much wider 
territory of the US in comparison with European countries has resulted in more 
opportunities for cities to move up or down the urban hierarchy. As a result, cities 
intensified advertising and publicity to win the inter-urban competition. Secondly, 
leading actors in cities such as estate agents, local banks, politicians and business 
leaders formed an economic growth coalition in terms of politics and promoted 
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business-friendly policies in order to stimulate investment and economic growth (ibid). 
Thus, civic boosterism is a publicity of places, usually used in US cities. In addition, it 
is a little different from place marketing because its approach tends to raise the 
product value (especially estate) of certain place and to emphasise only the merits of 
the city. 
 
2.3.2 Place marketing and place branding 
 
Since the 2000s, place branding (or city branding) has been paid more attention by 
both practitioners and the academic circle in the field of place marketing (Bitterman, 
2008; Braun, 2008; Julier, 2005), specifically in connection with tourism marketing. 
The reason might be that the differences among cities have increasingly 
disappeared. Many cities have become similar in terms of cityscapes. Here, place 
marketing activities have maybe contributed to this phenomenon. For example, 
whichever city you go to, you might have the same type of accommodation facilities, 
food services and something to see for the tourist. For business leaders and 
investors, cities commonly provide a number of incentives for investment. 
Accordingly, they now inevitably seek to create something distinctive and valuable 
which other cities have difficulties in following (Morgan, Pritchard and Piggot, 2003). 
From this respect, a city brand might be a unique and inimitable asset for a city, 
while certain architecture or a specific district tends to be easily reproduced. Thus, it 
might be judged from the marketing science perspective that a city brand is widely 
sought after because it is a powerful marketing tool enabling city marketers to 
differentiate their city from others. However, Bitterman (2008:244) argues, “place 
brands have become merely a delivery mechanism for artificial, and contrived 
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identities that may over time do more harm than good.” According to him, indeed, 
many place brands in contemporary cities in the US have resembled corporate brand 
counterparts and their transitory differences have thinned by beginning to overlap 
many other citys’ branding activities (ibid:250).  
 
What are place branding activities for a city comprised of? Place branding for a city 
starts from drawing the essential values of a city and establishing brand identity. 
Then, to take a distinctive and competitive brand position, city marketers frequently 
employ three instruments: brand architecture, hard-branding and brand marketing 
communication: firstly, to make brands (representative brand, tourism brand, 
investment brand and local product brand, etc) by using logos and slogans, then, to 
build inter-related hierarchical brand architecture ; secondly, to implement a hard-
branding strategy which reflects brand identity into diverse tangible and physical 
landscapes through symbolic architecture, art flagships, and public design activities 
in order to raise the city brand value ; thirdly, to enhance relationships with 
customers by doing promotions and holding festivals, events and exhibitions. Thus, 
we might conclude the tools of place branding and marketing for cities are very 
similar.  
 
However, some authors who are in the marketing science field strictly seek to 
separate city branding from city marketing since they consider the former more 
effective or evolved than the latter (Kavaratzis, 2007; Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 
2005; Morgan, et, al., 2003). From this perspective, city branding is a more holistic 
approach to managing a city and its image as a whole through a logo and slogan, 
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while city marketing is a strategy that seeks to change the image of a city utilising a 
marketing mix technique to develop specific places or some parts of the area. Hence, 
proponents of city branding explain that city marketing tends to deliver multiple 
messages to the audience, yet city branding usually emphasises one message 
under a brand leadership system. Thus, city branding requires a consistency of 
message more firmly. In addition, proponents of city branding argue that it enables 
us to measure the intangible effect of marketing by employing a brand equity index 
whilst the social effect of city marketing is often not measurable.  
 
Despite these arguments from proponents to city branding, most of the essential 
factors of city marketing are used for city branding and both strategies have many 
common characteristics. By the same token, some authors consider ‘branding’ as a 
main subdivision of the marketing tool set such as segmentation, targeting, product 
development, marketing communication and marketing (Braun, 2008; Kotler and 
Gertner, 2002).  
 
What essential factors of city marketing are used in city branding? In association with 
this, at first, Fretter (1993:165-173) suggests seven essential elements of city 
marketing: firstly, to set up a vision or mission in order to clearly describe the goals 
and achievements which city authorities want to attain in the future ; secondly, to 
know yourself (which means to clearly understand that what the advantages and 
disadvantages of your city are and what the city provides for your audience) ; thirdly, 
to define who your customers are in order to formulate a successful marketing 
strategy ; fourthly, to fit and develop your product to customer demands and needs ; 
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fifthly, to comprehend your rival cities to win the competition ; sixthly, to look for a 
unique selling point ; seventhly, to control and manage opinions for one consistent 
message.  
 
Here, the crucial items arise in connection with the common features of city 
marketing and city branding. Among Fretter’s elements, at first, vision is necessary 
for all strategies and it is not exclusive to only city marketing and branding. In 
addition, the fourth and the sixth are similar in that both are linked to handling 
products and images in a skilful way. Thus, from Fretter’s elements, five similarities 
can be suggested, as follows.  
 
Firstly, city marketing and city branding are common in their origin; both borrowed 
the main methods and techniques from corporate marketing theory. However, cities 
are different from companies. Consequently, there are several critical problems 
when using marketing theory from a basis of corporate marketing to apply to the city. 
For example, a place is not a singular commercial product or a corporate 
organisation, but a collection of identities and human activities (Bianchini and 
Ghilardi, 2007; Julier, 2005; Murray, 2001). Accordingly, it is very difficult to unify the 
diverse identities of a place. A city is also an even more complicated entity than a 
corporate organisation. Thus, drawing and defining only one identity from varied 
qualities for a city is painful and, sometimes impossible (Murray, 2001; Stigel and 
Frimann, 2006).  
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Secondly, they are common in the view of the customer. They tend to regard the 
human being not so much as a citizen rather as a consumer to buy and use up 
products. In fact, however, a number of city inhabitants seek to engage and 
participate in the process of urban policy with a sense of responsibility since they 
have a key stance in the future of the city.  
 
Thirdly, they are similar in a context of competition strategy. Both are strategies 
which attempt not to have a cost advantage but to differentiate themselves from 
competitors. According to Boisen’s study (2007), however, city practitioners tend not 
to consider their competitors as much as they concentrate on their own advantages. 
Thus, the recognition of inter-urban competition in the context of competing private 
companies might be only a theoretical assumption.  
 
Fourthly, both tend to deliberately contrive a way of exploiting authenticity about the 
urban place. In other words, marketed values and images through place marketing 
and branding do not necessarily reflect the city residents’ real cultures and lives. 
They might not be suitable for their customers’ requirements, sometimes impressing 
by authenticity in terms of a long-term perspective, exaggeratedly speaking, because 
they are often connected to fake or manipulated real values.  
 
Fifthly, they are managerial activities. City authorities often want to control a city as a 
business manager operates their organisation. However, such an approach which 
makes citizens follow the basic values and images forged by brand experts could be 
problematic. The reason is that such values and images come not from a basis of 
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complete consensus. In addition, the concept that urban authorities seek to manage 
citizen as firms handle their employees is not congruent with the principle of 
democracy. I will therefore not so much divide city marketing and city branding as 
emphasise their common features in the thesis because they are very similar in 
terms of their intrinsic qualities. However, it will be interesting to explore empirically 
how these terms are used by Korean practitioners and policy makers. 
 
 
2.3.3 Place marketing experiences from the UK 
 
This section shows the historical experience of place marketing in the UK. The place 
marketing experiences of some cities such as London Docklands, Birmingham and 
South Wales since the 1970s are described because this was the period when the 
prevailing adoption and prosperous use of place marketing began in earnest. 
 
While, in the US, local governments fostered the place promotion of private capital, 
and they only played a minimal role, in the UK, place marketing projects were 
launched normally by the support of public agencies (Millington, 2002:12). However, 
it is noticeable that since the mid-1970s British place marketing rapidly grew in cities 
(Fretter, 1993). Many British cities underwent unprecedented difficulty carried by the 
overlapping of a severe recession, deindustrialisation and a government financial 
crisis, especially in the traditional manufacturing and mining areas that had played a 
major part in the urban economy. For instance, Leicester’s foot-wear industry, 
Birmingham’s vehicle industry and South Wales’ mining and steel industries were all 
devastated from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. 
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However, according to Millington (2002), even in this severe crisis, the first response 
of local authorities was the provision of sites for the development of industrial estates, 
which was a limited and unrefined trial for local economic development. The reason 
for this initial response of localities being unsophisticated was a lack of experience. 
In contrast, when Mrs Thatcher came to power in 1979, she launched the 1980 Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act to create the UDCs (Urban Development 
Corporations) and drove many projects like the London Dockland project without the 
active participation of local authorities. However, lots of urban authorities came into 
the competition of place marketing for tourists and inward investors in earnest. In 
association with these attempts, Loftman and Nevin (1995) points out that many city 
politicians and policy makers have visited US cities such as Baltimore, Boston and 
Pittsburgh to learn how to revitalise urban centres by employing place marketing 
projects during the 1980s. They argue that many political leaders and public officials 
were favourably impressed by such experience and it led to the rolling out of flagship 
schemes in British cities. In addition, according to Fretter (1993), cities were forced 
by the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act to make programmes for local 
economic development activity and central government consulted them. The effect of 
such consulting was a market-led approach and a more direct response to 
consumers’ demand. This increased the momentum of city marketing to grow in 
scale and be more sophisticated in marketing techniques.  
 
In recent years, Millington (2002) concludes through a nation-wide survey and 
interview that most local governments use city marketing methods as a local 
economic strategy. However, he claims that city marketing as a strategic 
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management approach is still not established at a small-sized city level, while larger 
cities’ marketing is already relatively fixed.  
 
However, there has been criticism of city marketing policies based on this marketing 
and entrepreneurial management. Even though some authors from a marketing 
science perspective argue that city marketing practice has been elaborated in terms 
of method and technique, others feel concern about it. Murray (2001), in his study 
analysing a sample of 77 marketing brochures criticises that many cities in the UK 
tend to represent places as culturally uniform and to promote a similar marketing mix 
(facilities, events and tourism attractions). Moreover, he argues that practice needs 
to reflect more authentic messages from the perspective of urban regeneration for 
residents, criticising that even some cities’ marketing creates fictitious images that 
lack a sense of reality. 
 
In summarising these arguments, the use of place marketing strategies has 
constantly increased since the late 1970s. In the process of developing place 
marketing, a number of British cities have been affected by the experience of US 
cities. Recently, some concerns might be suggested about the tendency of urban 
practitioners mainly using marketing science approaches towards entrepreneurial 
governance.  
 
 
2.3.4 Place marketing experiences of South Korea 
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The history of place marketing in South Korea is much shorter than that of western 
cities’. American and British cities began place marketing to revitalise their urban 
economy after experiencing the phenomenon of deindustrialisation over three 
decades ago. Yet, the phenomenon was started much more recently in South Korea, 
with the same late initiation. The process of deindustrialisation was faced just after 
the industrialisation was over. Thus, it is dominant in Korean academic circles that 
the starting point of place marketing in South Korea is not a localities’ attempt for 
getting over the crisis of industrialisation but the introduction of a local self-
government system in 1995 (Kim 2006, Shin 1998, Lee 2006). Therefore, the 
experience of place marketing is not as abundant as in the UK.  
 
Since the mid 1990s, there was huge change in the way of regional and urban 
development. Though the range of devolved powers was limited, central government 
devolved authorities of budget, personnel and land development in virtue of 
introducing of a local self-government. As a result, mid and small-sized projects 
without central government’s support were diffused in many cities, while most urban 
and regional developments were launched and implemented, in the same way as 
large centre-oriented project, under the control of central officials in the past. Cities 
have competed with each other in an attempt to induce firms, investments and 
visitors, simultaneously building up their local identities. The most utilised means in 
such competition were local cultural festivals. The number of local cultural festivals 
increased extraordinarily from 105 in 1980 to 1,176 in 2006 (MCST, 2006). 
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Numerous city slogans and brands have been made in most cities in recent years. 
For example, 16 metropolitan regional governments already have 8,987 brands 
which took out a patent (Lee, 2008). Most of them are comprised of city brands, 
images and slogans, tourism brands and local product brands. As ‘Weekly Korea’ 
puts it, (as a crucial tool for city branding) “design is described as an omnipotent key 
to achieving urban competitiveness and economic value. Design is required by the 
structural expectations in order to overcome urban growth stagnation since the 
establishment of the local self-governing system.” However, regarding this flooding 
of public brands, Park (2009) positively points out that ‘the era of the city brand’ is 
opening up by arguing that city brands can play a major role in promoting the local 
economy and improving residents’ satisfaction of their localities. In this respect, if this 
trend of city marketing keeps growing, place marketing and branding could be one of 
the largest industries in South Korea in the near future.  
 
However, in terms of the level of place marketing in South Korea, Kim (2002) argues 
that it lacks the comprehensive recognition of place promotion. He indicates that it 
uses a partial and fragmented promotion such as cultural tourism, ecological tourism 
and local regeneration without organised connections. In addition, he argues that 
many Korean cities are copying other cities’ successful cases and points out that 
many Korean cities focus on excessively physical development. For example, 
according to Hwang and You (2006), many local authorities made their CI (corporate 
Identity: which originated from private corporate organisation and is a symbol, made 
for establishing of the companies’ image, reflecting their mission and vision), yet 
these were very similar due to using the same images like sun, mountain and water. 
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In addition, their slogans were centred on the same themes. Most cities in Gyeonggi 
regional province advertised themselves as a site of ‘cultural tourism’ and as a ‘high-
tech city’ through their similar slogans. Regarding this phenomenon, Hwang and You 
(2006) interpret that it is because many localities follow best practice without 
reflecting their own unique vision and meanings. Lee (2007) argues that it is still 
rudimentary. According to him, while the place marketing strategies of western cities 
have developed from simply fragmented advertisings and festivals to city branding 
and attracting investments and companies for substantial urban growth, most Korean 
cities have still focused on short-term fragmented promotional activities. Thus, it can 
be judged that the quality of place marketing strategy still remains low and a little 
crude. 
 
In addition, Korean city marketing has not always been regarded as a tool in order to 
revitalise de-industrialised urban space whilst, in the West, place marketing has 
often been employed as a strategy for regenerating urban decaying areas. Instead, 
place marketing activities in Korea have rapidly increased to boost tourism through 
festivals and events launching self-government, particularly in the mid and late 
1990s. Then, urban regeneration for declining city centres (which considers social, 
cultural and environmental components except physical redevelopment) has usually 
been brought into play in urban policy since the new millenium. Even though many 
cities exploit city marketing policies, they often do not connect with the regeneration 
for derelict urban areas. Thus, in the 1990s, a number of urban redevelopments in 
Korean cities might have had few links with place marketing activities. Hence, in the 
survey study in Chapter 6, some experts argued that urban regeneration and city 
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marketing would be separately discussed because they were different from each 
other in South Korea. 
 
 
2.3.5 The history of place marketing from a political perspective 
 
As described in the previous section, marketing science authors distinguish place 
marketing from place selling since they think the former is more customer-oriented 
and systematic than the latter. However, if we discuss it only from a promotional 
aspect, they might not be significantly different. Furthermore, I argue that both place 
marketing and place branding are similar in their promotional nature, especially their 
market-centred and managerial qualities: firstly, they are all originated from a 
corporate-style method, and adhere to corporate principles like competition, growth, 
and managerial efficiency; secondly, their goals are similar such as maximisation of 
attracting investments and tourists, thus, they are outward firms and visitor-oriented 
rather than inward resident-oriented; thirdly, they tend to treat people as economic 
consumers rather than political and social citizens; fourthly, they often deliberately 
manufacture place identity. In relation to these promotional characteristics, Bitterman 
also acutely criticise their distinction, saying: 
 
“Unfortunately, few of these [in the field of place branding] scholars are 
examining place branding through a critical lens. When place branding is 
examined more closely and objectively, it is readily apparent that in too many 
cases it is simply a sleek whitewash on an amalgamation of some very old 
ideas about selling and commodifying product (2008:246).” 
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However, if we approach this issue from the basis of a political view, the 
interpretation might be partly different. I think that place selling and place marketing 
can be divided by a political perspective. Since the 1970s, due to the global 
economic crisis, neo-liberalism can be seen as globally dominant and promotional 
activities such as place selling were strongly influenced by it. Such promotional 
strategies have transformed into more market-fundamental ones along with neo-
liberalism and their role also changed to the aggressive driving force for certain 
political groups. In other words, place marketing strategy has played a major role in 
diffusing and implementing neo-liberal doctrine as its politically faithful friend whilst 
the precedents of place marketing relatively were not imbued with politics. In this 
respect, as Hall (2006:85) notes, “it would be true to say that prior to the 1970s cities 
were largely ‘sold’. It is now truer to say that they are ‘marketed’.” From the political 
viewpoint, therefore, the evolution of place marketing can be recognized in the 
relational context of a neo-liberal political shift. The detailed relationship between 
neo-liberalism and place marketing policy shall be scrutinised in the next chapter.  
 
 
2.4 The politics of reimaging a city 
 
Contemporary cities are the places which the culture and modes of life in human 
society have been integrated. People are prone to construct political relations around 
significant city spaces since changes of urban landscape are shaped by residents 
(Till, 2004). Of course, urban place is a physical area, yet it is multi-dimensionally 
linked with citizen’s daily life and social relations (Short, 1996). Moreover, a place 
can serve the feeling of a sense of belonging and solidarity, and form collective 
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memory and shared identity. Sometimes, shared emotion and a similar cognitive 
world view from a certain place played a major role in developing a social movement 
and political coalition around the place. For instance, as described in chapter seven, 
the historic event of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement produced a unique 
historical memory and spatial identity for the Gwangju population which only existed 
in the city. In this respect, urban landscapes and city places are sites where different 
meanings are contesting and conflicting. Thus, they are political places. Additionally, 
urban landscape is a dynamic entity which is very difficult to define at a fixed time. 
As Mitchell (1996:30) puts it, “[s]ocial struggle makes the landscape, and the 
landscape is always in a state of becoming: it is never entirely stable…. Landscape 
is thus best understood as a kind of produced, lived, and represented space 
constructed out of struggles, compromises, and temporarily settled relations of 
competing and co-operating social actors: it is both a thing….. and a social process, 
at once solidly material and ever changing.” Thus, we need to approach it with a 
political context in order to track its changing process since this approach enables us 
to trace a trajectory of political relations around a certain place constructed in a 
variety of ways on a multiple scale.  
 
How are place images formed? Drawing on Boulding’s (1959) theory of national 
place image, the image of a place might be an impression and perception that 
creates mental pictures in our brain about that place which are highly structured 
through a process of imbuing our subjective knowledge and meanings. Then, the 
image changes and grows mixed with subsequent received messages and inputs. 
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However, images of a city might be formed through a varied channels and ways. 
Regarding this, Tim Hall (2006:78-9) suggests several examples as follows:  
 
- News reports of events in a place like riots in British inner cities during 1980s 
and in Los Angeles in 1992 
- Satirical words, jokes and artistic works about places 
- Direct personal experiences as a visitor or tourist and other indirect 
experiences 
- Rumour and reputation as unverified account or explanation about places, 
which forms an important component of our impression of places 
 
In addition to this, we can include diverse promotional campaigns and place 
marketing activities led by urban authorities and organisations. In other words, city 
images can be not only naturally formed but also deliberately manipulated. Though 
there are many different images of a place, place marketers and city authorities 
regressively simplify them (Hall, 2006; Murray, 2001). Additionally, they tend to 
develop promotional strategies on a basis of unrealistically manipulated images 
about the place. As Hall (ibid:78) notes, therefore, “place images typically 
exaggerate certain features, be they physical, social, cultural, economic, political or 
some combination of these, while reducing or even excluding others.”  
 
When a city landscape and its residents have something unique, they can be 
distinctive from others. People of a certain city or locality tend to have different social 
practices and emotional feelings like friendliness or hostility, differentiated from other 
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people. We can say that identities of the local people are situated in the context of 
their own ‘social relation’ within the places they live. Some people seek to construct 
a certain identity of their city with their own meaning, thought and perception. As 
described in the Gwangju case within a later chapter (Chapter 7), those attempts 
often appear through local economic interest or political aim of elites. Thus, we need 
an approach through a political context to catch an intrinsic base since local image or 
identity tends to be decorated by economic rhetoric and cultural instruments with a 
certain ideological orientation (Mitchell, 2004). In particular, economic relations that 
are reflected in a symbolic landscape or place to form a certain image or identity are 
often hidden from the dominant ‘ways of seeing’ the landscape or place (Mitchell, 
1996:353). For example, Short (Short et. al., 1993; Short, 1996) describes the 
process in the case of place marketing in Syracuse in the US that civic leaders 
transformed the city image from industrial to post-industrial through the rhetoric of 
economic renaissance and revival and various cultural built environments (such as a 
convention centre, Carousel shopping and entertainment centre, and galleries). The 
city was depicted as a ‘places of profit and sources of benefit to capital’, at the same 
time, marginalising its alternative images like those ‘cities as places where all people 
can lead dignified and creative lives’ (Short et. al, 1993:222).  
 
In historical aspects, the city’s images or meanings of place have been shaped by 
many sorts of social, economic, and political activities over time. City images are 
formed not only in the arena of urban politics but also in relation to various spatial 
scales around the city. Within the multi-dimensional spaces, a variety of political 
forces seek to suggest and achieve developmental visions, identities and meanings 
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with a certain political purpose and ideology (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999). Then, 
those visions, identities and meanings have been shaped in the complicated process 
of contestation, conflict, and compromise with each other through time within the 
context of social relations. In relation to this, Till (2004:358) argues that “geographers 
should treat political landscapes as everyday practice, an approach that would pay 
attention to the particular contexts in which social relations are contextually situated 
and multiple positions of identity are performed, enacted, challenged, and 
negotiated.” In this sense, I would like to consider the formation of social meaning 
about a place and its changes within the contesting, conflicting and compromising 
process between the dominant discourse, identity, and image and alternative ones. 
As such, we need to approach the evolution of place marketing policy from its 
political context since the approach enables us to apprehend its changing structural 
nature and social and political implications.  
 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
Place marketing can be broadly grouped into two different perspectives: place-
centred and marketing science-centred views. This thesis adopted the former, 
especially from the political viewpoint in order to examine changing political context 
of Korean place marketing. From the perspective of politics, place marketing might 
be understood as both a strategy where a certain political group forces others to 
allow a deliberately contrived identity and image of a place according to its own 
interest and a political process in association with that strategy.  
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In the aspect of promotion, place marketing might be little different from its precedent 
– place selling – over the course of its history. This is similar in recent place branding 
even though some marketing scientists regard it as a more sophisticated and 
evolved version than place marketing. However, if we take a political look at its 
history, previous place selling and place marketing might be quite distinct from each 
other. Contemporary place marketing can be differentiated from place selling since it 
has politically experienced radical transformation along with the emergence of neo-
liberal ideology. 
 
Images and meanings of a place (or a city) have been formed by diverse social, 
economic, and political activities through time. They might be influenced by not only 
internal urban or local politics but also its outward power relations on various spatial 
scales. They are often suggested with a certain political purpose or ideology, and 
they tend to be shaped in the complicated process of contestation, conflict, and 
compromise with each other. Thus, when we adopt a political lens, we are able to 
scrutinise its political nature. In the next chapter, we will widely examine the 
theoretical backgrounds about Western local economic development, place 
marketing, and policy transfer in order to gain a theoretical framework for the 
understanding of evolving Korean place marketing. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Background to Place Marketing 
(From the Political Perspective) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we broadly explored two main perspectives: place-centred 
and marketing science centred. In this chapter, I narrow down my focus to the former, 
in particular the political perspective. This chapter will examine diverse theories that 
are helpful to understand the changing political context of place marketing.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to study the relations between key terms for a political 
perspective and to acquire their theoretical and insightful implications in order to 
approach thesis topics more closely. In the next section, the main features of 
Western place marketing, the concept of neo-liberalism and its material and social 
consequences will be discussed. These will also be a foundation to examine the 
implications of Gwangju marketing cases. With a closer look to neo-liberal qualities 
of western place marketing, it might enable us to recognise the intrinsic nature of 
evolving place marketing by understanding the relationship between neo-liberalism 
and place marketing. It might be a useful lens to investigate the transforming policies 
of Korean place marketing. The fourth section examines the transfer of place 
marketing policy. The main intention of this section is to explore overlapping areas of 
three issues: place marketing, policy transfer, and neo-liberalism bearing the political 
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evolution of place marketing in mind. The next section examines urban theories from 
the West around local economic development since it can be a theoretical base from 
which to investigate the local political context. Through this process, I attempt to 
search for the best methodological approach for place marketing of the Korean local 
context. Moreover, theories of the politics of local growth will be helpful to deeply 
understand the role of place marketing as a major instrument for local economic 
development. The process of forming a growth coalition in a locality is important in 
making sense of the evolving political context of place marketing since it could 
provide us with a cognitive basis for a framework for exploring the internal dynamic 
of urban development and the territorialisation of local economic interest. Then, 
finally, a brief summary of above discussions will be suggested.  
 
 
3.2 Political context of Western place marketing 
 
The marketing of places cannot be understood without reference to the economic, 
political and social context within which they are set out. This section outlines the 
nature and main features of place marketing within wider national and global scales 
of political and economic conditions in the West. In particular, it will describe three 
processes: the policy response of local states to the global economic restructuring in 
1970s; transformation to the postmodern society based on consumption and 
symbolic value; and the proliferation of urban entrepreneurialism. In order to analyse 
and explore these processes this study will draw on three interrelated concepts: 1) 
global restructuring; 2) postmodern society; 3) entrepreneurial urban governance in 
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association with neo-liberal political ideology. The thesis will then examine the 
relationship between these three concepts and place marketing. 
 
Goodwin (1993: 147-148) indicates some points for the emergence of place 
marketing in urban policy in the UK. On the one hand, it resulted from the reduction 
of tax revenue and government spending triggered by the deindustrialisation of 
Western cities since the early 1970s, including neo-liberal privatisation and the 
deregulation of new conservatism. On the other hand, it was associated with the rise 
in recognition of the importance of style and image in postmodern society. From this 
viewpoint, place marketing can be understood as a local response to global 
restructuring in the international economy. In relation to social aspects, it can also be 
understood as an urban change to the emergence of postmodern society. Moreover, 
in terms of outcome it can be said to reflect the introduction of entrepreneurial 
governance to urban policy. 
 
3.2.1 Main features of Western place marketing 
 
Place marketing as a local response to global restructuring 
 
As Harvey (1989b) points out, many difficulties such as deindustrialisation, prevailing 
unemployment, budget curtailment of central and local governments threatened the 
advanced capitalist economies following the severe recessions and oil shocks of the 
1970s. In the process of restructuring of global economy from Fordism to flexible 
accumulation system, many British cities faced various economic and social 
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problems. Fordism is characterised by the development of mass production (Harvey, 
1989b). The connection of ‘Taylorism’ emphasised a detailed labour division and 
automated assembly-line facilities which resulted in standardised mass production. 
The role of the nation-state is focused on preventing a crisis of overproduction under 
a regime of Fordism. To avoid this crisis, governments seek to ensure effective 
demand leading to mass consumption. From the perspective of Keynesian ideas, 
public expenditure such as welfare service is grown and the government’s 
intervention is expanded. However, the triple crisis of oil shocks, stagflation and the 
rapid change of the global economic environment (for instance, fast technology 
innovation, diversification of market needs, intensified international competition) 
caused overproduction and withered consumption. Thus, Fordism converted to the 
more flexible accumulation system through the crisis of overproduction.  
 
The trend of deindustrialisation brought a relative decline of the manufacturing 
industry and an expansion of the service sector in small cities. However, more 
traditional manufacturing companies in larger cities often transferred their production 
to low-labour cost countries ensuring more profit. Thus, the divide between 
successful cities and unsuccessful ones in response to restructuring pressure arose 
in the restructuring process of the global economy. Moreover, as Pacione (2001) 
points out, urban crises such as the loss of industries and jobs and a reduction of 
population emerged with deindustrialisation. As these problems were accelerated, 
cities underwent severe decline. In this context, for example, Ward (1998:187) 
describes a situation in “…. Britain, where decline began in the late 1960s, becoming 
serious after 1974. Two decades later, in 1994, there were 3.6 million fewer 
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manufacturing jobs, a decline of 45 per cent. All the big cities in Britain …. were 
affected by this decline, experiencing devastating losses in very short periods.” 
 
To overcome these crises, local authorities implemented urban development policies 
for local economic revitalisation. It was usually through place marketing that cities 
sought out new means of wealth creation and of replacing their traditional industry. 
Thus, it might be recognised as a response by and a challenge of local governments 
to counteract a drastic crisis in the globalised economic environment. From the 
spatial perspective, it could also be a kind of a re-territorialisation of localities to de-
territorialisation pressure resulting from the global economic restructuring. In other 
words, place marketing might be re-territorialisation which cities seek to commodify 
their own place assets in order to develop their areas, against the de-territorialisation 
of a capitalist spatial economy due to the globalised economy and the increased 
mobility of capital.  
 
Postmodernism in place marketing as a cultural server for the logic of capital 
 
According to Harvey (1989b), a postmodern city might be a cultural and aesthetic 
reflection into urban space in response to transforming global political economic 
conditions (from Fordism to flexible accumulation). Cities that have seen the loss of 
their manufacturing industry in the West, have sought to obtain vitality again through 
a conversion to immense consumption spaces. For example, the building and design 
of new consumption spaces has become the basis of many place marketing 
activities and urban regeneration programmes since the 1980s in the UK (Raco, 
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2003). If the basic function of cities is the provision of jobs and an attractive 
environment for their residents’ cultural needs, this has been more required in 
postmodern society. In connection with this respect, even though financial incentives 
such as tax benefit were still primary strategies to attract firms, environmental and 
cultural amenities for residents and tourists were newly recognised key factors to 
place marketing in the post-industrial city.  
 
What are the features of postmodern society and how they are linked with 
contemporary cities? As Harvey (1989b) indicates, in Western Europe, mechanical 
rationality and efficiency of modern functional planning played a major role to re-
construct urban system after the Second World War, building a number of modular 
housing estates, schools, hospitals and factories very quickly. However, the 
extremely strict history of deindustrialisation and restructuring lead to a new style of 
architecture and urban spaces such as an eclectic ‘collage’, historical excerpts and 
ornamental design along with a series of economic and political transition since the 
1970s (see ibid). New cultural flows which are fictional, ambiguous and fragmented 
have increasingly been diffused in urban spaces. This is postmodernism in the city.  
 
Postmodern society is a consumption-friendly society. Consumption in postmodern 
life puts cultural tastes and aesthetic compliment beyond simple economic needs. 
Urban landscapes have been changed rapidly for more visual, imagery and 
spectacle in contemporary cities. The reason for changing urban landscapes like this 
is because of the conversion from city spaces being used for production to 
consumption with diversified consumers’ taste and need in a capitalist economy 
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(Zukin, 1991). The main methods of stimulating consumption desire are commercial 
advertisements and visual images. The effect of advertisements that provoke 
consumer desire, starting by a commodity in a commercial, to a window display, to a 
facade of a store, to a mall or department store, and to a shopping district, is 
expanded and eventually the city spaces become a simulated space and 
accumulation of spectacles. Many contemporary city authorities have attempted to 
implement urban regeneration strategies which are focused on visual attractiveness 
in order to promote shopping and to appeal to visitors (Zukin, 2003). As a result, 
most attempts at the reimaging of industrial cities in place marketing have been 
closely connected to postmodern culture, which promotes entertainment and 
ornamentation for more consumption. These days, cities keep investing funds in 
postmodern and festive landscape as a place marketing to entice more investors and 
tourists, even if they face a difficult choice between museums or gambling casinos 
(ibid).  
 
In association with this trend, Philo and Kearns (1993) criticise that place marketing 
plays a role of an advance guard for urban elites, who are able to utilise cultural 
resources for their economic interest and control society in an era of neo-liberalism. 
They argue that postmodernism only manipulates culture to support the 
accumulation of capital by beautifying consumption and selling places. In addition, 
Harvey (1989) indicates that postmodernism is just a cultural partner of the flexible 
accumulation mode which is made by capital for creating more consumption. In this 
respect, postmodernism might be considered a cultural logic with a bias for capital. 
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Postmodern society, related to place marketing, greatly affects the formation of 
images of cities. Place marketing policies changed urban landscapes rapidly by 
revitalising shopping districts, gentrifying slum zones and constructing large-scale 
buildings. Short (1996) argues that cities based on an old manufacturing industry 
legacy in an advanced capitalist economy replaced their old images with whole new 
images such as the fun city, green city and culture city through various physical 
reconstructions like leisure districts and postmodern business parks. In addition, 
Boyer (1992) and Crawford (1992) indicate that theme park type of fictious place 
marketing has fuelled the development of manufactured post-industrial city spaces in 
order to stimulate more consumption. As a consequence, many cities in advanced 
capitalist countries have created homogeneous spaces as a series of panoramic 
spectacles by depending on promotional place marketing tools. These physical 
changes often result in the remaking of a city image. In this respect, postmodern 
urban design is used to pursue the delivery of beautiful and vivid images of cities for 
people like tourists and residents. Then, such images and landscapes might 
contribute to attracting tourists, new inward residents and investments together with 
other place marketing policies. However, city images tend to be chosen for the 
economic interests of certain city elite groups or local growth coalitions in many cities. 
Thus, it becomes a crucial matter that selected images are for whom and for what 
(Griffiths, 1998). Moreover, a new image formed by city marketing strategy can hide, 
as a carnival mask, negative facts of the city such as expelled people due to prestige 
projects (Harvey, 1989). In this respect, diverse marketing policies like events, 
advertisings and brands might be a symbolic and cultural cover of some resident’s 
opposition and struggle which resulted from those marketing programmes. As 
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Harvey (ibid) points out, we should recognise that there are serious economic and 
social problems behind the successful myth of place marketing projects. 
 
Urban entrepreneurialism as neo-liberal city governance 
 
The conversion of political ideology from a social democratic welfare state to Neo-
liberalism was one of the key factors for the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism 
(Harvey, 1989). As observed in the previous section, the West has experienced 
extremely serious recession, unemployment and stagflation since the 1970s. It was 
recognised that Keynesian economic policies, emphasising active government 
intervention, were not successful in dealing with the depression and creating a 
sustainable business cycle. Furthermore, it was felt that the economic and financial 
crisis had been partly caused by excessive public intervention in the market and 
extravagant welfare expenditure. In 1979 the newly elected Thatcher administration, 
in the UK considered the expansion of the welfare state and government failure as 
the chief source of crisis. As a result, her government introduced new policies 
curtailing public spending. In addition, the Conservatives cut down on grants for 
urban development, and local authorities acted in an entrepreneurial manner seeking 
to maximise corporate investment (Logan and Swanstrom, 1990). 
 
Basically, entrepreneurialism is an essential thing in place marketing. Place 
marketing can often be mentioned as one of the means of urban entrepreneurialism 
because it is rooted firmly in the corporate marketing of products. Regarding the 
main features of urban entrepreneurialism, Harvey (1989:8) points out that ‘[t]he new 
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urban entrepreneurialism typically rests on a public –private partnership focusing on 
investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place 
rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate 
political and economic goal’. In particular, entrepreneurial urban governments are 
inclined to take adventurous risks. Accordingly, huge projects, often used in place 
marketing strategy, such as the constructing of a hallmark cultural infrastructure and 
hosting a mega-event are heavily favoured. For example, the Bilbao Guggenheim 
museum and the 1992 Olympic Games in Spain were frequently exemplified as 
successful cases mixing a large scale project with the cultural marketing of cities 
(Garcia, 2004). Another characteristic of urban entrepreneurialism, as Harvey (1989) 
noted, is that it is market-oriented. This is usually expressed by public-private 
partnerships and the privatisation of public services in terms of their organisational 
aspect. This also involves the increase of inter-urban competition and external 
orientation promotion (Paddison, 1993). For instance, Millington (2002) argues that 
inter-city competition in the UK intensified in the 1990s introducing a few competitive 
ingredients into the distribution of regeneration funds. Thus, place marketing can be 
understood as market-centred various activities seeking to improve urban 
competitiveness in order to win inter-city competition through public-private 
partnerships and an entrepreneurial approach. 
 
However, there are several criticisms of urban entrepreneurial place marketing. 
Firstly, it is an excessively economic growth-oriented strategy. It tends to exclude 
disadvantaged groups in cities and its benefits which resulted from projects often do 
not reach the main public interest. Many place marketing projects tend to contribute 
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the benefit of a small number of urban elites such as political leaders, corporate 
chairpersons and realtors and urban authorities often disregard opposition and any 
sense of alienation felt by disadvantaged residents. In relation to this, Harvey (1989) 
argues that this entrepreneurial turn has been affected by the transition of the urban 
political emphasis from welfare to creation of wealth. For example, according to 
Loftman and Nevin (1995), large-scale investment for place marketing projects made 
the City Council appropriate some welfare-related resources (such as social and 
education services and social housing) for city centre prestige projects, and 
accumulated an operational deficit. They indicate that the project, the World Student 
Games 1991, have aggravated the financial crisis of Sheffield City Council in 
Sheffield. Secondly, place marketing and branding make inter-city competition more 
intense and superheated. In this respect, Harvey implies that urban 
entrepreneurialism may lead to zero-sum games in inter-city competition, as follows; 
 
“If … urban entrepreneurialism (in broadest sense) is embedded in a 
framework of zero-sum inter-urban competition for resources, jobs, and 
capital, then even the most resolute and avant-garde municipal socialists will 
find themselves, in the end, playing the capitalist game and performing as 
agents of discipline for the very processes they are trying to resist. … Given 
the right circumstances, however, urban entrepreneurialism and even inter-
urban competition may open the way to a non zero-sum pattern of 
development (1989:5).” 
 
In addition, entrepreneurial place marketing can deteriorate the interests of inter-city 
cooperation by virtue of its promotion of more intensified competition. Thirdly, 
entrepreneurial place marketing tends to be speculative and thus risky (Harvey, 
1989; Griffiths, 1998). As a result, once a high-risk large-scale project is launched, it 
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is likely to fail. Loftman et al., (1995) point out that prestige projects as a means of 
place marketing are often dangerous with respect to finance. They notice that a 
number of city marketing projects start at the time of a realestate boom. However, 
most large scale prestige projects can be exposed to any financial crisis because of 
their long-term nature. Loftman et al., (ibid) warn of the possibility that an 
exaggerated optimism and wrong insight formed in a boom season can lead to an 
abandoned project.  
 
 
3.2.2 Neo-liberalism and place marketing 
 
In the above section, we observed that place marketing, which has emerged since 
the 1980s (influenced by neo-liberal ideology), has represented a new type of urban 
landscape and entrepreneurial governance along with globalisation and post-
modernism. This section seeks to provide understanding on the nature of changing 
place marketing under the wider political and economic conditions like globalised 
neo-liberalisation by investigating the inter-relationship between neo-liberalism and 
place marketing. In so doing, it examines the definition of neo-liberalism and its 
implication for place marketing. Then, it considers the mutual synergetic relationship 
between neo-liberalism and place marketing strategies. Finally, I will explore uneven 
development and its impact for class settlement, and discuss David Harvey’s 
argument that such a result should be interpreted as a ‘restoration of ruling-class 
power (Harvey, 2005:203)’.  
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Understanding neo-liberalisation, neo-liberalism and the implication of its 
emergence for place marketing 
 
The literature of neo-liberalism and neo-liberalisation enables us to recognise a new 
geography of changing political and economic relationships between nation state, 
market, and local state within the wider context of globalisation and state and urban 
restructuring (Eisenschitz, 2010). As described in the previous section, from the 
perspective of urban governance, place marketing policy newly redefines the role of 
urban government in post-industrial cities from a social democratic settlement to a 
market-centred neo-liberalised one along with the contextual impacts of globalisation, 
postmodernism, and urban entrepreneurialism. Brenner, Peck and Theodore 
suggests the development process of neo-liberalisation as three regulatory 
dimensions: 1) prototypical and disarticulated neo-liberalisation in association with 
regulatory experiment in the 1970s; 2) more mobilised neo-liberalisation in diverse 
policy arenas by system of inter-jurisdictional policy transfer during the 1980s; 3) 
deepening formulation of neo-liberalisation as a global rule regime since the 1990s 
(Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010:336-8). In the thesis, the evolution of place 
marketing also is correlated to the degree of the neo-liberalisation process.  
 
As Harvey (2005) points out, however, neo-liberal shifts have not been played out in 
the same way. They were different on a national and urban scale although we can 
capture a common trend of transformation towards neo-liberalisation widely in many 
cities. In contrast with the ideology of theoretical neo-liberalism, ‘actually existing 
neo-liberalism’ has been deployed with very complicated, contradictory and 
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variegated forms (Peck, 2002; Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2005), since the 
transformation process of neo-liberalisation has been politically shaped and 
mediated within different historical, economic, political, and spatial contexts (ibid). 
The reason why existing neo-liberalisation has been different from the theoretical 
ideology of neo-liberalism is its feature of being contextually embedded (Peck, 2002). 
Locally embedded mutations of neo-liberalism, as Peck et, al. (2005) suggests, have 
the following three qualities: firstly, they are path-dependent; secondly, they usually 
entail creative destruction; thirdly, they are going forward through neo-liberal 
urbanisation. In this chapter, I seek to focus on the neo-liberalisation of Western 
countries as advanced capitalist states since it appears their own common qualities 
have been more articulated and salient than others. They were growing a 
dependence upon entrepreneurial tools, business-centred rhetoric, and business-led 
governance (Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999).  
 
As to the conceptualisation of neo-liberalism, Harvey (2005) does not regard it as a 
revival or extension of old liberalism. Rather, he argues it is a political theory 
discussed over time in order to displace the embedded liberalism of social 
democratic settlement. As we have noted, over the last three decades, many 
Western cities have been transformed from post-war settlements of the Keynesian 
welfare state to market-centred neo-liberal ones, and this conversion is profoundly 
linked to evolving political strategies like place marketing. In recent years, it appears 
this phenomenon is firmly diffused and reinforced, coupled with deepening neo-
liberalisation, as Western neo-liberal ideas and models, defended and supported by 
super-powers like the US, are incrementally gaining dominance (Hall, 2011).  
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However, as Mudge (2008:723) points out, the concept of neo-liberalism tends to be 
recognised as somewhat narrow in meaning. Politically, it has been often understood 
as Anglo-American politics. In other words, it has been typically conceptualised as 
neo-liberalism equals Anglo-American ‘right’ politics: Thatcherism in the UK and 
Reaganomics in the US (ibid). However, such dualism of right-left politics might 
interrupt precise understanding of neo-liberalism. For example, the recognition 
based on the dualism enables us not to explain the emergence of market-friendly left 
parties and policies such as Tony Blair’s The Third Way. Also in geographical 
aspects, neo-liberal politics has been often perceived as a narrow area like Anglo-
American (specifically US and UK) politics, and it might contribute to a false 
recognition that there is no neo-liberal politics elsewhere (ibid). In this respect, 
therefore, I argue we should have a broader concept of neo-liberalism. In this thesis, 
neo-liberalism is not suggested as confined into Anglo-American area. It is not only a 
dominant political regime which is widely pervasive in many countries and cities but 
also an idea for consecrating the market and competition like in market-
fundamentalism. Through this thesis, I argue that neo-liberal ideologies and projects 
are diffusing to less advanced Korean cities as well as advanced Western cities, and 
in the process, place marketing strategies have played a key role in establishing 
neo-liberal urban politics through their mutual support. 
 
Broad conceptualisation about neo-liberalism also enables us to precisely grasp the 
nature of the phenomenon that marketing science authors and researchers suggest 
that the scope of marketing concepts have broadened in relation to the definition of 
place marketing. For example, according to Kotler, Roberto and Lee (2002), 
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marketing principles, tools and strategies can be applied to the public realm and non-
profit organisations such as schools, foundations, and city governments through the 
terms of social marketing and place marketing. They also suggest the possible fields 
of social marketing include health, safety, environment, and community (ibid:4). 
However, I argue that such a broadening of marketing concepts by marketing 
scientists should be understood within the wider political and economic context of 
‘neo-liberalisation’ and ‘expansion of the market’. As Harvey points out, “[t]he 
corporatization, commodification, and privatization of hitherto public assets has been 
a signal feature of the neoliberal project. Its primary aim has been to open up new 
fields for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to the calculus 
of profitability (2005:160).” Thus, the application of city marketing to public 
organisations should be recognised within the macro political and economic 
conditions of political transformation towards neo-liberalisation. 
 
The relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing 
 
As noted in the above section, neo-liberal political ideology influenced the rise of 
place marketing. However, their relationship is not unilateral from neo-liberalism 
toward place marketing. There might be some explanations about the relationship 
between neo-liberalism and place marketing. However, I argue we should 
concentrate on their political relation in the thesis. There have been political forces 
which mutually work together in their relationship. On the one hand, place marketing 
strategies have been strongly affected by market-centred neo-liberalism since the 
early 1980s, and on the other hand, they have worked as a vehicle and catalyst of 
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neo-liberal politics in urban space. It ultimately tends to result in uneven material 
outcomes in social and spatial aspects.  
 
Drawing on Eisenschitz’s (2010) argument, I argue that the relationship between 
neo-liberalism and place marketing is synergetic. He describes that neo-liberalism is 
the politics which provides a consistency for the revival of promotional activities like 
place marketing policies. He also argues that place marketing strategies have 
strengthened neo-liberalism by various means. He indicates that place marketing 
policies have changed not only the local physical landscapes but also the political 
perception of local inhabitants. On the basis of Booth and Boyle’s study on Glasgow, 
Eisenschitz (ibid) explains that the Glasgow authorities changed people’s political 
perception on Glasgow from ‘a city of working class’ (Booth and Boyle, 1993:38) to ‘a 
postmodern culture city’ by employing the designation of ‘European City of Culture’ 
and as a result, socialists in the city were marginalised to the edge of municipal 
political realm. Furthermore, urban authorities and city elites created sentimental 
interpretations of the socialist tradition in Glasgow for city tourism and economic 
growth rather than critically understanding it in terms of the political aspect (ibid). As 
such, place marketing strategies used historical components in order to hide or 
mutate original social relations between labour and capital and related meanings and 
images. Moreover, inter-urban competitive marketing policies which come from the 
elevation of urban entrepreneurialism also have contributed to the diffusion of neo-
liberalism. It was usually deployed by inter-city competition for attracting mobile 
capital deepening the geographical expansion of neo-liberalism. For instance, David 
Harvey indicated in his lecture at KRIHS (Korea Research Institute for Human 
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Settlements) in 16th November 2005 that Charlotte city government in North Carolina, 
USA attracted corporate investments through providing a set of hosting conditions of 
a minimum environmental regulation, week labour unions and, free or cheap public 
services like electricity and water (Ji, 2012).  
 
Even if overall urban economies in some cities grow by virtue of place marketing 
policies, cities still have or have more inequality and social divide. Within a city or 
even a district, there is often a clear divide between affluent neighbourhoods and 
deprived ones. In association with this, much of the literature tends to see place 
marketing as aggravating class and racial inequalities and, as a result, they criticise 
urban development by property-led regeneration for leading to gentrification and 
displacement. Griffiths (1998) points out one of the significant problems of place 
marketing is that it invests much financial support in flagship projects ignoring the 
social and economic inequality within a city. In addition, policy makers for place 
marketing tend to have little interest in the issue of distribution of growth benefit. One 
of the main problems for place marketing projects is the neglected periphery which is 
not marketed and the city authorities only focus on a part of the urban centre and 
waterfront for marketing projects. Disadvantaged people tend to live on the periphery 
of marketed places. As a result, they can feel a sense of alienation and be deprived. 
Many regeneration programmes develop inner-city areas into a gated luxury 
residence and they often expel the poor who lived there (Davis, 1990; Harvey, 1989). 
 
According to Eisenschitz (2010), place marketing strategies have been ultimately in 
accordance with the dynamic of certain class settlements. Over the last few decades, 
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industrial cities in advanced capitalist countries have transformed into post-industrial 
ones, and in the process, place marketing strategies led the way to displace old 
working class residences with places for the middle or upper affluent classes through 
gentrification. It was not an easy process since it often entails political conflicts and 
struggles. Nonetheless, place marketing strategies have cleverly performed the work 
in that they took the working class places and situated affluent people there (like 
yuppies) by mobilising cultural instruments and through political rhetoric. As he notes, 
“[a]s resistance to neo-liberalism was so strong in the cities, the very activity of place 
marketing was part of the politics of this transition from social democracy (ibid:79-
80).” He argues, in the process, gentrification has been significantly associated with 
it, saying as follows:  
 
“In order to create successful cities, place marketing has had to spell out 
some elements of the new settlement to convince its target market. In 
particular, it has been closely associated with the gentrification of the old 
industrial cities, which has been a way in which neo-liberalism quelled 
political resistance to its project (ibid:80).” 
 
Short (1989) describes gentrification as an economic and spatial restructuring 
process based on place marketing projects in Dockland, London, and he argues that 
such a process brought about changes in social relations such as bifurcation of 
employment opportunities and class war between yuppies and yuffies. Smith (2002) 
also indicates that the process of gentrification has been a way for Western city 
authorities coupled with private capital to suppress political resistances and 
movements and to consolidate class settlement. He argues that urban regeneration 
and renaissance merely cover class politics since they often entail displacement 
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through a gentrification process. He sharply criticises their intention, saying that 
“[t]he language of regeneration sugarcoats gentrification (ibid:445).”  
 
Upon further examination of the relationship between neo-liberalism and place 
marketing, we can recognise that they have created a synergy effect by mutually 
reinforcing each other and have co-evolved over time. And as Harvey (2005; 2006) 
argues, we can also understand it might cause deepening uneven development and 
bifurcation of class rather than creation of wealth.  
 
 
Uneven development and re-emergence of class politics? 
 
As aforementioned, over three decades, the political aggression of neo-liberalism in 
advanced capitalist cities, on the one hand, has torn down urban policy system 
based on social democratic class consensus, and it led to a new entrepreneurial 
governing system which is usually dependent upon place marketing strategies 
(Harvey, 1989). On the other hand, place marketing projects based on market-
centred ideas have contributed to the consolidation of neo-liberalism by creating 
uneven development through a variety of means such as property-led urban 
regeneration, commodification of culture (or economic instrumentalisation of culture), 
rhetoric and discourse of growth, gentrification and displacement (Eisenschitz, 2010). 
Particularly, in aspects of urban space, the most salient result from the reciprocal 
relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing is gentrification (ibid). As 
Smith (2002) points out, it was sociologist, Ruth Glass who vividly described the 
political character of the gentrification process in advanced Western cities. He 
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represented the process of gentrification, stating that “[o]ne by one, many of the 
working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle class – upper 
and lower….. Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on rapidly 
until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole 
social character of the district is changed (Glass, 1964:xviii Cited in Smith, 
2002:438).” Here, what is important is the class nature of the process.  
 
According to Smith (2002), the process of gentrification has grown since the 1950s 
and 1960s, and at that time, it was sporadic. However, contemporary gentrification 
has been upgraded in terms of politics. It has been closely bound up with 
entrepreneurial governance and has been more globalised. Its political methods 
have been also skilfully evolved by running parallel with both soft and sophisticated 
tools and coercive means. In the 1980s, while the role of state was to take authority 
from local government in order to give it to the private sector, both states and local 
governments have sought to meet private demands and needs since the 1990s (ibid). 
States and city authorities also endeavoured to hide the political partiality and class 
nature of marketing projects by mobilising cultural, symbolic and rhetorical 
components. On the one hand, they legitimised displacement in the name of 
economic development through architectural values and amenities for the preference 
of a new middle class (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005). On the other hand, they forcefully 
implemented gentrification policy through coercive and revanchist measures such as 
zero tolerance programmes against homeless in New York (Atkinson and Bridge, 
2005; Smith, 1996).  
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The gentrification of contemporary cities, according to Smith (2002:443), has 
developed into a political medium for large-scale transformation of inner-city 
landscapes and class resettlement by driving a ‘comprehensive class-inflected urban 
remake’. Currently, this new landscape became a set of multiple presents for a new 
affluent urban elite class since it was a mixture of residence and other functional 
components like cafes and restaurants, leisure, shopping, recreation and cultural 
facilities (ibid). Regarding class character of gentrification, Atkinson and Bridge calls 
it a ‘new urban colonialism’ (2005:1). For them, the process of gentrification means 
that elites take and occupy the urban core from vulnerable city natives, and they 
point to its result, in the end: displacement of the poor working class. They argue that 
the new residents usually have similar qualities to an elite class in a colony, since 
these new elite class people tend to live in exclusive and gated communities and are 
served by local service people (ibid:3). 
 
Since the 1990s, this phenomenon of gentrification might be globally observed along 
with the political transformation of neo-liberalisation (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; 
Smith, 2002; Taylor, 2008), though its typology is not the same in different cities. 
Smith (2002) indicates that the phenomenon is seen in other cities outside West 
Europe and North America. According to him, it had already spread out from old 
industrial cities like Cleveland and Glasgow to less advanced ones such as Sao 
Paulo, Cape Town, and Seoul. Recently, Beijing authorities displaced over 2 million 
people in order to host the global mega sports-event: the Summer Olympic 
(Eisenschitz, 2010). Mike Davis also shows that neo-liberal uneven development 
such as gated residences and shopping malls only for the affluent have been 
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globally diffused in many cities (e.g. Dubai, Johannesburg, Budapest, Nueva 
Managua, Dreamland in Egypt, etc.). As such, it appears that the phenomenon of 
neo-liberal uneven developments is increasingly expandeing and it might globally 
exacerbate the class divide (Davis and Monk, 2007).  
 
As mentioned above, the mutually reinforcing relationship between neo-liberalism 
and place marketing might have resulted in uneven developments and unequal class 
settlement in contemporary urban society. Regarding this issue, Harvey (2005; 2006) 
interprets it as the restoration of ruling class power. How can we understand it? Who 
is the ruling class? Will it lead to a revival of old class politics or class war? In this 
thesis, I think we should need more discussion of such a possibility although it has 
some similar aspects with old class conflict. If we call it class politics, I want to 
indicate what the term of class means, and then we should be clearer. For example, 
it seems Harvey’s (2005) term of class in his book, ‘A Brief History of Neoliberalism’, 
is somewhat lacking in theoretical rigidity. In the book, he denotes class as “[the] 
disparate group of individuals embedded in the corporate, financial, trading, and 
developer worlds (ibid:36)” or “[some people or groups who] possess a certain 
accordance of interests that generally recognizes the advantages (and now some of 
the dangers) to be derived from neoliberalization (ibid).” However, I think, in the 
aspect of theoretical terminology, this use of the term class is not clear and the 
division of classes is also ambiguous.  
 
Then, will the restoration of ruling class power lead to a revival of old class politics or 
class war? Currently, it is uncertain whether the increase of unevenness and 
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inequality in cities causes class political issues like the revival of aggressive labour 
unions and organised class resistance or not. In contemporary cities, it is true that 
there is growing unevenness and inequality partly by virtue of the reciprocal impact 
of neo-liberalism and place marketing. However, I think there might be more 
empirical evidence about whether deepening inequalities from a neo-liberal shift can 
directly result in class political issues. For instance, even the US with a serious 
income polarisation between classes has not been characterised by class politics 
based on labour movements. Nonetheless, I agree with the intention of Harvey’s 
argument that such political transformation has greatly contributed to forming a new 
small number of privileged elite groups since such practices have been increased in 
many cities. Consequently, over the last three decades, neo-liberalism and the 
entrepreneurial strategy of place marketing have driven the neo-liberalisation of 
urban policy with a synergetic inter-relationship by mutually reinforcing them. Then, 
its effects of uneven development and unequal outcomes have been witnessed in 
many cities. However, it is not yet clear that it could cause a revival of class politics. 
 
 
3.3 Transfer of place marketing policies 
 
3.3.1 The definition and type of policy transfer 
 
Current many urban studies have been approached through the context of 
globalisation, and the research on policy transfer between countries and cities is 
alike. This issue is also connected with the arena of political decision making which 
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involve a number of policy actors. It appears many policy makers – both at the level 
of contemporary countries or cities – have had increasing competitive pressures to 
see more tangible outcomes. They are commended to update and keep the latest 
trends and ideas. Thus, this tendency places city policy makers in the context of ‘fast 
policy transfer’ within the policy process (Peck and Theodore, 2001:429), and it 
makes urban politics globally relational as well as locally and inwardly territorial 
(McCann, 2011). On the other hand, if we consider it in terms of local politics, policy 
transferring and learning from other countries and cities in such a competitive 
environment might be one of the essential concerns of pro-growth local politics (Cox 
and Mair, 1988; Cook and Ward, 2010), since certain types of policy models known 
to be successful tend to be a mechanism which stimulates local identity and 
patriotism based on place-specific interests. Through the thesis, therefore, the main 
focus in regard to policy transfer is on how transferring policy models influence urban 
politics (in particular, the politics of growth) within wider political and economic 
conditions such as globalisation, and I will examine in the empirical chapters 
(chapter 7, 8 and 9) how Western policies on place marketing has influenced urban 
policy development in South Korea. For instance, I will consider whether such a 
transfer have contributed to the neo-liberalisation of Gwangju’s urban marketing 
policy. 
 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:13-4), policy transfer can be seen on a 
continuum from a voluntary situation with perfect rationality to a coercive one by 
direct imposition of policy models, programmes or administrative arrangements. For 
them, the transfer of place marketing strategies can be classified in a similar way to 
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the lessons drawn from voluntary situation. They also divide the number of policy 
actors involved in the process of policy transfer into 9 groups: politicians as elected 
officials, political parties, non-elected civil officials and techno-bureaucrats, interest 
groups, policy entrepreneurs and experts, transnational or multinational corporations, 
think tanks, supra-national governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
consultants (ibid:10). As noted in their study, what is transferred by policy actors is a 
variety of things such as policy goals, policy content, policy instruments and 
programmes, institutions, ideologies and attitudes, and lessons (ibid:12). In regard to 
the initial establishment of policy transfer study, McCann (2011) positively evaluates 
the contribution of policy transfer literature in political science and administration 
disciplines (Dolowitz, 1998; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2004; James and 
Lodge, 2003; Stone, 1999). Indeed, the literature, as he acknowledges, has helped 
us to systematically observe and understand the various actors and the types of 
things transferred around the complicated process of policy transfer. Additionally, 
most of the literature has concentrated on searching for successful conditions and 
factors in the process of policy transfer and policy lesson-drawing, and in the narrow 
perspective of public organisation management its outcome might be arguably useful 
for further study.  
 
From the perspective of urban politics, however, as McCann properly indicates, the 
literature from political science has a few significant limits (2011). First, it might be 
bound in a narrow issue like the typology of policy transfer actors and organisational 
mechanisms (ibid). It has seldom paid attention to the broader issues such as the 
influence of policy transfer on general outcomes in local politics or ideological 
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transformation. It is not concerned with the social and political background either with 
reference to why policy transfer takes place in the politics of local growth. Secondly, 
it seems political science literature focuses on only ‘the behaviour of transfer’ of 
policy neglecting political and social situations in the process (ibid). However, actual 
policies in cites tend to include policy assemblage which comes from different 
learning points, and transferred policy models as best practices are often modified 
and mutated within the embedding political situation and context. (Cook and Ward, 
2010; McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012)  
 
 
3.3.2 Baltimore’s formula in place marketing 
 
In general, the Baltimore development model has often been stated as a 
representative flagship place marketing project in the West (Hall, 2006). As Harvey 
(see 1989b:89-98) described, it was place promotional policies, as an 
entrepreneurial and cultural project, that Baltimore authorities and city elites had 
created together as a series of various and spectacular cityscapes including Harbour 
Place, Science Centre, Convention Centre, Aquarium, hotels, other leisure and 
pleasure facilities in order to stimulate local growth. Here, what is interesting is the 
reason why this pro-business place marketing strategy, launched at that time, was 
very political. It was planned to pacify strong resistant movements like riots, burning 
and looting which had often taken place in inner cities within the US in the late 1960s, 
of course coupled with an aim of city economic development. Harvey describes this 
situation as follow:  
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“‘Spawned by the necessity to arrest the fear and disuse of downtown areas 
caused by the civic unrest in the late 1960s,’ said a later Department of 
Housing Urban Development report, ‘the Baltimore City Fair was 
originated….. as way to promote urban development (ibid:89).’” 
 
Then, the projects including the Baltimore City Fair were positively evaluated by 
many people at that time by drawing over 2 million visitors in 1973. Harvey, however, 
points out that they actually resulted in the city authority’s neglecting and 
disregarding urban ills such as urban poverty, homelessness, and health care and 
education problems (ibid:90). However, such a place marketing model was not 
accomplished only in Baltimore. The entrepreneurial, spectacular and cultural model 
of remaking urban spaces has rapidly been copied and emulated by other cities like 
Boston, San Francisco, and New York. In relation to this entrepreneurial 
phenomenon, Harvey expresses a concern about its actually forceful effect in the 
urban context, saying that as “inter-urban competition becomes more potent, it will 
almost certainly operate as an ‘external coercive power’ over individual cities to bring 
them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development. It may 
even force repetitive and serial reproduction of certain patterns of development…. 
(1989:10)” Moreover, its meaningful impact on cities was not just confined to a 
physical fad. The best practice for place marketing in Baltimore could help urban 
theorists like Harvey to observe a structural shift in the nature of an urban governing 
system and a policy maker’s mind-set – ‘re-orientation of urban governance (Wood, 
1998:120)’. Drawing on the case of Baltimore marketing, Harvey suggested the main 
characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism: the structure of public and private 
partnership, speculative character of projects, and its non-public outcomes (Harvey, 
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1989). Since the 1980s, these qualities of entrepreneurial urban governance have 
been consistently diffused and reinforced at a global level. However, as Jessop and 
his colleagues (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999:142) indicate, “[s]tructures and 
strategies of urban governance may be copied not so much because they 
demonstrably ‘work’ but because their advocates have won out in the battle for ideas 
in response to shared problems.” In the empirical chapters, I will examine how this 
battle for ideas has been played out in Gwangju over several different place 
marketing policies. 
 
3.3.3 British marketing policy transferred from the US 
 
As Dolowitz (1998) points out, there was quite a long history of policy transfer 
between the US and the UK. It appears there was a mutual consonance of 
ideological orientation and political strategies between Reagan-Thatcher in the 
1980s and the Clinton-Blair relationship of the 1990s. In particular, the transfer of 
policies for urban regeneration and place marketing was active (Peck and Theodore, 
2001). Loftman and Nevin depict the transferred process of prestige projects for 
place marketing from US cities to British ones, saying: “[d]uring the 1980s numerous 
British policy makers and politicians, in search of potential solutions to the nation’s 
pressing urban problems, visited and were impressed by the apparent success of US 
cities such as Baltimore and Boston which had….. seemingly, turned around their 
economic fortunes through the development of prestige projects (1995:302). Evans 
(2001:213) also indicates many British cities like Glasgow, Huddersfield, Manchester 
and Sheffield have imported place marketing strategies mainly drawing on the 
methods of US cities’ marketing through their waterfront and downtown 
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developments. He describes the transferred process from US cities by emphasising 
the role of transfer agents like BAAA (British American Arts Association) which 
simulated importing activities through a series of conferences and publications about 
cultural place marketing policies (ibid). In the process, specifically Baltimore’s 
development model greatly influenced British place marketing projects (Hall, 2006). 
For example, the outcomes of its impact were Brindleyplace in Broad Street 
Redevelopment Area in Birmingham, London’s Covent Garden and Docklands, and 
Gateshead’s Metro centre (ibid). Keating criticised such an emulative fad of 
marketing policies, stating that “Cities have rushed into the economic development 
role under the impetus of events with little knowledge or understanding. They have 
ridden the latest fashions, imitated each other in often highly inappropriate ways. The 
perceived imperative of economic competition in a homogeneous world market has 
led to a homogenization of space as all cities strive for the same things, convention 
centres and shopping malls one year, science parks and waterfronts the next 
(1991:197-8, Cited in Loftman and Nevin, 1995:308).” Since then, however, US 
place marketing experiences like BID (Business Improvement Districts) have still 
been transferred to many UK cities in recent years (Cook, 2008).  
 
However, some authors have acutely criticised the reckless transfer of marketing 
policies without sincere consideration. Loftman and Nevin (1995) were very critical of 
policy makers’ behaviour of importing models known as best practice without 
questioning whether it will be beneficial or harmful and to whom. They also indicated 
that such projects tend to have some serious problems such as a political leader’s 
excessive ambition and high financial risk (ibid:307). In regard to policy transfer, 
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Peck and Theodore (2001) notes that British cities borrowed policies related to place 
marketing in the 1980s, and workfare regime policies in the 1990s from the US. They 
indicate that the attempts of UK cities which tried to emulate or merely copy US 
models have faced apparent limits since such attempts easily absorb administrative 
and managerial inputs, but it is nearly impossible to reproduce the original 
achievements. Peck (2001) argues that professional, but bureaucratic policy transfer 
and learning systems often led by technocrats have usually contributed to global 
diffusion of neoliberal political aims. They have strengthened the tendency of market-
orientation and increasing competitiveness in local government, and it led to a global 
expansion of neo-liberal hegemony in many cities. Harvey (2005:117) also points out 
the importance of complex interaction between internal dynamic and external forces 
in the spread of neo-liberal programmes and mind-set. According to him, public 
officials educated and trained in the US played a key role in applying US type neo-
liberal policies in order to restructure national and local states in Chile. However, as 
McCann (2011) suggests, many neo-liberal urban policies have produced only local-
centred outcomes even though they have expressed the internationalisation and 
globalisation of their cities. In addition, their achievements tend to be ephemeral, 
anything but sustainable. 
 
In summary, this thesis’s main attention to policy transfer is how it influences urban 
politics, which is quite different from the perspective of political science that has paid 
attention to typologies of transfer actors and transferred content. Within the wider 
conditions of globalisation and neo-liberalisation, it seems contemporary city leaders 
and technocrats related to political decision-making have been situated in a context 
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of intensified inter-urban competition and fast policy transfer. Thus, it might lead the 
majority of policy makers to be dependent on rapid copying or emulation of policies 
rather than sincere consideration of them. In the UK, place marketing policies in 
many cities have often been quickly transferred from US cities. Due to globalisation, 
such a phenomenon can be true in many other cities beyond the UK. For instance, 
there has been several western type of place marketing projects in Gwangju such as 
the Gwangju Biennale (transferred from the Venice), the Asian Culture Complex 
(from the Pompidou Centre), and the Dome Baseball Project (from the Tokyo Dome 
and the Chase Field in the US) in case studies of the thesis. I will argue that these 
projects have been introduced and developed by a combination of local political 
leaders’ ambition, economic elites’ interests, and the wider ‘macro-necessity’ 
(Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999) such as globalisation and competition pressure 
between Korean cities. In addition, currently many cities – whether advanced 
capitalist cities or not – tend to include policy assemblage of diverse learning points 
from different cities (McCann, 2011). However, they have often contributed to the 
homogenisation of place marketing policies by rapid copying or emulating best 
practice like the Baltimore formula within the wider structural forces of globalisation 
and neo-liberalisation. Moreover, they have actively served the diffusion of market-
oriented ideas.  
 
 
3.4 Political theories on local economic development 
 
Place marketing is a strategy used as a representative tool for local economic 
development. Thus, to examine political theories on local economic development 
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might present a basic theoretical frame from which to explore the process of place 
marketing policy within the context of urban (or local) politics.  
 
3.4.1 The rise of the politics of local growth 
 
New theory tends to emerge to describe changed reality. Likely, this is true in the 
rise of the politics of local growth. Since the mid-1980s, mobility of capital has been 
increased along with world economy restructuring and globalisation, and it has led to 
more fierce inter-local competition for footloose capital. Many local authorities in 
advanced capitalist cities have paid attention to revitalising local economies by 
attracting firms and investments, and pro-growth urban policies have been popular. 
In the process, place marketing strategy as a growth-centred policy has been 
conspicuously salient. Due to this transformation of political and economic 
environments, the main focus of urban politics rapidly moved from collective 
consumption and the crisis of social reproduction of the previous Keynesian Welfare 
state to a new politics of economic growth and development (MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999; Smith, 2002).  
 
Some scholars called this new politics of growth a ‘new urban politics’ (Cox, 1993, 
Cited in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999:507) or the ‘building wave of a new urban 
theory’ (Marston, 1990 Cited in ibid). This section considers Molotch’s growth 
machine thesis, urban regime theory suggested by Stone, Elkin and Stoker, and the 
local dependence approach of Cox and Mair as the political theories of local growth 
and development. All of these have roots in the United States. In terms of the US 
context, this new urban politics greatly contrasted with old community power 
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approaches (Cox, 1995). During the 1950s and 1960s, the urban political issue 
actively discussed in the US was the problem of who governs the local community. It 
was made concret by debates of community power between pluralists (who thought 
of community power as widely dispersed among pressure groups) such as Robert 
Dahl and elite theorists (who argued power was concentrated on small number of 
power elites in the community) like Floyd Hunter. In new urban politics, however, the 
process of structuring local internal economic interests is usually significant. Some 
indicate that those new theories might partly help the attention of politics to be 
situated in a relatively broader political and economic context (Cox, 1995; Jonas and 
Wilson, 1999; Ward, 1997), even though the theory’s result of growth machines and 
urban regimes of attempting to reveal the role of politics was questionable (MacLeod 
and Goodwin, 1999). Yet, they clearly have partly contributed to urban political 
theories in that they endeavoured to extend the theoretical focus to inter-urban 
competition for mobile capital between locales rather than simply to investigate 
dominant power groups among local community organisations, despite theories on 
growth machines and regimes still concentrating on somewhat narrow political 
process around coalitions between local internal agents. This section firstly 
examines how they explain the process by which local internal economic interests 
are structured and then, considers what theoretical basis they can give us.  
 
3.4.2 Growth machine thesis 
 
Molotch’s thesis in 1976, ‘The City as a Growth Machine’ was a simple but important 
insight that a growth machine based on land interests forms a political coalition of 
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local business and the political elite and it led to local authorities concentrating on 
improving local growth (Jonas and Wilson, 1999). In spite of the simplicity of its logic, 
this argument well described the US context of urban politics then (ibid). The key 
point of the thesis was that economic interests and social relations from a basis of 
land and building property make related elites to construct a coalition for growth. 
Molotch (1976:309-10) argues that the “political and economic essence of virtually 
any given locality, in the present American context, is growth. I further argue that the 
desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for 
members of politically mobilized local elites.” For him, the most important goal of 
capitalist cities is a continual growth and the agenda of city elites to acquire the 
various conditions for growth. Local growth coalitions produce various ideological 
discourses of development in order to gain popular support for local growth policies 
(Cox and Mair, 1988; Jonas and Wilson, 1999; McCann, 2002). They achieve the 
hegemony of development discourse through a co-operation with a variety of 
auxiliary actors such as media, universities, cultural institutions, the chamber of 
commerce, and professional sports franchises (Jonas and Wilson, 1999; MacLeod 
and Goodwin, 1999). As Jonas and Wilson describe, “growth machine interventions 
– often subtle and nuanced – penetrate far corners of local life that tie growth 
stratagems to common-sense thought and taken-for-granted practices. Thus, power 
becomes wielded not through contextless articulations that foist power and a new 
way of seeing on an unsuspecting mainstream but through cultivating prevailing 
beliefs and values in an ongoing political intervention (1999:9).” But, Jonas and 
Wilson assess Molotch’s argument of forming discourse as somewhat superficial, as 
the process of constructing development discourses in reality is more complex. In 
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summary, it is possible to say that the ultimate argument of the thesis can be 
summarised as an elite coalition based on economic interests related to land 
property make local authorities implement growth-centred policies in a varied ways.  
 
In the book of ‘Urban Fortunes (Logan and Molotch, 1987)’, Molotch later upgraded 
some explanations of the thesis with Logan. For example, he depicts ‘rentier’ class in 
detail. It becomes a group of community growth leadership which includes land 
developers, utilities, banks, and other place entrepreneurs who can gain economic 
interests from the exchange of properties and the development of urban 
infrastructure (Jonas and Wilson, 1999). They are closely connected with the 
economic interests of local places, and it enables them to have shared interests for 
the continuous growth of local economy. In the end, it leads to a growth-centred 
coalition of city elites who influence local government to do pro-growth policies like 
place marketing projects by employing their power and social class. 
 
Thus, local politics by growth coalition tend to show a strong inclination towards the 
interests of property owners, developers, and firms related to land development, thus, 
it leads to possible conflicts and struggles around land development in the local 
community. In association with this, Logan and Molotch also indicate the possibility 
of conflicts between exchange value and use value of land (1987). For example, a 
conflict between a growth coalition including property rentiers and a counter growth 
coalition of residents can take place in a certain land development project.  
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3.4.3 Urban regime theory 
 
Urban regime theory also is a new theoretical attempt to explain the decision making 
process of local economic development in association with institutional linkages 
beyond the community power approach from the 1950s and 1960s in the US. It was 
suggested by several authors such as Clarence Stone, Stephen Elkin, and Gerry 
Stoker.  
 
Among them, many commentators often note Stone’s theory. According to him, the 
term of regime can be defined as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies 
and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out 
governing decisions (Stone, 1989:6 Cited in Digaetano and Klemanski, 1999:14).” 
About the features of regime, he adds that a city “regime involves not just any 
informal group that comes together to make a decision but an informal yet relatively 
stable group with access to institutional resources that enables it to have a sustained 
role in making governing decisions (ibid:4 Cited in 1999:14).” Thus, for him, “[w]hat 
makes [it]….. effective is not the formal machinery of government, but rather the City 
Hall and the downtown business elite (ibid:3 Cited in MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999:507).” In addition, regime theorists paid attention to the governing capacity or 
political influence in regard to the problem of how a project is developed rather than 
a ruling community by the way of command and control (MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999). Drawing on the conceptualisation of power by Foucauldian way, they 
attempted to focus on not who is a dominant power group but who influences 
important development policies (Ward, 1997). In their perspective, power is not 
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simply to control society but is shaped by a complicated political process through 
coalition and bargaining among diverse actors (Stone, 1993). Regime theorists 
consider, in this process, the qualities of urban regimes are formed by chance. Cities 
have their own different regimes since their political process in which a coalition’s 
governing capacity is shaped are different each other. Thus, from this perspective, 
we might regard a political actor’s internal local politics more important than the 
wider macro economic and political forces and context (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 
1999).  
 
3.4.4 Critiques on growth machines and regimes and local dependence 
approach 
 
It appears some authors give a generous evaluation of the advantages of growth 
machine and regime theories. For example, regarding Molotch’s growth machine 
thesis, Jonas and Wilson (1999:4) evaluates it by saying “many researchers continue 
to draw inspiration from the growth machine thesis,” and Digaetano and Klemanski 
1999:15) argues that “[r]egime theory has gained great currency as an explanation 
for coalition building in urban politics.”  
 
However, there are many critical comments on these theories. Here, I suggest three 
points: 1) limited application of US-centred theories to other countries; 2) voluntarism 
of their analytical schema; 3) narrow focus on internal locality.  
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Firstly, they might be relatively appropriate for the local politics of the US context as 
they were born from that country. However, they have some considerable limit to 
their application in other countries when we apply them to the local politics of those 
countries. In general, the national governing system of the US is more decentralised 
than that of Western European countries and the degree of local government’s 
authority and autonomy is relatively high. For example, Ward (1996) argues that 
there is a difficulty in theoretical transfer since US style urban regimes might not be 
generalised in the centralised urban planning system of the UK. Likewise, in terms of 
the American context-specific nature of the original formulation, Wood (2004:2103) 
concludes that the ‘value of US theories is decidedly limited’ in a British application 
of them.  
 
Secondly, both ways of explanation of growth machine and regime theories rely on 
too much voluntarism (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999). These are agency-centred theories. They tend to emphasise the autonomy of 
local elites in urban politics. For instance, Molotch (1993:31) argues by saying that 
“there is plenty of human agency in this version of political economy. Where there is 
similarity across places, it derives from shared institutional contexts and parallel 
patterns of volition, rather than iron-like determinisms of internal hidden hands or 
exogenous constraints.” For him, it means that the politics of growth and 
development derives from voluntary agents and institutional components rather than 
the wider context of economic and political structural conditions.  
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Finally, the theories have the limit of localism in the way that they explain urban 
politics. They tend to focus on local internal political process rather than extra-local 
factors such as structural changes of governance towards neo-liberalism. However, 
such local-centred explanations might overlook the wider economic and political 
influences which work beyond the local and through the various scales of global, 
national, regional and local ones (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In addition, it 
seems they neglect the relationship between central and local government. However, 
it is very significant, specifically in a relatively centralised country like the Britain. 
Harding (1997:308 Cited in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999:508) concludes in his 
comparative study about European urban regime “little can happen sub-nationally 
without [the national state’s] cooperation, acquiescence or benign ignorance.” 
Jessop et al. also emphasise the importance of extra-local factors such as the 
national impact or context in the analysis of local politics. They claim that 
Manchester’s Olympic bidding strategy cannot be explained as only an interaction 
among local internal actors: they stress that it was also shaped by the national and 
international context set by the rules of UK central government and the IOC.  
 
In association with this, Cox (2004) argues that we have to pay attention to not only 
territorial structuring of the locality but also the relationship with global and national 
actors beyond the local in order to understand the politics of local economic 
development. As Cox (ibid) suggests, the essential point in conceptualising the 
politics of local development might be the relationship between state and local 
interests in a certain geographical scale. In this respect, we should concentrate on 
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wider national and global actors and the shared contexts of growth and development 
politics where they are connected with the local beyond the simple local territory.  
 
Moreover, Cox proposes a concept of ‘local dependence’, which is a more abstract 
term beyond the ‘interest based on land’ of growth coalition or machine theory (Cox 
and Mair, 1988). This term means the locally dependent tendency of place-specific 
interests which certain individuals and firms have in a certain localised space for 
their production and reproduction (ibid). He argues, furthermore, that the capitalist 
system inherently has a contradiction between mobility and fixity and this leads to 
the forming of a new urban politics of growth and development. Firms and workers 
tend to be dependent upon locally shaped social relations in a capitalist economy. 
Locally dependent actors expect such ‘structured consistency’ to be sustainable, but 
the mobility of capital and labour in a capitalist economy tend to be increased. For 
example, as Harvey says, “[a]ccumulation provides [capitalists] with the wherewithal 
for expansion, and the options are always to expand in situ or to set up a branch 
plant elsewhere. The incentive to go for the latter increases over time simply by 
virtue of the congestion costs associated with expansion on original sites 
(1989b:234-5).” Additionally, the capitalists often pursue a spatial fix to overcome a 
crisis of accumulation through spatial displacement during the time of economic 
recession (ibid). By contrast, individuals and groups with economic interests based 
on local dependence have political incentives to protect or increase locally place-
specific interests. Thus, conflicts between local dependent fixity and mobility can 
become a condition for the local politics of growth and development.  
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However, Cox’s argument is not perfect. As MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) indicate, 
his scalar approach based on local dependence has paid insufficient attention to 
cultural practices like discourse and ideology since it might mainly be founded on 
material relations. In particular, in order to analyse the changing political context, we 
might need to have political analysis on conflicts of city reimaging. As McCann 
(2002) argues, the process of place-making like place marketing projects is often 
associated with such politics of image-making and meaning-making. Thus, we might 
need to approach the understanding of the changing politics of place marketing 
through a cultural analysis of political actors’ discourses and meanings around place-
making process. 
 
In conclusion, through this examination, we can gain two implications from political 
theories of local growth and development with an American tradition. Firstly, if we 
consider the evolution of place marketing as the politics of local growth and 
development, we need to examine wider political and economic conditions of multi-
dimensional scales beyond the local scale. For example, the growth machine and 
regime approach might not trace wider macro and contextual impacts such as 
structural transformation to neo-liberalisation since they tend to narrowly focus on 
internal dynamic of local politics. In association with Korean urban politics, since the 
mid-1990s, there was a rapid increasing of place marketing policies in many Korean 
cities. I will suggest that this phenomenon was caused not only by the concerted 
local elites’ interests in many cities but also the wider conditions of central 
government’s policy of globalisation (see Chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9). Thus, we should 
understand not only local internal structuring of place-specific interests but also the 
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broader scale of national and global context, and also dialectically recognise their 
relationship. Secondly, we might need analysis not only on actors’ material relations 
but also on cultural aspects like discourses, meanings, and ideologies for 
understanding evolving place marketing policies as local economic development. As 
Jonas and Wilson (1999) indicate, to analyse a complicated process of forming 
discourses in practice might need a new approach which investigates a political 
actor’s visions and meanings for places rather than US style theories of growth 
politics. In relation to this, an approach of cultural politics, conducted by McCann 
(2002:396) in his study on Lexington and Kentucky in the US, might provide 
important implications for forming a research framework since it enables us to have a 
‘culturally enriched understanding’ about the politics of local economic development, 
which has been neglected in many political economy approaches. In particular, in the 
case city of the thesis, Gwangju, unique values and meanings of Gwangju local 
residents such as ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit born from the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement should be carefully treated. Thus, the cultural politics to 
local place marketing is very important in the case study of the thesis. 
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, diverse examinations were implemented in order to closely approach 
essential topics of the thesis. First, we considered the main features of place 
marketing strategy in Western cities. There were three points: 1) place marketing as 
a local response to global restructuring; 2) postmodernism as a cultural partner for 
capital accumulation and place marketing which actively employ it; 3) urban 
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entrepreneurialism as neo-liberal governance. In the next section, we explored the 
relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing strategy. They have driven 
the neo-liberalisation of urban policy in cities with a synergy by mutually reinforcing 
them together. Then, its effects were uneven development and unequal outcomes 
through gentrification and displacements which have been deployed in many cities. 
The third section treated policy transfer of place marketing by focusing on 
intersecting areas of place marketing, policy transfer, and neo-liberalism. In the 
fourth section, we examined urban political theories for local economic development. 
The forming process of local growth and governing coalitions is important in the 
recognition of an evolving political context of place marketing since it might give us 
the basis for a theoretical framework to understand the territorialisation of local 
economic interests. In this section, we acquired the following two significant 
implications from political theories of local growth such as growth machine and urban 
regime. Firstly, if we consider the evolution of place marketing under the wider 
political and economic conditions, we might need to examine in multi-dimensional 
scales beyond the local. Secondly, we might also need to analyse not only material 
social relations but also cultural aspects like discourses, meanings, and ideologies 
for deeper understanding of evolving place marketing policies. I expect, ultimately, 
these implications will contribute to the formation of methodology later examined in 
chapter four. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
To undertake research successfully, the researcher needs to be clear about the 
strategy for data collection, analysis method, and the associated research processes. 
The quality of the research often depends on how the researcher properly collects 
and analyses data in association with essential topics, and the process, of course, 
should be ethical. This chapter describes the methodology of the research by 
examining the establishment of a methodological framework and diverse techniques 
applied to the research. 
 
The next section of the chapter begins with an explanation of the theoretical 
framework to explore the research topics outlined in chapter one. In so doing, the 
benefits of structure- and agent-centred approach will be compared and the 
alternative approach of Jessop and his colleagues (Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999) 
which can incorporate these two will be briefly explored. My approach is based on 
the alternative approach, and at the same time I seek to elaborate it by employing a 
combination of extensive survey and intensive case study, and a mixture of multi-
scalar and cultural politics approaches.  
 
In the thesis, the streams of detailed investigation are divided into two parts. First is 
to understand the outline of national and urban contexts in terms of the political 
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aspects in Korean cities and to inquire into the general trend of changing place 
marketing practices. It will be conducted in the next chapter through documentary 
analysis of Korean urban politics and Korean expert survey. The second part is a 
case study of Gwangju, South Korea. Several research methods are employed to 
examine a series of place marketing projects in the city. In the thesis, it will be 
conducted from chapter seven to nine.  
 
The third section of the chapter outlines the detailed survey methods used in 
conducting in the research. Here, I will consider some issues such as response rate, 
the expert as an investigation object, and construction of survey items. Then, the 
fourth is an intensive case study. It introduces reasons why a case study is most 
significant in the thesis, and interview techniques for close encounter are examined. 
In the fifth section, the chapter briefly discuss ethical issues related to the research. 
Then, it concludes with a short summary of these sections. 
 
 
4.2 Establishing framework 
 
4.2.1 Dualism of structure and agency approach 
 
Approaches of analyzing urban politics can be divided into structure- and agent-
centred analyses. The former is a very macro approach with a Marxist tradition, and 
the latter, as examined in detail in chapter 3, is found in approaches linked with New 
Urban Politics, like growth machines and urban regimes. The former has been 
criticised for its reductionism and neglecting of extra-class components (Hall, 2006) 
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whilst the latter have faced criticisms since they are typically local-centred and 
excessively dependent upon actors’ voluntarism (Jessop et. al., 1999; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999).  
 
In regard to this structure-agent dualism, Jessop and his colleagues suggest the 
strategic-relational approach as an alternative to analyse the politics of urban growth. 
Basically, this approach is based on the combining of regulation theory and neo-
Gramscian state theory (ibid). Jessop and his colleagues believe that the approach 
is very useful to overcome an antipathy about structural analysis, at the same time, 
retaining its emphasis on political dynamics which are working in the changing 
structural context, because it can explain the importance of local individual actors’ 
political leadership, values, and discourses (Jessop et. al., 1999; Wood, 2004). 
According to this approach, we can consider that individual political actors act 
depending upon structurally oriented reflexive calculations with their own capacities, 
values, and world views. Thus, the approach might enable us to understand why 
local actors are seemingly viewed as acting voluntarily. However, it is more important 
that the action context of actor’s is dependent on structurally inscribed ‘strategic 
selectivity’ in this approach (Wood, 2004). Hence, as Jessop et. al. argues, “[t]hese 
structural contexts provide more than the scenic backdrop for local growth machines 
to act out petty dramas – they are ‘structuring’ in complex yet significant ways 
(1999:148).” 
 
4.2.2 Two approach streams of the research 
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Basically, this thesis agrees with the opinion of Jessop et. al. (1999) in that it 
suggests re-conceptualising the relationship between structure and agent in urban 
politics. To transcend the dualism of structure-agent (Hay and Richards, 2000; 
Jessop et. al., 1999; Wood, 2004), I attempt to employ Jessop’s strategic-relational 
approach as the theoretical ground in my research. As Jessop et. al.(1999:148) 
explains, on the one hand, urban political actors do possess agency, and on the 
other hand, they are often constrained to select their actions within the networks, 
meaning systems, and conditions in which they are situated. Regarding these 
structural forces, they indicate that “there is a general emphasis [in contemporary 
cities] nowadays on enhancing the role for business, a growing reliance on place 
marketing, rhetorics of urban entrepreneurialism, and so on (ibid:149).” They call this 
contextual coercive force ‘macro-necessity’ (ibid). Yet, they also acknowledge that 
the types and situations of city politics are different, and they name it ‘micro-diversity’. 
They argue that we have to investigate the relationship between macro-necessity 
and micro-diversity. Likewise, I think we need to dialectically consider it in a similar 
way to Jessop’s approach.  
 
However, as Wood (2004:2115) suggests, it appears that there are no detailed 
explanations in Jessop’s alternative approach. Just, to explore the relation of macro-
necessity and micro-diversity, the approach suggests the following four aspects 
would be closely inter-connected: 1) the structural constraints placed on actors; 2) 
the strategic context; 3) the strategic capacities of the various actors concerned; 4) 
the actual strategies and tactics they pursue (Jessop et. al., 1999:149). It is probably 
too difficult to consider all these aspects at one time, since this research has to 
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analyse a series of diverse marketing projects in Gwangju. Thus, I seek to simplify 
these components for analysis in the thesis. I want to approach my topics through 
two flows of analysis. Firstly, in order to understand the structural constraints and 
context placed on actors, I will examine the national and urban context and general 
trends of place marketing in Korean cities. It could enable us to consider the wider 
conditions and situational context for Korean urban politics. In the thesis, it can be 
achieved by examining the changing historical process of political conditions in 
national and urban dimensions through Korean literature of politics. Then, the 
general marketing tendency of Korean cities might be a superficial phenomenon. In 
order to identify this, extensive survey on Korean experts will be conducted in the 
next chapter. The second approach is to examine detailed interactions of various 
political actors in Gwangju politics and to consider this by dialectically linking with the 
broader structural constraints and context. In so doing, this research investigates the 
diverse interplay of political actors through case study by employing a multi-scalar 
and cultural politics approach. It is this very case study that my research 
concentrates on, and in particular, I want to focus on the interview method in the 
thesis.  
 
 
Why is a case study (as a qualitative method) significant? 
 
The thesis does not depend upon only quantity methods like surveys. Rather, in this 
thesis, the most important method is a case study as a qualitative one. Why is the 
case study more significant? 
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Firstly, according to Yin (1994), case study as a qualitative method has the 
advantage to acquire answers for questions of contemporary social phenomenon 
that the researcher cannot manipulate or control. In particular, case study or 
interview is more valid (rather than quantitative methods) for research questions of 
the thesis such as ‘why is there the optimistic view of place marketing in Korea’ or 
‘how has place marketing policy been evolved’ because these questions are not for 
mere fact finding but for digging out the nature behind the phenomenon (Hoggart et 
al, 2002; Yin, 1994).  
 
Secondly, qualitative methods are usually much more useful in examining political 
and social phenomenon based on various human power relationships while, as 
Hoggart and his colleagues (2002: 180) suggest, survey could only provide a ‘thin 
description’ of social phenomenon. The urban as the main object in the research is 
the place which consists of the many dynamics of individual lives and, 
simultaneously entails complicated, multi-dimensional political and social 
implications. Marketing science approaches could not identify the relationship 
between city place and lived experience in detail, since positive analysis tends to 
simplify a phenomenon by setting some limits and conditions. It might be quite 
difficult or, even impossible, to measure political phenomena based on power 
relationships such as contested marketing visions for urban development. As Bassett 
and his colleagues point out, “detailed case studies are useful as windows onto local 
governance, helping to illuminate deeper aspects of local politics and power 
structures” (Bassett, Griffiths and Smith, 2002:1773), case studies might enable us 
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to recognise such political phenomena. Further, in the aspect of analysis depth, an 
intensive case study of one city might be better than superficial quantitative analysis 
of over ten cities. The reason is that to critically scrutinize the evolving marketing of a 
specific city might allow us to have better understanding such as acute insight for 
revealing facts at their root. Hence, the case study in the research will consider the 
‘depth’ more salient than the ‘width’ of the research. In doing so, the case study 
selected a few relevant marketing projects in Gwangju and intensively examined 
them through diverse methods such as documentary analysis, in-depth interviews 
and field visits. 
 
 
Employing scalar and cultural politics approach for case study 
 
Aforementioned, Jessop’s alternative approach to the politics of local growth might 
transcend the gap between structural and agent-centred analysis by dialectically 
exploring both wider contextual conditions and diverse actors’ strategic actions. In 
this respect, I attempt to apply it to the politics of local economic development 
(including place marketing policy) by suggesting a combination of multi-scalar 
approaches based on Jessop’s alternative perspective and cultural politics approach 
in my case study.  
 
Firstly, multi-scalar approach on the basis of Jessop’s idea is needed in order to 
examine the inter-relationship between micro-diversity and macro-necessity and 
relationally understand the politics of local economic development beyond the local 
by linking it to the national and global. Traditionally, many political geographers have 
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treated national scale as significant in general. However, in urban politics, urban 
scale has been usually regarded as important and its main analytical unit was urban 
government (Martin, McCann and Purcell, 2003). Within the arena of local politics, 
local political actors’ visions often have discourses or discursive frames and such 
discourses tend to be connected to the local scale to create certain visions for 
special local places (McCann, 2003). However, over the last a few decades, scale 
has been associated with restructuring of contemporary states in capitalist 
economies through the rescaling process of state and capital (Brenner, 2004; 2009; 
McCann, 2003). Hitherto states’ political and economic power based on a national 
scale has increasingly changed into a supra-national and a sub-national one (Martin 
et. al., 2003). This mobilisation of scales has been connected with new expressions 
such as ‘glocalisation (Swyngedouw, 2004)’ or ‘relativisation of scale (Jessop, 2003)’ 
by some authors.  
 
Many geographers have studied how the scale is materially and discursively 
constructed on the basis of the discussion of social production of scale (Marston, 
2000). This thesis regards the scale as a mobile context and product of power 
relations based on a social constructionist perspective where the scale is socially 
constructed rather than ontologically pre-given. As McCann (2003) points out, this 
perspective pays attention to the political approach in which the scales operate 
where they are differentiated from and contested with each other within a series of 
scales. Thus, Marston (2000:228) suggests, “the multiplicity of scale involved in the 
socio-spatial organization of capitalism also enables multiple opportunities for 
resistance or opportunities to create linkages across and among scales.”  
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From this perspective, the territorial demands of urban business’s growth politics 
such as place marketing, on the one hand, stimulate expansion of power, and open 
up diverse new scales of resisting against the power of growth politics on the other. 
Smith (1982) argues that there is an intrinsic contradiction in capitalist economies 
since capitalist production on a global scale tends to be ‘equalisation’ whilst its 
production frequently results in the tendency of ‘differentiation’. It might be connected 
with Jessop’s argument about inter-relation between micro-diversity and macro-
necessity in the politics of local growth. In this respect, I seek to explore the macro 
context to stimulate the equalisation of cities in their pro-growth restructuring and at 
the same time to shed light on the local inward diversities of cities through a multi-
scalar approach from the basis of Jessop’s perspective. In particular, as Smith 
indicates, this approach might enable us to examine the politics of the local scale 
emergence of resistance by various social groups against the capital-centred 
dominant scale in cities (ibid). In this context, the politics of scale can be political 
activities and processes related to the production and modification of scale to 
acquire power in urban politics. Here, what we have to pay attention to is the term of 
jumping scale. It is a strategy that is used by certain social groups to reorganise 
existing power relation by creating a new broader or narrower scale than the existing 
one within the process of power conflict. Therefore, this research seeks to multi-
dimensionally examine the mobile power relations of local political actors linking the 
wider national and global contexts at a multi-level scale.  
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Secondly, why is an approach of cultural politics needed in the case study of this 
thesis? First, the approach might make us investigate the changing political context 
of place marketing with a balanced view of both material analysis and cultural one on 
local actors’ conflicts. Growth-first policies led by local business elites often bring 
about material effects such as displacement and unemployment of disadvantaged 
people. Furthermore, pro-growth marketing policies also tend to be implemented by 
discursive language and rhetoric. Thus, the cultural politics approach can help us to 
interpret the nature of discursive frames and their related political conflicts by 
analysing meanings of political agents’ actions and languages. As Jonas and Wilson 
suggest,  
 
“[P]olitical agendas [of local economic growth] always become activated 
through constellations of representations about people, places, and 
processes that circulate through daily life. People come to understand the 
world of growth – its prospects, possibilities, who gains, who loses – through 
significations rather than by interacting with a ‘brute reality’, debunking the 
notion of an always revealing preinterpreted reality (1999:8).” 
 
Particularly, the approach is useful to deeply understand the conflicting actors’ world 
view and ideologies by analytically comparing them.  
 
The second merit of a cultural politics approach is that it enables us to reveal the role 
of non-elitist or marginalised perspectives in the politics of place marketing, since 
analyses of different meanings (including human attachments to ideal images about 
certain places) highlight a terrain of contradiction, tension and difference in urban 
development politics (Martin, McCann and Purcell, 2003:114). In contrast with this, 
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the approach of urban growth politics such as growth machines or urban regimes 
might have some benefits in exploring the role of city elites in the politics of place 
marketing. But in this approach, “because the focus of attention is on the elites, the 
significance is likely to be understated, and – at best – they may be incorporated as 
spear carriers for locally dependent business (Cochrane, 1999:118).” However, the 
process of place-making in local economic development, as McCann (2003:396) 
suggests, tends to be associated with the daily life of people who are situated 
outside of the policy process which is led by dominant elites, and it frequently raises 
conflicting political issues of meaning-making between elites and non-elite people. 
Therefore, this politics of urban economic development (including place marketing) 
cannot be explained as only pro-growth policies led by city elites as it is often 
mutated or as abandoned by the opposition or resistance of other civic groups and 
people who have different meanings.  
 
Thus, as seen in Figure 4.1, the case study of the thesis seeks to analyse the 
process of place marketing policy by employing multi-scalar analysis based upon 
Jessop’s idea (which transcends the structure-agent dualism) and cultural politics 
analysis. This approach will regard city government, business, and citizen as key 
actors, and it will describe and analyse their interactions. It will also examine the 
process of tension, conflict and co-ordination in detail. This provides the broad 
methodological context and I will now turn to examine the specific method used 
within the thesis.  
 
 
  
Figure 4.1 A conceptual framework for PM (Place Marketing) case study 
 
 
 4.3 Extensive expert survey 
 
4.3.1 Types and methods of survey 
 
The questionnaire survey can take a number of forms. There are usually five types of 
survey that are frequently employed by human geographers (Gray and Guppy, 
1994): the personal survey, the intercept survey, the postal survey, the telephone 
survey and, the online survey. The questionnaire surveys can be either oral or 
written. In the thesis, an email survey of Korean policy-makers and experts was 
adopted as a variety of the postal survey, especially when by considering time and 
cost. As shown in Table 4.1, the advantages and disadvantages of adopting an email 
survey method were carefully deliberated. Despite their high response rates, the 
personal survey was not employed in this study, since it would have necessitated 
heavy travel and time costs. Moreover, the potential of ‘interviewer effect’ 
(respondents often express their opinions differently according to interviewer) was 
also considered in not selecting a face-to-face survey method (Hoggart et al, 2002).  
 
Table 4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of email survey method 
 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
 
▶ Quickness 
▶ Low cost 
▶ Easy to send and reply 
▶ 24 hours use 
(no time differential) 
▶ No ‘interviewer effect’ 
 
▶ Relatively low response rate 
▶ Sample limitation 
( computer and email user) 
▶ Concern of spam mail 
▶ Easy rejection 
▶ No list of mail address 
 
[I made this table by revising some source. (Source: A Literature Review on the Email 
 Survey Response. Kim, J.H., Ryu, J.H. 2002. Study and Research)] 
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4.3.2 Some issues in survey 
 
Raising response rate 
 
However, as many authors note, the biggest disadvantage of a post or mail survey is 
usually low response or non-response (Hoggart et al., 2002; Millington, 2002; 
Sheehan, 2001). Although some authors claim that there is no evidence that 
research with a lower response is less valid than a study with a higher one (Krosnick, 
1999), an appropriate level of response rate is required in survey research since too 
low a response of a sample might result in poor representation of that population.  
 
Thus, in order to raise the response rate of the email survey, a number of measures 
were attempted in the study. Firstly, I sought to express my special attention to all 
respondents in the process of survey. Hence, I did not send a blanket email to all the 
sample population at the same time. Instead, I sent an email to each of them 
reflecting their individual status and characteristics. This personalisation could 
counter classifying the mail as spam and enables respondents to feel the belief in 
the researcher (Kim and Ryu, 2002). Secondly, I tried to give them sense of the 
importance of the research since many commentators regard it as a significant 
incentive for respondents (Hoggart et al, 2002). I persuaded them by writing that this 
study was very scarce and valuable in this field. Thirdly, the fact that the success of 
this investigation might depend on the response rate was also written in the email. In 
doing so, I recommended indirectly the active participation of respondents. Fourthly, 
I treated respondents as high level experts as much as possible and sometimes I 
expressed respect for their career or qualification. This might enable them to feel a 
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sense of pride as experts. Fifthly, in general, follow-up mails could increase the 
response rate (Millington, 2002). Thus, I sent a reminder mail to non-respondents 
asking for their eager participation of the research before a 5 day deadline.  
 
Expert as sample population 
 
In the study, the sample population was a set of experts rather than the general 
population. However, on the whole, if we seek to make data from a survey easy to 
analyse, we would be better to design a survey study to focus on collecting less 
complicated and factual materials (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). One of the aims of the 
thesis is to examine general trends of Korean urban place marketing and its 
evolution.  
 
However, this might be too difficult for the general population to describe since they 
usually have no interest in it, while expert groups might be sensitive to the changes 
of place marketing policy and commonly have special interest about them. In 
addition, it might be difficult for normal people to clearly understand place marketing 
policies, since the introduction and implementation of such policies are relatively 
more recent. In the study, many points that should be identified through the survey 
might also be comfortable only for professionals who deal with and study place 
marketing strategies. Hence, the experts of place marketing as a sample population 
were selected in the research, even though they have some limitations of 
representing the whole population. To examine groups with more accurate 
understanding and information about Korean place marketing might increase the 
validity and reliability of the study results.  
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Designing a questionnaire: identifying general trends 
 
As already noted, the primary purpose of survey study is to recognise the general 
features of Korean urban place marketing and its evolutionary process (including 
policy transfer from advanced cities) in the thesis. The key advantage of the survey 
method is to identify general trends. Thus, to make survey results more useful, they 
should express an overall tendency of social phenomena. Despite its capacity of 
obtaining more information, an excessively complicated questionnaire is often not 
helpful in emphasising the strengths of a survey method. Therefore, special attention 
was paid to the process of questionnaire design in order to maximise such 
advantage. Relatively simple questionnaire items such as closed questions usually 
were employed in the survey. In particular, multiple choice and scaling questions 
were often used because many people tend to feel them easily due to frequent 
encounters. Although points that I want to find in the study might have some 
expertise, I sought to simplify the response of place marketing specialists through 
the structured questionnaire. The reason is that the objective of the study is to 
identify experts’ common views on the characteristics and evolution of Korean place 
marketing and the current situation of its transfer rather than to investigate whole 
opinions of Korean professionals. Many questionnaire studies tend to mix descriptive 
and analytical questions (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). However, I did not do so in the 
survey. Descriptive questions were used in the study. As already mentioned, the 
investigative focus of the research is identifying current trends and situations in 
South Korea. Thus, as seen in Table 4.2, the survey questionnaire usually employed 
questions that tell us ‘what’ rather than ‘why’.  
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As also seen in Table 4.2, the questionnaire items are divided into four parts and the 
total number of question is 28 (including background questions about respondents). 
The first part is to investigate the cultural aspects of evolving place marketing. 
Questions on preferable marketing tools, important background to the emergence of 
place marketing and the primary purpose of place marketing were set in this part. To 
examine the changes of place marketing in a cultural respect, questions on the 
concern for and utilisation of cultural tools within urban place marketing, the 
relationship between place marketing and cultural tools, and the change of the 
concept of culture within place marketing. The second is to identify the evolution of 
place marketing from the aspects of the politics. In this part, questionnaires consist 
of asking about the influential actors, the changing role of central government, city 
government and partnership organisations within urban place marketing, the degree 
of citizens’ participation and the most celebrated marketing activities by citizens. The 
third is about the transfer of place marketing policy. Sources of policy ideas, the 
need, frequency and effect of application of other countries’ policies in place 
marketing were asked. In this part, questions such as which country is usually 
examined, what parts are most helpful to Korean cities, what is the most difficult 
thing in the application of another country’s policy and the experience of visiting 
Western cities were placed. In addition, questions on whether they have any 
experience of hearing about the failure of case in Western or Japanese place 
marketing and formally introducing it were included. Then, the last part is composed 
of background questions about respondents like their occupation, years working, 
career field and level of degree. The results of the survey of Korean experts will be 
considered in chapter 6. 
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Table 4.2 Structure of survey questions 
 
 
Part 
(question numbers) 
 
Questions 
 
Question 
type3 
General features 
and cultural 
aspects of Korean 
place marketing 
(7) 
Change of preferable marketing tool Choice 
Background to the emergence of place marketing Choice 
Change of primary purpose of place marketing Choice 
Concern for cultural tools within place marketing Scaling 
Utilisation of cultural tools within place marketing Scaling 
Relationship between place marketing and cultural 
tools 
Choice 
Change of the concept of culture Choice 
Political aspects of 
Korean place 
marketing 
     (6) 
Most influential actor within place marketing Choice 
Change of role of central government Choice 
Change of role of city government Choice 
Change of role of partnership Choice 
Degree of citizen’s participation Scaling 
Change of most celebrated marketing activity by 
citizens 
Choice 
Transfer of place 
marketing policy 
into Korea and the 
problem of Korean 
place marketing 
     (11) 
Sources of place marketing policy idea Choice 
Need for application of another country’s policy Scaling 
Frequency of application of another country’s policy Scaling 
Effect of application of another country’s policy Scaling 
Which countries’ marketing is usually examined Choice 
Which parts are most helpful to Korean cities Choice 
Difficulty in the application of another country’s policy Choice 
Experience of visiting western cities Choice 
Experience of hearing failure of western marketing Choice 
Experience of introducing or indicating failure of 
western marketing 
Choice 
Biggest problem of Korean place marketing Choice 
Background 
questions about 
respondents 
     (4) 
Occupation, working year, career field and level of 
degree 
Choice 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
                                    
3 Choice is a multiple choice question which requires the selection of one or two answers among 2-8 
answers and scaling means a question which expresses the degree along 5 scales in the thesis. 
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4.3.3 Conducting a nationwide Korean expert survey 
 
The implementing procedure of survey research includes four stages: i) sampling 
Korean experts, ii) making a questionnaire draft, iii) piloting the questionnaire, iv) 
confirming the final questionnaire, and v) implementing the final survey. In this 
section, I consider sampling, piloting, and implementing the final survey as key 
procedures in turn. 
 
 
Sampling 
 
There are a number of sampling methods in social sciences. However, the usually 
employed methods in human geography are judgemental, snowball, quota and 
random sampling (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Judgemental sampling was employed in 
the research, since the study is targeting Korean experts whose number is very 
limited. 
 
However, such sampling might have a few limits, despite its capability of gathering 
high level expertise and relatively thoughtful description. If the number of the sample 
is too small or the sample population represents specific groups, it might reflect only 
a restricted representation of the whole population. Thus, various attempts to counter 
such a possibility were made in the study. Many efforts to make the sample size 
bigger were put into the research by gaining more expert lists. In addition, a larger 
geographical area from where the survey sample population comes might be 
relatively comparable with the whole population (Hoggart et al., 2002). To do this, the 
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list of national experts on place marketing and urban regeneration was collected 
through a number of routes. Firstly, the experts name list of urban regeneration 
policy was collected from the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime affairs 
(MLTM), for whom I work. Secondly, the expert list on culture-led regeneration was 
gathered from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST). Thirdly, practical 
professionals in urban policy and place marketing were identified from the biggest 
public agency in Korea - the Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH). Fourthly, 
related names of private marketing professionals were acquired from companies with 
whom I worked several years ago. Finally, other current lists of central and local 
public officials were collected from the internet (homepages of governments). 
However, some contacts were not clear in their phone number and email address. 
Thus, such lists were deleted, and the total number of names on the list of experts 
was 102. These almost cover both the practitioners and researchers who are experts 
in urban place marketing in South Korea.  
 
However, there were a few items which were needed to be considered in terms of 
the representation of the sample list. First is the allocation of occupationally balanced 
professionals. The top sub-group of the population sample was ‘professors’ and the 
bottom was ‘agency members’. In other words, these lists were not balanced in 
occupation. Thus, sub-sample groups were re-allocated in order to make informants 
more representative. In this process, many names of professor were filtered. In 
selection, priorities lay on professors whom have practical experiences like being a 
committee member in urban place marketing or regeneration policy. Despite having 
such experience, the list of engineering professors who might relatively have less 
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interest in place marketing policy was removed. The second point in sampling the list 
was geographical representation. Too many names of experts were from the Seoul 
metropolitan region (including Seoul). To secure a more representative sample 
population geographically, the list was reduced in size to balance SMR4 and non-
SMR respondents. A serious gap between the SMR and the non-SMR area is one of 
the biggest problems in Korea. However, the centralisation of experts to SMR area in 
urban place marketing might be natural in Korea. In addition, there was another 
imbalance of population between local cities within the non-SMR area. Under such 
intrinsic unevenness, strictly coercive sampling in terms of geography might not 
represent whole population. In the national allocation of the sample population, the 
balance between the SMR and the non-SMR could be more sensible than the 
balance in all provincial areas. Thus, a half of the expert lists were distributed in each 
the SMR and the non-SMR since the distribution of the whole population was similar 
to this. All sample groups (five occupational groups: professors, institute researchers, 
public officials, agency people and marketing company workers) were sets of 10 
through these a little complicated allotments and their geographical distribution was 
25 to each of the areas (SMR and non-SMR). 
 
So far, a series of procedures from the examination of the need of survey method to 
designing the survey study has been described. Additional implementation of the 
survey and analysis its results should follow this process. Due to the great content of 
them, however, the rest of the procedures such as piloting and establishing the 
questionnaire and analysing findings will be suggested in the next chapter.  
                                    
4 SMR denotes Seoul Metropolitan Region which means the area of Seoul and its surrounding in 
Korea. 
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Piloting and confirming the questionnaire 
 
Why do I need a pilot study in the survey? Concerning this, Hoggart and his 
colleagues (2002) explain that it could help a researcher to check the effectiveness 
and credibility of an instrument in the survey. Fink and Kosecoff (1985:1998, cited in 
Hoggart et al., 2002: 181-182) suggest useful guidelines for a survey pilot as follows: 
firstly, ‘the researcher should try to anticipate the circumstances under which the 
survey will be conducted and make plans to handle them,’ secondly, ‘select pilot 
informants who will be similar to those in the full survey.’ 
 
Thus, drawing on such guidelines, I conducted a pilot of the survey draft 
questionnaire to 5 Korean experts (non-participants for the full survey) on place 
marketing policy during 7 days from 11th February to 17th in 2011 (see Table 4.3). 
Through this process, I tried to find out the problems of the draft questionnaire and 
adjust them for better effect in the real survey.  
 
Table 4.3 Survey research schedule 
 
 
Work 
 
Term 
 
▶ Preparing questionnaire draft 
▶ Piloting the questionnaire 
(5 people, 7 days) 
▶ Amending the questionnaire 
(3 days) 
▶ Implementing survey 
(50 people, 9 days) 
 
 
November 2010 ~ January 2011 
 
11th February 2011 ~ 17th February 2011 
 
18th February 2011 ~ 21th February 2011 
 
22nd February 2011 ~ 2nd March 2011 
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In order to increase the validity and reliability of the questionnaire, according to 
Kitchin and Tate’s (2000:53) recommendation for pilot tests, emphasis for 
examination was laid on the following six points in pilot study: first, the clarity and 
interpretation of questions; the difficulty of response; the appropriate number of 
questions; the right sequence and structure of the questionnaire; the pattern of the 
questionnaire; the length of completion time.  
 
Regarding these check points, a number of opinions suggested by pilot informants 
were reflected in the final questionnaire. Firstly, some obscure words in draft 
questions were replaced by more clear expressions. In addition, ambiguous parts 
were deleted for more clarity. Complicated questions with dual inquiry in a sentence 
were divided into two questions. Secondly, in order to avoid the difficulty of making a 
response, a couple of questions indicated by informants as difficult to answer were 
erased. According to the pilot respondents’ proposals, a brief description on the 
definition, main instruments and examples of place marketing (one of common views 
in Korea) were added into the questionnaire in an attempt to help respondents’ 
understanding. However, a comment that such explanation was not relevant to my 
opinion was included. Thirdly, the draft questionnaire consisted of 28 questions and 
all pilot informants judged it appropriate. After the pilot test, although some questions 
were removed or added, the number of questions in the final questionnaire was the 
same as 28. Fourthly, one of the pilot respondents noted the need for adjusting the 
order of some questions. Reflecting his proposal in the survey questionnaire, they 
were logically arranged. Fifthly, there was an indication that the questionnaire was 
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likely to be lacking a few questions5 on policy transfer and respondent background. 
Thus, I complemented the questionnaire just as they propose. Sixthly, most reports 
at the pilot test were satisfied with the necessary time (approximately 20 minutes) for 
answering. Finally, after the correction of some miswritten words, the questionnaire 
was confirmed. 
 
Implementing the final survey 
 
Each place marketing expert in Korea, as respondents of the full survey identified, 
was sent the final questionnaire 22nd February 2011. They were given 9 days to 
respond (see the detailed survey schedule in Table 4.3). The questionnaire was 
made into two versions (MS word and Hangul word processor programme6), since it 
would be a responding vehicle for Korean experts. As discussed in the previous 
section, non-respondents were sent a second email 5 days before the deadline in 
order to raise the response rate. Most replies arrived back with in 6 days of sending 
the questionnaire.  
 
There were no illegible and insincere replies and enough to select as a valid 
response. However, one report was rejected as a valid survey response as it was 
received beyond the time of the deadline which I had promised to keep as the term 
of collecting replies on the questionnaire. 36 respondents of 50 submitted their 
                                    
5 One of the informants at the pilot test recommended a few questions about whether Korean experts 
had heard any example of failure of western city marketing and they had experience to formally 
introduce or discuss them. Another reporter demanded an additional background question about the 
final respondent’s career field in order to identify their expertise area. 
6 A number of Koreans often use the Hangul word programme which is produced by a Korean 
company (Hangul and Computer Ltd) instead of MS word in Korea. 
119 
 
answers to me, and thus, the final response rate was 68% (see Table 4.2), which is 
very high for a postal email survey. 
 
Table 4.4 Response rates by sample population groups 
 
Sample group No. of returns Response rate(%) 
Professors 7(10) 70 
Institute researchers 9(10) 90 
Public officials 7(10) 70 
Agency people 6(10) 60 
City marketing company people 5(10) 50 
Total 34(50) 68 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
 
4.4 Intensive case study 
 
 
4.4.1 Selection of case city 
 
In this research, as already suggested, the evolutionary process of place marketing 
in South Korea will be examined through the case study of Gwangju. The city has 
held the Gwangju Biennale which has spent the largest money for an art event in 
South Korea since 1995. In addition, Gwangju was the first in creating a city 
marketing bureau in the country and the city authorities have implemented active 
policies such as attracting firms (Samsung electricity and Kia motors) and hosting 
mega-sports events (The 88th National Sports Festival, 2015 Summer Gwangju 
Universiade). As a result, they won the first prize for city marketing from the KMMA 
(Korean Marketing Management Association) in 2007. Thus, Gwangju presents an 
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interesting case of a Korean city which has applied urban place marketing examples 
across the last twenty years. 
 
4.4.2 Methods of case study 
 
This case study has been chosen in the thesis in order to analyse the evolving 
process of urban place marketing. Case studies can often be conducted by using 
only official information such as published and documentary7 data. However, a 
range of diverse methods were used in the thesis. As Hoggart and his colleagues 
(2002:92) point out, even ‘seemingly objective’ formal statistics are often socially 
structured by reflecting their producer’s value and mindset. Thus, concentrating on 
formally published data might impose some limit in investigating the true story of 
events. In addition, research questions of the thesis involved the social and political 
context of policies which were selected and implemented.  
 
Thus, in this thesis, three forms of research methods were employed together for 
collecting data for the case study: related literature and documentary analysis 
(including newspaper articles and informal publications), face-to-face in-depth 
interviews with key persons, and observation, including data from related 
organisation’s internet homepages and photos of project sites. This qualitative and 
intensive case study which mixed various methods might enable us to observe and 
understand the detailed process of place marketing policy and related events. 
 
                                    
7 Here, according to Yin (1994)’s opinion, documentary data usually include administrative reports, 
official proposals, announcements, minutes of formal meetings and newspaper articles. 
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4.4.3 The importance of interviews for a close encounter 
 
One of most important things for the case study in this thesis is the intensive 
interview. The interview was conducted not as a quantitative one to collect superficial 
or general information, for instance by using a completely structured questionnaire, 
but a qualitative one to help deeply understand the context of social behaviours 
within place marketing policy. Patton (1990:196 cited in Lee 2010:43) reminds us of 
the importance of interview as a qualitative method stating that “We interview people 
to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe.…. The purpose of 
interviewing, then, is to allow us enter into the other person’s perspective.” Although 
some critics indicate the weakness of the interview method such as researchers’ 
prejudice, subjectivity and credibility, the method could be appropriate for finding out 
meanings and implications of such behaviours (Hoggart, Lees, and Davies, 2002). In 
particular, as Hoggart (ibid) and his colleagues point out, the intensive interview 
could be more valid to reveal complex relationships or gradually evolving events. 
 
The selection of participants is very important for an intensive interview since 
researchers need to have conversations with the appropriate people who have 
experiences in connection with research topics (Polkinghorne, 2005). Thus, I chose 
18 key people as my interviewees belonging to organisations and groups deeply 
involved in my topics (see Table 4.5). They provided me with a vivid and valuable 
description about Gwangju place marketing projects, and as a result their vigourous 
explanations allowed me to gain deeper understanding and more detailed 
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appreciation about the projects beyond superficial knowledge of formal information 
sources. 
 
Table 4.5 Key group’s participants for my interview 
 
Informant date venue 
MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport, and 
Maritime Affairs) 
6th Sep 2011 Office 
MCST (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and 
Tourism) 
8 th Sep 2011 Office 
Gwangju City Government 
(Tourism Promotion Div.) 
9 th Sep 2011 Office 
Gwangju PBC 13th Sep 2011 House 
Biennale Foundation 14 th Sep 2011 Cafe 
Gwangju Dream Newspaper(2 person) 15 th Sep 2011 Office 
Gwangju Chamber of Commerce 16 th Sep 2011 Office 
Baseball Stadium Civic  
Committee 
16 th Sep 2011 Research room 
Gwangju City Government (2 person, 
Sports Promotion Div.) 
19 th Sep 2011 Office 
Gwangju City Government 
(Urban Design Div.) 
20 th Sep 2011 Office 
Gwangju City Councillor 21st Sep 2011 Office 
5.18(Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement) Bereaved Family (2 person) 
23rd Sep 2011 Office 
City Government 
(Cultural Policy Planning Div.) 
5 th Oct 2011 Office 
Gwangju Minyechong (Artist Group) 14 th Oct 2011 Gallery 
Gwangju Citizen’s Coalition for 
Economic Justice 
18 th Oct 2011 Office 
 
(Source : Interview Data) 
 
 
As Weiss (1994) argues, one critical point for productive interviewing is to establish a 
collaborative partnership between researcher and informants. The reason is that an 
interview is formed by social interaction and communication between them (Dunn, 
2005; Hoggart et al., 2002). Weiss (ibid) emphasises the importance of a research 
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partnership, which enables them (the researcher and respondents) to keep a 
sustainable relationship which can lead to good study performance.  
 
In order to build a good partnership, a couple of measures were taken in this 
research. First is the use of a consent form. It included the title of the project, the aim 
of study, the procedures of using interview, and observance of university ethical 
guidelines8 related to research informants. In particular, words about observing 
university ethical advice might enable informants to feel at ease to answer and 
encourage them to give more candid responses. Secondly, a brief explanation of 
how participants had been recruited was served before getting started with the 
interviews. It might increase the informants’ belief in the researcher. In general, as 
respondents tend to be curious about the procedure of their engagement with the 
study, the investigator needs to resolve such curiosity.  
 
Getting the most from an interview usually requires from respondents’ a vigorous 
attitude. In other words, to make intensive and productive interviews, the interviewer 
needs to help the interviewee’s willingness to comment on their experiences. Thus, 
to encourage interviewees in the research some careful considerations were given to 
the interviews.  
 
Firstly, more motivated interviewees (of key people appropriate for this research), 
who felt my study would be worthwhile project, were selected. Those who had little 
time or no readiness to participate in the study were eliminated. Priorities lay on 
                                    
8 For example, it includes that the researcher will strictly observe the University ethical guidelines to 
protect informant’s confidentiality and privacy. 
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people who felt enthusiasm for participating or, at least, precisely understood the 
aims of the study.  
 
Secondly, places with which interviewees felt comfortable were chosen (see Table 
4.5). To make a close encounter between the investigator and respondents, spaces 
that interviewees prefer were chosen. Noisy places where the interviewer and 
interviewee could not concentrate on their dialogue were excluded.  
 
Thirdly, to keep the basic structure and focus of the interview, semi-structured or 
informal conversational interviews were conducted. According to Dunn (2005)’s 
recommendation in which an interview (or question) schedule is advisable for a first-
time interviewer, carefully worded interview schedules were used in interviews. 
When needed to gain more depth, regardless of prepared ‘question routes’ (Krueger, 
1994 Citied in ibid), eliciting questions which draw and extend respondent’s further 
experiences were actively conducted.  
 
Fourthly, according to interviewee reaction, flexibility was given to the length of 
interview. Interview time usually was over an hour. Whenever the respondent 
showed willingness to add comments or explain something, it exceeded the 
expected time.  
 
Finally, each interview was carefully prepared to prevent potential errors, specifically 
by remembering common mistakes which are suggested by Kitchin and Tate (2000, 
see Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.6 Common interviewing mistakes 
 
 
 
• Failing to listen carefully. 
• Repeating the questions.  
• Helping the interviewee to give an answer (e.g., ‘You mean like when …’). 
• Asking vague questions and insensitive questions. 
• Failing to judge an answer. 
• Failing to explore an interesting answer.  
• Asking leading questions (e.g., ‘Do you not think that …’). 
• Letting the interview go on too long. 
• Boring the interviewee. 
• Failing to adequately record the interview. 
  
 
(Source: Kitchin and Tate, 2000:217)  
 
 
4.4.4 Analysing the interview data 
 
The analysing procedure of interview data in this thesis includes three main stages: 
i) transcription, ii) coding, and iii) selection of quotes for the thesis.  
 
All recorded interview data were fully transcribed in Korean language. Then, some of 
them were translated into English when it is quoted. In the analysis of interview 
information, the most important procedure was a coding. Coding is an established 
basic analytic process in qualitative research to aid researchers in dealing with huge 
raw data into meaningful units (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Millington, 2002). As Cope 
(2005) points out, the coding in this research was very useful since it enabled me to 
easily index, analyse data and build a conceptual structure by reducing and 
organising large amounts of textual information.  
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Drawing on some ideas of grounded theory (see Corbin and Strauss, 1990), I divided 
the coding process of this research into two stages. The first step was open coding, 
which was the categorising process by breaking down and labelling data (ibid). For 
example, I categorised lots of meaningful units from interview transcripts by labelling 
words or phrases such as city image, Gwangju Democratisation Movement, city 
tourism, art festival, landmark, and urban design. Then, the next was axial and 
selective coding (ibid). At this stage, I classified categories and unified them around 
core category (e.g. background, conflict, vision, meaning and neo-liberalisation), and 
also explored structures and processes between categories (including sub-
categories) in association with research questions of my thesis. In this process, I 
examined the reasons and processes of interactions between political actors of 
Gwangju marketing projects, which enabled me to make an abstraction of the 
evolution of place marketing at a higher level.  
 
Many quotes in this thesis were used to support my key arguments and 
interpretations about Gwangju and Korean place marketing. By employing them, I 
was able to illuminate interviewees’ experiences, ultimately which led to illustrating 
my conceptual ideas of the evolution of place marketing.  
 
 
4.5 Keeping some ethical issues in mind 
 
Qualitative research typically tends to inter-relate between society, the researcher, 
and the research project (Dowling, 2005). For instance, in the case of an interview, 
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the behaviour of interviewing may influence the interviewee’s personal daily 
schedule. In addition, after the completion of the research, the result of the interview 
(including interviewee’s name and personal data) can be released to the public, and 
it might lead to the interviewee’s disadvantage. Or by contrast, research findings 
might contribute to societal development by communicating with related 
organisations. Thus, research behaviours of social science (in particular, qualitative 
research such as interview) can be associated with socially ethical issues in the 
process of its design and conduct. This research also employed such methods of 
social science. For example, interviews as qualitative research on politicians, public 
officials, news presspeople and residents were conducted in Gwangju of South 
Korea. 
 
Thus, this thesis sought to attentively conduct the application of such research 
methods reminding some ethical points of the present research. The university 
ethical guidelines are closely followed in the process of the whole research. Drawing 
on Dowling (2005:20-22), in particular, the following three points were focused on: 
protecting the informants’ privacy and confidentiality; informed consent; preventing 
harmful activities for the investigator and informants.  
 
 
Protecting informant’s privacy and confidentiality 
 
Huge attention was paid to data from not only survey responses but also interview 
results. Firstly, all survey answers were received by email and then saved in my 
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personal computer with passwords in order not to be exposed to other people. After 
completing an analysis of them, I deleted all data with personal names. Likewise, all 
interview sound files and transcripts were saved with none of the informants’ 
personal information such as their names and positions. All interview data was 
annonymised and it has been identified only by its identification code. Through my 
thesis, such personal information of all interview informants is never open in order to 
protect their privacy and confidentiality. In the thesis, only the informants’ 
organisation is exposed since it enables us to understand the diverse actors’ 
interactions and conflicts. 
 
Pre-informed consent 
 
I identified whether all research participants wanted to take part in my study through 
email and formal research consents (see Appendix 1). The research consent form 
includes the topic, purpose and, procedures of the study. Whenever some of my 
informants asked for additional explanation of my study, I sincerely provided them 
with more depth about my intention and process of research. I distributed and 
collected research consent forms to all interviewees. All consents were safely kept in 
my personal desk which has completely no risk in being exposed. After the final 
completion of my study, I will delete all raw data to thoroughly protect my informants.  
 
Avoiding harmful activities to research participants 
 
This thesis might have some critical content on place marketing policy (particularly, 
in the case of Gwangju in South Korea). Thus, I thoroughly paid attention to 
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protecting my informants in order not to place any negative effects on the research 
participants.  
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter started with establishing a framework for study. The research has two 
streams of approach. The first approach is to examine the wider and general political 
context of Korean urban politics through literature analysis on Korean politics and to 
identify general trends of Korean place marketing by a Korean nationwide expert 
survey. The second is to dialectically understand Gwangju place marketing through a 
case study by a framework combining multi-scalar analysis based on Jessop’s 
alternative approach about urban growth politics and cultural politics approach. It 
might allow us to deeply understand the political evolution of Gwangju marketing 
beyond the dualism of structure and agent urban political theories. In addition, it 
probably enables us to interpret the nature of political actors’ actions, discourses and 
language about place marketing projects within their contesting and conflicting 
political interactions. The third section of this chapter examined issues about the 
conducting of a survey such as raising the response rate, selecting experts, and 
constructing survey questions. Then, in the next section, we recognised the 
significance of case study in the thesis and examined the importance of the intensive 
interview for close encounter. In the final section, we examined several ethical issues 
like protecting research participant’s privacy and confidentiality, pre-informed 
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consent, and avoiding harmful activities to informants. As noted, we consider how 
this research was fully prepared and conducted to prevent ethical problems. 
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Chapter Five: Documentary Analysis on the Evolution of 
Place Marketing in the Korean Context 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
We have politically examined the evolution of place marketing policy by focusing on 
that of advanced Western cities and attempted to establish the methodology for the 
study. In this chapter, we attempt to move our attention to the analyses of evolving 
policy context of Korean place marketing as the start of the empirical work. In other 
words, I will critically analyse the Korean place marketing within the Korean (non-
Western) context since Korean cities have evolved in different political and economic 
situations and conditions. To do this, this section will discuss: 1) concerns about a 
marketing science approach, 2) Korean prejudice on place marketing in advanced 
cities, 3) possibility of evolving place marketing by policy transfer, and 4) applying 
limits of local-centred political theories to South Korea within the non-Western 
context. 
 
 
5.2 Concerns about a marketing science approach 
 
A marketing science approach has some limits in that it cannot investigate human 
relation networks in depth. In particular, it is difficult for social, economic and political 
relations between a number of actors and stakeholders and the engaged changing 
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process of place marketing strategy to be understood by the approach within an 
arena of urban politics and policy. Rather, there might be a little concern that 
duplication of place among cities tends to be easier under this approach. This is 
basically because of its product-centric marketing. The product-centric approach 
which usually depends on a reductionist method can show some big weaknesses for 
drawing out cultural values and identities, due to its excessive simplification and 
forging an authenticity, while it has advantages for enhancing the promotional 
message (Murray, 2001). The reductionist method is to simplify and reduce a 
complicated phenomenon. However, if a city marketer relies on the approach, 
diverse and multi-faceted qualities of place can be damaged. Thus, city marketing, 
based on the approach, might badly affect the evolution of itself. In this respect, 
Harvey (1989) argues as follows:  
 
“‘Many of the innovations and investments designed to make particular cities 
more attractive as cultural and consumer centres have quickly been imitated 
elsewhere, thus rendering any competitive advantage within a system of 
cities ephemeral (Harvey, 1989: 12).’” 
 
If Harvey’s indication is right, the value and effect of place marketing will inevitably 
decrease in urban policy. Moreover, it is problematic that the contribution of 
marketing science to urban place marketing resulting in the rapid diffusion of place 
imitation might be quite little in practice. Particularly in Korean cities, city authorities 
tend to heavily rely on marketing agencies which usually deal with corporate 
marketing and branding (Lee, 2008).  
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Even though examined in terms of place branding, there are also similar limits. As 
more and more cities use logos and slogans based on corporate branding 
techniques and skills, they might understand the narrowness of branding strategy. 
Externally, short bland words for city branding are restricted and a pool of symbolic 
logos which the human can memorise is also confined (Julier, 2005). Concerning this, 
it is not difficult to find examples in South Korea. For instance, ‘Happy Suwon’ and 
‘Happy 700’ (Pyeongchang) are similar. ‘Your Partner Gwangju’ (this is the slogan of 
Gwangju, case city in the thesis), ‘Your World Yeongwol’ and ‘Your Okcheon’ are 
also alike. In addition, ‘Yes! Uiwang’ and ‘Yes Gumi’ are the same, and ‘Gimhae for 
you’ and ‘Ulsan for you’ are almost the same. Thus, as Harvey indicates, if every city 
depends on urban place marketing based on marketing science, the effect of place 
marketing may be ephemeral. As a large amount of duplication of places and brand 
values is wide spread, the principle of manipulation for homogeneous space and 
image already works in contemporary cities. Place marketing and branding armed 
with marketing science skills could make urban practitioners strongly feel like 
copying other famous cases.  
 
In addition, the thesis has huge concern about the expansion of the market-mind in 
urban management. Just from a perspective of marketability, the humanistic 
meaning and value of various activities in our daily life such as sweat, pain and 
impression might be covered over or removed with programmed manipulation of 
image and brand. Then, only fictitious images from the view of marketing might be 
left in the real world, ultimately they can shape a ‘hyper-real’ place where the 
boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘simulacrum’ is blurred (Baudrillard, 1983; 
134 
 
Goodwin, 1993). Under such an environment, while some consumers backed up by 
abundant money to spend and a small number of the well-paid knowledge-workers in 
high-tech and creative sector are treated better, the majority of others such as 
disadvantaged people might be disregarded in the process of scientific and 
managerial city marketing (Boisen, 2007). 
 
There are a few more concerning phenomena in place branding. Firstly, it is its 
holistic approach by the top-down method. Actually, a holistic approach might not be 
necessarily bad. However, a serious problem in place branding is its top-down 
approach which seeks to manage an extreme variety of city spaces and residents’ 
activities for only one place brand or identity. It has a risk of the uniformity for many 
components in a city. As Bitterman (2008:249) says, “[p]aradoxically place brands 
ultimately suppress rather than encourage multiplicity and choice.” Extremely 
uniform and controlling policies for places, architecture and human behaviours by the 
top-down approach in place branding, as Hagen and Ostergen (2006) criticises in 
the case of Nuremberg of Nazi Germany, might be a tool only for celebrating and 
advertising the current political regime and its leaders. In this respect, sometimes 
cultures and histories, for place marketing or branding, might be thoroughly 
manufactured just for a political purpose.  
 
Secondly, as shown in Anholt’s brand index, which is a ranking of cities based on 
city brand value, it could probably intensify the inter-city competition. In association 
with this phenomenon, McCann’s study (2004) is full of suggestions. He analyses 
that the effect of ranking announcements in popular publications such as ‘Money’ 
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and ‘Fortune’ on urban growth coalitions in US cities. He argues that such rankings 
strongly affect the activities of local business and political leaders. Moreover, he also 
indicates that urban economic and political elites are making urban policies which 
are dependent on the evaluating criteria of powerful media, and in the process of 
making policies, there is little room for considering other alternatives or 
counterproposals. Similarly, these problems might be applied to place branding. For 
example, the Local Brand Competitiveness Index created by one of popular media in 
South Korea (Jungang Daily Newspaper) and a private group (Korean Local Brand 
Forum) has ranked every regional and local brand in South Korea since 2009. A 
number of cities and the mass media are increasingly paying attention to this ranking. 
If the competition for ranking between cities is intensified further, priorities of urban 
policy might also be uniform as they copy best practice in South Korea.  
 
If cities seek to pursue a unique marketing which is different from marketing science 
ones, at first, they should explore something locally cultural and distinctive. Places 
which we live in do not exist only with physical architecture and landscape: places of 
cities lie in the social and political interaction and relational network of the human 
(Lefebvre, 1974). According to his opinion, urban places for everyday life might be 
social and political rather than scientific not related to ideology or politics.  
 
In this respect, Goodwin (1993:150) indicates that all meaning of city places for 
residents are not congruent with that of a city manager or marketer through the 
following examples. “A closed steel works, or an abandoned dockyard, means 
something completely different to a redundant worker than it does to a property 
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developer or to a local politician.” Neo-liberal activities for the production and 
domination of space could deeply affect citizens’ daily life. In addition, as Paddison 
(1993) notes, marketing projects tend to emphasise positive images, intentionally 
excluding negative ones. Place-making often expresses the features of cultural 
politics involving conflicts among different groups, due to their conflicting intentions 
and meanings for place-making, within the process of selection and exclusion of 
such place marketing policy (McCann, 2002). Thus, as examined in the previous 
section, many changes resulting from urban place marketing policies and flagship 
projects such as increasing spatial polarisation, disadvantage groups’ alienation and 
blurred city identities can be recognised only by the political and cultural approach to 
urban places. As Bianchini and Ghilardi (2007:6) point out, place marketing and 
branding policies based on marketing science should be “seen as a truly creative 
rather than mechanical, formulaic processes.” City marketers and policy makers 
need more political efforts to discuss and coordinate conflicting interests in the 
process of making and implementing place marketing policy. Moreover, they should 
consider city places as cultural and daily spaces filled with residents’ needs, desires 
and emotions in order to have them feel a high cultural quality of life. However, due 
to lack of this approach in the literature of marketing science approaches, despite its 
advantage of rapid dispersion of forging a contrived sense of place and values, it is 
likely to present little help for developing the creative evolution of place marketing 
policy. 
 
 
5.3 Korean prejudice on place marketing in advanced cities 
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As observed in the previous chapters (2.3.4), it took only 10 years for approximately 
1,100 local cultural festivals to be held annually in Korean cities after the introduction 
of place marketing. In recent years, most Korean city authorities have earnestly 
imported place marketing policies without critical analysis under the reckless belief 
that they will guarantee success. Thus, there seems a firm belief that place 
marketing will lead to successful urban growth and wealth. In particular, it is no 
wonder that place marketing and branding is almost taken as common sense among 
Korean city leaders and urban policy practitioners. Why has inter-urban competition 
of a western-centric view of place marketing between cities been so popular since 
the late 1990s? What makes it considered as the ‘only alternative’ for local economic 
development or a ‘panacea’ for a variety of urban ills? 
 
Regarding this passion of Korean city leaders and policy makers for place marketing, 
Harvey’s (2005) argument about the problems of neo-liberalism presents a keen 
insight to us in his book, ‘A Brief History of Neo-liberalisation’. He suggests two 
reasons about ‘why neo-liberalisation has been so successful’ even though it has 
showed us (ibid:156) a poor outcome in terms of overall economic growth and social 
welfare in the world. First is “the fact that ‘success’ was to be had somewhere 
obscured the fact that neo-liberalisation was generally failing to stimulate growth or 
improve well-being. Secondly, neo-liberalisation….. has been a huge success from 
the standpoint of the upper classes (ibid).” He also indicates that media dominated 
by ruling class interests have consistently diffused and reproduced myth for neo-
liberal reforms. 
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I think we can apply Harvey’s insight to Korean political leaders’ passion for 
advanced cities’ place marketing and branding.  
First, cases of failure in terms of the marketing of places have not been made known 
to the public while a few successful cases have been well recognised. For example, 
some cases like Glasgow and Bilbao are recognised as ‘successful’ (yet, how much 
these are successful is arguable) while other disappointing place marketing policies 
have rarely been circulated by the media. In particular, though some cities invested 
as many resources as Glasgow or Bilbao, they are not as prominent in the literature 
due to their poor or negative results. In addition, Prestige projects like mega-events, 
flagship museums and large-scale international festivals often face financial crises in 
a time of recession. Sometimes, successful stories of cities might be inflated or 
exaggerated by the political leader and public officials. The estimates of projects in 
terms of economic effect tend to grow larger because they are probably used for 
supporting data. The similar logic might also be applied to the process of evaluating 
them. Ambiguous indexes might be employed for defending the validity of projects 
through many intangible figures such as the improvement of image or brand value 
and the degree of tourists’ understanding. For instance, the Jeonnam Provincial 
government in South Korea hosted a Formula One Grand Prix in 2007, arguing that 
it will be a growth engine for Jeonnam Province. Drawing on three agency’s 
preliminary validity evaluations chosen by the government, the Jeonnam authorities 
expected its operational profit would be over 60 million pounds over seven years. 
They pushed for the project, and in the end, the first game was held in Youngam 
within the Jeonnam Province October in 2010. Recently, however, according to BAI’s 
(Board of Audit and Inspection) audit result about it, its actual result was terrible. In 
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2011, BAI announced that “if the Provincial government keep it to 2016 (over 7 
years), it will bring about over 271 million pounds of operational loss and become a 
double burden on the regional financial system (Newsis newspaper, 28th July 2011).  
 
Regarding official statistics and information, Hoggart (2002:111) and his associates 
note that they might be manipulated by politicians or government officials, because 
they can be a tool for measuring their personal performance. In addition, as their 
sources are from their own perspectives, they argue that official figures are often 
biased (ibid). This tendency can be identified in Korean urban place marketing 
projects. For instance, Jung (2008) indicates that the impact of mega-events in many 
Korean cities has frequently been inflated. He suggests that many institutes and 
research agencies in South Korea tended to fabricate statistics or distort 
interpretations about the economic impact of mega-events in order to meet end 
user’s demand. According to him, nonetheless, such study results and 
interpretations were diffused by media without appropriate filtering processes and 
criticisms, which led the public to believe them.  
 
Second, from an urban elite’s standpoint, the fact that they push ahead such large 
projects is a success for their own class. The reason is that such projects are usually 
fitted with their economic and political interest (Philo and Kearns, 1993). In particular, 
many city leaders made a variety of festivals and events in an attempt to produce 
visible achievements for the next election (Kim, 2008). However, it is likely that some 
flagship projects have little positive effect on the daily life of many city dwellers. On 
the contrary, sometimes they have to endure disadvantages such as increased tax 
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and the reduction of public services and welfare which result from the implementing 
projects. In addition, city elites tend to disregard other people’s meaning of place and 
sometimes, even get rid of its historical character and practices that have continued 
in a place for years and the history of the people who lived, worked, struggled, and 
dreamed in there. As Hudson says, “[t]he point is that for these people [who actually 
lived there] the locality is not just a space in which to work for a wage but a place 
where they were born, went to school, have friends and relations.; places where they 
are socialised human beings rather than just the commodity labour-power and, as a 
result, places to which they have become deeply attached (Hudson, 1988:493-4, 
Cited in Philo and Kearns, 1993:17).” Marketing policies preferred by city ruling elites 
have often diluted and erased historical, social and political meanings of urban 
places in Korean cities. Thus, a recklessly optimistic view of Korean place marketing 
practitioners and literature should be modified towards a more comprehensive and 
balanced view. When policy makers attempt to make a decision on place marketing 
policies, they should consider thoroughly possible problems such as increasing gap 
between advantaged groups and disadvantaged ones, the spatial divide between the 
project area and the rest of the region, the loss of historical meaning of places and 
the difficulty of financing in economic crises by virtue of reckless marketing projects. 
 
Myth tends to be made by showing a part of the fact and, hiding the rest. As we have 
seen, the myth of Western place marketing in South Korea is likewise. Many Korean 
experts and media have not often shown its failures and disadvantages while still 
introducing its best practices. Thus, it seems the advanced place marketing strategy 
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has been partially recognised as an ideal destination for many Korean political 
leaders and policy makers to follow in South Korea. 
 
5.4 The possibility of evolving place marketing by policy transfer 
 
In South Korea, there are no studies on the evolution of place marketing from the 
view of policy transfer yet. Many Korean cities have followed famous examples of 
advanced cities’ place marketing policies, just as many British cities had learned 
from the US and particularly from Baltimore’s example. As such, the phenomenon of 
policy transfer might have an effect on the evolution of place marketing. This 
involves the relationship between the mobility of urban policy and the place 
marketing policy development in a city where they are importing the policy. Thus, I 
think it is possible to investigate the embedding process of foreign examples into 
Korean cities in association with policy transfer. Regarding this, two critical things 
can be suggested in the context of Korean politics and economy.  
 
Firstly, the main attention tends to be paid to only ‘transfer’ in relating literature while 
other things such as modification and conflict are relatively disregarded in the 
process of policy moves (Cook and Ward, 2010). However, Cook et al,. who studied 
the case of Manchester’s Commonwealth and Olympic Games projects conclude this 
is not true. According to their research, many people who visited Manchester from 
other countries do not copy the case of Manchester but synthesise a number of 
examples (including Manchester) comparing and adjusting their strategies to their 
own national and urban situation. Thus, some foreign examples might be similarly 
modified and involved in the struggles in the evolving process of Korean place 
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marketing. Furthermore, the literature of policy transfer from political science tends to 
neglect the political background or reasons. It is required to examine how the 
phenomenon of policy transfer can be connected with the urban political situation, 
since large-scale marketing projects in Korean cities have often been launched for 
certain political purposes of city leaders. The process of policy transfer might be 
linked to a politician’s interests rather than merely a rational formation of policy and 
lesson-drawing from the perspective of political science, as much power is typically 
concentrated on the political leader of the city like the mayor in Korean urban politics.  
 
Secondly, many Korean researchers and experts have introduced the diverse place 
marketing policies of advanced capitalist cities through Korean literature of urban 
policy. In particular, they have suggested only a selection of cases which they think 
successful while neglecting their (specifically social and political) problems. In 
addition, there was little literature to introduce or suggest examples from abroad 
which were experiencing difficulty or failure. This researcher and expert behaviour 
may urge Korean city leaders and policy makers to rush enthusiastically to follow 
foreign best practices. For example, Lee (2006) suggests marketing campaigns such 
as I Love NY and Glasgow’s Miles Better and large-scale development like 
Docklands in London and Minato Mirai 21 in Yokohama as successful ones. Seo and 
Bae (2005) argue that I Love NY, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Tate Modern 
in London, and the Pompidou in France were all successful and we have to learn 
from their success factors. Chang and Park (2005) also suggest London, Tokyo, 
New York and Singapore as successful branding cities in their book of ‘Reinventing 
Places’. Uhr (2011) cites Docklands (in London), Minato Mirai 21 (in Yokohama), 
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Battery Park City (in New York) as successful waterfront developments. As such, 
most researchers and experts seem to suggest similar successful cases. In addition, 
none of them consider the problems (including possible ones) in detail.  
 
However, these often cited cases do also have some negative points. For example, if 
we examine the case of the London Dockland development and Glasgow’s 
European City of Culture which are well known as successes in South Korea, due to 
this development the property prices of the site and neighbouring areas were rose 
highly. Then, many native residents and workers who lived there were forced to be 
displaced (Short, 1996). Thus, many allied groups like ‘Dockland Forum’ which 
represented over 60 small local groups struggled against the vision of LDDC 
(London Dockland Development Corporations), and alternative citizen groups such 
as ‘Worker’s City in Glasgow’ conflicted with city authorities in Glasgow (Boyle and 
Hughes, 1991; Goodwin, 1993). Nonetheless, there was little Korean literature about 
these social and political problems in the cities.  
 
Thus, the partial introduction and suggestion of Korean place marketing researchers 
and experts who use these examples might build prejudice in support of or create a 
success myth for place marketing policies in the example cities. As Peck (2001) 
points out, this tendency might not only be associated with internal domestic 
dynamics such as market-friendly public officials and policy (expert) networks but 
also, ultimately, contribute to the cause of a neo-liberal transformation of many 
Korean cities.  
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5.5 Examination on applying limits of local-centred political theories to 
South Korea 
 
Local political theories such as growth machine and urban regime might be useful to 
explain the internal dynamic of the politics of local growth, whilst structural 
approaches have faced criticisms of its economic determinism or reductionism which 
deal with human agents as passive ones (Hall, 2006:26) in economic structures. 
However, as observed in the previous chapter (3.4), they cannot adequately provide 
an explanation about the fundamental macro mechanism relationship between local 
and national governments, and the local and the global as they tend to focus on only 
narrow human actions for economic development within the local.  
 
Contemporary cities are experiencing many political, economic, cultural, and social 
changes within the transformation of globalisation and neo-liberalisation. Thus, we 
need to situate the politics of local economic development in the wider context of 
transforming conditions. However, the narrow scale of local-centred and sub-national 
perspectives might not enable us to explore such broad conditions. Moreover, 
current neo-liberalism is not operated only in a spatial scale like the local. It deploys 
in and through multiple scales though the most important scale is the urban. 
Furthermore, the evolving context of Korean urban politics might be deeply 
understood when it is explored and investigated in relationship with the nation state 
since local states have traditionally low levels of political autonomy in South Korea in 
comparison with the US where urban theories on New Urban Politics was born, and 
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they don’t have enough experiences of local politics by virtue of the late introduction 
of the local self-governing system. Additionally, a number of city governments are 
heavily dependent upon central support in terms of financial funds.  
 
In conclusion, I think a multi-scalar approach should be applied in the thesis in order 
to explore the changing political context of place marketing policy under the wider 
condition of globalisation (for example, the ‘Segyehwa’ policy of Kim Young-sam 
Government, see 7.4.3) and neo-liberal transformation, as well as examining it in 
relationship with central government since macro and structural forces like neo-
liberalisation do not work only on one spatial scale but are deployed in and through 
diverse scales (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).  
 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I sought to generally and critically analyse the evolution of place 
marketing policies within the Korean (non-Western) context as the start of the 
empirical work. Firstly, there are some concerns about the marketing science 
approach. The approach might bring about homogenisation of city places and other 
urban components, and its effect is typically transitory. Recently, the emerging 
strategy of place branding also has serious problems, which are its top-down 
approach and city brand index. The former possibly contributes to uniformity in cities, 
and the latter could stimulate inter-urban competition. Second is the possible 
prejudice or blind belief of city leaders and policy makers for the success myth of 
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place marketing in advanced capitalist cities - in particular, Western and Japanese 
cities. The reason why such myths can be made in South Korea was examined 
drawing on Harvey’s insight upon neo-liberalism. Thirdly, we explored the possibility 
of the evolution of place marketing by policy transfer in connection with the Korean 
urban context. I suggested a possible idea that policy transfer in the context of 
Korean urban politics might be caused by political interests of city leaders or 
politicians. Finally, in order to overcome the limits of local-centric political theories of 
urban growth, I indicated that we need to explore the wider political and economic 
conditions or structural forces. In so doing, I re-suggested the need of a new 
approach such as a multi-scalar one.  
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Chapter Six: Understanding General Korean Context of 
Urban Politics and Overall Trends in Place Marketing 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of the results of the first approach to understand 
the evolution of Korean place marketing in the thesis. As already noted in chapter 4 
(4.2), we examine the general contexts of national and urban aspects, and identifies 
the overall tendency of Korean place marketing. The next section examines the 
Korean context of urban politics such as a transitional urban society, the legacy of a 
developmental state, and the late introduction of a local autonomy system. The third 
analyses the implications of the survey findings. I expect the survey will enable us to 
identify and understand the overall trends and general contour of Korean place 
marketing in comparison with that of older industrialised countries. The final section 
suggests a brief summary. The ultimate intention of this chapter is to deeply 
understand the case study, thus it can be regarded as preliminary research for the 
case study. 
 
 
6.2 Some general contexts about Korean urban politics 
 
After Japan’s colonial rule (1910-48) and the Korean War (1950-53), South Korea 
was left as a very poor agricultural society. However, it has quickly transformed into 
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a late industrial country since the 1960s. It was the military coup of Park Jung-hee 
from which such transformation starts because he established the political and 
economic basis of South Korea as an authoritarian developmental and centrally-
concentrated state. Drawing on Korean literature of politics and political geography 
(Ahn, 2006; Cho, 1999; Choi, 2007; Sonn, 2010), I summarise the characteristics of 
Korean society and politics from the 1960s to the 1980s in the following three points: 
1) authoritarian military autocracy; 2) developmental state’s rapid industrialisation; 
and 3) centrally-concentrated political and administrative system. However, these 
have also transformed into a democratic, less industrialised (than Western countries 
and Japan), and (developmental) neo-liberalising state within the process of 
historical events such as democratisation in 1987; the introduction of local self-
governing system in 1995; and the Asian economic crisis in 1997. 
 
 
Transitional urban society (influenced by rapid industrialisation and 
democratisation) 
 
As Bae and Sellers (2007) indicates, South Korea has experienced extremely rapid 
industrialisation by authoritarian military regime. Consequently, as Harvey 
(2005:107) suggests, South Korea’s “[p]er capita income was less than $ 100 in 
1960 but now stands at more than $ 12,000. This astonishing economic performance 
is often cited as the perfect example of what any developmental state might do.” This 
very fast industrialisation has been accompanied by rapid urbanisation. These 
political and economic conditions have meant that Korean cities represent a very 
transitional society. In addition, since democratisation in 1987 (see 7.3.3 for more 
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depth), another essential dynamic change in urban politics was the growing power of 
civic society. In the 1990s, it resulted in a number of civic movements in diverse 
fields like labour and the environment. For example, there were 1,026 conflicts 
between labour and management from 1981 to 1986, but in just 1987, 3,749 labour 
conflicts took place (Park, 2005). Additionally, this expansion of labour movements in 
cities greatly influenced the establishment of a national labour union (Korean 
Confederation of Trade Union) in 1995 and labour’s political party in 2000 
(Democratic Labour Party).  
 
However, this trend of civic society gradually comes into conflict with increasing pro-
growth activities of the local elite who usually are based on landed proprietors in 
urban politics since the introduction of the local autonomy system in 1995. As Bae 
and Sellers (ibid) argue, this transitional Korean urban society might make Korean 
urban politics have different qualities as well as similar ones in comparison with that 
of Western cities. One similar aspect is to allow the emergence of elite coalitions 
based on local proprietors which resemble local growth coalitions in some Western 
cities. By contrast, a distinctive quality of Korean cities is that the coalition is usually 
a Mayor-centred one rather than business-led one (ibid). Cho (1999) argues that 
‘Korean urban politics’ has been open along with state restructuring (from 
authoritarian developmental to democratic state) since the democratisation of 1987. 
He also claims that there remains the influence of state-centred politics in cities on 
the one hand, while (somewhat rudimentary) Western components of ‘New Urban 
Politics’ have been increasingly unfolded with globalisation in city politics on the 
other (ibid:45). As such, Korean urban politics has shown a transitional quality partly 
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similar and partly different from that of Western cities by virtue of the mixture of rapid 
industrialisation, democratisation and localisation (introduction of the local self-
governing system). 
 
Remaining legacy of the developmental state: growth-first and Statist policy 
 
In terms of politics, since the 1960s, South Korea has been a developmental state 
which was characterised by a growth-first policy led by the state and authoritarian 
regime. Authoritarianism was transformed into democracy in 1987 (Sonn, 2010). In 
the mid-1990s, the developmental state increasingly experienced another change 
due to the wider political and economic conditions of globalisation which resulted 
from growing pressure of the US on South Korea for liberalisation of trade and the 
voluntary globalisation policy of the Kim Young-sam government. In 1997, South 
Korea experienced additional fundamental change through the Asian economic crisis. 
In terms of the economic system, it was a crucial background for South Korea as a 
developmental state to be restructured into neo-liberal economic mechanisms (ibid). 
In particular, it has rapidly transformed towards neo-liberalism since the economic 
crisis (1997-8). Ji (2011) also argues that the neo-liberalisation of the Korean political 
economy system as an authoritative developmental state has been achieved through 
the Asian economic crisis of 1998. However, he claims that the origin of Korean neo-
liberalism was senior public officials acting as market-fundamentalists in the central 
government economic organisation who had studied Economics in the US. He points 
out that they tried to launch the globalisation policy of the Kim Young-sam 
administration, yet they failed to achieve a more flexible labour market. He argues 
that it meant the failure of the nation state’s effort for voluntary neo-liberalisation. 
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However, according to him, they actively accepted and pushed neo-liberal reform 
measures (like financial liberalisation, opening the financial services market, and the 
deregulation of labour relations, etc) forced by the IMF and the US Treasury. He 
asserts that the neo-liberalisation of Korean economy has been gradually 
accomplished not only by the coercive reform pressure of the IMF and the US 
Treasury but also by active collusion of Korean economic officials with market 
fundamentalism. 
 
Recently, Jang Ha-jun, a professor in the University of Cambridge criticised the 
phenomenon of neo-liberalisation in South Korea which emerged about 10 years ago, 
describing:  
 
“As our country abandoned previous policies and embraced neo-liberalism 
since the Asian economic crisis, all Koreans thought ‘now, we also gain 
qualifications and get advantage for competition.’ Even though they made 
every effort to get qualifications for competition as much as the word of ‘be 
wealthy’ was popular in the society, the result was the reverse after 10 years. 
Rather, economic growth deteriorated, and the gap between the rich and 
poor was expanded….. Most people were dry and tough to live only except 
the 5% of top upper class (Hangyre-Sinmun [Newspaper], 6th March 2011).” 
 
Likewise, Harvey (2005) indicates developmental countries in East Asia like South 
Korea have quickly joined the transformation toward neo-liberalisation since the 
Asian economic crisis of 1997.  
 
Globalisation has influenced the radical change of advanced Western countries from 
the Keynesian Welfare National State to a Schumpeterian Workfare State as the 
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accumulation system of capital has conversed from Fordism to more flexible 
accumulation systems (Jessop, 2002). However, an attempt to make this political 
and economic transformation of Western countries to apply directly to South Korea 
might create some mistakes since there were few qualities of a welfare state in the 
country. From this view, the important aspect in Korean politics might be the 
authoritative developmental character, which is dependent upon a growth-first policy 
that only pursues growth at the expense of other values like human rights, 
democracy and concern for the environment (Sonn, 2011). As such, the traditional 
base of a developmental state with recently added neo-liberal components has 
influenced the Korean urban economy and its politics. In recent years, Bae and 
Sellers (2007) concluded in their case study on Goyang city in South Korea that a 
Mayor-centred growth coalition (in contrast to the US business-led growth coalition) 
has emerged in the city due to the tradition of the developmental state (excessive 
state intervention). Under the legacy of the developmental state, the recognition that 
the state should lead local development and that local development typically means 
the economy was established in Korean cities. Thus, we can assume the legacy of 
the developmental state has strongly affected the evolution of place marketing policy 
in Korean cities.  
 
Late introduction of Local Autonomy 
 
In South Korea, the introduction of a local self-governing system was relatively late 
compared to advanced Western countries because there was an old tradition of 
highly centralised government and the institutional establishment of a 
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decentralisation system was completed in 1995. As Kang points out regarding this 
situation,  
 
“States such as our country which have a strongly embedded tradition of 
centralism needs localisation….. However, though we have experienced it 
[over 15 years], there is still a tendency of centralism by virtue of central 
government and politician’s will for vested interest, local politics’ dependency 
upon central one, and citizens’ lack of attention to localisation and local self-
governing, etc (2011:29).” 
 
Thus, it appears local governments are still dependent upon central government. 
Local finance has had a dependent structure as local government’s revenue has 
usually been increased by subsidy from central government. In general, the degree 
of local government’s self-reliance was not high yet. According to Seo (2005), in 
South Korea the proportion of national and local tax is 80 and 20 per cent while the 
ratio is 60 and 40 per cent in many advanced countries like the US, Japan and 
Germany. Additionally, under the old tradition of central concentration, Korean 
central authorities have been inactive in the devolution of financial authority.  
 
It is difficult for many Korean cities to push large-scale marketing projects without 
central government’s support. Thus, many local governments have made great 
efforts to secure grants from the nation state. In the process, city leaders tend to 
launch local economic development projects in combination with local proprietors 
who have close relations with central politicians and government officials. Many 
Korean city leaders have run decision making on development projects since they 
were too powerful in the local politics. Sometimes, they have power because they 
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have close relations with key central politicians and government officials. And also, 
they have enough financial power and institutional network with local economic elite 
groups in order to expand their own political interests such as election. Thus, for 
example, Kim criticises Korean local politics and economic development policies, 
saying that  
 
“Local political leaders tend to employ [a local self-governing system] in order 
to enlarge their politics rather than to improve community development by 
mobilising pro-corporation policies and marketing projects with certain a 
political purpose (2011:276).” 
 
Therefore, we can regard the majority of city governments in South Korea as 
situated under the influence of powerful central government. In addition, despite 
central government-dependent local finance, many city leaders have frequently 
pushed place marketing projects which might be considered as being a mere display 
for their own political interests. 
 
 
6.3 Overall trends of place marketing from survey findings 
 
 
I will now analyse the key findings by discussing the results from the most pertinent 
questions. The data from other questions not considered here was used to inform 
the wider contextual material on Korean place marketing.  
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The emergence of Korean place marketing within the context of the local self-
governing system and globalisation 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, most respondents (70.6%) stated that the introduction of a 
local self-government system and the expansion of autonomy in local government 
are the most important background factors to the emergence of place marketing in 
Korean cities.  
 
Table 6.1 Background to the emergence of place marketing 
 
 
Expert response 
 
Ratio 
 
The introduction of a local self-governing system and the 
expansion of autonomy in local government 
24 (70.6%) 
 
The response of local government in order to overcome  
deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic 
restructuring 
5 (14.7%) 
The effect of urban entrepreneurialism in which local authorities 
behave like private companies 
3 (8.8%) 
In order to make achievement of city leaders since the introduction of 
local self-governing system 
1 (2.9%) 
The postmodern socialisation and the increasing effect of visual 
media and advertising 
0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
Then, relatively fewer experts (14.7%) indicated the response of local government to 
overcome deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic 
restructuring.  
 
This result can be interpreted as follows. The characteristic of authoritarianism in a 
regime of an authoritarian developmental state has been weakened by the 
democratisation of the 1980s. Then, the Kim Young-sam administration which took 
power pushed globalisation (in Korean, ‘Segyehwa’) policies in a coalition with the 
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previous military groups from the mid-1990s. For instance, the Korean government 
endeavoured to brashly join the OECD, and achieved it in spite of the resistance of 
many labour organisations and social movement activists. At that time, Korean 
central authorities greatly influenced urban politics in two manners. One was the 
introduction of the local self-governing system, and the other was to push ahead the 
policy of globalisation. The former was to provide political autonomy to city 
governments, and the latter was the early neo-liberal direction of the nation state to 
make cities become entrepreneurial. Due to these, promotional place marketing 
policies rapidly diffused into many cities, and the Gwangju Biennale (which will be 
observed in Chapter 7) was also launched in this period. However, some market-
friendly measures of the Kim’s administration (such as deregulation of employment 
protection and privatisation of public corporations, etc) were frustrated by strong 
labour unions. Nonetheless, this time (when globalisation policies were launched by 
the Kim Young-sam government) can be regarded as a rudimentary stage for neo-
liberalisation (Choi, 2012), since a different style of accumulation regime from 
previous developmental state had been attempted by mobilising neo-liberal policies 
like globalisation, dissolution of chaebols [Korean conglomerates], deregulation of 
labour protection, and financial liberalisation (Ahn and Ryu, 2010). 
 
In particular, the introduction of self-governing system strongly influenced many local 
governments in two ways (politically and economically) since it brought out the shift 
of much part of political and economic power from the central government to local 
government.  
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Firstly, in terms of politics, the introduction of the new local autonomy system 
resulted in the rise of very strong city mayors in local politics because we Koreans 
never have experienced local autonomy in our long history. It might be understood 
as the unique Korean (non-Western type of) transformation from a central-led 
political and administrative statistic system to a new oligarchical system which 
political and administrative power excessively centrated on the City Mayor. Because 
City Mayor had much power in the arena of local politics after introducing local 
autonomy whilst related democratic processes and mechanisms like City Council 
and civic organisations had not enough capacity to keep checks and balances. For 
example, following Yoon’s (2011) study results (interviews with some local journalists 
in Gwangju) can show us the relationship between City Mayor as a very powerful 
leader and City Councillors as its inadequate checking rivals.  
 
“[City Mayor] is the President. He/She is like a local President. I think it is 
natural. Political power is inevitably concentrated in the hands of City Mayor 
because he/she is elected person [who is quite different from the previous 
appointed Mayors by central government] (Yoon, 2011:26).” 
 
“Some people openly say that ‘Even 000, the chair of the City Parliament is a 
secretary of 000, the City Mayor’. Most City Councillors belongs to the same 
[Political] Party. The City Mayor, 000 is an elder stateman in the Party. Many 
City Councillors have to read his countenance, so they have to be the yes 
person for the City Mayor’s policy (Yoon, 2011:28).” 
 
Secondly, since the new system of local autonomy, local authorities have much 
economic power in using financial resources independently, which it means that City 
Mayor have a wide range of discretion on how to spend funds of local government. 
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As a result, it has led to rapidly increasing local marketing projects in many Korean 
cities.  
 
Increasing use of cultural instruments in place marketing policy 
 
Respondents of the survey were asked to ascertain how they understand changing 
degrees of concern for cultural means within urban place marketing between the 
1990s and the present. Most respondents (64.7%) stated that cultural instruments 
have sharply increased (see Table 6.2). Then, the response of ‘gradually increased’ 
was 35.3%. However, there were no answers for ‘no change’ or a ‘decrease’. This 
might show a trend that the importance of cultural components has expanded within 
the practical policy field of place marketing in South Korea. 
 
Table 6.2 Degree of concern for cultural tools in place marketing 
 
 
Expert response 
 
Ratio 
Sharply increased 22 (64.7%) 
Gradually increased 12 (35.3%) 
Steadily no changed 0 (0.0%) 
Gradually decreased 0 (0.0%) 
Sharply decreased 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
Furthermore, growing attention to cultural tools for place marketing might have 
contributed to the increase of inter-city competition and city authorities’ 
entrepreneurial activities. In association with this, Kim Gyuwon indicates as follows: 
 
“Lately, when I took part in a forum in Gwangju, I heard that an urban 
planning expert announced [something about place marketing]. It was the 
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fact that currently, city centres of all large core cities in our country were 
quickly declining. The conclusion was only for ‘culture’ to revitalise and boost 
these urban centres and the task was very urgent in urban policy….. Many 
cities started to pursue making ‘money’ employing a showy culture. So, large 
concert halls and museums were built, sometimes they were not fitted with 
local residents’ demands and situations….. Sometimes, large-scale 
expenditure started popular as they were called ‘prestige plan’ or ‘flagship 
project’ (2005:25-6).” 
 
Thus, through these results, we can recognise that Korean cities have increasingly 
paid attention to and employed cultural instruments for place marketing, and it has 
led to competitive consuming of money by local governments.  
 
 
Characteristics of power relations in place marketing policy 
 
One of the ways to deeply understand the mechanism of local governance is to 
examine power relations among local policy actors. All survey results about this topic 
might show the diverse qualities of Korean place marketing. In this section, however, 
I briefly suggest two points which differentiated the Korean situation from the 
business-led growth coalitions of many US cities.  
 
Firstly, the role of city leaders such as mayors might be bigger than that of Western 
city leaders in place marketing policy. The survey results (see Table 6.3) revealed 
that the most important actor has been the city mayor and government since the 
1990s. In terms of place marketing policy, a majority of Korean experts chose them 
as the most influential people or organisation between the 1990s (67.6%) and 2011 
160 
 
(50.0%). This might result from the different structure of local government in Korean. 
Korean city administrative governments have ultimate responsibility for local 
administration (and the city council only have power to audit and check it in South 
Korea) such as in the presidential system, while British city councils usually have 
such responsibility. In addition, another interesting thing is that the second influential 
actor was central government in the 1990s. Recently, however, it was converted to a 
partnership organisation. Thus, we can see a trend that the most important player 
has been the city government and mayor within an arena of urban policy over less 
than 20 years, and partnership organisations and civic groups have been gaining an 
influence in recent years. 
 
Table 6.3 Most influential actor within urban place marketing 
 
 
(1990s) 
 
Mayor and City Government 23 (67.6%) 
Central Government 9 (26.5%) 
Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce    1 (2.9%) 
Artist groups 1 (2.9%) 
City Council    0 (0.0%) 
Partnership organisation    0 (0.0%) 
Civic groups    0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Mayor and City Government 17 (50.0%) 
Partnership organisation 15 (44.1%) 
Civic groups    2 (5.9%) 
Central Government 0 (0.0%) 
City Council    0 (0.0%) 
Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce    0 (0.0%) 
Artist groups    0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
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Many authors on urban politics in South Korea (Park, 2004; Park, et. al., 1999; Ji and 
Ryu, 2005; Lee, 2011) have suggested that the city mayor is an influential actor. 
Then, they have suggested the central government or city elites as the next 
influential actor. Similarly, my survey result showed us that the city mayor and 
government has been the most important player in the arena of urban politics. Many 
Korean authors argue that highly concentrated centralised administrative and 
financial systems resulted in such a phenomenon. For example, Park et. al. (1999) 
analyses the power structure of local communities (Cheongju, Pyeongtaek, 
Sungnam, Jinju, and Bucheon city) through interview and survey methods. They 
conclude that the most influential group in Korean city politics was the city leader 
rather than the city’s economic elites. Park (2004) also concludes that the city mayor 
and by-mayor were very powerful, and the next most powerful group were central 
government officials and politicians. Thus, drawing on these results, we might 
assume that political city leaders and government officials rather than local economic 
elites have influence on the process of urban place marketing. 
 
The second distinct feature is that the relationship with central government is very 
important in the politics of local economic development such as place marketing 
projects because central authorities are still very powerful in planning regulation and 
allocating financial resources even since the introduction of local self-governing 
system. As already observed in the previous section, the late local self-governing 
system and highly centralised administrative tradition might result in much regulative 
power remaining in central government. Additionally, the local finance base is usually 
vulnerable to large-scale projects such as international sport events or flagship 
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projects, and thus, it has led to a central government-dependent financial structure in 
many cities. Therefore, the evolving process of Korean place marketing policy should 
be analysed within the relational context with central government. 
 
Transfer of place marketing policy into Korea 
 
At first, in terms of policy ideas of urban place marketing in Korea, most Korean 
experts (see Table 6.4, 76.5%) stated that city authorities and agencies obtained the 
ideas from other cities or other advanced countries’ examples. Respondents 
expressed that the second source (11.8%) of ideas was research findings of 
institutes. However, support of the rest of the opinions such as a private economic 
group or company suggestion (5.9%) and citizens’ idea challenge (2.9%) was 
relatively little. Thus, according to this result, we can see that Korean city authorities 
tend to utilise other cities’ successful cases rather than to make creative alternatives 
by themselves when they examine policy alternatives. 
 
Table 6.4 Origin of ideas for place marketing activities 
 
 
Expert response 
 
Ratio 
Other cities’ (including other countries) successful case 26 (76.5%) 
The result of institute research 4 (11.8%) 
Private economic group or company suggestion 2 (5.9%) 
Citizen’s suggestion such as idea challenge 1 (2.9%) 
No response 1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
In addition, according to the survey, it was identified that many Korean experts 
thought Korean cities has often considered and applied other countries’ place 
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marketing policies. As seen in Table 6.5, most respondents stated that Korean city 
authorities very often (47.1%) or often (47.1%) utilise other country’s marketing 
policies. In addition, of their responses, ‘occasionally’ had only 5.9 per cent and there 
was no negative reply of ‘rarely’ and ‘never’. This confirms our earlier conclusion of 
the policy transfer literature which pointed out that the adoption of examples from 
other countries is widespread.  
 
Table 6.5 Frequency in applying other country’s place marketing policy 
 
 
Expert response 
 
Ratio 
Very often 16 (47.1%) 
Often 16 (47.1%) 
Occasionally 2 (5.9%) 
Rarely 0 (0.0%) 
Never 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
Which country is usually examined by Korean cities? As suggested in Table 6.6, a 
majority of Korean experts chose ‘Japan’ (55.9%) as a popular benchmarking object 
for city marketing policy. Then, the second and third response was ‘UK’ (23.5%) and 
‘USA’ (17.6%).  
 
For the South Korea, Japan was was the dictatorial authority during the time of 
colonial rule (1910-1945) and it was the precedent country of Westernisation in the 
Aisa. This table can provide us the evidence of Korean marketing policy transferred 
from advanced (Western or early Westernised [like Japan]) countries. In addition, 
through this table, we can understand that Korean cities might have diverse learning 
points such as Japan, UK, and US within the unique Korean (non-Western) context. 
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Table 6.6 Which country is usually examined by Korean cities 
 
 
Expert response 
 
Ratio 
Japan 19 (55.9%) 
UK (United Kingdom) 8 (23.5%) 
USA (United States of America) 6 (17.6%) 
Germany 1 (2.9%) 
Other country 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
Moreover, according to Table 6.7, we can identify how much the effect of the 
application of other country’s success example in Korean cities. The largest number 
of respondents (58.8%) stated other country’s cases were much effect of application 
to Korean cities. Then, the response of ‘a large effect’ (35.3%) followed. However, 
negative answers were scarce because the response of ‘not very much effect’ and 
‘very little effect’ was only 2.9% and 0.0%. Thus, we can recognise that the majority 
of Korean experts acknowledge the effect of application of other country’s success 
examples. 
 
Table 6.7 The effect of the application of other country’s success case 
 
 
Expert response 
 
Ratio 
Some effect 20 (58.8%) 
A large effect 12 (35.3%) 
Very large effect 1 (2.9%) 
Not very much effect 1 (2.9%) 
Very little effect 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
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What I would like to say in this part as another important point is that we can 
recognise the fact about what makes city leaders in South Korea favour and ardently 
follow Western cities’ place marketing policies. 
 
Table 6.8 Experience of hearing about the failure of Western place marketing 
 
Yes 21 (61.8%) 
No 13 (38.2%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
According to the survey result, most Korean experts actively introduced or suggested 
successful cases while they usually did not mention failed ones (85.3%, see Table 
6.9) even though most of them had experiences of hearing about them (61.8%, see 
Table 6.8).  
 
Table 6.9 Experience of introducing failures of Western place marketing 
 
No 29 (85.3%) 
Yes 5 (14.7%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(Source: Korean expert survey) 
 
Many Korean experts did not raise bad examples or problems to others although 
most of them already knew them. Consequently, it might be an empirical proof for us 
to identify their biased favour towards examples of place marketing from advanced 
countries. Thus, it might influence many Korean city leaders and policy makers to 
have a Western- and Japanese-biased perception, this again confirming the earlier 
discussion on policy transfer. 
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6.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we sought to understand the general political context and overall 
trend of Korean place marketing. In the second section, we examined the Korean 
national context of urban politics. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Korean political 
economy can be characterised as a dictatorial military regime, rapid industrialisation 
by a developmental state, and a highly centralised administrative system. However, 
since then, the evolution of Korean place marketing might be situated within the 
diverse transitional waves such as democratisation, globalisation, and localisation 
(due to the introduction of local self-governing) and it might be contextualised as a 
rapidly democratised, but less advanced, increasingly neo-liberalising developmental 
state. Thus, as Harvey (2005:72) points out, it appears that “[n]eoliberalization….. 
opens up possibilities for development states [like South Korea] to enhance their 
position in international competition by developing new structures of state 
intervention” within this transitional context.  
 
The third section suggested the conducting process of the survey and its several 
implications. Firstly, many Korean experts responded that the introduction of the 
local self-governing system and global economic restricting were key backgrounds 
for the emergence of Korean place marketing policies. Thus, the evolution of Korean 
place marketing might be identified within inter-relations between the Korean context 
of new local autonomy and the wider transitional wave of globalisation. Secondly, we 
could recognise that growing attention to cultural means in place marketing policy 
has contributed to the intensified inter-urban competition and expanding 
entrepreneurial municipal activities in Korean cities. Thirdly, we might identify that 
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the influence of city leaders and central government officials have been powerful in 
the political arena of local growth like place marketing under the inertia of the 
developmental and statistic tradition. Finally, it seems many Korean experts 
(composed of professors, researchers, public officials, public agency and marketing 
company professionals) have not usually introduced or suggested examples of 
failure or problems in advanced countries’ place marketing whilst they ardently 
introduce successful cases. This might have influenced Korean city leaders and 
policy makers to get a favourable biased view of advanced countries’ (like the US, 
Japan, and Western European countries) place marketing. 
 
Having discussed these broad findings, the thesis will now turn to the local study of 
Gwangju. Chapter 7 will discuss the Democratisation Movement, which as we shall 
see provides the context for successive place marketing policies. This chapter also 
discusses the rationale for, and outcomes of, establishing an Art Biennale in 
Gwangju. Chapter 8 then looks at the recent development of the Gwangju Hub City 
of Asia Culutre and the Asian Culture Complex, as major attempts to foster cultural 
economic growth. But as we shall find these have been contested and the policies 
contain many tensions. Finally, in these case study sections, chapter 9 will look at 
the defeat of a proposal to build a domed sports stadium, and other recent cultural 
and marketing policies. Taken together these next three chapters provide a detailed 
case study of urban place marketing and cultural development in one of South 
Korea’s major cities. 
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Chapter Seven: The Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
and the Gwangju Biennale 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The next three chapters are derived from the second approach to understanding the 
evolution of Korean place marketing in the thesis and each will present different 
place marketing policies used in Gwangju. In this Chapter, the Gwangju Biennale will 
be introduced as a first case, and the evolving political context of Korean place 
marketing will also be examined. The second section will provide a geographical, 
administrative overview, the history of urban landscape and economic and political 
conditions of Gwangju. Then, the third will present the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement which has been influential in the creation of the image of the city. The 
fourth and fifth will explore the image of Gwangju and the conflicting local scale of 
actors around the Gwangju Biennale. In particular, the fourth will intensively examine 
the series of processes of making the ‘Yehang (traditional town of art)’ discourse 
which led to the Gwangju Biennale. And then, the sixth and seventh will examine the 
political dynamic of the Gwangju Biennale through highlighting the conflicts and co-
ordination between the Gwangju Biennale and Anti-Biennale. The final section will 
suggest a brief summary of these discussions. 
 
 
7.2 Gwangju Overview 
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Gwangju is the only metropolitan city in the Honam region which is located in the 
south western part of South Korea. The Honam region is divided into two provinces; 
Jella-namdo and Jella-bukdo9. Gwangju is a leading city in that it plays an economic, 
social and cultural major role in the province of Jella-namdo (see Figure 7.1). 
Gwangju is one of six metropolitan cities as the 6th largest city in South Korea, and it 
has approximately 1.4 million people (Gwangju Metropolitan City, 2012). It has five 
Gus10; Dong-gu, Nam-gu, Seo-gu, Buk-gu, and Gwangsan-gu. While Dong-gu and 
Nam-gu of the five Gus are somewhat decling as traditional urban centres, others 
have had more land development of housing, retail and manufacturing industry since 
the 1980s.  
 
Figure 7.1 Location of Gwangju 
 
(Source: CIA, 2012, modified by author) 
 
                                    
9 Their abbreviated forms are Jeonnam (Jella-namdo) and Jeonbuk (Jella-bukdo). 
10 Gu is a name of administrative boundary such as British Borough in South Korea. 
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The Provincial Hall of Jella-namdo was located in the central site of Dong-gu in 
Gwangju until 2005, and then it was moved to Muan city, one of cities in the 
Southern extremity (Lee, 2010). On the map of Gwangju (see Figure 7.2 and 7.3), 
we can identify the locations of the three case projects in the thesis.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Map of Gwangju and case sites 
 
 
 
Biennale Exhibition Hall 
Old JPH and ACC 
Dome Stadium (estimated site) 
 
 
(Source: Lee, 2010:55, modified by author) 
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Figure 7.3 Case sites on city planning map 
 
 
 
 
Biennale Exhibition Hall 
Old JPH and ACC 
Dome Stadium (estimated site) 
 
 
(Source: Gwangju Metropolitan City, 2007:1, modified by author) 
 
7.2.1 The history of urban landscape in Gwangju 
 
Urban built environments are closely connected with the historical context of the city. 
As in many other cities in South Korea, Gwangju was also established with its 
current basic frame of city centre in terms of spatial structure during Janpan’s 
imperial regime (Jo, 2002; Kim, 2009). The Gwangju Eupseong (Gwangju’s 
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traditional town wall), which had symbolized the city of Gwangju for over 1,000 years, 
and other traditional architecture of the Chosun Dynasty was removed by the 
Japanese colonial rulers. In their place, Japanese residences, banks, companies, 
retail shops and new boulevards occupied the same places in order to help 
Japanese capital accumulation. Geumnam Boulevard11 and Jella-namdo Provincial 
Hall12, which are major places in the thesis case study, were also built by Japanese 
within the process of such colonialisation (Shin and Chun, 2001). Under the 
Japanese imperial rule, there was a big event known as the ‘Gwangju Student 
Independence Movement’, which was very influential to the forming of the image of 
Gwangju. It became a nationwide Movement starting from Gwangju students’ 
resistance where Korean middle and high school students protested over 3 months 
in 1929 against Japanese imperialists’ national discrimination and colonized 
education. It was the biggest independence movement and nationwide struggle for 
Korea’s freedom since the Samil Independence Movement in 1919. Due to this event, 
the name of Gwangju developed a reputation for being ‘a city of resistance’ against 
the Japanese for freedom in Korea.  
 
In 1945, with the collapse of the Japanese imperial regime, Korea was liberated. 
Five years later, however, there was a Korean War in 1950, in which most of the 
urban infrastructure in Gwangju was destroyed. Fortunately, however, a part of the 
central architecture and roads like Jella-namdo Provincial Hall and Geumnam 
Boulevard avoided the mass destruction of the War. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
                                    
11 Geumnam Boulevard, which located in front of Jella-namdo Provincial Hall, was a large street 
where citizen and student used to be gathered and protested for democracy. It was also the place 
where the Gwangju Democratisation Movement took place. 
12 The area of the place and Geumnam Boulevard is the site of the Asian Culture Complex in the next 
Chapter. 
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South Korea achieved rapid economic growth which led to radical sprawl and 
changes in the urban area of Korean cities. Most cities broadened their streets and 
provided a number of houses through large scale urban development and sprawl. In 
addition, there was the phenomenon of massive population transfer from agricultural 
villages to cities in order to access jobs, more money and better education. The 
phenomenon exacerbated the situation of urban problems such as the shotage of 
housings and it was not easy to solve. However, in Gwangju, even though many 
people moved from the agricultural villages around Gwangju, those things were not a 
relatively big problem. Since the industrialisation of Gwangju was late in relation to 
other cities such as Seoul, Incheon, Daegu, Busan and Ulsan, the need for 
urbanisation was not so immediate in Gwangju. For example, the Gwangju street 
system established by Japanese colonial rule was kept to the early of 1970s 
because there was little large scale of industrial complex and housing town in 
Gwangju during the time. Thus, it means that the image of Gwangju at that time was 
a poor developed and backward in industrialisation than other cities in South Korea. 
 
Since the late 1990s, however, urban landscape of Gwangju was rapidly changed, 
which was characterised by the declining city centre area and quickly growing non-
city centre (sub-urban) area. This transformation has been influenced by political and 
industrial factors like an opposition party-led regime change and financial support of 
new (Kim Dae-joong) government. As a result, some giant conglomerlate (Korean 
Chaebol) like Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor were established in the city in 
1990s. In addition, Gwangju authorities built a cluster of photonic industry under the 
political patronage of Kim Dae-joong Government in sub-urban area. These series of 
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factors have accerlated the urban and industrial transformation of Gwangju 
landscape. I think this can be understood as a transitional urban society – for 
example, coexistence of industrial and early post-industrial landscape - in many 
Korean cities which we already discussed in Chapter 6 (6.2). 
 
7.2.2 The history of Gwangju’s economic and political background 
 
Due to the strategic uneven development by Park Jung-hee’s Govenrment, Gwangju 
had fallen behind other cities in terms of industrialisation during the 1960s and 1970s. 
One of the reasons for such underdevelopment of the Honam region and its central 
city, Gwangju is that intensive investment in and development of specific regions like 
Capital13, Youngnam14, and their connecting regions, simultaneously led to the 
disregarding of other ones (Kim, 2003). As a result, the economic gap between 
developing and other regions was greatly increased and Gwangju was little favoured 
by Park’s economic policy.  
 
In particular, Park’s uneven economic development was definitely expressed in his 
selection of infrastructure and manufacturing complexes. The first express motorway 
was Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) in South Korea. Since the 1970s, most of the heavy 
industry complexes were built in Capital and Youngnam region such as Incheon, 
Gumi, Ulsan, Pohang and, Changwon city. In this process, many Korean Chaebols 
(such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, Posco, SK, Doosan, Daewoo), which was settled 
down in Capital and Youngnam region at that time, quickly grew up by receiveing 
                                    
13 Capital region is composed of Seoul, Incheon and their neighbouring cities.  
14 Youngnam region includes Daegu, Busan, Gumi (Park Jung-hee’s hometown) and other cities 
adjacent to them. 
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special benefits of cheap land property for factories and long-term low interest funds 
from the authoritarian State. These policies expanded the gap between not only 
large and small companies but also regions. Thus, for example, when we compare 
the GRDP 15  of Capital, Youngnam and Honam, we can easily see the 
consequences. In the early 1960s, their GRDP was similar (all of them were 28%). 
However, in 1980, their figures had diverged; Capital: 40%, Youngnam: 30%, and 
Honam: 15%. Furthermore, in 2000, the gaps had expanded further; Capital: 50%, 
Youngnam: 30%, and Honam: 10% (Seo, 2008).  
 
Some local business people did not sit idly by and watch these discriminating 
policies of Park’s central government. They gathered together and made requests to 
central government for supporting money in order to build an industrial complex in 
Gwangju. This was a discourse of ‘making a manufacturing city’ to overcome local 
economic difficulty resulting from the industrial weakness of consumption-orientation 
without manufacturing production. However, Park’s regime which was mainly 
composed of Youngnam political elites disregarded the suggestion and then such 
industrial and economic difficulty had continued in Gwangju since the 1960s. This 
economic discrimination made a unique feeling of political and social discrimination 
for the Honam region and its central city, Gwangju with a political check to Kim Dae-
joong, opposition party leader who was the most likely election competitor to Park in 
South Korea because the Honam and Gwangju people strongly supported Kim.  
 
 
                                    
15 GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Products) refers to the market value of all final goods and 
services produced within a region in a given period. 
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In terms of general economic condition, since the 1970s, the population of Gwangju 
has quickly increased along with a rapid urbanisation process under the national 
context, just like other Korean cities. As shown in Table 7.1, the population of the city 
in 2000 (about 1.4 million) has been more than double of 1970 (634 thousand). 
 
Table 7.1 Changing population in Gwangju16 
 
(Unit: Ten thousand) 
 
Year 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
Nationwide 
 
31,435 
 
37,407 
 
43,390 
 
45,985 
 
Gwangju 
 
634 
 
856 
 
1,139 
 
1,375 
 
Gwangju and 
Jeonnam 
 
4,005 
 
3,741 
 
3,646 
 
3,345 
 
 (Source: National Statistical Office, 2002) 
 
However, the increasing population may not secure the interpretation of every urban 
place in Gwangju has continuously and evenly developed. Firstly, in recent years, 
the growing trend of Gwangju population is slowing down. According to Hyung’s 
(2004) study, the increasing rate of population in Gwangju has decreased from 26.3 
per cent in 1990 to 6.8 per cent in 2000. Secondly, as observed in Table 7.2, the 
population of non-city centre (sub-urban) area in Gwangju rapidly increased due to 
attracting new industrial facilities like potonic cluster whilst the area of city centre 
have greatly lost its residents (see more detail in 8.2.2). 
 
                                    
16 Before 1990, the population of Gwangju equals the populational sum of Gwangju city and 
Gwangsan-Gun, because the two areas were integrated.  
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In other words, the population of city centre has decreased from 343 thousands 
people in 1990 to 192 thousands in 2000. However, the population of non-city centre 
(sub-urban area) has rapidly increased from 801 to 1,209 thousands people during 
the same time. 
 
Table 7.2 Changing population in city centre and non-city centre in Gwangju 
 
 
 
Number of  
population (A) 
 
 
Number of  
household (B) 
 
 
A/B 
 
Year 
 
 
1990 
(thousand 
persons) 
 
 
2000 
(thousand 
persons) 
 
 
1990 
(thousand 
households) 
 
 
2000 
(thousand 
households) 
 
 
1990 
(person) 
 
 
2000 
(person) 
 
 
Gwangju 
 
1,145 
 
1,402 
 
288 
 
449 
 
4.0 
 
3.1 
City 
centre 
 
343 
 
192 
 
84 
 
69 
 
4.1 
 
2.8 
Non-city 
centre 
 
801 
 
1,209 
 
204 
 
38 
 
3.9 
 
3.2 
 
(Source: Gwangju City, 1999 and 2003) 
 
In terms of economic aspects, due to the uneven development policies of Park Jung-
hee Government, relatively late industrialisation of Gwangju might still negatively 
influence on the lives of residents’ in Gwangju. According to recent some statistics 
about Korean core cities, Gwangju population may be economically disadvantaged 
rather than people in other cities from the legacies of such uneven measures. As 
observed in Table 7.3, economic living standard and asset of Gwangju residents lags 
behind people in other core cities in South Korea.  
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Table 7.3 Economic comparison of Korean core cities 
 
 
 
 
Seoul 
 
Busan 
 
Daegu 
 
Incheon 
 
Gwangju 
Average 
housing 
price 
(thousand 
pound) 
 
 
162 
 
 
67 
 
 
70 
 
 
68 
 
 
49 
Household 
net asset17 
(thousand 
pound) 
 
 
109 
 
 
55 
 
 
63 
 
 
69 
 
 
53 
Household 
monthly 
income 
(pound) 
 
1,670 
 
1,117 
 
1,298 
 
1,416 
 
1,214 
Economically 
active 
population 
(thousand) 
 
 
4,861 
 
 
1,729 
 
 
1,186 
 
 
1,216 
 
 
585 
Labour-force 
participation 
rate (%) 
 
62.5 
 
60.0 
 
60.1 
 
62.1 
 
56.5 
 
(Source: Moct, 2005 and National Statistical Office, 2002) 
 
[I made this table by combining < MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation), the 
report of Housing Demand Research 2005 (estimate) > and < National Statistical Office, the 
Report of Economically Active Population 2002 >] 
 
Thus, according to Table 7.3, we can recognise that the major factor of the economic 
gap between Gwangju and other city residents is property value. In addition, 
Gwangju’s rate of labour-force economic participation is also behind other core cities’. 
In terms of economic aspects, therefore, late industrialisation of Gwangju (due to 
nationally uneven development policies since the 1970s) has still influenced the 
                                    
17 Household net asset = houging asset + financial asset - debt 
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current daily lives of Gwangju residents, though such trend of regional discrimination 
has been weakened during the time of Kim Dae-joong Government of the 2000s. 
 
Some scholars pointed out the regional discrimination and economic gap made 
Gwangju socially and politically isolated from other regions. They also argued that 
such discrimination was one of the influential factors in the creation of the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement (Jung, 1997).  
 
 
7.3 The Gwangju Democratisation Movement and ‘city of resistance’ 
 
7.3.1 Story of the Movement in 18th May of 1980 
 
Before examining the historical and political background of place marketing policy in 
Gwangju, the story of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement18 will be outlined in 
this section. The story will provide us with the important background to the next parts 
of the section and the next chapter. The reason is that we could not deeply 
recognise place marketing policies in Gwangju without understanding the historical 
                                    
18 There are some other representative terms for the ‘Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ such as 
‘Gwangju Riot’, ‘Gwangju Incident’, ‘Gwangju People’s Uprising’, and ‘5.18’. Of these terms, ‘Gwangju 
Riot’ or ‘Gwangju Incident’ stemmed from the announcement of Lee Hee-sung, the chief martial law 
administrator as follow. He stated the movement, at that time, that a “violent incident of rioting has 
occurred in Gwangju” and since then, some right wing groups have used the term in order to decry 
the historical meaning of the movement. On the contrary, liberal politicians and civic groups preferred 
the ‘Gwangju People’s Uprising’ to others because they want to emphasise the spirit of resistance for 
democracy. Finally, ‘5.18’ means the date of the movement. Each term reflects diverse historical 
perspectives on the Movement. Throughout this thesis, I have chosen to use the term the ‘Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement’ as the name is a formal one employed by the Korean government within 
formal activities like compensation for victims and commemorative ceremony.  
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event – as we will see a lot of subsequent policy was concerned with either 
challenging or commemorating what happened.  
 
The former Present Park Chung-hee who rapidly industrialised the country during his 
eighteen-year dictatorship from 1963 to 1979 was murdered by his one of close 
henchmen, Kim Chae-gyu (the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency) at their 
secret private meeting on 26th October, 1979. This event led to the collapse of Park’s 
autocratic government. Many Koreans believed that the military authorities had come 
to an end with his death, and most citizens expanded their desire for democracy.  
 
Unfortunately, however, things unfolded differently. After the assassination of the 
autocratic leader Park Jung-hee, two months later, another dictatorial junta was 
established by a new military leader Chun Doo-hwan’s coup 19 . This was a 
retrogressive event which Korean people expected. They had a strong desire to 
reach the creation of a democratic regime. In the spring of 1980, many university 
students demonstrated against the military junta all over the country. They asked for 
the complete clearing of military authorities. They also strongly required the citizens’ 
direct vote for a new president and the retirement of old politician who supported 
Park’s military regime with lifting the martial law. In May 1980, the demand for 
democracy was vastly increasing and conflicts between the military junta and 
students expanded to a decisive situation. At that time, in the aspects of geography, 
it was in Seoul and Gwangju that the desire for democracy was most strongly 
expressed. Gwangju is a city embedded in the influence of the opposition party, 
                                    
19 Since 1950s, authoritarian military regime which seized political power and established military rule 
by coup can be divided into ‘Old Military Authorities’ and ‘New Military Authorities’. If Park Jung-hee is 
the ‘Old Military Authorities’, Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo are the ‘New Military Authorities’. 
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while Seoul is the central city of Korean politics. In particular, Gwangju was the 
hometown of Kim Dae-joong who could be a political threat to the New Military 
Authorities as a leader of the opposition party.  
 
On 15th May, a crowd of students numbering more than 20 thousand marched 
toward the Jella-namdo Provincial Hall and many citizens cheered them on. The next 
day, more than 50 thousand demonstrators gathered near the fountain in front of the 
Provincial Hall and on Geumnam Boulevard and they prayed for the realization of 
democracy with torches. However, the military regime implemented martial law with 
all its effect over all parts of South Korea on 17th May, 1980 and the situation was 
quite different. Against the martial law, many university students demonstrated in city 
centre of Gwangju (near the previous Jella-namdo Provincial Hall) yelling out 
‘remove the martial law’ and ‘down with the Chun Doo-hwan’s military junta’ on 18th 
May (Yoo, 2008). Armed martial troops (special warfare forces and paratroop 
regiments) with heavy weapons, guns, swords and sticks were deployed to Gwangju. 
They attempted to brutally crush down the demonstration. However, the 
demonstrating crowd quickly increased since lots of citizens in sympathy, actively 
joined the group. The headquarters of the military authorities were embarrassed by 
the situation and they tried more powerfully to subdue the people. In the end on the 
morning of 21st May, soldiers fired on them, which resulted in many casualties.  
 
However, it made the situation worse. Even more ordinary people who had 
previously just observed the event participated in the demonstration and they 
attacked police stations and munition factories (Park, 2009). They armed themselves 
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with guns, military truck and armoured vehicles. Many women supported them with 
food and water, and some people voluntarily contributed their blood to help the 
injured at hospital (Yoo, 2008). In the afternoon of that day, martial troops battled 
with the civil militia, which caused more casualties. As the matter had grown more 
serious, the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters temporarily withdrew forces.  
 
Over the night, the peaceful rule by the citizens was launched. Citizens organised 
the Settle Committee, at the Jeonnam (Jella-namdo) Provincial Hall, which took 
measures such as preparing the dead for burial, clearing streets, providing electricity 
and water to citizens and keeping the public peace and security. In addition, it 
implemented citywide rallies asking for the establishment of a democratic 
government five times from 23rd to 24th May (Yoo, 2008).  
 
However, such peaceful control by the people was too short. On 27th May, the 
military junta attacked with a large scale unit using tanks to cruelly quell citizen army. 
As a result, the Martial Law Command retook the Jeonnam Provincial Hall (the 
headquarters of the civil militia) resulting in heavy casualties for the democratic 
movement. According to statistics from UNESCO’s record (2011:1-2), “During 10 
days of resistance, 165 citizens died in and around Gwangju. 76 people went 
missing, 3,383 were injured, and 1,476 were arrested, affecting 5,100 in total. In 
addition, 102 people later died from injuries incurred during the siege. Survivors were 
far from unscathed with many reporting mental health problems such as auditory 
hallucinations, somnambulism, obsessive-compulsive behaviours, etc.” 
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Figure 7.4 Confrontation between citizens and military 
 
 
(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation) 
 
Figure 7.5 Suppression and bloody killing 
 
 
(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation) 
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Figure 7.6 Arrested and murdered citizens 
 
 
(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation) 
 
Figure 7.7 Bereaved family and burying the dead in Mangwol cemetery 
 
 
(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation) 
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7.3.2 The Gwangju Democratisation Movement within the context of Korean 
politics 
 
In relation to the historic meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, 
Katsiaficas (2003) considers both the Paris Commune in 1871 and the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement in 1980 as events that showed us the voluntary 
governing capability of people during the last two hundred years. He pointed out in 
both their commons citizens had waged war against the government and had 
peacefully dominated their cities. By accident, both civil militias were suppressed by 
the government army on the same date, 27th May (Jo, 2010).  
 
The Gwangju Democratisation Movement has some important meanings within the 
context of Korean politics. First, the Movement was a symbolic event that showed us 
that the political aspiration of Koreans for democracy had been expanding at that 
time. On the other hand, it informed people that the New Military Authorities had little 
democratic legitimacy as it had political power based only on forces. Since the event, 
many students and citizens remembered the Movement and protested against the 
military government every year asking for disclosure of the truth about the event and 
the punishment of related criminals. Consequently, seven years later, a large scale 
of nationwide opposition to the military regime exploded in 1987 and it led to the 
wave of democratisation in all societies within South Korea.  
 
Second, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement resulted in the transformation of 
Koreans’ perception and attitude toward the US. Drawing on the Armistice 
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Agreement, the Commander of ROK20-US Combined Forces has had Operational 
Control of South Korea’s Armed Forces since the Korean War21. On the 16th May 
1980 (before the outbreak of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement), the Chief of 
Staff in the South Korean Army, Lee Hee-sung demanded the Operational Control in 
order to keep national security for a while. The US Commander agreed with this after 
he discussed the issue with his boss in Washington. Then, in spite of no symptoms 
of a likely North’s invasion, the US military warned the Korean people that the 
Gwangju Movement might bring about a return of the North’s southward invasion. 
That was very influential in making the New Military’s brutal suppression of the 
Movement legitimised at that time (Gwangju city, 1997). Thus, many Korean people 
haven’t considered the US as an allied nation since the Movement. Rather, it made a 
number of intellectuals and progressive citizens in South Korea hold an antipathy 
against the US even though over 30,000 American troops have maintained their stay 
in South Korea to defend aggression from North Korea since 1953. 
 
Third, even though the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was one of the most 
fierce protests, not all Korean people have the same memory of it. Most remembered 
it as a great resistance in support of democracy, but others considered it as a violent 
event of rioters who were friendly to North Korea (Jung, 2002). The event resulted in 
a number of sacrificed lives and it gave serious trauma and mental wounds to 
surviving victims and their families. Then, the truth of the event was intentionally 
                                    
20 It stands for Republic of Korea, which is a formal name of South Korea. 
21 The Korean War was a war erupted by sudden southward invasion of the North Communist 
country between South Korea (supported by UN) and North Korea (supported by Communist China 
and Soviet Union) from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953. The first President in South Korea, Lee Seung-
mann took over the Operational Control of South Korea’s Armed Forces to the Commander of ROK-
US Combined Forces during the War. Due to this war, Korea has been divided into the South and 
North. 
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distorted by the military authorities which further damaged survivors. In addition, the 
perversion of such historic truths resulted in political discrimination of Honam region 
and its leading city, Gwangju beyond the previous unjustifiably different economic 
treatment of the region and city. The new military authorities led by Chun Doo-hwan 
and Rho Tae-woo twisted the truth of the Movement by designating it as a brutal riot 
simply due to regional emotion of discrimination. At that time, the Movement was 
described as ‘an armed riot of violent rebels’ by the announcement of the 
Commander under martial law. They also cut off all sources of information about the 
event in order to block and distort the truth. All newspapers reported it as ‘an armed 
riot of violent rebels’ following the direction of the military authorities. It made many 
Koreans have a distorted perception of the Movement. After the event, during the 
next seven years, the formal discourse of ‘Gwangju’s violent riot’ which was shaped 
by the military junta kept it in people’s mind as if it were common sense. Thus, many 
Koreans misunderstood the political uprising in support of democracy as just a 
regional conflict. Furthermore, many people considered Gwangju had a bad image 
such as ‘a city of violent riots’. As a result, the Honam region and Gwangju were 
alienated from other areas socially and politically until the truths were revealed with 
the collapse of the military authorities. 
 
Finally, there emerged a positive evaluation that the Movement was a temporal 
accomplishment of democracy by civic republicanism and it was very valuable event 
in terms of national democratisation from the early 1990s. With the rise of the 
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Munmin 22  Government led by Kim Young-sam, historic re-evaluation of the 
Movement was quite different than before. As a result, most Koreans recognised that 
the formal discourse of ‘Gwangju’s violent riot’ by the military regime was completely 
wrong adding a number of research papers and academic examinations of the 
Movement. Indeed, many researchers discovered the real political value of the event 
by vividly representing the historic truths through a series of citizens’ verbal evidence, 
related historical data and reports of the foreign media. Some scholars compared it 
to France’s Revolution or the Paris Commune (Jung, 2007; Jo, 2010).  
 
Many foreign scholars and activists have attached some significance to the political 
value of the Movement. In 2005, Bruce Cummings, a professor at the university of 
Chicago pointed out in a BBC news report that “through the experience of Gwangju, 
Koreans escaped the firm grasp of dictatorship and this can be related to a release 
from the restrictive measures of the United States (Lee, 2010:66).” Edward Baker, 
former Vice Director of Harvard-Yenching Institute considered it as a historic turning 
point at which the Korean people changed their attitude on dictatorship and the US 
at a symposium held in Kim Dae-joong Library in December 2005 (UNESCO, 
2011:8). At the 20th Anniversary of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 2007, 
George Katsiaficas of the Wentworth Institute of Technology in the US noted that the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement was a historic lever which pushed South Korea 
from the dictatorship era to democracy (Lee, 2010). A recipient of the 2005 Gwangju 
Human Rights Award, Vardah Hafidz (Secretary General of the Urban Poor 
Consortium in Indonesia) stated that “the human rights advancement post 5.18 (the 
                                    
22 Munmin means that the political regime which was dominated by non-military authorities. Despite 
coming from the ruling party, Kim Young-sam was one of opposition party leaders until he joined the 
coalition party with military authorities. 
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Gwangju Democratisation Movement) in Korea is Asian civil rights activists’ prime 
model and goal (ibid:67).” Moreover, Dandeniya Gamage Jayanthi (Leader of the 
Monument for the Disappeared in Sri Lanka) emphasised that the Movement was an 
important fountain of inspiration for human rights conflict (UNESCO, 2011). In this 
context, we might evaluate that the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was not 
only a historic and political turning point from authoritarian dictatorship to securing 
democracy and human rights but also a good example for developing countries 
which still have not established democratic politics and defended human rights for 
their people. 
 
7.3.3 The Movement and Gwangju citizens 
 
Despite the failure of the Movement, most citizens in Gwangju take pride in the event. 
Firstly, since 1980, there were demonstrations asking for democracy by 
remembering of the Gwangju Movement in May every year. In the end, seven years 
later, the Korean people won practical measures for democracy such as a direct vote 
for a new president by the people through a nationwide democratic uprising in June 
1987. Gwangju citizens believe that the Gwangju Democratisation Movement of May 
1980 was a significant base for the national uprising of June 198723 (briefly called 
‘June Uprising’). In fact, the Gwangju Movement stood at the centre of all Korean 
civic movements for democracy during the 1980s and many people saw a series of 
democratic protests and movements between May 1980 and June 1987. Much 
                                    
23 Many citizens and students protested against autocratic and violent governing of military regime 
led by Chun Doohwan nationwide June in 1987. They argued that stepping down military regime and 
the amendment of constitution for democratic government. Such strong protests expanded to all over 
the country. As a result, military authorities were forced to announce the constitutional improvement 
for people’s direct selection of the next President and amnesty for Kim Dae-joong. 
190 
 
literature argues that the June Uprising was strongly influenced by the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement (Yoon, 2006; Jung, 2007; Jung, 2006; Choi, 2005). 
Secondly, although only for a week, Gwangju citizens remember that there were any 
serious crimes such as robbing a bank or mall during the peaceful rule of the citizen 
army. As soon as the military authorities, which were in charge of social security and 
keeping public peace retreated, then rather, real peace was accomplished. Ironically, 
crime and violence disappeared and people helped and co-operated with each other. 
Taxi drivers joined the protest against the military junta; housewives distributed their 
own home made lunch (rice balls) and food to the citizen militia; and many citizens 
and students gave their blood to hospital for treating the wounded. They all set up a 
few barricades together in order to prepare for the military junta’s assault. Then, 
even if it was for a really short time, they enjoyed peaceful self-governance which 
they had dreamed about for a long time by themselves.  
 
A Korean professor, Han Hong-gu in Seunggonghei University, stated in his lecture 
that the Movement “[I]t was an event not easy to witness in human history. It really 
was marvellous. Despite the release of thousands of weapons, there was no robbery 
or riots of any sort. Even with the lack of supplies, not one person claimed a store as 
their own. This, in fact, is Utopia. I have met numerous people in Gwangju who have 
said to me that they can die in peace, knowing that they lived through it (Lee, 
2010:68).” Similarly, a famous painter from Gwangju, Hong Seong-dam mentioned 
the Movement in an interview with Korean news media saying that “I saw the most 
perfect world for the 10 days of the uprising. We can live happily with only the ten 
day’s memory even though we face great suffering. But, others never understand it 
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(Ohmy-news [Newspaper], 3rd November 2007). The Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement showed us an exemplary model of a culture based on humanity, 
compassion and resilience. Even while being confronted with terror from military 
forces, isolation from other regions and economic difficulty resulting from supply cuts, 
Gwangju citizens did not resort to violence and instead, mutually co-operated with 
each other during the movement. They called it ‘Daedong’ (solidarity and distribution) 
spirit or ‘Owol’ (May) spirit and most of them were very proud of it as a unique 
identity of Gwangju.  
 
In terms of place marketing, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement has greatly 
influenced key places for creation of the city image of Gwangju. For instance, some 
historic sites of the Movement such as Geumnam Boulevard, old Jeonnam Provincial 
Hall, and Mangwol cemetery of victim’s have became major spaces for tourist 
destination and a cultural museum within the political process of place making.  
 
 
7.4 City image of Gwangju 
 
In this section, I explore how the image of resistance formed by the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement has been changed for economic development. In 
particular, the focus of the section is to take a closer look at the process of 
transformation from the strong and tough city image of democratic uprising to a soft 
artistic one by manipulative and intentional discourses and activities of political and 
economic elites. Then, how such an image can be expanded to encompass the 
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international cultural event, Gwangju Biennale for local economic growth will be 
considered at the next section.  
 
 
7.4.1 Gwangju images and the city image as a sacred democratic ground 
 
There have been multiple images symbolising Gwangju. Traditionally, the important 
components of Gwangju images are the Mudeung Mountain and town of light. The 
former is the huge mountain (at an elevation of 1,187m above sea level) which is 
located in the area of Gwangju. The mountain is a place closely connected with 
citizens’ lives and currently employed as a public park for climbing, hiking and leisure 
activity. The name of the mountain originated from one of the Buddist scriptures, 
Banyasimgyeung means a completely equal world so much that we don’t need the 
word equality any more (Kim, 2009). The latter has the same meaning of its Chinese 
letter. Precisely speaking, Gwangju which consists of the Chinese letter which 
correlated to the Korean word Bitgoeul, a town of light. Currently, the formal symbolic 
character of Gwangju is ‘Bitdori’ in order to announce Gwangju as a city of light. In 
addition, the architectural concept of the Asian Culture Complex, one of the most 
important cases in the thesis is ‘the forest of light’. Gwangju usually has 20 per cent 
more sunshine than the national average (Kim, 2006), and has attempted to develop 
photonic industry as a key local industry since the late 1990s. Like so, Gwangju has 
many symbols and meanings of light within the cityscape. Another element of the 
Gwangju image is the Gwangju Student’s Independence Movement. As observed in 
7.2.1, it was the historic event that demonstrated the Korean people’s resistance to 
the Japanese imperialism.  
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However, any images of them had not been dominant in expressing Gwangju identity 
until the Gwangju Democratisation Movement took place. In addition, negative 
images of Gwangju as a city of deprived places have emerged since the 1960s. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of the Gwangju population moved to Seoul 
and its surrounding region, Gyeonggi to find jobs as there was little industrial base in 
Gwangju. Thus, there were many poor people from Gwangju within the Seoul 
metropolitan area. For example, according to the KDI’s (Korea Development 
Institute) work investigating Seoul residents’ hometown in 1981, twice as many 
people came from Gwangju and its surrounding region, Jella-namdo than residents 
from other regions. As a result, Gwangju has increasingly had an image of a place 
where the poor lived or the hometown of the needy.  
 
To overcome such unfair feelings that people disregard the Honam region and its 
central city, Gwangju, researchers of this region have attempted to discover the 
unique good qualities of Honam’s regional culture, art, and history since the 1970s. 
They have usually investigated the traditional arts and excellent figures. As a 
consequence, the argument that there were a number of brilliant artists in Honam 
region and Gwangju emerged, yet it was not resonant with the rest of the regions in 
South Korea. In addition, such an unfair situation was exacerbated by the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement. The Honam region and Gwangju were also suppressed 
by the New Military regime because the Honam population still supported Kim Dae-
joong (the leader of opposition party), a political threat to the New Military authorities. 
Thus, Honam and Gwangju were more alienated from other regions in terms of 
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politics while the political identity of this region increasingly differentiated from others 
after the Movement. It led to a politically evident divergence in Presidential and 
National Assembly election between regions. 
 
However, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement left many historic assets to city. 
As examined in the former section (7.2.1), a number of traditional heritages such as 
Gwangju Eupsung (traditional town wall) were demolished by the Imperial Japanese 
regime and thus, currently, most Gwangju citizens know little about the traditional 
appearance of Gwangju. However, new historical sites in relation to the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement were shaped by the Movement. Persistent efforts to 
succeed such sacred historical sites and sprit of Gwangju to next generation have 
enabled us to conserve the historical value of the Movement through some sort of 
cherishing event and voluntary artistic display. Despite being held only in Gwangju, 
5.18 memorial events, the Geumnan Boulevard art display and the citizen art school 
were such examples. Yet, these endeavours were often disturbed by the oppression 
of the military authorities at that time, so distorted reports and images were 
expressed by formal media to most other regions. Some truths of the Movement, 
however, secretly and slowly spread into a part of the progressive groups and 
intellectual circles through informal channels like university clubs, church and civic 
groups. Although, in particular, university students played a major role in circulating 
historic facts, many of the rest of the people in South Korea still believed that the 
Movement was a riot of violent people who were friendly to North Korea according to 
the formal discourse of ‘Gwangju’s Violent Riot’ manipulated by the military junta.  
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Since the June Uprising in 1987, however, many truths were revealed and broadly 
diffused among public people. In 1989, the ‘Gwangju’s Violent Riot’ was officially 
renamed the ‘Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement’ by the government and then, 
victims of the Movement began to get national compensation for their losses in 1990. 
Diverse cultural works such as paint, poetry, fiction, movie and TV drama were made 
under the theme of the Movement. This series of processes brought about the 
transformation of people’s perception from a city of violent riot to a holy place of 
resistance and uprising in support of democracy. Therefore, the most prevailing 
image of Gwangju was as a city of the ‘Sacred Democratic Ground’ after 1980. 
 
However, for city leaders and business elites, such an image was not good since in 
terms of place marketing strategy that they would drive for local growth, a city image 
of resistance was not helpful or possibly even harmful for attracting inward 
investment. In relation to this, many advanced capitalist cities had negative images 
such as economic decline and dilapidation, smokestacks, and pollution in the 
process of world economic restructuring. For instance, as some authors note, one 
have might imagined the examples of Syracuse’s image of pollution, Glasgow’s of 
excessive drink and slum (Short, 1996), Liverpool’s of crime, Manchester’s of drug 
problems, and Birmingham’s of being a cultural wasteland (Hall, 2006:79) during the 
1970s and 1980s. Since then, these cities have tried to transform such ‘industrial’ 
images into ‘post-industrial’ ones through diverse place marketing projects. By 
contrast in South Korea, Gwangju’s bad images usually came from the different 
reason of an historic movement. In spite of citizens’ pride for the Movement, a 
selection of Gwangju city elites must have thought it not useful for their economic 
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interests, and in the end, it led to consistent pro-growth marketing projects focused 
toward becoming a global cultural city. As observed in later sections, Gwangju 
marketing projects have continued to push their activities sponsored by secret 
central political authorities since the early-1980s.  
 
7.4.2 Forming ‘Yehyang’ discourse for image conversion 
 
As noted in the above section, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement of May 1980 
completely changed people’s perception of the Gwangju image to a city of 
democratic uprising and resistance against the autocratic military regime. However, 
a part of the business community in Gwangju sought to have other frames of 
meaning within the Gwangju image. They thought that such ‘a city of resistance’ 
image little helped local economic development. Accordingly, they have attempted to 
take away or erase the resistance elements from varied images of Gwangju.  
 
In so doing, what they attempted was the transmutation from ‘a city of resistance’ to 
‘a city of Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’. They want to spread out a frame that 
Gwangju has had abundant traditional cultural assets for a long time. Indeed, Honam 
region and its leading city, Gwangju had enough cultural resources like 
Namjonghwa24, Pansori25, and calligraphy and many artists such as Hur Baek-
ryeon26, Im Bang-wool27 and Jung Youl-sung28. However, Gwangju might not have 
                                    
24 It is a field of Chienese art which mainly use a black and white drawing and light colouring. 
Traditionally, Korean art has influenced by China, but it has been developed uniquely. 
25 Pansori is a traditional Korean narrative song, which is similar to solo opera or a long epic song. 
26  He was a great master of Chinese painting and Uijae Art Museum was established to 
commemorate him. 
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been a leading city of traditional culture since there were many other cities of 
traditional culture like Gyeongju, Andong, Jeonju and Buyeo in South Korea. In 
addition, many Korean people may not agree with the argument that Gwangju was ‘a 
city of Yehyang’ and there are a lot of cities which want to be called Yehyang instead 
of Gwangju29.Despite such truth, city business elites sought to diffuse their own 
frame, Yehyang into Gwangju citizens’ mindset in order to cover the city image of 
resistance and fighting for democratisation.  
 
Their making of ‘Gwangju as a Yehyang’ was launched after the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement (Kim, 2008; Kim, 1999). They thought that the Gwangju 
image as ‘a city of resistance’ was an obstacle to drawing foreign investments30 and 
private companies into Gwangju. Thus, they established a committee of Gwangju-
Jeonnam Local Development (briefly called ‘Gigaehyeop’ 31 ) and implemented 
diverse efforts to block the formation of the image of Gwangju as a city of resistance. 
They locally acted a range of dimensional policies of control and appeasement 
toward the Gwangju Democratisation Movement for the military regime. 
‘Gigaehyeop’ expressed its purpose through its establishment announcement as 
following “we, Jeonnam region lamented our poor industry and low income … but 
fortunately, the President supported us giving an enormous budget, 344 billion won 
                                                                                                                
27 He was a great singer who lamented for the loss of a nation and its people. Im Bangwool Korean 
Traditional Music Festival was made to keep traditional music and encourage new Korean classical 
music performers. 
28 A native of Gwangju, Jung Youlsung is one of East Asia’s best musicians. He delivered freedom 
and democracy to people through many compositions in China. Every year, Jung Youlsung 
International Music Festival is held in Gwangju. 
29 Such cities are Sangju, Tongyong, Jeonju, Mokpo, Seguipo, Namwon, Iksan, Gochang, Jindo. 
30 At that time, some Gwangju business groups intended to attract an IBRD loan in order to build the 
Hanam Industrial Complex in Gwangju. 
31  People who participated in ‘Gigaehyeop’ included local business leaders (CEOs of local 
newspapers, local bus transportation, alcohol retailers and leather producers) and intellectuals (the 
head of the general hospital and graduate school in the university). 
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[approximately 0.2 billion pounds]…. agreed some projects like Yeocheon chemical 
and Gwangyang steel complexes, as a result, our future is going to be bright. In this 
context, we local elites gathered and erected a new committee in an attempt to make 
a base for local economic development and social inclusion (Ji, 2001:184).” The 
committee pushed Jeonnam authorities to make the committee of attracting 
manufacturers in November 1985 and held some forums about the investment 
climate of the region together.  
 
Members of ‘Gigaehyeop’ had a sense of considerable discomfort from people’s 
perception of Gwangju as a holy place of democracy. For example, on 18th May in 
1982, they suddenly made an event, ‘Jeonnam Residents Cohesion Contest’ and 
mobilised many local people to Mudeung Stadium in order to obstruct the citizens’ 
ceremony for cherishing the memory of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 
Mangwol 32  cemetery. Furthermore, they won some bereaved families of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement over to their side through consolation money or 
even forced others to move graves out of Mangwol cemetery by threatening them. In 
other words, they induced victims’ families to bastardly support them saying that they 
would give some money donated from local businesses to the families if they 
transferred the victims’ tombs to other places. As a result, 26 graves were exhumed 
and buried elsewhere since most bereaved family suffered from extreme poverty 
without any compensation from the military authorities at the time. In response to this 
behaviour, some of the victims’ families came to the head of ‘Gigaehyeop’s’ house 
and protested by shouting ‘stop moving graves’ in front of his house. Nonetheless, 
                                    
32 This place was a cemetery for the dead in Gwangju Democretisation Movement. 
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the organisation didn’t stop such wrongdoing. Members of ‘Gigaehyeop’ disturbed 
the making of a unitary group by Gwangju Movement victims’ through creating 
groups for military government use. In the end, Victims could not form a unitary 
organisation (Ji, 2001).  
 
In this process, it appears that ‘Gigaehyeop’ was a sort of growth coalition. However, 
it was quite different from the US style of growth coalition suggested by Logan and 
Molotch (1987). Local and urban political conditions were not mature enough to 
organise voluntary local economic development like the US since Korean cities didn’t 
have a self-governing system in those days. According to the evidence I gained from 
my field trip to South Korea, it is likely that the military regime had the Gwangju 
business elites establish ‘Gigaehyeop’. In an interview with the Hangyre-Sinmun 
[Newspaper] in South Korea, a member of ‘Gigaehyeop’ noted that “I know….when 
the Committee [Gigaehyeop] was launched, because public authorities [like 
Jeonnam and Gwangju governemtn] could not manage the Gwangju Uprising by 
themselves…. Jeonnam government and National Security Planning Agency 33 
established ‘Gigaehyeop’ together under their mutual co-operation (11th Dec 1988, 
Hangyre-Sinmun [Newspaper]).”  
 
In this context, ‘Gigaehyeop’ might be a fictional growth coalition contrived by the 
central military regime for its political purpose (i.e. distorting the meaning of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement and blocking its formation of a sacred history) 
rather than as a growth machine for purely local economic development. At that time, 
                                    
33 The organisation was the most national intelligence agency such as US CIA and played a major 
role to manipulate political election and control local media. 
200 
 
the military authorities very carefully approached the Movement by mobilising a 
private local organisation because their mobilising of local government could bring 
about a bigger problem such as civic protest and resistance regarding the Movement. 
Thus, ‘Gigaehyeop’ did not have voluntary features in its formation within the context 
of the local political economy. Therefore, it might not be a local growth coalition 
voluntarily generated from within the area, rather it is likely to have been a political 
construction body shaped by the New Military authorities (central government) and 
local business in the process of diluting the Gwangju Movement image of the city as 
a sacred resistance for democracy.  
 
In addition, ‘Gigaehyeop’ as a local business group have attempted to hide the 
strong and resistant image of Gwangju with a city image of ‘Yehyang’ (Jung, 1996). 
In so doing, some people of the organisation in ‘Gwangju-Ilbo’ (newspaper) founded 
the magazine ‘Monthly Yehyang’34 in 1984 and the rest of them established a 
magazine, ‘Jeonnam Gaebal (development)’. ‘Gwangju-Ilbo’ was the monopolistic 
press in Gwangju, which was organised by the military junta’s coercive integration of 
the press in 1980. The local press formally declared that it respects economic 
development in the local community through its companies’ goal. Its members 
diffused a discourse of Yehyang (a town of traditional art), which led to the making of 
‘Gwangju as a Yehyang’ employing its dominant position within local press society. 
For instance, ‘Monthly Yehyang’ specifically repeated ‘Gwangju = Yehyang’ by often 
inserting diverse texts such as ‘why Yehyang?’, ‘shameful Yehyang’ and ‘discourse 
of Yehyang’. Such activity increasingly formed a public opinion of why Gwangju 
                                    
34 Two persons of 14 ‘Gigaehyeop’ organisers belonged to Gwangju Ilbo. They were Kim Jongtae 
(president of Gwangju Ilbo) and Park Jindong (former vice president of the local newspaper). 
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should be the Yehyang and how the citizens achieved it. Consequently, it led to the 
implementation of local authorities. There were two representative policy actions. 
One was the shaping a ‘Street of Art’35 after 1987 and the other was hosting an 
international art festival, the Gwangju Biennale in 1995. In particular, the Gwangju 
Biennale was an endeavour to transform the city image from ‘a holy place for 
uprising and resistance’ to a ‘modern Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ through the 
Gwangju marketing strategy for economic growth (Jung, 1996). In addition, <Monthly 
Yehyang> which represented the perspective of local business and the military 
authorities employed the public expression that there was a Chinese painting on the 
wall in a noodle restaurant even within a poor neighbourhood (Park, 2006). Such a 
frame of Yehyang was increasingly diffused and absorbed into the public 
consciousness. For example, a member of the Gwangju officials who was 
interviewed by me explained the formula of Gwangju = Yehyang like it is popular 
common sense.  
 
“Several decades ago, Gwangju was well known as a city of Yehyang. There 
were few cafes which had no Chinese painting or calligraphy in Gwangju. At 
that time, if there was no such thing in those places, people ignored the 
owners as rude people. Now, Gwangju has become a modern art city 
through the Gwangju Biennale, in the near future, it will be a cultural hub city 
of Asia, specifically in the modern art and design field (author interview, 
interviewed on 9th September 2011).” 
 
                                    
35 It is 300meters of street houses galleries, art studios and small theaters. If you walk about 5 
minutes from the Asian Culture Complex, you will find it. 
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In this manner, the discourse of Yehyang was presented not only through some 
physical spaces and art festivals but also common expressions that general people 
could easily understand and use.  
 
 
7.4.3 When ‘Yehyang’ meets ‘Segyehwa’36 
 
In the mid 1990s, a meeting forged between the discourse of ‘Yehyang’ and a new 
political goal of ‘Segyehwa’ of Kim Young-sam’s central government resulted in the 
Gwangju Biennale which was unfamiliar to local citizens at that time. The two 
dominant images of sacred democratic grounds and ‘Yehyang’ (a town of traditional 
art) played a major role in forming Gwangju identity, even though Gwangju had other 
components of images such as Bitgoeul (a town of light) and Mudeung mount. 
Considering different periods of history, however, the more powerful elements of 
Gwangju’s image have increasingly changed. There was a certain time marked by 
the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and then, the image of Yehyang was 
intentionally emphasised by a local business group. In the process, people’s 
perception of Gwangju has gradually moved to a soft and artistic image. In particular, 
an opportunity to accelerate such a trend happened in November 1994. It was 
President Kim Young-sam’s announcement of ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’. At a later 
date, the President’s office explained that it meant “a national development strategy 
in which all of us should be the best in our own field in order to advance national 
development under the epochal situation that the world is reorganised as a 
                                    
36 It means globalisation as a governing goal of the Kim Young-sam Government in South Korea in 
1995. 
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borderless global village and the intercourse of locals, firms and peoples as well as 
that of nations are rapidly increasing (Presidential office, 25th January 1995, cited in 
Lee, 1995).” When the new policy directions were established towards globalisation 
in central government, Gwangju authorities launched the ‘internationalisation of 
Gwangju culture and sports’ as a local growth strategy. Kang Un-tae, City Mayor 
noted the Gwangju Biennale when announcing the internationalisation strategy in 
November 1994. One of the local newpapers, Mudeung-Ilbo reported “Large scale 
international events such as <Pacific Gateball Game> and <Asia-Pacific International 
Art Festival> [its name was changed to the Gwangju Biennale, author adds] will be 
held in next year… Mayor, Kang Un-tae told us that I will advance the time of the 
Honam region’s internationalisation by hosting many international events like these 
(Mudeung newspaper, 5th November, 1994).” Such an intention of Gwangju City can 
be identified in an interview with a member of the Gwangju Biennale Foundation as 
follows.  
 
“From the 1980s to mid-1990s, many 5.18(Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement)-themed art works and programmes were conducted in Gwangju. 
However, at that time, it usually appears that the atmosphere of Gwangju 
was dark and heavy. Thus, there was a need to break or overcome such a 
city image like that of a city of resistance and darkness by employing an 
urban tradition like Yehyang…..It [the Biennale, author adds] can cure the 
wound of the Movement, and such a possibility and capability was very 
persuasive. In particular, then, it was relevant to the governing goal of Kim 
Young-sam Government. At that time, central government was implementing 
Segyehwa (globalisation) and Gibanghwa (localisation). Then, the Biennale 
was launched as the President really liked it. Under such political background, 
the Biennale was established, and it became a backdrop and starting point of 
transforming the city image in terms of city culture and image within Gwangju 
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(author interview, interviewed on 14th September 2011, a member of the 
Biennale Foundation).” 
 
To summarise, the Gwangju Biennale started from upgrading ‘Yehyang’ (a town of 
traditional art) based on a discourse of Yehyang purposely contrived by local 
business group like ‘Gigaehyup’. Furthermore, it was an intentional attempt to hide 
the strong and tough image as a city of uprising and resistance and to convert those 
into a soft and sophisticated image such as ‘Yehyang within the world’ and ‘city of 
modern art’ through an international art festival. 
 
 
7.5 Gwangju Biennale 
 
7.5.1 Background 
 
In 1995, Gwangju city government founded the Gwangju Biennale under the aims of 
‘image improvement and economic development of Gwangju through a large scale 
global cultural art event’. The term of ‘Biennale’ was derived from an Italian word. It 
can be used for all sorts of biennial events, yet it usually tends to be used for 
international modern art exhibitions and accompanying events held every second 
year. The first Biennale was held in Venice in 1893, and then such Italian became a 
usual term in public use (Gwangju Biennale Foundation, 1995:25). Since then, 
Venice has been well known for its Biennale and international film festival as a city of 
art and tourism. Following the success in Venice, a number of similar Biennales such 
as Lyon in France, San Paulo in Brazil, Whitney in the US, Istanbul in Turkey, and 
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Johannesburg in South Africa have been established. Since the 1990s, globalisation 
and increasing place marketing of cities have deepened such imitating phenomena 
of the international art festival. As a result, more and more people have criticised the 
problems of the Biennale as a global business suggesting it has an indifferent 
pattern, a repetition of famous artists, and similar display planning (Lee, 2000). 
 
Korean central government formally announced that the festival was organised to 
commemorate 50 years of Korean Independence and celebrate the Year of Art in 
1995. However, it would be a nominal purpose. Rather, it might be shaped to 
transform the traditional cultural value of Gwangju, Yehyang to a modern city of 
culture and uplift the Gwangju sprit. In this respect, the historical and political 
background of the Gwangju Biennale except the formal reasons could be explained 
as follows.  
 
First, it appears that there was a political consideration to select Gwangju as a 
hosting city (Chun, 2002; Shin, 2006). At first, Gwangju was not a candidate city on 
the list of the Ministry of Culture and Sports for the Biennale. Only Seoul, Gyeonggi, 
and Jeju were candidate cities placed upon the table by the Ministry and the Korean 
Fine Arts Association (KFAA) (Kuk, 1999). However, Kim Young-sam and his 
presidential office might have had an influence on Gwangju becoming the nation’s 
first international Biennale city. At that time, much of the Gwangju population 
demanded rapid resolution measures for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
like revealing the truth of the event, compensating victims, punishing related military 
officers and launching commemoration projects. Particularly, many citizens strongly 
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required the establishment of a special law on the Movement rigorously criticising the 
government’s inactive attitude towards it. The situation was politically a considerable 
burden to the Kim Young-sam Government since his Government was proud of its 
identity as a democratic Munmin (non-military or civilian) Government. In this 
complicated process, Kim’s Government might have intended to pacify Gwangju 
public opinion by agreeing to the Gwangju Biennale in terms of compensation for the 
Movement. Indeed, such an intention came true and kept successive measures after 
the Biennale Festival. Kim Young-sam continued his Government from former 
Military regimes through ‘Rightly Erecting History’37 projects and there was the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement within the centre of them. Thus, Munmin 
Government made efforts to compensate the Movement in order to strengthen such 
differentiation from previous authoritarian military governments. His Government 
continued other programmes such as the establishment of a special law for 
compensating victims and the designation of the date (18th May) as a national 
commemoration day. 
 
Second, the political autonomy of local and urban government had been increased 
more and more before the complete implementation of the self-governing system38 
in 1995. In relation to this, Kang Un-tae, the former city Mayor of Gwnagju stated in a 
related episode in his autobiography that he persuaded the President (Kim Young-
sam) as follows. At that time, Kim Young-sam visited Gwangju for an annual tour of 
                                    
37 ‘Rightly Erecting History’ was already announced by Kim Young-sam through his special statement 
13th May in 1993. In this announcement, he noted the The Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a 
base of his Munmin Government. Major projects for ‘Rightly Erecting History’ included the demolition 
of Governor-General Building of colonial Chosun Dynasty in Seoul and Punishment of military officers 
about Gwangju Movement including former Presidents like Chun Doo-whan and Rho Tae-woo. 
 
38 Self-governing system was partially implemented by the election of city and local councilors in 
1991, but it was fully launched by the election vote for city and local mayors in 1995. 
207 
 
inspection. The Mayor said to the President that “[A]re you emphasising globalisation 
and localisation in these days? According to your policy direction, I think locals 
should expand their own unique competitive edges and extend them toward the 
global market. Such types of measures for globalisation and localisation could be 
highly relevant to your concept. Thus, I would host an international art festival like a 
Biennale in Gwangju because, you know, Gwangju is Yehyang and we have many 
assets and public ethos of traditional art. Then, he added that the President agreed 
with him saying ‘Right, I think so. Now, our cities have to make an effort by 
themselves.’ (Donga-Ilbo [newspaper], 4th October 2010).” Through this conversation, 
we can recognise that the President’s governing guidance toward globalisation and 
localisation influenced the hosting of the Biennale in Gwangju.  
 
Thirdly, Gwangju city government intended to improve the city’s image and expand 
local growth based on a discourse of Yehyang, and it might be the most important 
background to the hosting of the Biennale. In other words, as observed in the above 
conversation between Kang (Mayor) and Kim (President), the Biennale was an 
achievement of Gwangju marketing policy based on the ‘Yehyang (a town of 
traditional art)’ discourse which was connected with the ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ of 
central government, and ultimately led to local economic development through the 
commodification of art. Indeed, within the dialogue, Kang, the Mayor, emphasised 
Gwangju’s image as that of a city of ‘Yehyang’ and he persuaded the President 
noting the logic of global competition among cities. In addition, the argument that 
Gwangju’s image should be improved for local economic development was 
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persuasively suggested in a panel discussion39 in Gwangju. The discussion was 
held with the university institute’s study results40 of Jeonnam (including Gwangju) 
image. In particular, the assertions that many firms tended to avoid investment due 
to the bad image of Gwangju and that to overcome it, Gwangju would have to create 
a new image employing cultural instruments like the Biennale, as an international 
event were strongly raised from participants of media and business groups (Shin, 
1998). In this context, we can recognise that the Gwangju Biennale was organised 
with an intention to reshape the poor city image into an international and modern one 
by city government along with local media and business people. It can also be 
identified in an interview given by Kang, City Mayor to a local newspaper. 
 
“At that time, I created the Gwangju Biennale with a view to making a global 
cultural product by using the local merit and characteristic of Yehyang….I 
drew promises to support us totalling 40 billion won [approximately 2.5 million 
pounds] from local companies like Nasan (CEO An Byung-kyun) and Duksan 
(CEO Park Sung-sup) and announced the event plan to press and media. 
Then, in spite of much opposition, I won the hosting of the event from central 
government [Ministry of Culture and Sports] defeating the Seoul Biennale…. 
Then, I did my best to produce a successful event (Goodnews people, 6th 
October 2010).” 
 
However, it was not just an attempt to improve city image for city tourism. It extended 
its territory to the culture industry beyond cultural tourism. Kang Un-tae, City Mayor 
who created the Biennale revealed the ultimate intention in establishing the event in 
                                    
39 The discussion on ‘The Future of Gwangju and Jeonnam in 21C’ was held in Gwangju March in 
1995. Here, some political and economic experts participated in the meeting. 
40 According to the findings of the research institute (Jeonnam, Seoul and Busan National University 
social science institute), many respondents indicated ‘the lack of central government support’ and 
noted ‘political environment (30.7%)’, ‘business leaders’ prejudice (27.1%)’, ‘economic under-
development (19.3%), and ‘labour or student movements (12.1%)’ as the reasons for low company 
investment. 
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a lecture given in June 2007 noting “The reason why I set up the Gwangju Biennale 
was not only to hold an international art festival every other year but also to boost the 
culture industry based on the design industry (Yeonhap news, 8th June 2007).” Thus, 
Gwangju might be created through the reimaging of city toward local economic 
growth. Indeed, Gwangju branched into a Design Biennale which blatantly expresses 
its aim as to boost the culture industry and the local economic growth matched up 
with the creator’s intention. This will be further examined in a later section.  
 
 
7.5.2 Brief overview of the Gwangju Biennale 
 
The Gwangju Biennale is usually held over about 3 months. It consists of 
international modern art, festival performances, an international academic 
symposium, and other events. City authorities newly built the Biennale hall with 
3.7acres of space for display, an art museum and a folk museum. They employed 
Jungoi Park (580 acre) as a location for the festival. The Gwangju Biennale started in 
1995 and the 8th event was in 2010. It is the biggest cultural festival yet in Gwangju. 
As seen in Table 7.1, it has been held in every second year and over 100 artists from 
30-40 countries participate. Since 2005, however, Biennales have been held in 
Gwangju every year by the creation of the more commercialised Design Biennale. In 
relation to a selecting theme of display of the Gwangju Biennale, the international 
and western oriented ‘Beyond the Boundary’ from the first contest was not relevant 
to the local character and spirit. Thus, it led to intense opposition like the Anti-
Biennale from local groups and artists. Then, it has been gradually changed toward a 
local character joining with some people involved in the Anti-Biennale, even though it 
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still lacks the Gwangju spirit and a local quality. In addition, the Gwangju Biennale 
had difficulty in differentiating itself from other ones such as Yokohama, Taipei, 
Shanghai, and other domestic festivals. As a result, to choose a unique theme 
connected with Gwangju became more difficult than before.  
 
 
Table 7.1 Overview of the Gwangju Biennale 
 
  Date 
 
Theme Participants 
(country/artist) 
Visitor 
(ten thousand) 
 
1st 20 May ~  
20 Nov 1995 
 
‘Beyond the Borders’ 
 
50 / 249 
 
163 
 
2nd 1 Sep ~  
27 Nov 1997 
 
‘Unmapping the Earth’ 
 
35 / 257 
 
     90 
 
3rd 29 Feb ~  
7 Jun 2000 
 
‘Man + Space’ 
 
46 / 245 
 
     61 
 
4th 29 Mar ~  
29 Jun 2002 
 
‘Pause’ 
 
31 / 325 
 
     44 
 
5th 10 Sep ~  
13 Nov 2004 
 
‘Grain of Dust,  
A Drop of Water’ 
 
41 / 237 
 
     51 
 
6th 8 Sep ~  
11 Nov 2006 
 
‘Fever Variations’ 
 
32 / 127 
 
     70 
 
7th 5 Sep ~  
9 Nov 2008 
 
‘Annual Report:  
A year in Exhibitions’ 
 
36 / 127 
 
     36 
 
8th 3 Sep ~  
11 Nov 2010 
 
‘10000 Lives’ 
 
31 / 134 
 
4941 
(estimate) 
 
(Source: 2008 Gwangju Biennale Report and http://www.gb.or.kr]) 
 
A number of audiences have visited the Biennale. Particularly, over 1.6 million 
people visited the first time. The reason is that the city government forced and 
mobilised many school (elementary, middle and high) students to see the event. 
                                    
41 This is an estimate from newspaper (News Town, 2010.11.8) 
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Then, however, the figure decreased to half or below half this first audience since 
mobilising students was changed from ‘by coercion’ to a ‘strongly recommended’. 
 
 
7.6 Multi-scale actors and contested visions 
 
7.6.1 Diverse actors in the Biennale 
 
In terms of spatial scale, the Gwangju Biennale was limited to a local scale. It was 
suggested in connection to the ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ of the Kim Young-sam 
government and it was one of the important projects on a local scale to support the 
policy direction of on the national scale. However, some artists had concern about 
the success of the cultural festival since the Tokyo Biennale failed in 1952 and there 
was had been no further Biennales in Asia since that time (Kim, 2001). Nonetheless, 
as we can see from the figures in Table 7.1, the first Biennale in Gwangju attracted 
huge visitors. And then, the city authorities have managed to hold it eight times. In 
addition, global influence made an impact on the transfer of policy for the Gwangju 
Biennale. At the time of its establishment, the Gwangju Biennale was greatly 
influenced by Venice. On 15th October 1994, the planning director of the Venice 
Biennale visited Gwangju and introduced their overview to city officials and Biennale 
Foundation members. Then, they transferred Venice’s know-how to them while 
taking a look around the sites of the Gwangju Biennale (ibid). Thus, we can guess 
that the Gwangju Biennale members learned much from the Venice team.  
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In this project, the city authorities, the Biennale Foundation, and the Organising 
Committee played leading roles. Central government organisations (the Presidential 
Office and the Ministry of Culture and Sports) were also involved in and made the 
final decision of whether the project would be launched or not. Some organisations 
such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Citizen Supporting Committee 
(thereafter refer to as ‘CSC’) stressed the economic importance of the project in 
order to support the city authortities’ policy to host the Biennale. Meanwhile, the 
other party composed of a number of cultural groups and civil organisations like the 
Gwangju Minyechong (Democratic artist organisation), the Biennale Citizen 
Emergency Committee, and the Gwangmigong (Gwang and Jeonnam artist 
community) planned and drove the Anti-Biennale.  
 
However, central government was not favourable to the Gwangju Biennale from the 
start. In 1994, public officials in the Ministry of Culture and Sports examined other 
places like Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Jeju as possible host cities. Particularly, they 
prepared it having Seoul in mind. Nonetheless, the Gwangju City Mayor, Kang Un-
tae, pushed to host the Biennale obtaining the acknowledgment of the Presidential 
Office in advance. In the process, he persuaded them of the need for Gwangju 
winning the Biennale bid by emphasising the possible healing of the wounded mind 
left from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the city’s identity as a 
Yehyang. Then, this caused a conflict between the MCS and the Gwangju city 
government. Regarding this, the local newspaper Gwangju-Ilbo described that “at 
that time, the Minister Lee Min-seop verbally abused the Gwangju City Mayor, Kang 
Un-tae ‘Do whatever you want [without my help]’ throwing down his notebook (21st 
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November 1995).” However, after the visit of the President, Kim Young-sam to 
Gwangju in February 1995, such conflict was dramatically resolved. The City Mayor, 
Kang persuaded him to support Gwangju explaining his will to promote Kim’s policy 
direction, ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ through the Gwangju Biennale.  
 
The President agreed it at a luncheon meeting in the city, saying that “Gwangju 
citizen! I think the Gwangju Biennale should be a national event as a cultural art 
Olympic which would be comparable to the Daejeon Expo, but I heard that central 
government didn’t acknowledge the related budget and personnel to implement it. I 
will fully support it right now and hope you will make it a success with pride (Donga-
Ilbo [Newspaper], 4th October 2010). With this momentum, the conflict between the 
MCS and the city government was completely cleared up and was followed by 
diverse supports from the central Ministries. In particular, the Minister of Education 
commanded schools nationwide to visit the Gwangju Biennale as a required site of a 
school trip aiming for a number of 1.2 million student visitors (Kim, 1999). As a result, 
the first Biennale welcomed over 1.6 million people and such mobilising of students 
might have played a major role in the event.  
 
The first Biennale in Gwangju was not achieved only by the support of central 
government. Many local business people contributed to it. They occupied many 
seats in the Biennale Foundation and the CSC (Citizen Supporting Committee) and 
actively backed up the festival. For instance, the CSC (304 people) consisted of 165 
business and financial people, 99 local councillors, other public organisation 
managers, and military chief officers. In adiition, Duksan and Nasan business firms 
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promised to donate property for the Biennale Exhibition Hall and after the event, city 
authorities received 3.5 million pounds from many local companies (ibid).  
 
7.6.2 Forming tensions between parties 
 
Policy is a serial process of agenda setting, decision making, implementation and 
evaluation. Various actors and stakeholders are involved and the process tends to 
be a complicated process. Within such a complicated process, diverse actors contest, 
conflict and co-operate with each other often having different perspectives and views. 
Thus, such a policy process naturally leads to some tensions among actors and the 
knots of these tensions tend to be expressed when a policy is constructed through 
contestations and conflicts of actors’ interests.  
 
Also in the Gwangju Biennale, two parties formed a sharp tension. There was 
competition between the party which was for the festival and the other party against 
it.  
 
The former attempted to transform the city image from one of resistance into an 
internationally polished one. They endeavoured to attract more tourists and refined 
tough image. For example, the Chief Executive of the Chamber of Commerce 
represented this position, saying that “to hold the event, it will cause the 
improvement of citizens’ pride and relationships with international society and our 
economy will be revitalised. If one million tourists came and spent 5.5 pounds per 
individual here, we could make a total of 550 million pounds (Kim, 1999:81).”  
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However, their economic trial sparked the strong opposition of some local and artists 
groups since they thought of the resistant spirit of the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement as a local symbolic quality. The major criticisms of the party against the 
Gwangju Biennale were these two. First, they thought the goal of event should be 
changed from promoting economic growth in the city to reflecting the ‘Daedong 
(solidarity and distribution)’ spirit of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. 
Second, they made the criticism that there were few open discussions about the 
international festival. They thought that pure artistic groups and people should be the 
hosts of the event rather than city the authorities. Thus, the marketing policy of the 
city government evolved in an unexpected direction conflicting their visions and 
values between the two parties. The Biennale was an arena for conflicts about 
Gwangju’s images and the democratic decision making between them (Shin, 1998). 
 
 
7.7 Conflict: Biennale vs. Anti-Biennale 
 
 
7.7.1 Local marketing toward event nationalism 
 
In the context of relationship between central and city government, the Gwangju 
Biennale could have been a common interest. Nationally, the Presidential Office and 
MCS (Ministry of Culture and Sports) wanted to make it a success in order to 
promote the globalising of local cities. The MCS had a five year-plan which was 
established in 1992 to create an international art event. Then, after the President’s 
suggestion for ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’, many cities like Seoul, Jeju, and Gwangju 
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were putting themselves forward in the competition for the winning of the Biennale 
bid. Meanwhile, Gwangju city government, the Biennale Foundation and local 
business groups tried to use the event as an opportunity to change the city image for 
local economic growth. Within this context, the city authorities needed central 
government’s support such as mobilising student visitors, and central public leaders 
and officials also wanted local authorities’ aid against the local pressure of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement. This contextual situation might have enabled 
them to co-operate around the Biennale. In addition, the city authorities ardently 
upgraded ‘Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ into the international and modern 
‘Culture and Art Olympics’ and such Gwangju marketing was greatly suited to the 
Presidents’ governing suggestion, ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’. Thus, even though its 
space was limited to a city, they attempted to jump up the scale from local place 
marketing to the nationalism of ‘Culture and Art Olympics’.  
 
 
7.7.2 Conflicting meanings in local scale 
 
Against the international Biennale marketing of the city authorities, some radical 
groups and local artists scathingly criticised it. For them, a desirable art event in 
Gwangju should be one in which they could keep and sublimate the values of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement such as the protection of human rights and the 
‘Daedong (solidarity and distribution)’ spirit. Thus, they hosted the Anti-Biennale42 in 
Mangwol cemetery during the time of the Gwangju Biennale in 1995. A member of 
the Biennale Foundation described the situation as follows: 
                                    
42 They called it ‘Tongil Misulje (Unification Art Event)’ in Korean, but they formally announced it as 
the Anti-Biennale in English.  
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“This Biennale was a very unfamiliar western event and on the other hand, 
through the emerging Munmin government, Gwang citizens highly expected 
a thorough investigation about what happened in the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement. But such activities were not going well and 
suddenly strange Biennale was launched….. So, there are many people who 
suspected whether it had a real motives such as hiding the 5.18 [Gwangju 
Democratisaiotn Movement] issue. But we don’t have enough time to prepare 
a large-scale international art event in 6 months. So, whether they criticised 
us or not, we had no option but to push it. Anyway, we thought it possible 
because we had a cultural tradition of and pride in Yehyang (author interview, 
14th September 2011).” 
 
Even though Yehyang was an intentionally shaped tradition by the government and 
local business elites, the host people of the Gwangju Biennale thought it could be a 
cultural base from which they deserved to hold the event.  
 
By contrast, a member of the Gwangmigong which had participated in the Anti-
Biennale criticised the lack of local identity in the Gwangju Biennale of the city 
authorities, saying that “Once they hold the Biennale in Gwangju, we suggested 
them to do a ‘Human Rights Biennale’. And we told them that they should need more 
time and citizen participation to prepare it in order to emphasise Gwangju’s unique 
image, because it’s a sacred democratic place. But, they just pushed it [the Gwangju 
Biennale]…. And also, due to the sudden introduction of the Biennale, many citizens 
had doubts about it. For example, they very much questioned whether the city 
authorities were attempting to dilute out Gwangju’s spirit and values. There were 
quite a few people who were angry because of it (author interview, 14th October 
2011).” They also criticised the formal event in that it became a non-historical one 
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with no connection to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement since the city 
authorities only pursued internationalisation and promoting tourism. In the Anti-
Biennale, they staged a Korean traditional type of opening ceremony (Madang-nori) 
which included delivering a Korean coffin, playing the Korean flute, and other folk 
performances to express a meaning opposite to the Western type of Gwangju 
Biennale. Particularly, their ceremony of the Korean coffin also meant to pacify 
victims of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. They displayed a number of 
paintings and sculptures themed on the Movement around Mangwol cemetery. It 
seemed that the response of local residents was not bad. For example, according to 
the Donga-Ilbo [newpaper], there were many visitors (over 200 thousand in two 
weeks) and they left some memos like ‘if someone asks about the future of the 
nation, let them see Gwangju’, ‘Segyehwa [globalisation] without resolving the 
Gwangju issue is false’, and ‘Demand to investigate the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement’ (Donga-Ilbo, 11th October 1995).  
 
Figure 7.8 Anti-Biennale pictures 
 
 
   [Source: Kim, 2001:212(left, Sangyeo ceremony), 217(right, display)] 
 
219 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Conflicting meanings of the Gwangju Biennale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        < City government,                       < Artists groups,  
          Biennale Foundation,                     cultural local groups > 
          Business groups > 
 
 
 
However, in relation to the formal Gwangju Biennale, the people hosting Anti-
Biennale could not sustain the energy to keep its resources, personnel running the 
Anti-Biennale, and scale. Regarding this, an interviewee explained to me the 
difficulty they faced, saying that “money was the most important problem, there was 
a money problem. And also, we shaped the exhibition space around Mangwol 
cemetery by ourselves….. We couldn’t draw pictures during the time and we had to 
protect our work from possible robbery and damage. If it was rainy, we had to 
remove them. So, we couldn’t continue our artistic activity (author interview, a 
member of Gwangmigong, 14th October 2011).” As a result, the situation was more 
favourable to the formal Biennale festival rather than the Anti-Biennale since the city 
authorities, the Biennale Foundation and business groups had much more resources. 
In addition, it might have influenced the rising visitor numbers to the event that the 
Western 
International 
Biennale 
(Culture Olympic) 
Human rights 
Biennale 
(Art display in 
Mangwol) 
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city authorities nationally appealed to people to support this as a ‘Culture Olympics’. 
There were a number of placards which were written with the slogan: ‘Establishment 
of the Gwangju Biennale, the World Culture and Art Olympics’ everywhere in the city 
and the city authorities selected the theme of the first formal Biennale, ‘Beyond the 
Borders’ for the internationalisation of the city. Through this series of behaviours, 
they attempted to gain support for the event by manipulating it as a nationally 
mobilised international event far beyond just a local marketing one. In other words, 
they overcame the opposition of the Anti-Biennale party through scale jumping from 
the local issue of a Biennale to the nationwide issue of a ‘Culture Olympics’ = 
Biennale.  
 
By contrast, the people who hosted the Anti-Biennale failed to effectively expand the 
scale of their event from an art event based on local history to a more universal one 
such as the Biennale for human rights, peace and democracy. They did not try to 
appeal to other people who lived in other cities. Rather, they were busy in keeping 
Mangwol cemetery which was only a place in the local area. Thus, the Anti-Biennale 
was not expanded to encompass national or global visions and values since its host 
people failed to diffuse its broader meanings and values such as the ‘Daedong 
(solidarity and distribution)’ spirit, human rights, and peace to many other citizens.  
 
In addition, this case can be examined in term of the relationship between ‘macro-
necessity’ and ‘micro-diversity’ (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999:149) which 
suggested by Jessop’s alternative approach (see 5.2) related to local growth politics. 
The Gwangju Biennale as a representative place marketing policy of Gwangju was 
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created by a combination of ‘Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ discourse 
(manipulated by psedo- or quasi-local growth coalition in the name of ‘Gigaehyup’) 
and neo-liberal ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ of the Kim Young-sam Government. 
Accordingly, the Gwangju Biennale might be recognised as a westernised cultural 
festival led by the economic interests of local business elites within the wider context 
of globalisation. Thus, I suggest that this example should be understood within the 
dialectic context between the broader phenomenon of globalisation and ‘Yehayang’ 
discourse as locally mobilised economic interests. 
 
 
7.8 Conflict co-ordination and consequences of the Gwangju Biennale 
 
 
7.8.1 Conflict co-ordination in the Gwangju Biennale 
 
Co-ordination or co-optation? 
 
The Gwangju Biennale absorbed Kang Yeon-kyun, the head of the Anti-Biennale 
who had planned and actively led opposition activities in one of the key positions at 
the 2nd Biennale. Some of the people who supported his vision with a negative 
attitude toward the Gwangju Biennale followed his route, and subsequently joined in 
the government festival of Gwangju Biennale. The Anti-Biennale became one of the 
special events in the 2nd Gwangju Biennale. Its English name was also changed from 
the Anti- Gwangju Biennale to the Gwangju Reunification Art Festival. In regard to 
this situation, a member of the Biennale Foundation stated that “while many people 
in Minjoong [people] Art rejected and opposed the 1st Gwangju Biennale, some of 
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them participated in the 2nd…. I presume that they thought that only by their efforts, 
they could not change anything in the Biennale. So, instead, they joined the festival 
in order to reflect their legitimacy and artistic mind in the formal festival. In particular, 
it was decisive that Kang yeon-kyun, the head of Minjoong Art in Gwangju changed 
his role and position as a major supporter for the second Biennale. In other words, 
he became the head of the Gwangju Museum of Art and the secretary-general in the 
Gwangju Biennale. Then, due to his new position within the Biennale, conflicts 
between the Biennale and Anti-Biennale were co-ordinated (author interview, 
interviewed on 14th September 2011, a member of the Biennale Foundation).” 
 
In contrast to this, a person who belonged to the Gwangmigong had a different 
interpretation of the situation. “The expression of ‘was co-ordinated’ is completely 
wrong, they conciliated opposite opinions by throwing some money at us. So, after 
the first Gwangju Reunification Art Festival [Anti-Biennale], we didn’t like to resist 
against them any more without a head person….. And also we didn’t have the 
willpower to stick at it. What can we use it for? What is its meaning?” And, he added 
that “When we were preparing the second, a suggestion was received. OK. Let us 
see it. Then, we argued that you [the city government] should treat us as formal 
artists and if you don’t want to let the Mangwol cemetery be vacant, you should 
support us as we want. The 2nd Reunification Art Festival was shaped by us to 
toughly express our thinking that the Biennale should be like this. However, it was 
hard to stick it within the formal Biennale. And citizesn and the media also lost their 
attention to our activity. Consequently, we could be placated by their money (author 
interview, interviewed on 14th October 2011, a member of the Gwangmigong). He 
223 
 
argued it was not a co-ordination but only a co-optation made by money and a formal 
position. Co-ordination or co-optation by absorbing the local Anti-Biennale into the 
international Biennale was a critical opportunity to dilute the symbolic meaning and 
image of a city dedicated to democracy. Since then, Gwangju’s image as a Yehyang 
and modern culture city has been increasingly naturalised within Gwangju and South 
Korea.  
 
Relationship between the Yehyang discourse and Gwangju Biennale 
 
It is an interesting fact that even though the nickname of Yehyang Gwangju was 
contrived by a small number of local businesses and press groups (supported by 
military government), most Gwangju citizens do not oppose it now. Furthermore, the 
term of Yehyang Gwangju is often used by the national media and people as well as 
by the local newspapers and population. To my surprise, however, I discovered the 
fact that some Gwangju citizens still don’t agree with it or actually doubt it during my 
field visit to Gwangju. According to Song (2007) and my following interview results of 
Gwangju residents, such arguments might be acknowledged.  
 
“Actually, is there a traditional culture in Gwangju? Gossaum in 
Gwangsangu…. It is a thing of expanded boundary in Gwangju. There is no 
palace and…. I don’t know how the watermelon becomes a symbolic thing of 
Gwangju (Song’s interview, 2007, 42 year old woman).” 
 
“I think Gwangju is an irony and strange all the time. It is ironic. People call it 
Yehyang Gwangju, but there is little Yehyang [traditional art and culture] and 
such mind in the city (Song’s interview, 2007, 32 year old woman).” 
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 “Unexpectedly, when my colleague soldiers asked me about tour attraction 
sites in Gwangju during my military service, I couldn’t actually answer them. It 
is a problem. We often call our city as one of culture and art city, but there 
are few things here about culture and art. All Gwangju people know the street 
of art is not really one and Gwangju has no unique cultural thing. Yet, it is not 
desirable to suggest how about going to Mangwol cemetery (Song’s interview, 
2007, 32 year old man).” 
 
“In terms of city marketing, I am not sure that it is a good city [as a tourist 
attraction] for people coming to Gwangju… In this regard, I think that when 
most people come in here, they tend to be disappointed. Additionally, I don’t 
have any sites to recommend to others in my mind. Why do you think the city 
is Yehyang and a culture city? (author interview, interviewed on 21th 
September 2011, a city councillor)” 
 
These interview answers might be evidence of the fact that the Yehyang (a town of 
traditional art and culture) image of Gwangju is just a shaped truth and so it could not 
reflect the reality of the city. In addition, the discourse of Yehyang discloses a few 
real meanings about Gwangju. First, it was an attempt to divert the association: 
Gwangju = the Democratisation Movement or blooding uprising for democracy into 
another theme like culture. Its ultimate goal was economic growth. The discourse 
played an intermediary role to draw a new issue of local development whilst hiding 
the image of sacred place for democracy. As a result, many historic sites like 
Mangwol cemetery and the old Jeonnam Provincial Hall have degenerated into one 
of the tour sites to attract visitors rather than a place for historic education and 
memory. Secondly, the Yehayang discourse supported by the military junta had a 
very political aim and led to the international Biennale as a form of political marketing 
of Gwangju for local political and business interests. Proponents for the Yehyang 
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Gwangju asserted the Gwangju Movement should not be a hot issue any more in the 
city through their inaction about responding to revealing 5.18 truths and making a 
special law. Their logic of Yehyang discourse seemed to keep people paying 
attention to the Biennale. Therefore, it appears the discourse of Yehyang influenced 
holding the Biennale and the Gwangju Biennale played a major role in producing an 
upgraded version of Yehyang, a discourse of culture city. 
 
7.8.2 Diverse results of the Gwangju Biennale 
 
Changing city image 
 
The Gwangju Biennale was a key catalyst within the transforming process from a 
‘city image of resistance’ symbolising Korean democracy and collective justice 
toward a ‘city image of contemporary and global art’. Its final goal was urban 
economic development employing a cultural art festival. A Korean newspaper noted 
the impact and meaning the Gwangju Biennale had on the city image as follows.  
 
“<The 95 Gwangju Biennale> was very meaningful because it positioned 
Yehyang Gwangju as an international cultural city and displayed our cultural 
capacity to the world….. We had already advertised our level of sports and 
science to all countries through the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and the Expo in 
1993. Thus, the Gwangju Biennale was not an event of only Gwangju citizens 
but an opportunity to inform the international society of our cultural capacity 
(Kyunghyang Shinmun [newspaper], 20th November 1995).” 
 
As observed in the press news at that time, however, the Biennale was not just such 
a meaning. Another huge result was the marching for a new discourse of the culture 
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city. On the one hand, it produced the Gwangju Design Biennale like a brother of the 
Gwangju Biennale. On the other hand, it also influenced the creation of the Asian 
Cultural Hub City, which was a larger scale cultural project shaped by the State and 
city government. The former blatantly emphasised the local economy and culture 
industry, and the latter caused bigger controversies in Gwangju society. Here, I 
explore the relationship between the Design Biennale and the design industry and 
the latter will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
The Gwangju Design Biennale, the design industry and marketing employing 
design 
 
It seems that the Gwangju Biennale has focused on promoting tourism rather than 
boosting the cultural industry. However, it was complemented by the creation of 
more industry-oriented Design Biennale. Gwangju city authorities went forward to the 
cultural industry by establishing the Design Biennale. This Biennale blatantly 
emphasised its connection with the design industry. In 2002, Park Gwang-tae, the 
former city Mayor stated that “In order to boost the design industry, I will launch the 
building of a design centre, a design business incubator, a specialised design street 
and a design biennale by investing 80 million pounds (Hangook Gyungje newspaper, 
14th July 2001).” The Design Biennale was started in 2005. Despite its artistic 
character, city authorities employed the Kim Dae-joong Convention Centre which 
usually hosted industrial exhibitions for private firms as its main display. Its focus of 
display was industry and advertisement design. Furthermore, in 2007, the Art 
Director asserted the importance of design industry within the Design Biennale as 
follows. “The aim of this 2nd Design Biennale is to make a new opportunity for design 
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convergence industry (ibid).” In addition, many commercialised displays like ‘premier 
design products’ and ‘industry design exhibition’ were conducted at the event.  
 
In contemporary cities, the popularity of design is not bounded by the area of an 
industry and product. In many Western cities, design is closely connected with the 
marketing of public spaces. Design is one of the urban make-up strategies of 
neoliberal place marketing. That is to say, design tends to be used not only as a 
promoting tool for increasing consumption but also an urban discourse of neo-
liberalism.  
 
In cities like New York, public design has often been used for building aesthetic 
landmarks displacing dirty homeless people and street stalls. For example, as Zukin 
(1995:135) described in her book of <The Cultures of Cities>, 42nd Street of Times 
Square in New York has been transformed by an art themed-redevelopment plan of 
UDC (Urban Development Corporation) from a low-income class area with 
pornographic movie houses into a commercialised culture with tourist facilities. Smith 
(1992) noted that fierce battles occurred between the police and homeless people 
because of the commercial development (for developers) which was part of the 
process of gentrifying the area around Tompkins Square Park in New York. In recent 
years, such phenomena have increasingly taken place in Korean cities. In Seoul, city 
authorities expelled many street booths into and around Dongdaemun stadium when 
shaping the artificial Chunggye River (a restored city wartercourse) as a large-scale 
urban spectacle. A few years later, the Seoul government moved them out again 
from the stadium in order to transform it into a Design Museum during the campaign: 
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Design Capital Seoul. As such, neo-liberal place marketing based on public design 
often results in the spatial politics of exclusion and selectivity for small numbers of 
city elites. Many other cities have followed Seoul’s urban design and Gwangju has 
also done so. In the context of urban design, improvement project signboards have 
been implemented in city centre and special lighting was established in some streets 
like the Street of Art (see Figure 7.10). However, some citizens have a negative 
opinion about them since they considered them a waste of tax. According to a 
Korean newspaper, most merchants and dealers (82%) in the Street of Art wanted 
the removal of the special lighting (Newsis, 22nd December 2010). As a result, the 
Dong-gu government decided to get rid of it very recently (December 2010) since 
they could not endure the resident’s endless complaints. 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Biennale Bridge (left) and Street of Art (right) 
 
 
 [Source: http://www.gb.or.kr (left), Newsis, 22nd December 2010 (right)] 
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Increasing Biennales and their effects 
 
In the aspects of scale and visitors, the Gwangju Biennale might be considered 
somewhat successful. So, many other cities imitated and emulated it. According to 
Ju Yoon-sil’s study (2008), there are Biennales in as many as 11 cities43 in South 
Korea including Gwangju. However, it is uncertain whether they have delivered good 
effects for their local residents. In relation to this, Noh Hyeong-suk criticised the 
increasing of Biennales in a forum of the Korean Art Magazine, Art Management 
saying that the “political desire of city governments is joining a desire of the art 
market. Recently, a Korean Biennale showed this boldly. Many well-known collectors 
and directors of the US and Europe came together at the Gwangju Biennale. As a 
result, I think the host of the Biennale and the major galleries were busy making a 
place for their social meeting. I felt that it was ‘only their party and festival’. It was not 
a place for communicating with domestic artists and critics. I felt that the event was a 
like the ebb and flow of the sea unconnected with us (Weekly Art Magazine, 26th 
November 2010).” Thus, if his argument is true, Korean Biennale festivals might be 
conducted for only certain groups and city governments rather than for the general 
local people.  
 
In this context, the diverse results of the Gwangju Biennale are critically examined 
although some authors in South Korea evaluated its effect positively. Firstly, some 
interviewees of mine noted, as a positive consequence, that the city image had 
                                    
43  They are the Gwangju Biennale and Design Biennale, the Busan Biennale, the Chungju 
International Crafts Biennale, the Seoul International Media Biennale, the International Print Biennale, 
the Gyeonggi International Ceramics Biennale, the International Calligraphy Jeonbuk Biennale, the 
International Woman Art Biennale, the Pochun Asia Biennale, the Keumgang Nature Art Biennale. 
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increasingly changed from the resistant and dark to the soft. They argued that 
Gwangju had transformed its image into modern and international city beyond 
traditional Yehyang along with the Biennale. However, it might be a naive evaluation 
to interpret only this change of image as a success since it may hide the Gwangju 
spirit and symbolic image of sacred place of democracy, in connection with the 
active involvement of State power agencies and local government. In addition, many 
spontaneously generated festivals from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
have increasingly disappeared during the process of international Gwangju 
marketing projects focused on local growth. Furthermore, as a local reporter noted, 
citizens’ collective values and civic historic pride have faded. 
 
“There is a changed landscape in comparison with the past of over ten years 
ago. Every May, a large number of workers, farmers, students and disabled 
men and women voluntarily gathered in the Geumnam Boulevard in Gwangju. 
It was an evening of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. They put 
many placards into the streets and distributed prints to express and appeal 
about their unfairness and sadness…. But this landscape has disappeared 
now. I think the spatial characteristics of Gwangju enabled such meetings 
every year….. Now, people have become spectators of not participants in the 
festivals of Gwangju. Manipulated and shaped stages are left in here, now 
we don’t have our previous voluntary events that many citizens willingly 
wanted to join in with. Now, those festivals are left only in my memory (author 
interview, interviewed on 15th September 2011).” 
 
Second, the Gwangju Biennale as a modern and international upgrade of Yehyang 
might little influence upon citizen’s daily life while some people argued it was a base 
for city branding and a future culture industry to promote the local economy in 
Gwangju. Rather, it was an opportunity for the city authorities to expand a series of 
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more international events: the Design Biennale, the International Light Expo, the 
Jung Youl-sung International Music Festival, the Im Bang-wool Korean Traditional 
Music Festival, and the International Culture Creative Industry Exhibition. However, 
most interviewees of mine were sceptical about the effect of the Biennale on citizens’ 
economic life. For example, a local newswoman stressed there was little impact of 
the Biennale on residents’ lives, saying: 
 
“As one of the citizens, I don’t think the effect of the Biennale has been 
positive over the last 15 years in Gwangju. Rather, it has not had a good 
impact on citizens’ daily life, in particular the economic aspect..... Staging 
such cultural festivals and events haven’t made our economic and cultural life 
better….. The size of the Biennale organisation has been smaller, even if the 
scale of event has been larger. Due to the economic recession, professional 
staff and personnel related to the event were dismissed and even the overall 
organisation has been downsized. In contrast, work has been increased 
constantly. Now, the city government added the Design Biennale onto the 
previous Biennale, so Biennales are held in Gwangju in every year….. So, in 
my opinion, Biennale has had little influence on employment and tourism in 
our city in spite of its increasing scale. Rather, its economic impact might be 
relatively decreasing more and more over time. That is, it seems such 
cultural projects like the Biennale have little effect on the economic life of 
residents (author interview, interviewed on 15th September 2011).” 
 
In addition, even though the Gwangju Biennale has large number of visitors, these 
might be exaggerated. Particularly, the number of visitors in the first year was over 
1.6 million and drawing on this figure some Korean authors consider the Biennale 
successful. However, as we observed in the previous section, a great part of those 
visitors were students coercively mobilised by the government. In the first Biennale, 
the proportion of foreign visitor was just 1.5% of audience while the host had 
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expressed it as an international festival and even a cultural art Olympics (Kim, 2001). 
In this respect, my interviewee criticised it as a wasteful festival for obtaining 
international prestige saying that “for example, if we turned the money for the 
Biennale, with no smell of Gwangju, to making just 50 working studios for poor artists, 
it would have a much more productive effect on our cultural industry (author 
interview, a local artist, 14th October, 2011).” Rather, he argued it would be much 
better if the city government used the expenditure given to the consuming festival of 
the Biennale (over 10 million pounds every two years) to other creative cultural 
facilities like artist studios and welfare services for supporting deprived or disabled 
people.  
 
Third, some people regarded increasing the opportunity and local art facilities for 
enjoying modern art as one of the Biennale’s positive effects. However, others 
criticised the Biennale’s cultural impact. They argued that the Biennale made the art 
activity of local artists sink into atrophy and decrease support for other cultural fields 
such as music and dance in Gwangju (Kim, 2001). In the Biennale, there were few 
works from Gwangju artists, and rather, during the time of the Biennale local artists’ 
individual displays disappeared. In addition, local artists who belong to other genres 
like dance, literature and Korean traditional music attempted to argue for the 
‘removal of the Gwangju Biennale’ since they felt it was relatively unfair that so much 
public funds for culture were invested into modern art based at the Biennale and that 
city officials often neglect their fields. Accordingly, some local media outlets 
suggested that funds for the Biennale should be evenly used overall cultural fields in 
Gwangju (ibid).  
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Finally, as in Gramsci’s logic about ideology, it is likely that the dominant class 
ideology on place marketing around the Biennale had already penetrated into public 
common sense in Gwangju. In other words, the neoliberal logic of the political and 
business elite is that Gwangju needs to transform its image into a global and modern 
one through aggressive cultural marketing projects like the Biennale to make a 
competitive and growing city. Such a perception might naturally be accepted by local 
people without a doubt about its ultimate goal. To my surprise, both interviewees 
from between the Gwangju Chamber of Commerce and a local group resisting the 
commodification of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement had a similar logic in 
their answer about the Biennale.  
 
“I think marketing activities like the cultural convention, expo and festival 
have contributed to the improvement of Gwangju’s image and the city’s 
competitiveness. For example, Gwangju has attempted to advance its image 
by staging the international art festival of Biennale. And it led to the 
development of a culture industry….. In recent years, the World 
Championships in Athletics were held in Daegu and I think it influenced the 
improvement of local economy and the civic pride of Daegu’s citizens. Such 
large scale events tend to completely change a city’s image. So I think such 
sort of sport marketing is very important for a city because marketing events 
and festivals can transform the negative image of Gwangju to a positive and 
hopeful one (author interview, interviewed on 16th September 2011, a 
member of Chamber of Commerce in Gwangju).” 
 
“We need attempts to market the city if it enables our Gwangju to be more 
competitive than other cities. It will inform more people about Gwangju and 
attract more tourists into Gwangju. So I don’t oppose events like the Biennale 
and Universiade because such things could advance our city’s standing. 
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They brought us roads, transport infrastructure, and cultural facilities and the 
name of Gwangju can be well known within the process of holding events. 
Probably they raise Gwangju’s status in the world (author interview, 
interviewed on 23th September 201, a member of the Bereaved Family Group 
of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement).” 
 
As Harvey says, currently, “neoliberalism has ….. become hegemonic as a mode of 
discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has 
become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and 
understand the world (Harvey, 2005:3).” This argument might be identified from this 
empirical evidence.  
 
 
7.9 Summary 
 
Diverse images of Gwangju have been expressed as many colours over time. 
However, the thickest colour was that of resistance for democracy which resulted 
from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980 since it was a significant 
historical event of the country as well as the city. Local business groups wanted to 
dilute and hide such an image by shaping a discourse of ‘Yehyang (a town of 
traditional art)’ under the support of the military regime and local government. In the 
1980s, the representative image of Gwangju was not a Yehyang but of a sacred 
place of democracy. However, local business developed a strategy for local 
economic development based on Yehyang, it led to the international marketing 
event: the Gwangju Biennale configured with central government’s new policy 
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direction, so called ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ in the mid 1990s. Then, in the end, 
these became a foundation for the recent development strategy of Gwangju: a 
commercial discourse of a cultural city. If we take a look at this example in terms of 
Jessop’s alternative approach beyond the dualism of structure and agent, the 
Gwangju Biennale can be recognised as a combination which is created by both the 
‘Yehyang’ discourse manipulated by ‘Gigaehyup’ (psedo-local growth coalition) and 
the neo-liberal ‘Segyehwa’ policy of the Kim Young-sam Government. In other words, 
this case can be understood within the dialectic context between the broader 
phenomenon of globalisation and ‘Yehayang’ discourse for local economic interests. 
Through this case, I suggest, however, it is more important that local political leaders 
and economic elites’ strategies and activities related to the Gwangju Biennale were 
dependent on wider condition of globalisation.  
 
At the first Gwangju Biennale, the hosting group launched it as an ‘international and 
western Biennale’. However, many citizens and artists resisted this since it didn’t 
reflect the local identity. They emphasised local characteristics like the succession of 
the ‘Gwangju (or Daedong) Spirit’ generated by the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement within the event. As a result, there was a conflict between the 
‘international Gwangju Biennale’ and the ‘Anti-Biennale for Human Rights’. However, 
the host didn’t stop their march towards neoliberal local growth by pacifying 
opposition groups through a co-optation strategy. The Gwangju Biennale resulted in 
the commercialised Design Biennale created for blatantly promoting the design 
industry, and then, led to a number of international marketing events and festivals 
little connected with the local qualities of Gwangju. A series of changes in the 
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historical and political context of Gwangju marketing examined within the case of the 
Gwangju Biennale is a transforming process from the distinctive locality of a 
democratic city image to the international and modern cultural, but not unique, one. 
Thus, some authors criticise the Biennale arguing that there is no Gwangju art in the 
Gwangju Biennale. 
 
The meaning of art around the Gwangju Biennale is various. It started from a 
traditional art manipulated by business groups and the military regime to the western 
art of the Biennale, then extends to the commercial design industry and slick urban 
design in order to emphasise local economic growth. According to my investigation, 
however, many citizens might have felt little economic benefit from such international 
art festivals. Rather, it seems such art festivals attenuate the local collective value of 
‘Gwangju or Daedong’ spirit and civic pride born from the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement along with the penetration of the political and business elite’s artful 
marketing discourse for local growth into the normal citizens’ common sense.  
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Chapter Eight: Asian Culture Complex 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines a series of political processes within the ‘Asian Culture 
Complex’ (thereafter refer to as ‘ACC’) which is the key part of ‘Gwangju Hub City of 
Asia Culture’ (thereafter refer to as ‘HCAC’) national project. Gwangju city 
government has attempted to employ this project as a marketing policy and local 
economic strategy rather than as part of a national development strategy. Like the 
Gwangju Biennale in the previous chapter (Chapter 7), this case is also connected 
with the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in aspects of the place for the ACC. 
The next section examines the background of the ACC project in association with the 
memorial project of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, the decline of the city 
centre and the presidential commitment for a capital of culture. The third explores 
multi-scale actors and their conflicting visions around the ACC. The fourth and fifth 
treat the Landmark Controversy which emerged from local government and citizens 
and its co-ordination. Then, the sixth looks at the local controversy of the 
removal/conservation of the Jeonnam Provincial Hall as a historical site since its 
location is in the construction field of the ACC, and the seventh discuss its temporal 
co-ordination and the politics of memory about the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement. The last concludes the chapter summarising the political and social 
implications of the ACC project.  
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8.2 Background 
 
8.2.1 Memorial project of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and 
Jeonnam Provincial Hall 
 
Historical meaning of the Jeonnam Provincial Hall site 
 
The site on which the government is currently building the ACC was the location of 
old ‘Jeonnam Provincial Hall’ (thereafter refer to as ‘JPH’) is closely connected with 
memorial project for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. The reason is that this 
site was first examined by central government as a place for memorializing the 
Movement, and, it led the government to move the JPH to another place. In other 
words, while many Koreans think that the transfer of the JPH led to the problem of 
urban centre decline and thus the ACC are building there in order to resolve the 
problem and to specially treat Gwangju city in a political sense, the truth is not so. 
Actually, the start of these changes was associated with the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement. The place was examined for a memorial project since it 
was the most essential space during the democratic uprising and to implement a 
memorial, the government transferred the JPH. Consequently, the site of the ACC 
took the place of the memorial space for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, 
helping to underline the importance of the place and why these policies have been 
so contested. 
 
However, the meaning of the place is not simple because it is a space containing 
diverse historical events and complicated meanings. At first, as deeply observed in 
7.3, it was the key space for the citizen uprising for democracy against the dictatorial 
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military junta. That is to say, there were the headquarters of the citizen militia and it 
was the place where the democratic uprising of Gwangju people was begun and 
ended. In particular, focused on the historical context of the site, the place has been 
the space for not only the power elites’ densely aggregated domination of agencies 
but also the mass of people’s resistance constantly resisting against repressive 
regimes since Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945).  
 
The JPH was built in the September of 1910. It was rebuilt by the Japanese regime 
as a two story building in 1930, and then expanded to three stories by enlarging its 
width in 1975. Through this process, it has acquired its current appearance (Song, 
2008). There were many political power offices and agencies in the surrounding area 
of the JPH: the HQ of Japan’s military police, the Jeonnam Police Bureau, Gwangju 
police station, Gwangju district court and the public prosecutor’s office. After the 
Second World War, those agencies were still there ruling the Jeonnam region and its 
leading city, Gwangju during the American military regime (1945-48) too (Han, 2010). 
Jeonnam was one of the most fertile regions for rice and barley crops in South Korea 
and was a main target of plundering by the Japanese colonial regime. Gwangju 
played a role as the base city for collecting the crops. It might have lead to the city 
being a righteous one by persistently resisting these power organisations. Thus, 
since the Japanese imperialism, the place has been clustered with domination 
agencies altogether in the same place and was considered by the people, on the one 
hand, as a centre of power, and on the other, as a place that should be overthrown 
by the deprived Korean people (ibid).  
 
240 
 
In this context, we can understand why the historical event of the Gwangju Student’s 
Independence Movement took place in the city. Even since the restoration of 
independence, such tendency has kept going and there were often democratic 
uprisings against the dictatorship like the 19th of April Revolution in 1960 and the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980. Above all, during the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement, the JPH became the symbolic space to rigorously 
express anger and resentment towards military dictatorship. It can be easily 
identified in a slogan of citizens like ‘Go to Dochung (JPH)!’ for the Movement (Han, 
2010:89).  
 
Figure 8.1 The old JPH, Democratic Square, and Geumnam Boulevard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   [Upper left: Old JPH in 1930, upper right: people in Democratic Square 15th May in 1980, 
   Bottom left: Old JPH in 2008, bottom right: Democratic Square and Geumnam Boulevard in 2008] 
 
[Source: (upper left: Song, 2008:65), (rest pictures: The 18th May Memorial Foundation, 
2008:214, 279, 289)] 
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During the Movement, the place was the historic spot of slaughter of hundreds of 
people, the achievement of a fully self-governing community for real democracy by 
citizens for the first time in South Korea, and the dying of a glorious death in the final 
battle with the powerful martial troops of the military junta. To sum up, the old JPH 
has been one of our cultural assets over the time since Japan’s colonial rule. In 
addition, the site was the symbolic space of the imperialist country and the dictatorial 
power used to suppress the masses and, simultaneously, was the historical space of 
the Gwangju people’s uprising for democracy, liberty and human rights.  
 
JPH as a memorial space for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
 
It was under the Munmin (non-military) Government of Kim-Younsam that the 
national memorial project for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was launched 
in earnest. The former President, Kim Young-sam, announced a discourse about the 
Movement on 13th May 1993. The essential bones of the announcement were 1) 
expanding and consecrating the Mangwol cemetery, 2) transferring JPH and building 
memorial park and tower at the site of JPH, and 3) making Sangmudae (name of the 
Gwaungju military base) land available to the city government making a citizen park 
at the site of the Sangmudae (Jung, 2002).  
 
The Munmin Government (Kim Young-sam Government) carried out three symbolic 
measures for the Movement. First, the President, himself, apologized for the Nation 
state’s brutal violence to Gwangju citizens in 1980. Second, the Munmin 
Government transformed the meaning of the Movement from that of a ‘violent riot of 
an armed mob’ to a ‘righteous citizens’ uprising for democracy’. Finally, the Kim 
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Young-sam Government upgraded the political significance of the Movement within 
the historical context of Korean democracy. These, later, became essential 
components (the designation of national commemoration day, the establishment of a 
special law and the construction of memorial spaces) of the memorial project for the 
Movement (Han, 2010:72). As examined in 7.5.1, both the designation of a national 
commemoration day and the establishment of a special law were finished by the 
Munmin Government by the late 1990s. However, representation of the memory of 
the Gwangju Democratisation Movement through constructing various memorial 
buildings, towers, and parks etc. and the conserving of historical sites is not yet 
completed.  
 
Memorial spaces were divided into three types: memorial cemetery, park and 
building (ibid). Firstly, the memorial cemetery as a space for cherishing the people 
who sacrificed is Mangwol Cemetery district. Even though some of the missing and 
unidentified bodies of victims are still in Mangwol, the place was expanded and 
upgraded to the 5.18 Democracy Cemetery. Second is the Sangmudae military jail in 
which many citizens were imprisoned and tortured during the Movement. Its 
neighbouring area was developed into a large-scale town including a citizen park in 
which the Gwangju City Hall and other public and commercial buildings are located. 
Finally, the third is the JPH as a space for understanding history. It was the most 
essential space of all the memorial spaces of the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement. Currently, it (the memorial building) has not been transformed to a 
memorial space while the two former spaces (the memorial cemetery and park) have 
been shaped by central government. 
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Although plans for using the JPH have been gradually changing over time, the bare 
skeleton of the plans did not so. The gist of them was to construct a memorial 
building or human rights museum about the democratic movement and build a 
democracy square (or park) on the neighbouring site.  
 
Table 8.1 Changing plans of using the old JPH 
 
  
Name of plan 
Old Jeonnam 
Provincial Hall 
 
Surrounding area 
1995 5.18 Memorial Project 
Comprehensive Plan 
Memorial Hall of the 
Democratisation 
Movement 
Public square 
2000  
Culture Gwangju of Light and Life 
2020 
 
International Human 
Rights Museum 
International Cultural 
and Artistic History 
Museum 
2001 A study on Gwangju Development 
Strategy Preparing for Transfer of 
Jeonnam Provincial Hall 
 
Human Rights Museum 
Public square 
2003 A study on Revitalisation of City 
Centre of Gwangju 
Memorial Hall of 
Democratic Uprising 
Democracy Plaza 
and Park 
 
 (Source: Han, 2010:74) 
 
As seen in Table 8.1, Gwangju city government planned to transform the JPH 
building into a 5.18 Memorial Building for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
improving the surrounding area into a large public square through 5.18 Memorial 
Project Comprehensive Plan in 1995. In 2000, the Gwangju government established 
another general plan about using JPH. It was < Culture Gwangju of Light and Life 
2020 >. The new plan was quite different from the former one of 1995. It focused on 
suggesting a city development and economic revitalisation strategy towards 
developing a cultural city while the former plan maintained the city’s democratic 
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image. It included various programmes for developing Gwangju as a cultural city 
such as forming 8 cultural districts and fostering a culture and tourism industry. It 
became an important motive for central government to later launch the HCAC project.  
 
Anyway, the plan suggested that the old JPH building should be upgraded to a 
Museum of International Human Rights after transferring the JPH. However, public 
opinion which is opposed to it has gradually increased in Gwangju since President 
Kim Young-sam announced the move of the JPH which led to bringing about some 
concerns of urban decline. In particular, the opposition to the move of the JPH 
rapidly expanded arguing that the integration of Gwangju City and Jeonnam 
Province in Gwangju when the Munmin Administration announced the reorganisation 
plan of local administrative districts. There was a conflict between Gwangju city 
government and Jeonnam Provincial government because Gwangju city government 
opposed the transfer of the JPH and Jeonnam Provincial government supported it at 
that time. Due to the continuation of this conflict between them, the commemorating 
project of the JPH was also delayed constantly and there was no progress. In 2001, 
Gwangju city set up the Gwangju Development Strategy preparing for the JPH-
moving to Muan city. JPH was planned as a Human Rights Museum or Memorial 
Building which would play the role of symbolic landmark to revitalise the city centre 
around the JPH. Likewise, this trend toward economic tourism and a cultural industry 
was kept in the new plan, a study on the Revitalisation of the City Centre of Gwangju 
in 2003.  
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Relocation of the JPH and response of the Gwangju city government 
 
In 2002, the final decision about the relocation of the JPH to Muan city was 
confirmed. It was achieved by the ordinance of Jeonnam provincial government and 
the support of central government while Gwangju city government opposed it. In a 
response to the decision, Gwangju city government prepared for the JPH-moving out 
by examining diverse place marketing strategies for urban regeneration. It 
announced the construction of the ‘Human Rights Tower’ and the ‘Bell of 
Democracy’ as tourist attractions neighbouring the JPH in 2003. The ‘Human Rights 
Tower’ was planned to be built as a high and spectacular tower for a city landmark 
on the site of 24.5 acres and the ‘Bell of Democracy’ was designed to be made and 
set as the largest bell in South Korea by raising money from citizens and local 
companies. A number of local groups and 5.18 victims groups, however, strongly 
criticised these strategies of the city government since they could commercialise the 
holy places of the democratic uprising. For instance, a member of the May 18 
Memorial Foundation complained about such marketing strategies of the city 
government in an interview with the Hangyere newspaper, saying “I’m so 
embarrassed by the city authorities’ plans like a tower of 518 metre. That definitely 
threw me for a serious loop. The city government should rationally launch a 
memorial project for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement since there was a 
master plan to build a city for democracy, human rights and peace in Gwangju. It 
should not do things incoherently (Hangyere newspaper, 13th January 2005).” In 
addition, even central government (MCT: Ministry of Culture and Tourism) expressed 
a negative perspective on such plans.  
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Consequently, both the ‘Human Rights Tower’ and the ‘Bell of Democracy’ were not 
successful. The former was refused because of the opposition of many citizens and 
the latter was built by 75 million pounds of citizen donations and city finance in front 
of the old JPH. Moreover, the ‘Bell of Democracy’ was removed from the site during 
the launch of the HCAC project of central government in 2008 and currently it is 
stored at a warehouse. Thus, many citizens remember it as a bad case of wasting 
money.  
 
To briefly sum up Section 8.2.1, the relocation of the JPH was discussed in the 
process of planning a commemoration project for the Gwagngju Democratisation 
Movement. It has been examined through the promise of former President Kim 
Young-sam that the site of the JPH will be used as a space of remembering the 
Gwagngju Democratisation Movement for a long time. However, the vision of the site 
has been transformed into a place for economic regeneration and city marketing 
rather than for remembering democratic resistance and uprising due to a growing 
concern of urban decline since 2002 when the JPH’s moving was confirmed to Muan 
city. 
 
8.2.2 Urban centre decline and launching a regeneration strategy 
 
As examined in the section immediately above, the JPH-moving mainly raised 
discussion about the problem of decreasing population in the city centre within the 
arena of the urban policy of Gwangju in the early 2000s. In addition, the deterioration 
of infrastructure and declining function of facilities in the urban centre has been 
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suggested as another reason for the shrinking population. Thus, Gwangju city 
government has driven an economic regeneration policy focusing on the physical 
improvement of the downtown in the city, combined with opposing the relocation of 
the JPH. However, those might not be the most important factors for the missing 
population. In other words, what Gwangju city authorities paid attention to such as 
the movement of the JPH might have not be the most salient reasons of the 
decreasing number of people in Dong-gu (the old central area of Gwangju city) 
because the population of Dong-gu had already rapidly decreased in advance of the 
confirmation of the JPH-moving to another place.  
 
According to Han’s (2010) study, some large-scale developments in the outskirts of 
the city might rather have influence the shrinking population of Dong-gu. As she 
argues, the outflow of Dong-gu’s population to newly-developed residential towns 
such as Keumho, Sangmu, Chumdan and Songjung districts with their modern 
apartment complexes and commercial malls resulted in a strong decline of the city 
centre.  
 
According to Table 8.2, 60 per cent of Dong-gu population has been continuously 
decreasing over the last 20 years while Seo-, Buk- and Gwangsan-gus have grown 
in terms of their residents from 51 to 130 per cent. Yet, the total population in the city 
has gradually increased due to the inflow of people from rural areas even though the 
urban centre experienced a serious shrinking population.  
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Table 8.2 Changing ratio of Gu’s population in Gwangju 
 
 
Gu 
 
1985-1990 
 
1990-1995 
 
1995-2000 
 
2000-2005 
 
1985-2005 
Dong-gu -14% -20% -19% -7% -60% 
Seo-gu 20% 9% 24% 8% 61% 
Nam-gu 23% -9% -10% -7% -3% 
Buk-gu 18% 32% 5% -4% 51% 
Gwangsan-
gu 
 
-8% 
 
75% 
 
42% 
 
21% 
 
130% 
Total 39% 87% 42% 11% 127% 
 
 (Source: Han, 2010:70) 
 
Consequently, it might be considered that the decline in the centre of Gwangju 
mainly comes from several large-scale residential developments in the suburbs of 
the city. In addition, it seems that the changing political environment like the decision 
of the JPH-moving exacerbated such trends of declining Dong-gu (Bae et al., 2010).  
 
In terms of the city’s spatial structure, the mono-centric urban system of Gwangju 
which was built after Japan’s colonial rule was maintained in the 1960-70s (Lim, 
2011). However, it has been reorganised to a multi-core city through newly 
developed residential areas such as Sangmu, Keumho and Chumdan. We can 
identify such trends in the changing urban planning of Gwangju. The < 2020 
Gwangju Urban Master Plan > established by the city government in 2004 
acknowledged the Sangmu area as a new urban centre apart from the previous city 
centre, the JPH area in Dong-gu. It suggests a multi-core city setting with 2 CBDs 
and 2 sub-centres (Chumdan and Songjung residential areas) as major urban 
spaces in the Gwangju city region (ibid). According to this plan, in terms of urban 
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centres, the city authorities are implementing culture-led urban regeneration in the 
original CBD in order to rejuvenate its urban vitality and are improving the newly-
emerged city centre, the Sangmu area by accumulating pivotal management (i.e. 
public administration and office) and commercial (i.e. shopping and convention) 
functions. They are developing two axes of sub-cores: the Songjung and Chumdan 
areas. The Songjung district has been developed toward a node of transportation 
intertwined with the KTX (Korean Express Train), the express motorway and 
Gwangju Airport, and the Chumdan has been built as a high-tech industry cluster 
such as the Samsung Electronics factory, many other many photonics and LED 
companies (ibid).  
 
Within the Gwangju urban landscape, on the one hand, there is a rapid urbanisation 
based on industrialisation, on the other hand, there is cultural and post-industrial 
regeneration in the city centre. Likewise in Gwangju, many Korean cities have similar 
trends that show a mixed state of compact industrialisation and post-industrialisation 
in terms of urban landscape. In the short term, as industrial urbanisation has been 
achieved and simultaneously moved onto post-industrial urbanisation, many cities 
have a mixture of industrial and post-industrial landscape. This trend of Korean cities 
might also be identified in the population pattern of Gwangju. The population of 
suburb areas has increased while the city centre is missing its people. In response to 
this, the Gwangju authorities have developed diverse urban regeneration strategies. 
As observed in the previous section, city government suggested a master plan for 
reorganising the whole area of the city centre through a plan of the < Cultural 
Gwangju of Light and Life 2020 > published in 2000. Furthermore, they conducted < 
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A Study on Gwangju Development Strategy Preparing for Transfer of JPH > in 2001 
and < A Study on Revitalisation of the City Centre of Gwangju > in 2003 in order to 
economically regenerate the urban core area, Dong-gu. These became an important 
ground44 for moving toward the later cultural development strategy of Gwangju city. 
However, it is a ‘discourse of the culture city’ suggested by central government that 
Gwangju city government actively examined the radical reimaging the city beyond 
marketing strategies based on the urban scale, and this will be explored in the next 
section. 
 
 
8.2.3 Noh’s presidential election commitment for a cultural capital of South 
Korea 
 
‘Cultural Capital’ and Gwangju 
 
The commitment of ‘Cultural Capital’ in Noh’s campaign was connected with the 
problem of why Gwangju should be selected when there were already many cities 
pursuing the title of cultural city such as Busan, Jeonju, Andong, Bucheon, and 
Gyeongju. On 14th December 2002, the former President Noh Mu-hyeon visited 
Gwangju and said that “I will develop a capital of public administration in the 
Chungcheong region, a capital of maritime in Busan, and a capital of culture in 
Yehyang Gwangju (Shin, 2005:35),” when he had been designated as a Democratic 
                                    
44 Kim Man-gon (who belonged to the Presidential Committee for the HCAC as an organisation of 
central government) emphasized the contribution of Gwangju’s development strategy on the HCAC 
(Hub City of Asian Culture) project, saying: “Basically, we obtained a clue from the locally prepared < 
Cultural Gwangju of Light and Life 2020 > project in the process of making the HCAC strategy 
(Hangyre 21, 23rd September 2004).” 
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Candidate. In relation to this, the Kang Un-tae, Gwangju city Mayor represented the 
situation in an interview with Pressian newspaper, saying: 
 
“When the former President Noh Mu-hyeon came to Gwangju as a candidate, 
the project of HCAC was improved in a detailed promise as he travelled 
together in a car with me. At that time, he asked me ‘what is necessary for 
Gwangju?’ so, I answered that ‘as you promised Daejeon to be an 
administrative capital, now how about you suggest Gwangju as a cultural 
capital in order to generalise the meaning of capital over the country?’ Then, 
as he hit my knee, he said ‘Right. Cultural city based on the Gwangju identity 
of democracy, human rights, peace, and Yehyang tradition! That’s a good 
idea.’ The concept of HCAC was begun like that (Pressian [newspaper], 3rd 
November 2011).” 
 
And also, Park Gwang-tae, the former Mayor of Gwangju argued that the 
commitment to establishing a cultural capital was started by his suggestion, noting: 
“Mr. Noh asked me ‘what suggestion is good for Gwangju as a campaign promise?’ 
and I said that ‘cultural capital and Light Expo will be good in Gwangju’ and he 
agreed with me (Nocut-news [newspaper], 9th June 2005).” 
 
According to these interviews, we can recognise that politicians tend to advertise 
their achievements regarding local development commitments such as the project of 
‘Cultural Capital’. In addition, if such interviews are true, the commitment to ‘Cultural 
Capital’ might be shaped by complicated components like the Yehyang identity as 
contrived by Gwangju elites and the national balancing policy which meant over 
cities were concerned as capitals of public administration and maritime.  
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However, there was an important component in addition to those. That is Noh’s 
politically biased preference to the city of Gwangju and he probably had to treat the 
city in a special manner due to the contribution of the Gwangju citizens to his political 
success. At first his rating was very low. However, he suddenly received public 
attention after winning the candidate campaign in Gwangju and then, became the 
final candidate of Democratic Party. In addition, Gwangju was a politically significant 
city because it was a supporting ground for the Democratic Party and was a sacred 
place of democracy in South Korea. Thus, the Gwangju contest might have been a 
turning point for him in terms of politics. At last, he won the presidential election 
against Lee hye-chang, the first dominant counterpart of the New Korean Party 
(Conservative Party) and also in the process, was fully supported by the Honam 
region and its leading city, Gwangju. Thus, whenever he visited Gwangju as the 
President, he called the city a ‘second hometown45’. Then, he endeavoured to keep 
his promise of ‘Cultural Capital’ to specially treat Gwangju.  
 
In this context, many Koreans often considered the project of HCAC as his political 
reward or special favour to the city. For example, Choi Jung-gi, Professor of 
Jeonnam University said that “HCAC is a result of a political process that originated 
from the President’s mind (Lee, 2010:124).” Dr. Lee Young-hun (2010) also 
interpreted the project as a sort of compensation for the political debt of Participation 
government (Noh’s administration) in his paper. Other similar evidence was identified 
in statements of Lee Hyeong-seok, secretary of managing social policy in the 
Presidential Office. In 2008, when the Presidential transition committee of Lee 
                                    
45 Noh Mu-hyeon was born in Busan. The city was located in Youngnam which usually considered as 
a friendly region of New Korean Party (Conservative). 
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Myung-bak (the next President after Noh) attempted to remove the Presidential 
committee of HCAC, Lee Hyeong-seok strongly resisted, saying that the “projects of 
Cultural Capital in Gwangju and the Joint Innovation City in Naju were the biggest 
political rewards to the Honam region under the Participation government (Noh’s 
administration). Such measures which will ruin the future of the Honam region must 
be political revenge to these specific cities (Yeonhapnews, 4th February 2008).” 
 
To sum up, the former President Noh’s campaign commitment was the result of 
complicated factors such as the Yehyang image, the strategy of national balanced 
development, and Noh’s individual political emotion towards Gwangju. Among them, 
the last factor might be the most influential for the Participation government’s 
selection of the city as a capital of culture. 
 
From ‘Cultural Capital’ in South Korea to an ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’ 
 
It was not easy for the HCAC project of Gwangju to maintain its good trend of 
presidential commitment since there were excessive demands from Gwangju city 
government and other cities’ opposition to the special treatment for Gwangju. It was 
Gwangju city government that put into action the ‘Cultural Capital’ after Noh’s 
success at the election and local press supported their government. The Gwangju 
authorities suggested a ‘Basic Promotion Plan of Cultural Capital’ composed of 25 
sub-projects within 6 categories in January 2003. The plan included many items like 
expanding the cultural infrastructure and national budget, promoting the cultural 
content industry, and building symbolic artworks from the plan < Cultural Gwangju of 
Light and Life 2020 > already established by the city government. It also includes 
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other proposals such as moving the MCT (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, currently 
transformed into MCST: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism), cultural research 
institutes, and public organisations to Gwangju and building a democracy tower over 
500m tall, an international scale facility for bungee jumping and shaping beautiful 
exterior lighting. These might have been a burden for central government. 
 
In addition, opposition from other cities’ about the special favours for Gwangju 
continuously increased at that time. For instance, Jung Jung-bok, a Member of the 
National Parliament from Gyeongju argued that “to promote the HCAC only focusing 
on a specific city through a special law does not fit with policies of national balanced 
development and decentralisation (Lee, 2009:161),” in a public hearing for the 
establishment of a special law for HCAC project. Lee Jung-duk, a Professor of 
Jeonbuk National University located in Jeonju, refuted the HCAC for Gwangju, 
arguing:  
 
“The Gwangju HCAC project can’t be made successful. The reason is that 
there is no connection between Gwangju and Asia culture. As far as 
regarding Gwangju, the key image is 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement). However, is Gwangju the only city of resisting against 
dictatorship? There are many other resisting cities for democracy like Manila 
and Bangkok….. Rather, Jeonju is superior to Gwangju in terms of 
conserving Korean traditional culture, art and food. So, I think Jeonju has a 
more competitive edge as a city of culture than Gwangju (Lee, 2010:118-9).” 
 
Central authorities had to break through these oppositions from other cultural cities. 
And also, they had to implement the President’s command which he intended to 
grant to Gwangju citizens a present as a political reward. Thus, there was a scale-up 
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(jumping scale) strategy from the national ‘Cultural Capital’ to the global ‘Asian 
Mecca of Culture and Art’ that central government employed in order to overcome 
the difficult hurdles of the President’s pressure and other domestic cities’ opposition 
at that time.  
 
It took a shape through Noh’s announcement at the anniversary of the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement on 18th May in 2003. The President suggested that he 
would promote Gwangju toward being an ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’ by 
building a large-scale culture complex like Pompidou in France on a basis of MCT 
(Ministry of Culture and Tourism) task force’s report. Four months later, the strategy 
took a more concrete shape at a meeting with the local press. President Noh made a 
basic plan of the HCAC known publicly as follows: central authorities would build the 
ACC (investing a national budget of 2.546 billion pounds) by 2010 and investing 7.5 
billion pounds additionally to make Gwangju the Hub of Asian Culture by 2023. It 
was a tremendously large-scale project in South Korea since there were no cultural 
facilities with this much money invested in them. Currently, the biggest investments 
had been just 2 billion pounds for the National Central Museum and 0.8 billion 
pounds for the National Art Palace.  
 
 
8.2.4 Overview of the HCAC and the ACC 
 
 
                                    
46 In the process of establishing comprehensive HCAC plan, the budget rose to 3.9 billion pounds 
later. 
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Overview of the HCAC 
 
The goal of the HCAC is to be a national development strategy to improve national 
competitive power by employing culture. Such an intention can be easily identified in 
any government documents, books and government offical’s rhetoric. Jung Dong-
chea, the Minister of Culture and Tourism begins “Now, culture is part of national 
competitiveness,” in his statement for the preface of, < The ‘Culture of Light’ Project 
Asian Culture Hub, Gwangju: Concept, Vision and Strategy > published by the MCT 
in 2005 (MCT, 2005:4). Then, he concludes by emphasising the importance of the 
project as a national development strategy, noting: 
 
“The project originates in Gwangju, but will be nurtured with the hopes of 
fostering local as well as national growth and translating cultural value into 
economic value by new understanding and interpretation of Asian culture. 
Hence, let us not forget that the success of the project is directly linked to the 
elevation of national competitiveness and to the parallel growth of the Asian 
continent. To this end, I sincerely look forward to the best-effort for co-
operation of the national government, Gwangju city, the people of Gwangju, 
and all those involved in this historical endeavour (ibid:7).” 
 
In addition, according to the HCAC Comprehensive Plan (MCT, 2007:22), the project 
of the HCAC is to make Gwangju city a ‘Window of Asian Culture to the World’. It 
means that central and city government would develop Gwagnju towards a cultural 
city enabling Asian cities to exchange their cultural assets for cultural industry and 
art in order to improve national competitiveness (ibid). In the same context, Kim Ho-
kyun, the director of the citizen culture team in the Executive Agency for Culture 
Cities (thereafter refer to as ‘EA’) belonging to the MCT, emphasised the ultimate 
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goal of the project, saying that “What is the reason of building the HCAC….. The 
level of this national project is not just to make an exhibition or performance hall. In 
the near future, we Koreans need a new cultural concept and its enabling facilities, 
and then it will lead to a new era of culture convergence mixing culture and industry 
in order that culture can make money and livelihoods. It means that culture should 
be a new ‘growth dynamic power’ in our country (Lee, 2007:54).” Thus, central 
government’s perception of the HCAC in Gwangju might be that is a national 
economic development strategy employing cultural components for promoting local 
and national competitiveness. 
 
The HCAC project has taken an institutional grounding since 2004. Central 
authorities made a special law and presidential decree in February 2004. They 
launched the Presidential Committee for the HCAC (thereafter refer to as 
‘Presidential Committee’) and the Executive Agency for the project (thereafter refer 
to as ‘EA’) in March in the same year. Then, in 2007, they established the 
Comprehensive Plan as a master plan for the HCAC. The HCAC project has four 
top-priority tasks in Gwangju: building and operating the ACC, promoting the cultural 
and tourism industry, setting the cultural urban environment, and improving the 
brand image of a cultural city. Among them, central government has considered the 
first (building and operating the ACC) as a top-priority agenda because President 
Noh announced that a large-scale cultural complex like Pompidou would enable 
Gwangju to promote itself as an ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’. The rest of the 
tasks are regarded as less important projects that the Gwangju authorities have to 
lead since national budget support is mainly focused on the first rather than the rest. 
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In association with this, a public official in Gwangju city government emphasised the 
importance of the ACC within the HCAC project, saying:  
 
“The cost of building the ACC will be charged to the nation state. So its 
leader is the central authorities. But they should accept public opinion in 
Gwangju because the site is in Gwangju. It makes central and city 
government co-operate with each other. Otherwise, the ACC will not be built 
in the city. By contrast, regarding the remaining three tasks, we are leading 
them and central government just support us. However, to make the ACC is 
the most important thing in the project of the HCAC, because the ACC will 
play a key role in improving Gwangju toward beung a real cultural hub of Asia 
(author interview, 5 October 2011).” 
 
Additionally, the HCAC might be influenced by the changing political environment 
since it will take a long time – up to 2023. Indeed, its national budget was decreased 
by the new government of Lee Myung-bak. The presidential committee of the HCAC 
was also nearly abolished by the new administration, but it is maintained by the 
strong resistance of the Gwnagju people. Thus, currently, the main concern of the 
city government is only to obtain the project budget from central government without 
any loss as financial support from the MCST has been decreased. 
 
Overview of the ACC 
 
The main facility of the HCAC, the ACC will be situated at the site of the former JPH 
with a total area of 44 acres. It will be an up-to-date postmodern architectural style 
building where most agencies will occupy it under the ground such as in the Louvre 
Museum in Paris and the World Trade Centre Memorial Park in New York. It will 
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have 5 agencies and 13 facilities: the Cultural Promotion Agency (Cultural Contents 
Development Centre, Cultural Contents Production centre, Multi-Functional 
Exhibition Hall), the Asian Arts Theatre (Grand Performance Hall, Multi-Functional 
Auditorium), the Cultural Exchange Agency (The May 18 Memorial Hall, Asian 
Cultural Exchange Centre, Business Strategy Centre), the Asian Culture Information 
Agency (Asian Culture Research Institute, Asian Culture Resource Centre, Asian 
Culture Academy), and the Edu-Culture Agency for Children (Edu-Culture Contents 
Development Centre, Children’s Edu-Culture Museum). The ACC’s detailed function 
is outlined in Table 8.3. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Design and facility plan of the ACC 
 
 
(Source: Gwangju Hub City of Asia, http://www.cct.go.kr/index.do) 
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Table 8.3 ACC facilities and their functions 
 
 
Institution 
 
Facilities 
 
Description 
 
 
Cultural Exchange 
Agency 
The May 18 Memorial 
Hall 
Consist of various spaces including an exhibition hall, a 
resources centre, and a conference room, all representing 
the ideals of democracy, human rights, and peace. 
Asian Cultural Exchange 
Centre 
Supervises the ACC’s cultural exchange functions, 
including visitor’s centre and online services. 
Business Strategy Centre Manage profit-generating businesses of cultural contents 
produced by the ACC, and provides business strategies. 
 
 
 
Asian Culture 
Information Agency 
Asian Culture Research 
Institute 
Provides source materials for the arts and the cultural 
industry upon research on Asian cultures by regions and 
themes. 
Supports productions of cultural maps of Asian food, 
colour, religion, etc. 
Asian Cultural Resource 
Centre 
Conducts collection, classification, preservation, and 
archiving of Asian cultural resources. 
Operates an open library (Library Park) for the citizen’s as 
well as professionals’ convenience. 
Asian Culture Academy Conducts training for experts in Asian cultures and 
provides cultural education for the public. 
 
 
 
Cultural Promotion 
Agency 
Cultural Contents 
Development Centre 
Provides facility support for the planning and creation of 
cultural contents. 
Cultural Contents 
Production Centre 
Provides production support to translate creative ideas into 
cultural contents using the up-to-date digital technologies 
and equipment. 
Multi-Functional 
Exhibition Hall 
Consists of a multi-functional space for performance and 
special exhibitions of the arts and cultural contents 
produces by Cultural Contents Development and 
Production Centres. Also operates a ubiquitous user 
experience centre. 
 
 
Asian Arts Theatre 
Grand Performance Hall A 2000-seat hybrid theatre with cutting-edge technologies 
enabling the multi-division of the space. A ‘factory shop’-
type art complex where the production, performance, 
distribution and sales of Asian performing arts are taking 
place year-round. 
Multi-Functional 
Auditorium 
A 500-seat multi-functional theatre with a proscenium 
stage, accommodating most of the existing genres. 
 
 
Edu-Culture Agency 
for Children 
Edu-Culture Contents 
Development Centre 
Plans and develops edu-culture contents that enable 
learning of the fundamental principles of knowledge 
through aesthetic experiences. 
Children’s Edu-Culture 
Museum 
Helps children learn the fundamentals of languages, 
mathematics, social sciences, natural sciences, and arts 
through exhibitions and diverse hands-on activities in an 
educational museum. 
Others Common facilities, auxiliary facilities, common area, parking facilities, machine 
rooms, outdoor parking annex, etc. 
 
Total floor area 
 
44.03 acre (site area: 31.78 acre) 
 
(Source: MST, 2007:46) 
 
261 
 
At a glance, the ACC’s design appears to consider the importance of the history of 
the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. However, if we see it in detail, we can 
recognise that most facilities of the ACC are focused on the commercialisation of 
cultural products and the development of cultural contents rather than to conserve 
and support an historic function in association with the Gwangju Movement. In the 
aspect of the Movement, even the Cultural Exchange Agency only has The May 18 
Memorial Hall, and the rest of the facilities are an Asian Cultural Exchange Centre 
for the internalisation of Gwangju and a Business Strategy Centre for promoting 
cultural industry (Jang, 2011). 
 
 
8.3 Multi-scale actors and contested visions 
 
8.3.1 Multi-scaled diverse actors 
 
Drawing on spatial scales, different actors in the ACC project might be easily 
recognised. National scales of actors are led by the Presidential Committee, the EA 
in the MCST (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism), and other ministries in central 
government. Most essential organisations are the Committee and the EA. The 
Committee consists of under 30 people and they are ministers and other civilians 
designated by the President. The Committee has discussed an important agenda 
about the HCAC: its basic direction and regulations, the establishment of a 
Comprehensive Plan, supporting the required budget, and designating Investment 
Promotion Districts, etc. Another key actor is the EA belongs to the MCST. It has 
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implemented all the significant items of the HCAC. Many other central ministries47 
have supported the HCAC’s 20 sub-projects. It was launched with 44 people in 
March 2004, but it was downsized to 41 people in 2008.  
 
Actors on an urban scale are the Gwangju city government, the city council, 
business groups like the Chamber of Commerce, and local groups such as ones 
related to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, cultural ones, environmental 
ones. The most important actor of these is the city government. City authorities 
launched an organisation about the HCAC project, Cultural Capital Supporting 
Agency (2 divisions, 31 people) in 2004. Even though there was a struggle for 
control of the HCAC between the EA and Gwangju city government at the initial 
stages, now Gwangju authorities mainly support central government adjusting their 
role to central-led projects. In addition, there were some proponents of the city 
government’s position such as the Gwangju City Council and Chamber of Commerce. 
However, their role was very limited in the political process of the HCAC and the 
ACC project. The City Council only made formal acknowledgements after the city 
authorities had made decision for local growth and the Chamber of Commerce was 
also inactive in its response to the marketing position of city government. By contrast, 
local groups like the cultural and environmental ones have vigorously attempted to 
express their opinions. They have also actively participated in the process of making 
detailed annual plans for Gwangju city government. In particular, their role stood out 
                                    
47 They are MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs), MOD (Ministry of National 
Defense), PCRD (Presidential Committee on Regional Development), MEST (Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology), MOJ (Ministry of Justice), MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), 
MOKE (Ministry of Knowledge Economy), MHWF (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs), 
MOE (Ministry of Environment) and MPA (Ministry of Public Administration and Security). 
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in the Landmark and Conservation/Removal Controversies in the city which will be 
explored in later sections (8.4 and 8.5).  
 
Finally, there were local scaled actors. They were the Distirct Office, Council and 
resident groups such as the Emergency Measure Committee in Dong-gu. They 
pressed together central and city government for the local interest of Dong-gu 
supported by Dong-gu District Office. Sometimes, their opinions were not in harmony 
with that of other Gwangju local groups due to their different scales.  
 
8.3.2 Different scaled visions and values 
 
Visions and values from diverse actors were different each other. Firstly, their scales 
of recognition were different. Central authorities based on the Asian scale 
considered the project as a means of promoting the cultural industry and culture-led 
place marketing to compete with Japan and China. In particular, as observed in the 
previous section (8.2.3), they have expanded their perspective from the national to 
the global. At first, the project was expressed on the basis of a ‘Cultural Capital’ 
commitment of national scale in the 2002 Presidential Election since it was an 
endeavour to promote Gwangju as an advanced city in terms of cultural industry in 
South Korea. However, central government scaled up in order to overcome other 
cities’ opposition.  
 
It was also exposed in the HCAC Comprehensive Plan (MCT, 2007) of central 
government. According to the Plan, central authorities argued that the project could 
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not implemented by one city’s capacity since it was on the basis of a global scale 
project. They added that “Gwangju has to develop the Asian community rather than 
compete with other domestic cities for national cultural dominance (ibid:29).”  
 
However, there might be some other reasons for such scaling up. Firstly, ‘Hanryu’ 
(Korean wave or fever in pop-culture) mainly diffused in Asian countries such as 
Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Hongkong, Vietnam, and China might be a reason since 
the popularity of Korean pop-songs, dramas and films resulted in much economic 
value (Lee, 2010)48. Central authorities wanted to expand this phenomenon in Asia 
(ibid). Therefore, they might want to establish such ‘Hanryu’ as a sustainable trend in 
Asia by developing the cultural industry through the ACC project in Gwangju. 
Secondly, both Japan and China might have similar weak points about being a 
cultural hub in terms of how other Asians view them. Historically, Chinese people 
had a sort of mentality, ‘Joonghwa’ which means that ‘China is the centre of the 
world’ and it led them to reign over other Asian countries many centuries ago. Due to 
this painful history, many neighbouring countries are alert to China’s rapid economic 
development (ibid). Japan also has a history of being an imperial invader during the 
Second World War. Thus, many people in Asian countries such as Korea, China, 
Vietnam, Thailand and Philippines still have an antipathy towards the Japanese (ibid). 
However, they might have a favourable feeling toward South Korea in relation to 
them since South Korea has no such history. In this respect, such a friendly attitude 
of Asian people toward South Korea might enable the Korean central government to 
pursue the HCAC project in Gwangju. In short, central government has changed its 
                                    
48 According to Korean Bank’s statistics, export income related cultural industry like films, TV 
programmes, music records was approximately 0.5 billion pounds (Hangyre newspaper, 6 February 
2012). 
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scale from national ‘Cultural Capital’ to global ‘Cultural Hub of Asian Culture’ in order 
to drive national development and there might be some reasons for this such as 
overcoming the opposition of other domestic other cities, expanding the Korean 
Wave in Asia, and employing relatively favourable attitudes toward South Korea in 
relation to Japan and China.  
 
However, Gwangju city government recognised the HCAC and ACC as the means of 
occupying a dominant position as a cultural capital competing with other cities like 
Gyeongju, Busan and Jeonju in the country. Thus, city authorities wanted to have a 
title of ‘Cultural Capital in South Korea’ since they thought it would be a warranty 
securing national support for developing the local cultural industry. However, 
Gwangju people’s visions and values were not the same. A number of local groups 
have had slightly different visions and values for the HCAC and ACC. Some 
considered it as an opportunity to encourage the cultural industry for local growth 
while some thought it should be a catalyst to change the local cultural environment 
for improving citizens’ quality of life. In addition, the District Office, Council and 
residents in Dong-gu recognised it should be a tool to promote tourism and 
economic development for revitalisation of the declining urban centre. As seen in the 
following two sections, these diverse actors have shown tensions and conflicts 
between each other. 
 
Likewise, actors around the ACC project have emerged with their own diverse 
visions and values under their different scales. Their different visions and values 
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about the project realign with citizens’ opinions for and against the ACC as a 
Landmark through the ‘Landmark Controversy’ in the next section. 
 
 
8.4 First Conflict: the Landmark Controversy 
 
 
8.4.1 Conflicting main actors around ‘Forest of Light’ 
 
Conflicts and struggles between the EA in central government and Gwangju city 
government were intensely expressed in the process of the Land Controversy. It 
began with the result of a design contest about the ACC. When the result was 
announced in December 2005, Gwangju city government, Dong-gu District Office 
and Dong-gu residents resisted it. The reason was that they thought it was not 
enough to improve Gwangju’s image in terms of economic development. In other 
words, they might have thought that it should be an enormous architectural structure 
like the Pompidou Centre and the Bilbao Museum in order to market Gwangju. 
However, a more important factor might be the race for dominance in the project 
between the related parties since both the EA and Gwangju city government 
endeavoured to control it. At last, the Landmark Controversy brought their tension 
and conflict to public notice.  
 
Gwangju city authorities attempted and challenged to gain the dominant position 
arguing the need for their landmark. Regarding this, the central authorities rejected 
the city’s Landmark suggestion in order to protect their hegemony of the project. 
They argued that they should respect the architect’s philosophy and want the project 
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to be implemented on the basis of a broader – Asia or global- scale. However, if their 
visions of the ACC are dealt with in greater detail, both the visions of the EA and city 
government might have little difference. They were similar strategies in employing 
economic means to promote economic growth, whether it was for South Korea or 
Gwangju. Thus, they could both be judged as place marketing strategies since they 
were attempts to economically develop a nation or city by utilising culture as an 
economic instrument. However, both had different points. There was the difference 
of scale. Even though the central authorities could not give the title of ‘Cultural 
Capital in South Korea’ to a specific city (Gwangju) due to many other cities’ 
opposition, they had an ambition to improve and extend ‘Hanryu (Korean wave)’ to 
the ‘Cultural Hub of Asia’. Thus, they overcame domestic cities’ resistance by 
suggesting a new broader scale of ‘the centre of Asian Culture’, even though it was 
quite far from the city’s existing image of a city of resistance, democracy, and human 
rights. As a result, they might occupy the political dominance of cultural city policy 
since no city could challenge the strategy which had a global scale far beyond the 
urban or local scale.  
 
In addition, I want to suggest that these conflicts should be understood within the 
wider context such as a national development strategy based on global scale of 
expanding ‘Korean Wave’ and the competition for being a cultural capital or a 
dominant cultural city of South Korea between many Korean cities rather than 
narrow local issue around the ACC in Gwangju. 
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8.4.2 Conflicting meanings: the political process around the ACC design 
 
‘Arguments for a landmark’ can be represented by some of the following statements: 
‘We should be citizens who can make a living through culture (Dong-gu resident)’, 
‘We do not need underground glittering jewels (City Mayor, Park)’ and ‘Make a large-
scale landmark like the Pompidou Centre in France or the Bilbao Museum in Spain’. 
If we see the ‘argument for a landmark’ in detail, we could recognise that it 
corresponded with the place marketing strategy of the city government and local 
business group.  
 
For example, on 20th January 2005, Gwangju City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae said at a 
lecture that “I will promote Gwangju as a place of an international cultural industry 
and make the whole area of Gwangju have the best companies, housing, arts, and 
sciencse as a tourism city.” And also, he expressed his perspective of economic 
place marketing in the city arguing in an interview with the Gwangju-Ilbo (newspaper) 
that “I think Gwangju needs to create employment by promoting a cultural industry 
and needs to establish the infrastructure for attracting tourists. To do this, I am 
investing in the cultural contents industry and CGI (Computer Generated Image) 
industry in harmony with our tradition of ‘Yehyang Gwangju’ (17th April 2006).” Thus, 
the ‘argument for a landmark’ and the marketing strategy of city government was the 
same in that the ACC should be a representative product of tourism and culture and 
should be a catalyst for local growth in Gwangju.  
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Similar opinions came from some residents. On 3rd November 2006, a local citizen 
from the city centre emphasised the economic function of the ACC in a conference 
for the success of the HCAC project in Gwangju, saying that “when the President 
presents us with 0.35 billion pounds, its meaning is to make the Gwangju citizen 
economically affluent and happy through culture. But some people have pushed the 
project while disregarding this meaning. What do citizens like me know about that? 
Culture? Yes, it would make us being, playing and living well. Art? I know that. 
However, we do not know the words that the professors discussed before. But you 
have to follow the President’s meaning, so when he will visit us, we ought to be able 
to say ‘we are very happy because of your present’ (a resident from Hakdong).”  
 
An inhabitant belonging to the Emergency Measure Committee in Dong-gu 
remembered fierce protests against central government, noting that “I have activily 
participated in and suggested my opinion about the ACC design since the beginning 
of the project. What the most critical point was the Dong-gu residents’ strong 
opposition since they thought it should be an international landmark, but it was just 
an underground building. They thought it would be a luxurious architectural building 
but it was a something normal. So Dong-gu residents made the Emergency Measure 
Committee and argued for a re-design because there was no landmark….. [They 
were] very serious. We had two protests in front of the JPH. There were some 
people whose shaved their heads and wrote protesting letters in their blood. And we 
threw our signitures ….. (Han, 2010:92-3).”  
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Figure 8.3 Pictures of protesters 
 
 
 
(Source: Yeonhap-news, 29th March 2007) 
 
Consequently, the meaning of a landmark might be as an international luxurious 
architectural building drawing greater local growth for them. The protesters 
expressed their argument by shouting some slogans like ‘reinforce the function of the 
ACC’, ‘why build an underground building at the site of the ACC’, ‘build a cultural 
tourism belt’, ‘we don’t need a cultural complex like a basement bunker’. Among 
them, the most effective phrase was ‘basement bunker’. The term contributed to 
degrading the historic concept of the ACC from the up-to-date architectural style and 
eco-friendly meaning of central government, to being something just for local growth 
symbolised by a landmark.  
 
Regarding this, however, a member of the EA in central government refuted the 
‘argument for a landmark’ emphasising the historic and Asian value of the site as 
follows:  
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“We should express periodic ideology and value by a landmark. I do not think 
that a very lofty building can be automatically a landmark. What is 21st 
century? I think we have to express the Gwangju identity in the traditional 
context of Asia and Gwangju (Lee, 2007:59).”  
 
In addition, most local groups49 including cultural, environmental and related the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement ones announced the ‘argument against a 
landmark’, saying: “these days, some people argue that the design of the ACC 
should be amended since it does not have the function and beauty of a landmark, 
but we cannot agree with them. Simply a large building cannot by itself be a 
landmark of the city. We think the underground Cultural Complex, plenty of green 
space, and the conserved JPH would be a new type of landmark and symbol. 
How we can make a lofty giant of a building on the site of the old JPH regarding 
its history. We are sure that the underground Cultural Complex and historic 
architecture such as the old JPH and fountain would be a good landmark in 
Gwangju (Lee, 2009:170).” This controversy might be a conflict for dominance of 
the ACC project between related parties. Particularly, the clash between the EA 
in central government and Gwangju city government was the most salient issue. 
At first, Gwangju city pushed the EA demanding budget support from central 
government as a ‘Cultural Capital in South Korea’. At last, however, the central 
authorities took the dominant position in the project. Since the argument of the 
global scaled ACC, they firmly occupied the hegemony of the project.  
 
                                    
49 The number of these groups was 18. They were 5.18 Bereaved Family, 5.18 Wounded Group, 
5.18 Persons of National Merit, 5.18 Memorial Foundation, Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice, 
Cultural Coalition, Minyechong (Democratic cultural group), Democratic Woman’s Group, Education 
Coalition, Writer’s Meeting, Environmental Movement Coalition, Heungsadan, YMCA, YWCA, A 
Group of Architect Planted Tree, Nuri Culture Foundation, Artist Coalition, The Korean Teachers & 
Education Workers’ Union, Participation Autonomy 21. 
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Nevertheless, Gwangju city government challenged the EA with the help of the 
Distirct Office, the Council, and some residents in Dong-gu. At a glance, it looked like 
a serious protest of residents since they were shaving their heads and writing some 
letters with their blood as a sign of protest. However, these behaviours might be 
different from most citizens’ opinions, indeed because there was empirical evidence 
of fabrication.  
 
On 14th April 2007, a member of the Minyechong (Democratic Artist Group) sharply 
criticised the manufactured protest of the landmark in a forum, saying that “since the 
1980s, I think the mental mainstream of Gwangju was May (the Gwangju 
Democratisatin Movement). Related local groups including ‘The 18th May Memorial 
Foundation’ have often suggested the conservation of the JPH and other historical 
places as spaces of memory….. Even though most people in Gwangju agree with 
this, only a small part of the local press and others oppose [don’t agree with] the 
argument describing the ACC design as a ‘basement bunker’ and simultaneously 
demand the alteration of the design for a landmark. We have to see who suggests it 
because it is very political issue. These days, there has been an Emergency 
Measure Committee and a fabricated protest in Dong-gu. A local journalist asked the 
old people who were mobilised by Dong-gu District Office and to participate in the 
meeting ‘Do you know what the landmark is?’ and they said ‘Landmark? What’s 
that?’ (Cha and Lee, 2007:65-6).” Through this interview, we can recognise that the 
very key factor of the Landmark Controversy might be the mobilisation of citizens by 
local authorities for their own interests. The argument was supported by my 
interviewee’s response. A local newspaper reporter, stated “Landmark Controversy? 
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It was forged by the city mayor and the Chief of Dong-gu District Office, by mobilising 
some residents. The problem was that it resulted in a loud dispute in our Gwangju 
society because of the discussion about the ACC design (author interview, 15th 
September 2011).” According to this evidence, we can conclude that the local 
authorities attempted to manipulate public opinion by mobilising local people and 
they thought this could make local style marketing of places and promote a local-led 
cultural industry. As a result, the manufactured protest for a landmark brought about 
a broader discussion in civil society in Gwangju. This led to over ten meetings 
among many local groups and citizen organisations. They finally concluded that the 
ACC should have a design representing the historic meaning of the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement combined with the growing cultural industry and artistic 
activity.  
 
In the controversy, both central and local government intended to use culture for 
economic development. The former attempted to improve national competitiveness 
and economic growth and the latter endeavoured to develop the local economy 
through a cultural strategy. However, the central authorities emphasised the global 
scale of Asia rather than a national or urban one in order to differentiate their 
strategy from the local one beautifying Gwangju as a sacred place of Asian 
democracy. For example, according to the MCT’s report (2005), central authorities 
argued that many Asian countries share similar experiences with Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Philippine, and Miyanmar in the course of their modernisation history such as 
colonial rule and dictatorship. They emphasised Gwangju as a city that symbolises 
Asian suffering, noting: 
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“Gwangju is the very place where the commonality of oppression imprinted in 
the memories of Asians each in their own ways – oppression in action and 
reaction against the oppression – is most evident and clear. The struggles of 
that month of May in Gwangju demonstrate the prototype of pain suffered by 
Asia as a continent (MCT, 2005:13).” 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Conflicting meanings of the ACC 
 
 
 
 
< Central government >                       < Many local groups, 
                                            5.18 civic groups > 
 
 
 
         < City government , Dong-gu office and Dong-gu residents > 
 
 
In summary, the intention of central government (the EA) in the project of the ACC 
was similar to that of local government’s since both of them endeavoured to employ 
culture as an economic promotion strategy. However, central authorities argued that 
building a towering giant landmark in the site of the JPH would deteriorate the history 
of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, and it appealed to citizen groups. 
Though both side’s purpose for the ACC was very much alike, central government 
won the fight to dominate the project by emphasising the Asian scale of Gwangju 
being an Asian holy place of democratic uprising related to the historic identity of the 
 
Asian Cultural 
Hub (Mecca) 
 
Sacred place 
of Democracy 
City  
Landmark 
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JPH. After the controversy, the local authorities had to be satisfied with their limited 
role of supporting the project. Thus, this might be the most important factor of the 
‘Landmark Controversy’: who was able to substantially dominate the project. 
Through this conflict for occupying political dominance, we can recognise that scale 
is a product of fluid and situational power relations (McCann, 2003). 
 
8.4.3 Co-ordination by an alternative landmark 
 
The Landmark Controversy around the ACC was over and a co-ordination plan was 
established by the EA. The key content of the plan was to build a symbolic 
architectural structure as a landmark on another site not far from the JPH. To 
implement this, the central authorities announced a back-up plan that they would 
launch a study for a new architecture as an alternative landmark in 2008 and confirm 
the implementation of plan through a public hearing. This ended the controversy that 
had lasted for two years. Then, central authorities formalised the co-ordination plan 
(an alternative landmark), putting it into the HCAC Comprehensive Plan in October 
2007.  
 
In the process of the Landmark Controversy, drawing on an Asian scale, the EA 
members belonging to central government argued against a landmark while local 
politicians, city officials and Dong-gu District Office on a basis of urban or local scale 
insisted on the landmark. In spite of drawing on the local scale, however, most local 
groups and citizens supported the argument against a landmark since they thought 
the prize design of the ACC contest enabled residents to conserve the history of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement and gain eco-friendly green space. As a result, 
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the ACC could keep its original design. However, another problem was raised later 
possibly which might have been because of the differences of scale, recognition and 
visions among the actors of the ACC project. The central authorities considered it a 
national developmental strategy in the competition with other Asian countries such 
as Japan and China while some local people thought it an essential place of local 
history and identity. Then, this changed into a big controversy as large as the 
landmark one.  
 
 
8.5 Second Conflict: Removal or Preservation Controversy 
 
8.5.1 Conflicting visions around the removal/preservation of old JPH 
 
The dispute of whether the old JPH building should be demolished or preserved in 
Gwangju was started by questioning of some victims of the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement right after the groundbreaking ceremony of the ACC in 
June 2008. It had been unfolded mainly by the conflicts and struggles between the 
EA and local groups (including victims’ organisations of the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement) over two and half a years (from June 2008 to December 
2010). However, according to some of my interviewees, symptoms of the 
Controversy might have been emerging from a time before June 2008. That is, in 
January 2008, when a study on the utilisation of historic conserved spaces related to 
the Gwangju Movement in the ACC was launched by the MCST, the issue was 
raised by some people from local groups. Then, tension between the central 
authorities and local citizens was forming and growing. Therefore, we can recognise 
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that the conflict between the two parties did not suddenly explode, but gradually 
expanded and developed into severe battles.  
 
The most important reason for the Removal/Preservation Controversy is that the 
central authorities did not properly inform the public of the fact that a part 
(approximately 60%) of the old JPH would be demolished within the process of the 
ACC project. They announced that they would preserve all historic buildings and 
sites50 related to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement through a press release 
in May 2005. However, they had different plans. Indeed, they had already planned to 
tear down all the previously expanded parts of the old JPH (approximately 80 per 
cent of all the old JPH building). Such a fact could be identified in the English 
directive of the EA to the 480 participating architects in the design contest for the 
ACC in June 2005. In addition, the Minister of the MCT, Jung Dong-chae promised 
to some members of local groups that he would save all historic buildings and sites 
from possible damage in the process of the ACC construction in July 2005. 
Nonetheless, the central authorities pushed their original plan without changing the 
design guide. The reason might be that the old JPH was an obstacle rather than aid 
to accomplish their ambitious vision for the ACC.  
 
The arguments of removal/preservation of the old JPH was spread out across 
diverse actors and each of these visions could offer a different interpretation of the 
place.  
                                    
50  These included the old JPH, the public service centre, the National Police Agency, the 
Sangmugwan building and the public square and fountain. 
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Firstly, the argument of removal was suggested by central government (the EA), the 
city authorities and council, local business groups, and many local journalists. For 
them, the ACC was the latest fashion in architecture which it could be a catalyst for 
national or local growth. Thus, they wanted to shape it very attractively since it 
should be a driving force for economic development and the cultural industry.  
 
In contrast, the argument for preservation was raised by some local groups such as 
victims’ organisation of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement (5.18 groups), the 
Joint Civic Committee for the old JPH (JCC), the Korea Alliance of Progressive 
Movements in Gwangju & Jeonnam (KAPM). For them, the old JPH was the most 
symbolic place in Gwangju as a sacred democratic space where their family 
members and neighbours had resisted, fought, and sacrificed their lives against the 
military dictatorship. Thus, they endeavoured to make the space a place to 
remember the meanings of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the best 
way was to conserve the old JPH. Additionally, they wanted to add some spaces 
such as a Human Rights Museum and Peace Memorial in order to encourage the 
next generation to learn and practice the Movement’s values like human rights, 
peace, freedom, and democracy. In terms of the interrelationship between actors, 
what we have to pay attention to here is that their relations are situational. In the 
previous Landmark Controversy, the EA and city government had a clash with each 
other. However, in this controversy, they united against the people who argued for 
the preservation of the old JPH. It shows us that the relations between actors were 
not static but dynamic depending on their situation within the politics of place 
marketing. 
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8.5.2 Conflicting meanings: political process around the old JPH 
 
“This building will be torn down. Do you remember the scream of blood shed 
in the May of 1980? Now, you citizens protect it, please (from the placard of 
the Gwangju Democratisation Movement victims on the wall of old JPH)” 
 
[Source: GVO (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement Victims Organisation), 
2009:1] 
 
The issue of removal/preservation of the old JPH was closely connected with the fact 
that the place had been the most significant space for the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement. Thus, this section deals with how the different meanings of the various 
actors were contested and conflicted within the process of the political controversy.  
 
From the argument for removal 
 
The central authorities (the EA) argued that one of the ACC’s future values is the 
“spirit of democracy, human rights, and peace through the ‘Gwangju Student 
Independence Movement’ and the ‘Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ (MCST, 
2007:44)” by noting the architectural meaning of the ACC as an “emphasis of the 
historical characteristics of Gwangju as the main place of the democratisation 
movement (ibid:41)”. Despite the fact that the design of the ACC would demolish 
much of the old JPH, Woo Kyu-seung, the international architect (American Korean) 
of the ACC, who was selected by the central authorities, stressed that his work, 
‘Forest of Light’ intended to reflect the memory of the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement, saying that “well preserved memories of the democratic uprising will 
make the ACC an internationally famous site (MCT, 2005:132).” However, the 
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central authorities’ activity for the representation of the ACC was quite different from 
their remarks. They destroyed many parts of the old JPH as a key vehicle for the 
memory of the historic event (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement), while their 
rhetoric was used to emphasise the historic importance of the site or to preserve 
memories of the Movement. We can feel and learn the values of democracy, human 
rights, and peace which was only rhetorically emphasised by them only when they 
conserve the old JPH as a key reservoir of memories. Thus, their rhetoric might be 
fictitious since their language and action were not consistent. For them, it seems 
memories of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement were some decorations for the 
success of their ambitious marketing project.  
 
From the argument for preservation 
 
In contrast to the argument for removal, a number of people in 5.18 (the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement) victims’ organisations and other local groups 
considered the meaning of the Movement as a precious one. For them, it was far 
beyond one of the simple historic sites. For instance, it was a ‘battle field of the 
citizen army against dictatorship (GVO, 2009:67)’ and a ‘lamentable site where many 
5.18 victims fought and were killed, wounded, and jailed in order to protect the old 
JPH and democracy (ibid:38)’. Thus, from the scalar perspective, it was a precious 
place and memory of personal body (the individuals involved) or on the family scale. 
However, for many residents in Gwangju, it was a place for the collective memory of 
‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit. A member of a local group, as one of my 
interviewees, argued that such an ACC which is irrelevant to the citizens’ memory 
and values cannot produce Gwangju development, strongly refuting the need for it 
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as follows: “indeed, we can’t explain Gwangju except through 5.18 [the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement]. Can we? If someone says Gwangju or 5.18, we 
naturally recall the old JPH. Because, in May 1980, it was the place where the 
military junta’s soldiers fired onto citizens and many people were hurt and killed. It 
was where we people struggled against them to the end. So it is our pride and the 
most symbolic place of democracy, freedom and peace in our country. So it’s the 
landmark of city…. But now, what they are building is no such thing. Both the EA and 
city government advertise it as if it will make many employment opportunities and 
attract tourists. However, we don’t trust them. Do you think it [the ACC] will bring 
prosperity to Gwangju? No way….. If we want to be wealthy, we must attract huge 
factories like POSCO steel or Hyundai automobile (author interview, 23rd September 
2011).” As we can see, for them, the old JPH was the most precious location in the 
city. Thus, they cannot agree the demolition since that behaviour is to deny the key 
value of Gwangju. They also distrust the authorities’ vision about and the economic 
effects from the ACC as being only for local growth. There were lots of artists who 
had similar views. For instance, Ju Ro-mi, the film director acutely criticised the issue 
in an interview with the national media.  
 
“In the case of youth, they can’t pay attention to socio-political problems due 
to their unemployment or finding a job. I heard, recently, most middle and 
high school students answered ‘money’ when asked the question of ‘what is 
the condition necessary for happiness?’. This State [Nation state of South 
Korea] makes us bet all the things we have for more money. In this respect, 
authorities let our old JPH be destroyed at any time. Indeed, they control our 
atmosphere and environment like that. But if we remind ourselves of the 
value of May [the Gwangju Democratic Movement] of 1980… during the 
period of ten days, we had the happiest collective society even in the worst 
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violence and isolation….. I hope people have a mind for collective value 
rather than only an economic one (Ohmystar, 13th May 2011).” 
 
The disputes and conflicts between actors for and against the removal of the old JPH 
continued in a number of different ways over two and a half years (from June 2008 to 
December 2010). At first, 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement) victims 
and local groups argued about the injustice of the demolition of the building through 
news conferences and rallies. Against it, the authorities (the EA) criticised them by 
arguing it would result in delay of and more expenditure on the project through some 
press releases, news conferences, and advertisements. However, the argument 
against the removal of old JPH increasingly gained the support of many citizens. For 
example, according to a joint survey by eight51 local press agencies covering one 
thousand residents in Gwangju, the proportion of those supporting the argument for 
preservation (62%) was almost two times higher than the argument for removal 
(32%). In addition, a part of the nation-wide netizens52 and artists joined in the 
campaign and they held a candlelight vigil together to save the old JPH building. 
Specifically, 5.18 victims strongly resisted with the slogan: “no touch, even one brick 
in the old JPH (Lee, 2009:175).” They variously expressed their antipathy through a 
series of print distributions, individual demonstrations, a Ochetuji protest53, a sit-in 
with tents, and a hunger protest (see Figure 8.5). They established a committee for 
conserving the old JPH with other local citizens and pressed the EA by beginning a 
                                    
51 They were Mudeung Ilbo (newspaper), Gwangju Ilbo, Jeonnam Ilbo, Gwangju Maeil, Jeonnam 
Maeil, Namdo Ilbo, Gwangju MBC (Munwha Broadcasting Corperation), and KBS (Korea 
Broadcasting System).  
52 It means people who are actively involved in online communities and internet users.  
53 It is a performance where protesters express their strong opposition by marching and giving a 
buddistic bow in every three steps. It has often been employed by environmental activists in South 
Korea since it can acquire mass media interest in spite of its physical suffering.  
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sit-in tent protest in front of the EA branch office in Gwangju in June 2009. Then, 
they gave the authorities more pressure with a hunger protest in September of the 
same year. However, it made the situation worse. The central authorities were 
embarrassed by it, and violently suppressed them by coercing dispersion and arrests 
(Han, 2010). In addition, the city government and council, business groups, and 
much of the local press supported the argument for removal because the delay of 
the project could bring about a budget cut from the central authorities. Then, due to 
several national politicians’ arbitration, the cental authorities reluctantly gave an 
alternative of partly preserving the old JPH (from complete removal to less than 40 
per cent preservation). Despite the fact that 5.18 victims and some local groups still 
opposed the plans, the authorities pushed forward with their dicision. More than half 
of the building was demolished and now, it is being replaced with a large-scale 
cultural complex (see Figure 8.6).  
 
Figure 8.5 An individual demonstration (left) and Ochetuji protest (right) 
 
 
(Source: Jang, 2011:33) 
 
Figure 8.6 Under construction of the ACC (22nd Dec 2011) 
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(Source: http://blog.naver.com/hwa202?Redirect=Log&logNo=30126837116) 
 
In the previous Landmark Controversy, the EA people argued that the site should not 
be the place for a giant building since it was a historic site of democratic uprising by 
suggesting it should become an Asian mecca of culture to commemorate the historic 
event. However, it is very doubtful that they really wanted to preserve historical 
meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement because they, in the end, 
destroyed much of the old JPH. Some researchers assert that the central authorities, 
from the start, had no interest in preserving the building since they only focused on 
the economic gain which would be accomplished by the ACC rather than any historic 
value (Jang, 2011; Jung, 2007; Han, 2010).  
 
In particular, Jung Ho-gi argued that they had a negative attitude about 
accommodating commemorating facilities in the ACC. He suggested several 
reasons: firstly, they suppressed the movement which supported the preservation of 
the old JPH; secondly, they persistently avoided giving detailed responses to 
questions from local groups about commemorating the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement in the project; and finally, they did not examine the historic meanings and 
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qualities of the site in their various publications, reports, and studies (Jung, 
2007:194-5).  
 
In relation to this, an interviewee of mine cynically criticised the injustice of removing 
the old JPH, noting that “both central and urban authorities should have preserved it, 
of course, with the original form. No matter how much they need, they must conserve 
the lively field of 5.18 [Gwangju Democratistion Movement]. Because, when 
someone comes to Gwangju, probably he [/she] comes to see it. So, also in the 
Landmark battle, we concluded its type as an underground building. But, now they 
destroyed it….. It’s funny. It would have rather supported a giant landmark than the 
current ACC at first. The goal and means were changed each other. It [the old JPH] 
should be demolished because of the ACC and it should be cut because of the ACC, 
all of them because of the ACC (author interview, a member of Minyechong, 14th 
October 2011). Furthermore, many people worried about its negative effect on 
residents. Kim Min-su, a famous architect in South Korea pointed out that “most 
residents have concerns about the ACC plan because it possibly results in severely 
changing the urban systems of transportation and retail and it would lead to great 
damage to the sense of place and memory of ‘Owol’ [May 1980] around the old JPH 
(Gwangjuin, 8th February 2010).” He added that “the problem of city design in 
Gwangju is over-flowing design (ibid).” According to him, over-flowing design means 
excessive urban make-up with no connection to historical and cultural assets like the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement. He argued that the authorities should not to 
spend citizens’ taxes on projects unnecessary for residents’ lives, and should not sell 
the ‘Uihyang’ (a righteous town) for an exotic city of culture any more. Consequently, 
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we can observe an irony that the more political leaders and government officials 
endeavoured to develop cultural projects, the worse it became in terms of 
presevaton of cultural assets such as the old JPH. Values like ‘Daedong (distribution 
and solidarity)’ spirit increasingly disappeared because of the growing 
commercialisation of the ACC project. 
 
 
8.6 Unfinished resistance and politics of memory 
 
“[P]laces are never merely backdrops for action or containers for the past. 
They are fluid mosaics and moments of memory, matter, metaphor, scene, 
and experience that create and mediate social spaces and temporalities. 
Through place making, people mark social spaces as haunted sites where 
they can return, make contact with their loss, contain unwanted presences, or 
confront past injustices (Till, 2005:8).” 
 
This section, firstly, examines the meaning of blending alternatives suggested by the 
authorities to related actors. Then, it explores the politics of memory around the old 
JPH in association with the meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and 
the changing image of Gwangju.  
 
8.6.1 Fixing up by blending alternative? 
 
Central and city authorities are, currently, implementing the ACC project together. 
They have removed much (approximately 60 per cent) of the old JPH building in 
order to make a large exit to the underground facilities of the ACC.  
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However, many victims of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and local 
citizens still oppose the ACC plan which has been partly modified by blending 
alternatives. For example, an interviewee stated that “the goal of the ACC is to make 
Gwangju a lively cultural city embedded with the 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement] spirit. If so, we have to preserve the Dochung [old JPH]. If they want to 
build the ACC, they can easily find other, better places. There is also such cheap 
land for the ACC in the suburbs of the city. They can build it at any time. Even now, I 
don’t know why they are building it in this place (author interview, a member of 5.18 
Bereaved Family Organisation, 23rd September 2011).” Though many people in 
Gwangju still oppose it, all officials of the central and urban government told me that 
the problem was completely resolved by their alternative plan. It is doubtful whether 
the issue was cleared up or not. Even one city councillor argued that it was not 
resolved, saying that “I don’t think the conflict [around the ACC project] was solved, 
although it looks like it is co-ordinated. I think that the conflict is hidden. But when the 
time comes, it can break out in any form (author interview, a city councillor in 
Gwangju, 21st September 2011).” Though one party pushed it arguing that all 
problems were resolved, another party is still against it. Thus, it seems the 
removal/preservation dispute is not yet finished since a precarious state exists with 
tensions between the two parties that keep going on. In addition, we can recognise 
that there might be another conflict which could come back between them at any 
time. 
 
8.6.2 The Gwangju Democratisation Movement and politics of memory 
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Even though studies on memory have been abundant for a long time, it is Maurice 
Halbwachs who began to approach it in association with groups or society (Assman, 
1995). However, he did not deal with the theme of ‘mnemonic functions of 
objectivised culture’ well (ibid:128). By contrast, Assman (1995) comprehensively 
examines the relationship between memory, group, and culture by using ‘cultural 
memory’. He emphasised its transmission of ‘objectivised meaning’ beyond the 
collective memory of a group. For example, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
gave many Gwangju citizens common experiences and memories and it became a 
collective memory of the Gwangju people. Drawing on Assman’s theory, however, 
this thesis argues that it has been developed into a cultural memory through the 
people of Gwangju’s diverse activities to transmit the objectivised meaning of 
‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit beyond simple collective memory. In this 
section, the politics of memory around the old JPH will be discussed from this 
perspective. 
 
The past in the present is formed by historical re-interpretation and re-forming of 
memory. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s idea, Till stated that “memory is the self-
reflexive act of…. continuously digging for the past through place. It is a process of 
continually remaking and remembering the past in the present rather than a process 
of discovering objective historical ‘facts’ (2005:11).” In relation to the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement, the most active behaviours of the nation state in 
creating a memory of the Movement were authoritative activities such as establishing 
a national commemoration day and constructing memorial parks. In addition, in 
terms of the historical aspect, central authorities changed one of the stock names of 
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the event from a ‘violent riot of the mob’ into a ‘righteous democratic movement’ in 
the 1990s. However, the politics of memory around the Movement have kept 
happening in Gwangju over the past 30 years. In the process, the dominant view is 
to consider it as ‘one of the democratic movements in South Korea’ and to use it for 
boosting tourism and the cultural industry. In contrast to this, an informal view is to 
transmit the memory of the Movement as a proud historic asset. The Movement, 
from this view, can be understood as the precious values of ‘courageous resistance’ 
against national violence for a completely democratic regime and self-governing by 
the people, and the ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit which leads people to 
distribute rice balls and blood and co-operate with each other. These two views have 
continually struggled against each other within the policy arena of Gwangju 
marketing. We observed similar conflicts such as the ‘Yehyang’ discourse and the 
Biennale vs. Anti-Biennale in the previous chapter (Chapter 7).  
 
One of the most important things in Gwangju marketing is to confirm and reflect 
whose memory as the major image of the city. History is a reconstructed memory 
through the present rather than a simple memory of the past. Thus, what is important 
is, in the context of the present, to decide whose and what memory we employ for 
marketing places. The Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a collective memory 
was a dominant image of the city during the 1980s. The memory of citizens about on 
the Movement is still being constructed now. However, it has been increasingly 
threatened and damaged mainly by the political and economic elites’ commercial 
marketing. For example, a member of the 5.18 Bereaved Family Organisation as an 
interviewee indicated the commercial trend of the ACC, saying that “many tourists in 
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Gwangju may have been interested in 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement] rather than the ACC. At that time, the ‘Dochung’ [old JPH] was the place 
where our sons and daughters, husbands, and neighbours died. It was the uprising 
HQ. It was the space for them to hide, eat, sleep, and fight. Without that place, we 
would never feel the historical facts….. I’m sure it’s an attempt to make money by 
commercialising 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement] through the ACC. 
It’s so lamentable that the ACC covers and damages the history of 5.18. In the end, 
it will go toward more commercialisation (author interview, 23rd September 2011).” 
As a result, it seems the memories and sprits of many citizens about the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement have increasingly been covered by commercialised 
discourses and the latest architectural trends of cultural complex.  
 
However, a number of residents still have great memories about the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement which enabled us to experience the first purely 
democratic self-governing by the people in South Korea and feel the ‘Daedong 
(distribute and solidarity)’ sprit. These memories have persistently challenged the 
dominant one shaped by the government. For example, as shown in Figure 8.7, such 
memories were expressed in a variety of art works and activities. Additionally, every 
May, victims’ families of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and some civil 
organisation members voluntarily attempt to hold small ceremonies in which citizens 
could be reminded of the Movement such as distributing rice balls and blood. They 
have helped disadvantaged people and donated to hospitals with money and blood 
obtained by through those events.  
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Figure 8.7 Memories about the ‘Daedong (distribute and solidarity)’ spirit 
 
 
[Source: left54 (Newsis, 12th May 2011), right (Yeonhap-news, 29th May 2011)] 
 
Another example was the documentary movie, ‘Owolyea’ (sad memory of May) 
which dealt with normal people’s stories about the Movement. It came out in May 
2011. It described the disappearing memories of ‘the others’ about the Movement in 
comparison with the formal history of government. The co-producer of the movie, Ju 
Ro-mi stated “it was the Presidential commitment of the Noh Mu-hyeon Government 
that they would make Gwangju a historic city by building the ACC at the site of the 
old JPH.…. But I heard authorities didn’t notify citizens of design plans for removing 
the old JPH. To put it plainly, they gave considerable thought to the economic value 
rather than the historic one of the ACC.…. Though it was linked to an economic 
aspect, I want to solve a question of what matters more between these two values 
(Ohmystar, 13th May 2011).” And she also added that “for the State, the May [the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement] is a history which they want to erase. At the 
national ceremony for the Movement last year, indeed, they prevented people from 
                                    
54 The print is Hong Seong-dam’s work that has a title of Daedong-sesang to express ‘Daedong’ 
world. Hong is one of the most famous painters from Gwangju in South Korea. 
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singing ‘A March for Them55’, and there was no historic site of 5.18 [the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement] with original form. They have destroyed them one by 
one. I think they can make the ACC without the removal of the ‘Dochung’ [old JPH]…. 
(ibid).” In relation to the old JPH, what is evident is that the first vision of the central 
authorities was to make it into a very historic place like a 5.18 Memorial Museum 
preserving the building. However, currently, much of the building was destroyed with 
a sophisticated rhetoric of the ACC through which they will modernistically interpret 
and represent a memory of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Furthermore, it 
has been discussed as a promotional tool for national and local growth rather than 
as a place for historical and collective values.  
 
‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit was an unprecedented collective value in 
South Korea constructed by the purely voluntary participations and sacrifices of the 
Gwangju people. However, its precious values and meanings have just been kept 
alive covered by diverse pro-growth discourses like the Yehyang, Cultural Mecca in 
Asia, the Landmark, and Removal argument, etc. of city authorities and business 
elites. Thus, to some extent, it appears those pro-growth frames are beginning to 
resemble the market-led ideologies and values of Western leaders such as Reagan 
of the US and Thatcher of the UK in that their emphasis lies on the value of the 
market rather than historical, social, or political values. Against it, quite a few people 
in Gwangju have resisted and expressed their own visions and meanings through a 
variety of ways. Their attempts, however, were limited in that they were all 
discourses and activities based on much narrower framed scales of the local or 
                                    
55 It is a popular song on the theme of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, which has usually 
been sung by grass-roots activists and University students. 
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community. If they wanted to appeal to our society, they should have expanded the 
scale of their meanings. They might need to discuss and suggest the broader 
collective values of Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement like the ‘Daedong 
(distribution and solidarity)’ spirit, human rights, and peace beyond just locally 
remembering the Movement. 
 
8.6.3 The damaged old JPH within transforming Gwangju’s image 
 
Gwangju has long been the breeding ground for strong resistance against the 
violence and injustice of imperialism and dictatorship such as Gwangju Student’s 
Independence Movement under Japan’s colonial rule and the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement in 1980. Such an image has been regarded as a very 
significant component to explain and understand Gwangju. As examined in Chapter 
7, in spite of diluting the image with pro-growth ones, it seems that it still holds a 
somewhat influential power for people outside Gwangju. As an interesting example, 
according to a study by GDI (Gwangju Development Institute), a majority of foreign 
residents (37.5%) in Gwangju chose the Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a 
key image of the city (Min, 2008). Most of them (45.2%) also suggested a human 
rights-themed festival as the most fitting one for the Gwangju image (ibid). By 
contrast, their response about a city of culture and art which the city authorities 
strongly hope to be the city image was only 4.8% (ibid). Indeed, quite a few Asians 
have perceived the city as a city of democratic uprising. It can be identified in my 
interviewee’s statement as follow: 
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“If someone asks me how Gwangju is recognised from an outsider’s 
perspective, I can say that, at least for people in the Third world, they feel it is 
a city of human rights and democracy because the Gwangju people56 in non-
governmental organisations endeavoured for it. They gave 5.18 prizes to 
South East Asians every year and brought them into Gwangju, then, they 
presented them with various experiences through the learning programmes 
of democracy in the Gwangju Human Rights School. They have made great 
exertions towards it (author interview, a professor in Chosun University, 16th 
September 2011).” 
 
However, Gwangju’s image as a sacred ground of democracy is increasingly 
obscured by the international cultural hub city. The symbolic places for the 
democratic uprising have been transformed into one of the travel products where we 
can go by a tour bus operated by city government. The old JPH where citizens 
resisted against the dictatorship as the location of their HQ has been changed to the 
luxurious space of the ACC as a Cultural Mecca of Asia. According to Till (2005), 
similarly in terms of the politics of memory, Berlin has also experienced contradictory 
tensions and conflicts in the process of making places with social memory. However, 
memorial projects for intentional forgetting of dark pasts like the National Socialist 
Party and the Holocaust, and ornamental marketing representations has gone hand-
in-hand and promoted the ‘New Berlin’ as a global city within negotiations and co-
ordinations led by the dominant interests of places (ibid). For another example, 
Harvey (2005) notes that the place marketing strategy around the financial crisis of 
New York in the 1970s as a crucial point for neo-liberalism, nationally and trans-
nationally, to take hegemonic power within the arena of politics. He argues that city 
                                    
56 Gwangju people here means non-governmental and voluntary organisations in Gwangju such as 
Gwangju Citizen Solidarity and The 18th May Memorial Foundation. Since the mid 1990s, they have 
established and implemented the 5.18 prize, the Gwangju Human Rights School, the Gwangju 
International Peace Forum, and the International Intern (voluntary activist) Intercourse Project. 
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government, the municipal labour movement, and working class New Yorkers were 
deprived of the social democratic infrastructure which they had accumulated over the 
previous three decades (ibid:46). In particular, he asserts that cultural instruments 
played a major role in the process of marketing the city, saying:  
 
“New York investment bankers….. seized the opportunity to restructure it [the 
city] in ways that suited their agenda. The creation of a ‘good business 
climate’ was a priority….. The city’s elite institutions were mobilised to sell the 
image of the city as a cultural centre and tourist destination (inventing the 
famous logo ‘I Love New York’). The ruling elites moved, often fractiously, to 
support the opening up of the cultural field to all manner of diverse 
cosmopolitan currents….. Artistic freedom and artistic licence, promoted by 
the city’s powerful cultural institutions, led, in effect, to the neoliberalization of 
culture. ‘Delirious New York’ (to use Rem Koolhaas’s memorable phrase) 
erased the collective memory of democratic New York (ibid:46-7).” 
 
Then, according to Harvey (ibid), the Reagan Administration of the 1980s just 
expanded New York’s neoliberal model to a national scale. Thus, taking a close look 
into these complicated politics of memory around places allows us to have deeper 
understanding of the evolving political context of city marketing policies in connection 
with those places.  
 
From the perspective of urban landscape, the Gwangju ‘Eupsung’ (traditional town 
wall) was a representative cultural asset of the city for over 1,000years. Currently, 
however, most Gwangju citizens don’t know much about it since it was completely 
demolished by the Japanese. In recent years, central and city authorities pushed the 
growth-oriented ACC design and it led to a damage of another important historic 
building (the old JPH). Now, we have only two sites for remembering the Gwangju 
296 
 
Democratisation Movement: the greatly damaged old JPH and Mangwol Cemetery. 
A publication from the 5.18 victims’ organisation points out the responsibility of 
Gwangju citizens, saying: “we think our neglecting of the removal of this place will be 
a bigger crime in our history…. Once a historic site has disappeared, we cannot 
reverse it. So, we have the responsibility to remember and transmit historical value 
and meaning…. We hope this problem will be solved not through ‘resolution of 
forgetting’ but through ‘one of remembering’ (GVO, 2009:preface).” Nonetheless, 
over 60 per cent of the old JPH was demolished in order to transfigure itself to a 
deluxe cultural centre of Asia. 
 
Furthermore, in this chapter, we have focused on the changes of intangible 
ideologies, images and meanings, rather than tangible transformation like the 
physical environment and landscape in order to explain the political process of neo-
liberalising place marketing. In other words, what is matter in the thesis is 
disappearing collective values and meanings which were formed in process of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Most interviewees who I met in Gwangju had 
some shared values like democratic experience and voluntary distribution, sacrifice 
and solidarity during the time of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and they 
are proud of them. For instance, a local news-woman answered my question (what is 
the meaning of Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement for you?) as follows. 
 
“Well, what have I to say? I think, just we survivors should have and keep like 
a principle. 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement] left us a spirit of 
resistance and the Daedong [distribution and solidarity] against dictatorship. 
What is the Daedong spirit? It is not the term about only my happiness. It is 
for our happiness and we should live well together because people with no 
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power are always driven over the edge. It is like a principle we have to 
embrace those people (author interview, 15th September 2011).” 
 
For some elites in the city, however, those memories and values were only negative 
things which should be hidden and erased since they thought that those would be an 
obstacle to attracting investments and firms. For them, such resistant and tough 
images were not applicable to advanced and post-modern ones which Gwangju want 
to resemble; while, for others, they were precious memories about their family 
members and historical experiences. Nonetheless, such crucial meanings and 
values were not dealt with within the policy process of Gwangju marketing. Those 
mental values have disappeared from the mind of Gwangju people through the 
diluting by a neo-liberal pro-growth frame of dominant discourse contrived by city 
elites. Through this case, we can trace not only the transformation of the physical 
landscape but also the changing mental memory, value and meaning towards neo-
liberalisation of contemporary cities.  
 
 
8.7 Summary 
 
Gwangju’s image has been constructed by the conflicting and contesting visions and 
values of diverse actors with the geography of multi-scales around the ACC. In the 
process, the space of the old JPH was a vehicle for forming inter-relationship of 
various actors and they politically acted for their own interests based on different 
geographical scales. Through this complex process, multi-dimensional and -scaled 
politics of place have socially been constructed and re-constructed around the ACC 
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project. In conclusion, as leading politicians and economic elites have expanded 
their ‘Yehyang (town of art)’ discourse mixed with ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ and a 
Culture Olympics into the international festival of the Biennale in the previous 
chapter. In this chapter, the dominant groups of the ACC project have created a new 
image of a cultural hub city covered by an Asian scale on a basis of Yehyang and 
the Biennale. And also, I attempted to illustrate how Gwangju places can serve as a 
material manifestation of competing ideologies and meanings about visions of ‘urban 
growth and development’. In the process, we could observe that the historic meaning 
and value of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement such as the ‘Daedong’ 
(distribution and solidarity) spirit, democracy, human rights and peace have been 
transformed into commercial ornament for development strategies. In addition, 
through this chapter, I have attempted to describe and understand this case within 
the wider context such as a global strategy of central government (Asian Mecca of 
Culture and Art) and the competition towards dominant cultural city between Korean 
cities rather than within the narrow scale of conflicts between the local authorities 
and residents around the ACC. 
 
Currently, a part of the old JPH as a historic site of the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement was torn down by the authorities in order to build a lavish symbol of a 
cultural hub city in Asia. Initially, politicians labelled the site as a place for 
commemorating the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Now, however, much of 
the historic JPH building was demolished, even though it was the most significant 
place for remembering the Movement. For victims of the Movement, the place was 
their usual haunt for remembering their missing family members. The place gave 
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them energy to sustain their hard lives. In addition, it was a vehicle for many citizens 
to feel the precious values of the ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit, human 
rights, peace and democracy. Now, however, much of old JPH was destroyed by the 
authorities and the site is rapidly changing into a space for a glossy cultural complex 
contributing toward the creation of the city as a cultural hub in Asia. The history of 
Gwangju as a ‘Sacred Democratic Ground’, which consisted of place identity of 
Gwangju in South Korea becomes an aesthetic ornament of a cultural city for local 
tourism and growth. Therefore, for local political and economic elites, the Gwangju 
image was a bad one that they should hide and erase by their contrived discourses 
like ‘Yehyang (a traditional town of art)’ and cultural hub city. However, for others in 
the city, it was a valuable image that they should preserve and develop into 
cherished values such as the ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit, human 
rights and peace. 
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Chapter Nine: Dome Baseball Stadium and Other 
Marketing Projects 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the Dome Baseball project as a third case in order to 
investigate the evolving political context of Gwangju place marketing. However, it will 
be less deeply examined in relation to the previous cases since this case might be 
seen as much more recent and a bit too earlier for judging its implications. The 
Dome case has a different point from the prior ones. It has the symptom of western 
place marketing that has often been driven by private-led governance. Thus, this is 
especially the focal point in the next section. And then, other marketing projects in 
Gwangju are very briefly explored, focussing specifically on their social and political 
implications. The last section concludes with a brief summary of these discussions. 
 
 
9.2 Dome Baseball Stadium 
 
9.2.1 Background of the project 
 
Just as in other Korean core cities, there was chronic shortage of housing stock 
because of rapid urbanisation in Gwangju during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the 
population of Gwangju increasing from 370,000 in 1965 to 610,000 in 1975, the 
figure of the KHPR (Korean Housing Provision Rate) in Gwangju decreased from 63 
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per cent to 57 per cent (Han, 2010). To solve this problem, city authorities preferred 
large-scale residencial complexes since it would enable them to rapidly build a 
number of housings. In particular, the former City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae 
endeavoured to build a huge new town rather than focus on city centre regeneration 
as a major way of solving the problem of housing provision. By contrast, many 
residents in the Dong-gu area politically demanded revitalisation of the declining 
urban centre. Thus, there was a lot of tension between the sprawl-centred urban 
policy of city government and the inward-looking re-development that local citizens 
demanded at that time.  
 
Around that time, a domed stadium boom began to emerge in Korean cities since the 
Korean national baseball team put up a good fight against the USA, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico and Venezuela and took second place in the first WBC (World Baseball 
Classic 57 ) competition. Additionally, that year the KIA Tigers (Gwangju-based 
professional baseball team) finally won the championship of the Korean series ten 
years after their previous success, and it made people in Gwangju have more civic 
enthusiasm than ever. These events might be good grounds for why the city 
authorities embarked on a large-scale sports project for local growth. As Molotch 
puts it: 
 
“The athletic teams in particular are an extraordinary mechanism for instilling 
a spirit of civic jingoism regarding the ‘progress’ of the locality. A stadium 
filled with thousands (joined by thousands more at home the TV) screaming 
for Cleveland or Baltimore (or whatever) is a scene difficult to fashion 
                                    
57 It is an international professional-baseball tournament just like World Cup in soccer. The first WBC 
was held in the US in 2009. 
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otherwise. This enthusiasm can be drawn upon….. in order to gain general 
acceptance for local growth-oriented programs (1976:315).” 
 
As Molotch (ibid) argues, also in Gwangju, many residents’ enthusiasm towards the 
KIA Tigers naturally attracted the attention of politicians. Then in effect, it greatly 
contributed to a political decision on local growth-centred strategy for a giant sporting 
stadium. Many cities like Seoul, Ansan, Daegu and Busan, meanwhile, got in on the 
race for a domed stadium. Then the city leader of Gwangju made a decision without 
carefully considering the economic situation and also went in for the competition of 
constructing a domed stadium along with heated atmosphere between different cities. 
Regarding the background of the Dome Stadium, one of the public officials in charge 
argued that “the project did not stem from one reason but from somewhat 
complicated factors (author interview, 19th September 2011).” He added some more 
about the background, saying: “at first, there were many people who were interested 
in a domed stadium. At that time, we won the second prize in the first WBC, and our 
KIA Tigers (Gwangju-based professional baseball team) captured the championship 
of the Korean series. So many baseball fans and citizens asked to take this 
opportunity to build a new ballpark. And, they told us that as long as we are making it, 
let’s build a Dome like the Tokyo Dome. And, competition among other cities played 
a role. Other cities like Seoul and Daegu also considered building a Dome. So some 
people denounced us, saying that ‘all cities have attempted to build one but what you 
are doing’. Therefore, bearing in mind these complicated factors, our City Mayor 
made a decision to do it (ibid).”  
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This formal opinion, on the face of it, might lead us to a conclusion that most citizens 
wanted to build a domed stadium. According to some of my study results, however, 
general public opinion seemed to be incongruent with the interpretation of city 
government.  
 
A local newspaper reported, “in the case of ‘Horangyi Sarangbang [tigers fan’s 
internet chatroom]’ on the KIA Tigers’s Homepage where many local baseball fans 
communicate each other, most of them wanted to have an open stadium instead of a 
domed one (Gwangju-dream, 29th October 2009).” Furthermore, the following 
answers to my questions in interviews show a different interpretation from the formal 
one, since they indicate that the major reason for the Dome Stadium project in 
Gwangju was because of City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae’s personal interest on his 
election rather than citizens’ demand.  
 
“It [Dome Stadium project] was a crazy thing. We didn’t need it. The Dome 
was impossible due to the population scale or urban situation in city….. To be 
honest, it was begun for Park’s third election of City Mayor….. He argued that 
he would make the Dome as a landmark and representative tourist 
commodity for Gwangju. But most people opposed it. We didn’t need to build 
it wasting huge money. Actually, we, the city of Gwangju, didn’t have enough 
money to do, and once we built it, we couldn’t afford to keep it (author 
interview, a local newsman, 15th September 2011).  
 
“We didn’t say ‘we want to see baseball in a Dome’. But, he [City Mayor] 
promised it to us for his election; to make it up for his own achievement: ‘I did 
it during my term of office’; to demonstrate visibly. It’s a so-called display 
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administration (author interview, a member of Gwangju-Gyeongsilryeon58, 
18th October 2011).” 
 
In addition, the Dome New Town project was announced by City Mayor, Park without 
any public hearing or open forum, even without the agreement of City Council.  
 
However, was such a big project indeed launched only for his personal 
achievement? This might be not true. I gained another hint about how we can 
approach an answer to this question through an interview with a policy maker in the 
Gwangju authorities. He pointed out that the pressure of the media’s ranking of city 
marketing results played a role for them to push entrepreneurial marketing policies, 
saying that “evaluating agencies like Anholt or the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences internationally have announced a city brand index and ranking these days. 
And also, domestically, the KMA (Korean Marketing Association) and some major 
newspapers have assessed rankings. We local authorities have to keep an eye on 
the results because the impact of a low ranking is severe. But, once we have a good 
result, it’s very good. Especially, the City Mayor likes it. In 2007, when we had a 
grand prize for city marketing from the KMA, he really liked it. We aggressively 
conducted marketing campaign. He made the first City Marketing Bureau in South 
Korea and held the Design Biennale. Due to the prize, he received a media spotlight 
and had a number of interviews celebrating the achievement with the media. That’s 
important for him because he is a politician (author interview, a public official in City 
Government, 20th September 2011).” He also indicated that the ranking behaviour of 
                                    
58 It is an abbreviation word of Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice in Gwangju which is a 
progressive civic organisation to be formed in response to the unjust structure of Korean economic life. 
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the media and academic circle has contributed to entrepreneurial policies between 
cities, adding that “because of frequent rankings, the former City Mayor [Park 
Gwang-tae] paid great attention to it. So he made a Samsung-street and KIA-street, 
and cut taxes for Samsung Electronics and KIA Motors because they have invested 
much in our local economy - because such actions influence the rankings. This year 
we are making a by-law for promoting city competitiveness and our own index to 
improve those rankings (ibid).” 
 
In association with this, McCann (2004) criticises the media’s rankings for ‘liveable 
cities’ and ‘best places’ in that they have ultimately strengthened the transformation 
towards the neo-liberalisation of cities. He believes that the rankings produced by 
some major media publications like Fortune and Money impose high pressure on 
cities and can lead to the city elite’s greatly intensified marketing activities for 
winning high results. He criticises that those rankings enable urban growth coalitions 
shaped by an alliance between local business and political elites to easily frame 
urban policies which suit their own interests. The reason is that such mainstream 
publications simplify the criteria of city success as both ‘liveability for the middle and 
more affluent class’ and a ‘good economic climate for businesses’ and as a result, it 
nearly corresponds with the urban growth coalition’s own interests and tastes. 
Similarly, we can identify the phenomenon of ranking cities that has emerged in 
South Korea through this interview. It might be a contributing factor to the change of 
behaviour of city leaders and marketing policy led by them towards a more 
entrepreneurial one.  
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To sum up, diverse factors could be seen as background for the Dome Stadium and 
New Town project in Gwangju. These were the city authorites’ sprawl-oriented urban 
policy, a Dome boom between Korean cities, and the increasing pressure of ranking 
cities for competitiveness. Most of all, however, the most significant factor might be 
the increasing pressure and imperatives of competition between Korean cities 
because not only Gwangju but also other Korean cities eagerly endeavoured to 
construct domed baseball stadium, to host mega-sporting events, and to gain higher 
city brand ranking. Such entrepreneurial marketing policies were not only led by Park 
Gwang-tae’s leadership of Gwangju. In this respect, Park’s political ambition should 
be related to the wider political context of competition pressure between Korean 
cities as an ‘external coercive power’ (Harvey, 1989:10). 
 
9.2.2 Contested visions and conflict: Dome new town vs. normal ballpark 
 
On 29th October in 2009, Gwangju city authorities signed a MOU (memorandum of 
understanding) with the POSCO Corporation59 (thereafter refer to as ‘POSCO’) 
about the Dome Stadium project. The city government promised POSCO that they 
would hand over land and administrative power and the POSCO was supposed to 
plan and implement the project by encouraging some financial investors such as 
banks, security and insurance companies. According to the press release on that 
day, they did not approach the project in the manner of building only a domed 
baseball stadium. In addition to building it, they intended to construct a large scale 
                                    
59 It is one of representative chaebols (Korean giant business groups) and multinational steel-making 
and construction company (world’s fourth largest steel-maker), which it headquartered in South Korea. 
It has subsidiaries in many countries like China, India, US, Mexico, Poland, Vietnam, Venezuela, etc. 
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new town (estimated for over 50,000 residents) which could accommodate diverse 
facilities such as an international food village, a cultural industry complex, residential 
apartments, and a theme park. They predicted that the 30,000-seat Dome would be 
a landmark and symbolic tourist attraction for Gwangju. Moreover, they argued that 
“many people in other cities like Seoul and Incheon would come to see baseball 
games by KTX [Korean Express Train] and metropolitan train (Gwangju Metropolitan 
City, 2009:3).” They suggested their vision of it as “spaces for multi-use sports and 
leisure for performances, concerts, events, which we can access at any time (ibid).”  
 
The City Mayor, Park emphasised the importance of the domed stadium in an 
interview with Goodnews-people (a national level media outlet), suggesting a few 
overseas examples as follows:  
 
“The Dome is not just a baseball stadium. If we use it as a culture and art 
complex, it is the best project that will play a role as a landmark and will 
make Gwangju to be the Gwangju in the world. For example, the ‘Tokyo 
Dome’ in Japan made a profit on sales of around 1,000 billion Won 
[approximately 560 million pounds] shaping theirs spaces for various 
amusement facilities, a hot-spring, hotel, and racetrack, etc. In the case of 
Chase Field in the US, it provides a huge restaurant which can accommodate 
4 thousand people in the domed stadium, and the city authorities receive 
stadium fees of 3.3 billion Won [approximately 1.8 million pounds] from 
Chase Field Corporation every year (23rd January 2010).” 
 
The city authorities were not active only in the dome stadium project. They were also 
involved in constructing a new town. They had a favourable attitude for a new town 
in the past. For instance, when the relocation of the old JPH to another place was 
confirmed by Central Government, they tried to suggest a new town with the theme 
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of a cultural industry complex to the MCT, and then the proposal was rejected. In 
particular, the former City Mayor, Park supported the Dome Stadium and New Town 
project, saying that “we should build 100 new towns, once we have the need for 
them (Prime economy [Newspaper], 19th November 2009)”, and “as cities have been 
fiercely competing with each other in fields of culture and economy within the global 
village, the 21C became the era of the theme park (Gwangnam-Ilbo [Newspaper], 
24th February 2010).” 
 
There, however, were a number of opposing voices against the government’s vision. 
Most of them had concerns about damage to the residents in the city centre, the lack 
of economic validity for the Dome project, and unilateral pushing of the project. On 
29th October in 2009, the Democratic Labour Party as one of the smaller opposition 
parties criticised the plans through the official comment: “considering the scale of 
population of Gwangju, we really doubt that the Dome Stadium can attract enough 
people, and it will probably result in a huge operating deficit like the World Cup 
Stadium (Prime economy [Newspaper], 29th October 2009).” A City Councillor, Yoo 
Jae-shin was also critical about city’s vision, pointing out that “there is no validity for 
the Dome Stadium and the 50,000-New Town since the government has no detailed 
solutions for the decline in the urban centre (ibid, 12th November 2009).” In addition, 
on 25th of same month, over 500 residents in Dong-gu and some citizens in the 
Redevelopment Housing Coalition held a rally opposing the project. They shouted 
slogans like ‘the Dome Stadium kills redevelopment’, ‘the urban centre is becoming a 
lettuce and cabbage field’, and ‘absolutely oppose the 50,000 New Town’. Most 
slogans were about the redevelopment in association with their economic interests. 
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Figure 9.1 Conflicting meanings of the Dome Baseball project 
 
 
 
 
 
   < City government, POSCO >          < Local groups, most city 
                                         residents, local media > 
 
 
In terms of scale, Gwangju city government and the POSCO pushed the project on 
the basis of public and private partnership at a local scale in order to build a large 
scale new town with a domed stadium which would be situated at a site far from the 
city centre.  
 
By contrast, many civic and environment groups tried to be satisfied with only a small 
repair or remodelling of the old baseball stadium [Mudeung Stadium] since they 
assumed the cost of the Dome Stadium would be too high. In particular, 
environmental local groups such as Participation Autonomy 21 and the Korean 
Federation for Environmental Movement fiercely opposed the city authorities’ 
cancellation of the Green Belt for the project. Based on their community scale, a part 
of the residents related to housing redevelopment in Dong-gu worried about the 
negative effects (e.g. oversupply in the housing market) on their own projects 
resulting from the Dome Stadium and New Town and they were partly opposed to it.  
 
Dome and 
New Town  
 
Sports landmark 
Normal 
Stadium 
Affordable ballpark 
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Figure 9.2 Design of the Dome Stadium and protesting citizens 
 
 
[Source: Left (Money-today, 19th Nov 2009), Right (Newsis, 25th Nov 2009)] 
 
They did not argue about the Dome Stadium and only resisted about the New Town 
since it could be harmful for their redevelopment investments. Their interests were a 
little different to each other. Nonetheless, they could all, ultimately, ally together to 
oppose the city’s project at a local level. 
 
In this case, policy actors had different interpretations and meanings of the Dome 
Stadium and New Town because of both their economic interests and spatial scales. 
Yet, they easily formed an allied party. How could they make this alliance? The 
reason might be that the two intertwined issues of the Dome and New Town should 
be embarked on together. The city government needs a domed stadium but did not 
have enough funds. The POSCO wanted to create profit from a New Town rather 
than the Dome. Thus, city authorities must provide the private company, as a project 
partner, with a large scale for residential development. As a result, they could not 
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split the two connected items. Such a situation enabled different opposing groups to 
unite their positions.  
 
Through this example we can recognise that polical actor’s interpretations and 
visions vary from their scalar positions (difference between local and community 
scale) as well as economic situations. In addition, as observed on some community 
residents’ scale in Dong-gu, we might identify the term of scale based on a social 
constructive approach is a contingent concept dependent upon situated 
interpretation. Increasingly, due to the alliance of the opposition forces, there was a 
groundswell of public opinion against the Dome Stadium and New Town.  
 
The city authorities did not stand back against the opinion. Rather, they pushed their 
original plan artfully mobilising various methods. Firstly, high-level government 
officials asserted the need for a domed stadium through a series of contributions and 
interviews with local press and broadcasting media. Secondly, they tried to 
manipulate public opinion along with government-controlled organisations and some 
local businesses. The city authorities allowed them to hang banners celebrating and 
supporting the Dome project in the streets (see Figure 9.3). Then, these banners 
were all over the streets in Gwangju. Thirdly, they trained public officials and actively 
encouraged them to diffuse arguments for the Dome. Through these activities, they 
persistently attempted to forge ‘fictitious opinion’ such as ‘we desire to have a Dome 
and giant scale of leisure town like Tokyo’.  
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Figure 9.3 A banner to mobilise opinion for the Dome60 
 
 
(Source: Gwangju-dream, 29th October 2010) 
 
The negative aspect of the project did not stop there. It led to an endeavour to bid 
and host international sporting mega-events like the Summer Universiade, which will 
be examined in a later section. The Dome was only one of the sports marketing 
projects of City Mayor, Park. After his success in being re-elected as City Mayor of 
Gwangju in 2006, he already noted several sporting mega-events which he wanted 
to host in the near future: the East Asian Games 2013, the WBC (World Baseball 
Classic) 2013, and the Summer Universiade 2015. Of course, explanations about 
their likely enormous economic effects and improving city status always followed 
them. In addition, there was emerging private-led governance through the project. It 
was found that the POSCO demanded considerable benefits such as permission to 
build thousands of houses and some golf courses, and operation for a Water Park. 
However, it has an important implication on the evolving nature of urban governance 
                                    
60 It said ‘Soccer is the World Cup Stadium, baseball is the Dome Stadium’. It might be a sentence 
which appealed to sports nationalism in connection with Korean’s special attention to the World Cup 
after 2002. 
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beyond just providing some economic benefits to a private company as a project 
partner. As Harvey argues, “in many of the instances of public-private partnerships, 
particularly at the municipal level, the state assumes much of the risk while the 
private sector takes most of the profits (2005:77).” Thus, despite market-led 
governance usually takes the form of partnership; it tends to have an inclination 
towards private interest. There was a similar indication in Gwangju society. The 
Participation Autonomy 21, a progressive local group, criticised the city authorities’ 
plan, by commenting: “when it comes to Private Investment Projects, without good 
arrangements, it might bring us problems such as privileged profit for specific 
companies and economic burden for citizens (Prime-economy news, 29th October 
2009).”  
 
Such a partnership might not be consistent with the principle of local democracy and 
public involvement (Hall, 2006). For example, Goodwin (1993) points out in a study 
on the marketing projects of Sheffield’s Don Valley and London’s Docklands in the 
UK that Development Corporations as non-elected agencies took the place of the 
city authorities even though they were not representative of nor had any 
accountability to citizens. According to him, “an appointed agency is, in each case, 
replacing the power of local government in order to carry out a market-led 
regeneration of each inner city (ibid: 161).” Such appointed agencies implement 
speculative development programmes in order to make a good climate for business 
rather than for residents like the industrial workers in the Don Valley and Docklands. 
He adds that such regeneration on a basis of partnership “is bolstered by the type of 
cultural speculation which promotes mythical landscapes and new images of each 
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place in order to build speculative confidence (ibid: 161-2).” If the original plan of the 
Dome Stadium and New Town were actualised in Gwangju, it would be a new town 
for the POSCO rather than for Gwangju citizens. The reason is that the city 
authorities attempted to fully authorize a purely private company [the POSCO] to 
conduct the project. Behind this political effort of government lies a symptom of the 
important shift to market-centred ideology. Harvey (2005) also suggests that one of 
the significant vehicles for a neo-liberal state is becoming increasingly dependent 
upon public-private partnership along with a flexible labour market, privatisation and 
commodification, deregulation in financial systems, and a minimum level of social 
safety net, etc. Despite its failure, the case of the Dome project is important from this 
contextual perspective. It implies the changing political nature of governance towards 
neo-liberalisation.  
 
9.2.3 Death of the Dome to participatory civic stadium 
 
Fortunately, the Dome Stadium and New Town project foundered. A deepening 
economic recession since 2008 global financial crisis contributed to its death. There 
was an increase of unsold housing in Korean cities at that time. The same story was 
in Gwangju and there were over 7 thousand units of unsold apartment housing. In 
addition, many residents in the inner city opposed the new town and most civic 
organisations criticised the City Mayor’s dogmatic behaviour. As the economic and 
political situation worsened, the POSCO rejected participation in the project. It meant 
the failure of the plan since it would cost too much and the city authorities could not 
afford it. Then, they inevitably established the Citizen Committee for Constructing a 
Baseball Stadium (thereafter refer to as ‘CCBS’) accepting the citizens’ participation. 
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Largely, people from civic and community organisations took the lead in discussing 
the issue in the CCBS. Initially, some of the Committee members still had some 
intention for a new domed stadium. After a tour of inspection abroad (in the US and 
Japan), however, their opinions easily converged on a non-domed design. One of 
the members accounted for the reason, saying that “in Japan, we looked around 
stadiums such as Hokkaido Dome and Hiroshima, and we heard some explanations 
from stadium personnel. At the end of the trip, we recognised whether the Dome 
could or could not be applied to Gwangju (author interview, 16th September 2011).” 
The most important reason is economic feasibility. He added, “The cost of the Dome 
Stadium was three times more than that of normal one. If a normal one is 10 billion 
won [about 56 million pounds], a domed one is 30 to 40 billion won. It is beyond 
Gwangju’s finance. In addition, the maintenance cost is also enormous. So the 
answer came right out…. One of the Hiroshima personnel said to me, ‘recently, there 
was no domed baseball stadium being built in the world.’ I deserve to carefully listen 
to it (ibid).”  
 
However, some Korean cities like Seoul, Busan, and Ansan are still constructing or 
having a debate over plans for a giant scale domed stadium with civic organisations. 
By contrast, now, Gwangju city authorities are building a non-domed stadium within 
their budget following the majority of public opinion. In my interviewing process, 
many interviewees were proud of such a policy switch, even city officials. A professor 
of the CCBS argued that this issue would be a clue for future urban policy in 
Gwangju, saying as follows: 
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“In spite of not securing complete success, I think we have solved major 
problems in the baseball project through communication with citizens. So I 
thought it was a great exemplar which we have achieved by actually 
guaranteeing and encouraging local people’s participation on municipal 
policy-making…. This implies to us that, at least forming an agreement with 
local people is indispensable to make a creative and good city (author 
interview, 16th September 2011)” 
 
Currently, as seen in Figure 9.4, the Gwangju authorities are constrcting a stadium 
which most local people want to have by remodelling the current stadium into a 
bigger one with an athletics track located at the side of old baseball ground. They are 
shaping a resident-friendly-stadium rather than a domed one with new town for 
private capital investors like the POSCO. Additionally, they gained a precious 
experience in how they can encourage acutual participation of the city’s population 
and reach a consensus through collaborative policy-making. 
 
Figure 9.4 Old baseball stadium (left) and new one (right) 
 
(Source: Aju-economy news, 7th June 2011) 
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We can draw a few implications from this case.  
 
Firstly, it appears that company-led public-private partnerships which can be often 
found in western place marketing have emerged in Gwangju marketing. The 
Gwangju Dome project was an attempt of the city government to develop a large-
scale new town by drawing on a private company (the POSCO), on condition that the 
city authorities will secure economic benefits for the company. Fortunately, it failed 
because of severe economic recession and growing numbers of unsold new houses. 
However, if it had been implemented, we cannot anticipate the negative results of 
not only the economic effects for citizens’ lives but also for the overall change of 
governance in urban planning in Gwangju.  
 
Secondly, we have observed that Gwangju authoritites’s efforts for hosting a series 
of mega-sporting events were caused not only by City Mayor’s (Park Gwang-tae) 
personal ambition and leadership but also by the wider context of ‘macro-necessity’ 
(Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999:149) towards entrepreneurial competition such as 
Dome Stadium construction boom and city brand ranking competition between many 
Korean cities. In particular, we could recognise a tendency that the neo-liberal 
phenomenon of ranking cities by the media and academic associations has been a 
(contextually) coercive influence in Korean cities. Thus, I want to suggest the 
phenomenon that Korean city authorities’ zero-sum competition for higher 
reputations and rankings by actively hosting promotional events and aggressively 
attracting companies and investments should be understood within the broader 
context of neo-liberalisation of cities.  
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Thirdly, like in the Yehyang (a town of traditional art) discourse (7.4) and the 
argument for a landmark (8.4) in the previous chapters, we could discover evidence 
of the city authorities’ endeavour to manipulate or mobilise public opinion in this case 
too. This is just one method of neo-liberal politicians’ and marketeers’ diverse tactics 
used when they are trying to evade conflicts in adivance that might arise from their 
marketing policy. Thus, we need to accurately recognise the essence of hidden 
political power behind the rhetoric of ‘citizen’ or ‘public opinion’ within the politics of 
place marketing. Furthermore, we should understand whose interests the place 
marketing activities of government actually often help and support and to do this, we 
should know for what the political authorities have tried to manage citizens’ opinion 
in a skilful way.  
 
9.2.4 Transfer of marketing policy: process and interpretation 
 
In the process of the Dome project, City Mayor Park asserted its need by suggesting 
advanced capitalist cities’ examples such as the Tokyo Dome in Japan and Chase 
Field in the US. This sort of city leader’s behaviour is frequently observed in other 
marketing cases. In the previous chapters (chapter 7 and 8), City Mayor Kang Un-
tae suggested Venice’s case for the Gwangju Biennale, and President Noh Mu-hyun 
noted the Pompidou Centre of France in association with the ACC. Thus, we can 
recognise that Korean city cuthorities in charge of place marketing projects have 
been typically influenced by advanced city marketing examples (whether its effect 
has been great or not). In fact, it had been already assumed by survey results since 
most Korean experts responeded that Korean cities tend to acquire marketing ideas 
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from successful examples in other cities (including domestic and overseas cases). 
Seemingly, this policy transfer can be seen as a process of rational deceion-making. 
However, it might be a superficial recognition about Korean policy transfer of place 
marketing since many political leaders like city mayor often suggest famous foreign 
examples merely because they rhetorically emphasise or legitimise marketing 
projects as their political commitment. Thus, such political suggestions have been 
frequently lacking in economic feasibility and social validity.  
 
Its effect might be suggested in following two points. Firstly, policy transfers in 
Gwangju marketing projects (the Gwangju Biennale, the Asian Culture Complex, and 
the Dome Baseball Stadium) in the thesis have been attempted in order to legitimise 
a politician’s commitment and rhetoric for their own political interest rather than to 
learn lessons for rational decision-making. In three cases, politicians just used 
famous foreign examples for their personal interests because policy makers visited 
those example cities after the politician’s political commitment. Secondly, such 
transfer might have contributed to the neo-liberalisation of Korean cities. For 
example, though many students were coercively mobilised in the Gwangju Biennale, 
it obtained the reputation of being a successful event in South Korea. Then, many 
cities have emulated the Gwangju Biennale, leading to a spring up of over 11 
competing biennales in Korean cities. In the end, it has contributed to the increase of 
entrepreneurial marketing in many cities.  
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9.3 Other maketing projects in Gwangju and their implications 
 
In addition to the previous three major projects, this section briefly explores the more 
recent and smaller scale marketing projects in Gwangju. It examines in turn the 
Urban Folly project as an architectural project and Gwangju Universiade 2015 as an 
international sports marketing event, and concludes with some of the implications of 
these current development trajectories.  
 
9.3.1 Urban Folly project 
 
In recent years, there has been a number of architectural structure designed by 
international architects here and there in the city centre within Gwangju. This is the 
Urban Folly that the Gwangju authorities launched in 2010 as a special project of the 
Design Biennale and subsequently, they have expanded it for urban regeneration 
since 2011. The Urban Folly in Gwangju has been made along the site of the 
Gwangju Eupsung (traditional town wall) which was built by the Chosun Dynasty. As 
seen in a prior section (7.2), the Gwangju Eupsoung was a representative traditional 
asset in Gwangju before Japan’s colonial regime. It was completely destroyed by the 
Japanese for their control of the local market in 1909. Like in many other examples 
of the marketing of places, the aims of the Urban Folly were not only to decorate the 
urban landscape for encouraging more visitors to come but also to internationalise 
the city’s image. To do this, the city authorities have employed world class architects 
and designers investing several million pounds into the project. However, these 
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architectural structure might not really help to beautify the cityscape since they are 
not truly congruent with local identity.  
 
Figure 9.5 Urban Folly in Gwangju61 
 
 
 
 
(Source: author’s picture, 24th September 2011) 
 
Additionally, even though they were constructed along the site of traditional town wall, 
they are never connected with its history. It seems that they are only exotic 
structures. For example, an artist criticised the project as having no connection with 
Gwangju identity and history, saying:  
                                    
61 These are the structures of designers Peter Eisenman (USA, upper left), Nader Tehrani (USA, 
upper right), Dominique Perrault (France, lower left), Alejandro Zaera Polo (Spain, lower right). 
Among them, Peter Eisenman’s work is still not completed because of shopkeeper’s opposition.  
322 
 
 
“The Urban Folly, it has many problems….. For instance, there are some 
artists who want to join in and gain some benefits, but it is just similar to the 
Street of Sculpture in Geumnam Boulevard. Of course, current things are not 
going well because neighbouring shopkeepers protest due to its covering of 
the shop’s signboards. So I don’t know why they build foreign works in 
narrow alleys like that because they don’t have Gwangju’s smell and quality, 
and don’t have any smell of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and 
Eupsung. Why do they want to do it? (author interview, a member of 
Gwangju MinYechong [Democratic Artists Group], 14th October 2011)”  
 
As observed in Figure 9.5, many Gwangju citizens are complaining that the Urban 
Folly has little harmony with city identity. However, the city authorities are 
enthusiastically absorbed in making a post-modern and international city through 
somewhat strange and exotic sculptures rather than listening to the criticisms of local 
residents. In addition, the structures directly caused some residents economic harm 
even though they were built for local economic growth and development. For 
instance, some shopkeepers in Choongjang Boulevard protested in front of the City 
Hall demanding the removal of part of the Urban Folly since the structure covered 
their signboards and led to some damage to their business. A member of a local 
broadcaster criticised the city authorities’ urban regeneration policy, sharply 
indicating its tendency for a mere display as an international city:  
 
“The Urban Folly is for urban revitalisation and they are constructing some 
structures. The city authorities told us it would improve the city’s image and 
character. But the people who sell in those places opposed it because it hid 
their shops. They said ‘Hey! Move out and go away’. So the structure in 
Choongjang Boulevard is still not completed. The purpose of it was not bad, 
but they failed to gain support from retail shop owners who were related to 
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the place of the Urban Folly. As they did it like that, they just caused some 
damage to salespeople. I think they are all Gwangju citizens, either they are 
two, or ten. So if they planned to do it, they should have considered such 
detailed things and listened to people affected by the project. But they didn’t 
do so; it was a problem. Salespeople argued that ‘if it’s not helpful for us, we 
don’t need such international sculpture or city’. For them, selling is more 
important than the policy of the ‘international cultural city of Gwangju’ since it 
is their means for earning a living (author interview, 13th September 2011).”  
 
For salespeople, they thought the project of the Urban Folly might be completely 
harmful for their economic life since it just caused their business losses. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to maintain a number of sculptures such as the Urban Folly since they 
have the possibility of damage at any time and need continuous cleaning. An 
interviewee as a city councillor in Gwangju argued that the maintenance cost of the 
Urban Folly would be much higher than that of other sculptures shaped by domestic 
artists because the Urban Folly works were made by worldwide architects. Thus, the 
international structures of the Urban Folly need much more cost and care. However, 
it is not apparent what positive effects they caused in Gwangju citizens’ lives. By 
contrast, it seems more clear what problems they brought in.  
 
9.3.2 Gwangju Universiade 2015 
 
The Summer Universiade 2015 will be held in Gwangju. Regarding the economic 
effect of the games, according to the KIEP’s (Korea Institute for International 
Economic Policy) study, the effect on production and employment inducement was 
expected to be 535 million pounds and 12,000 people. In addition, the study result 
suggested that other economically immeasurable effects such as the improvement of 
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the national and city brands and image would be enormous. A public official 
managing city marketing affairs in Gwangju emphasised the significance of the 
games in an interview with the Donga-Ilbo (newspaper), stating “Gwangju 
Universiade 2015 will be a turning point toward a bright future and taking this 
opportunity, we will show you a growing possibility of the ‘global city Gwangju’ as a 
cultural hub of the Asian continent (25th October 2010).” In this way, optimism for the 
mega-event has been overflowing among political and economic elites in Gwangju. 
Indeed, this mega-event sports game and the Dome stadium have been regularly 
items of Gwangju marketing for the City Mayor elections in Gwangju. During the 
former City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae’s government, the city authorities applied to bid 
for hosting the games, but they failed. When the bidding failed they were severely 
criticised by many citizens for their reckless decision to participate in the bidding 
without consideration of the city’s financial situation and citizens’ opinion. In 
particular, there were a number of criticisms about ambiguous expenditure related to 
hosting activities and unilaterally pushing the project. Nonetheless, the city 
authorities pushed it again several months later. A local news reporter, Hwang Hye-
yoon in Gwangju-dream described the situation as follows: 
 
“When the challenge of hosting the U game failed and led to many criticisms 
of the city authorities, they became such a wimp saying ‘we will decide a re-
challenge or not depending on the citizens’ command’. But then, they are 
attempting to shape public opinion for the re-challenge by mobilising local 
press and government-controlled organisations. Suddenly, contributions 
arguing the need for re-bidding to host the U games from personnel in such 
groups are increasing in most local papers these days (Mediaus, 26th May 
2009).”  
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She added that she opposed it since the benefits of winning the bid, in the end, 
would only be a trophy for the politicians, construction contractors and developers 
(ibid). And then, Gwangju City Council and the Chamber of Commerce supported the 
city government. They hosted a conference to explain and persuade the necessity of 
re-bidding for the U games gathering panels for it. After such complications, the re-
bidding for the event was successful for Gwangju under the current City Mayor’s 
regime, and now, Gwangju city authorities are endeavouring to prepare for it.  
 
However, their attempts might be not easy to make the games a success because 
they are facing a few serious problems. First, they might pour a large amount of 
money, so much that they cannot finance it, for hosting the successful international 
event. According to the KDI (Korea Development Institute)’s study on the economic 
validity of the games, the total cost is expected to be 465 million pounds and the city 
authorities have to input 251 million pounds at least. The money is expected to be a 
huge burden for city finances since the annual revenue of the city is only 630 million 
pounds and its local self-reliance ratio is the lowest among 6 core cities in South 
Korea62. Regarding this study result, a public official in city government explained in 
an interview with the Donga-Ilbo (newspaper) that “[due to the Summer Universiade 
2015,] probably we will be forced to downsize other fields of local budget such as 
social welfare, construction and transportation (Donga-Ilbo, 25th October 2011)”, and 
added “so, we have to expand national supporting money and create more self-
revenue from the U-games Organising Committee through selling insignia and 
improving advertisement income.” Drawing on this interview, we can understand the 
                                    
62 Fiscal self-reliance ratio is a Korean index to measure the proportion of self-source revenues to 
total budget income.  
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financial situation of Gwangju city government. There is a high possibility that the city 
authorities have no choice but to cut large amounts of money from social welfare 
services, transportation and infrastructure construction in order to host the Summer 
Universiade 2015 as an international city.  
 
This might be not only a problem for Gwangju since there are more serious 
symptoms and problems emerging in other Korean cities. For example, Incheon will 
host the Summer Asian Games in 2014. Since 2008, however, the city government’s 
deficit has grown so they could not recoup their initial investments to Free Economic 
Zones like Pudong’s Zone in Shanghai due to the recent economic recession. 
Additionally, investing much expenditure in sporting facilities and transport 
infrastructure in order to successfully host the Asian Games exacerbates the 
situation. As a result, the city authorities are facing a severe financial crisis. Then, 
many local groups in Incheon have demanded that the city authorities have to return 
the right to host the Games, which are expected to cost around 1.7 billion pounds. In 
the end, since 2011, the authorities have embarked on a variety of measures such 
as partly cutting public officials’ salaries and welfare expenditure, selling municipal 
properties, and raising public rates in order to avoid a default (Joongang-Ilbo 
[newspaper], 3rd October 2011).  
 
For another example, the Winter Olympic Games will be held in Pyeongchang in 
Kangwon province. In terms of economic resources, however, local governments 
involved in the Games are supported by central government (75% of the total 
Olympic budget) since they are short of funds to host it (Jung, 2008). Nonetheless, 
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they have invested much money to build ski facilities, golf courses, and resorts 
through their Development Corporations (ibid). Then, similarly in Incheon, they also 
face financial crises and it keeps getting worse. Since the beginning of 2012, they 
have sold their public assets. Very recently, some Korean cities including Gwangju 
are undergoing these financial difficulties from hosting mega-sports event without 
thoroughly considering the cost implications.  
 
As often observed in place marketing examples in advanced countries such as the 
US and the UK, the second problem of the U games in Gwangju is a change in the 
old areas of low income classes are being gentrified and it leads to a displacement of 
poor native dwellers. At first, the idea does not seem bad. The city authorities 
attempted to reconstruct old apartments and employed them as an athletes’ village, 
then, after the games, they intended to return them to the original apartment owners 
in order to successfully prepare athletes’ housing and simultaneously to revitalise the 
declining city centre. However, many dwellers cannot move back there because of 
the high housing price and increased rent. Rather, they are moving out to other 
poorer residences. A member of the local broadcaster criticised it in my interview, 
indicating as follows:  
 
“I think the attempt to internationalise the city by hosting the U games is a bit 
reckless. It seems that the City Mayor and officials are pushing the project 
without sincere consideration as if they are crazy for ‘internationalisation’. 
Many residents who live in the city centre were displaced out of their home 
areas by their reckless international projects. One example is an athletes’ 
village for the U games. The village is being built by the way of reconstructing 
old apartments in the urban centre and its problem is the expensive housing 
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price. At first, residents were pleased to hear the winning of the bid for the 
games because they think that they can get new housing through the 
reconstruction project. But they are disappointed now. The compensation 
money for their old property is so low while the price of new ones is very high. 
So, many of them cannot move back to their previous locations after the 
games. In addition, tenants are more serious than house owners because 
they were forced to move out with a very small amount of transition money. 
As a result, they have changed their minds and oppose the reconstruction 
project (author interview, 13th September 2011).”  
 
Currently, as the project is kept to its original plan, some low-income residents who 
live in old apartments might be expelled from their old homes. In other words, the 
international project of the city authorities started to discharge and marginalise 
people who lived peacefully in their places.  
 
We can find other examples of gentrifying phenomenon in Gwangju in recent years. 
As examined in Chapter 7, the Gwangju Biennale was a representative marketing 
activity in the city. To host the festival, city authorities built a new large-scale culture 
belt composed of the Biennale Exhibition Hall, the Folk Museum, the Gwangju 
Culture and Art Centre, the Art Museum, and Jungoe Park. It might be a catalyst for 
gentrification. For example, there was an old apartment complex (Jugong Apt in 
Unam-dong) in front of the culture belt. Now, the apartment complex has been rebuilt 
and the price of neighbouring houses rose. Probably, most low-income residents 
moved out to the area of poorer neighbourhood or to the edge of the city-region. 
According to Ki Woo-yil’s study (2008), the first block of the complex was built into 
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Lotte Nakcheondae63 apartments, but its resettlement ratio of dwellers was only 13 
per cent. In addition, 75 per cent of the previous old apartments (900/1,200) were 
small-sized (below 42 square metres) units which low-income people can afford to 
live in. After the reconstruction, however, all new apartments (1,490) were above 76 
square metres and among them 569 units turned into very large (148 square metres) 
and were expensive for Gwangju. Subsequently, their prices dramatically rose from 
28,000 pounds to 150,000 pounds and the prices of neighbouring houses also highly 
rose.  
 
In short, recently, many old apartments around the area of the Biennale Exhibition 
Hall and its culture belt have been transformed into more luxurious residences 
appropriate for affluent migrants. As a result, many native people who had lived in 
there might have to move out to look for cheaper houses on the edge or in niche 
area of the city-region.  
 
As seen in these examples, mega-projects for place marketing tend to entail creative 
destruction of landscapes. Here, as Harvey (2010:176) argues, the problem is that 
such creative destruction towards neo-liberalisation of cities and its subsequent 
urban restructuring usually have a class dimension. In other words, the neo-liberal 
diverse marketing of places to create an international and fashionable city is often 
attended with the sacrifice and suffering of the poor. It is not clear whether the effect 
of marketing projects for the ‘global city’ is economically good or not to its residents. 
However, we can find out that such projects resulted in soaring housing prices and 
                                    
63 It is a brand name composed of Chinese characters, which means that it is the highest place with a 
happy and cozy paradise. Judging by its meaning, we can guess the apartments targeted middle and 
higher-income classes as consumers. 
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displacement of low-income dwellers through the previous examples. We can 
identify that more luxurious residences for affluent classes replace their old places 
even though such a process is not the same as that in the gentrification of Western 
cities. Additionally, as observed in the U games in Gwangju, we can recognise 
mega-events might cause budget cuts to social services and welfare for local 
residents.  
 
 
9.4 Summary 
 
It seems that the Dome Baseball Stadium was planned because of a city leader’s 
political ambition (the City Mayor’s re-election). However, it was not caused only by 
City Mayor’s personal interest. Rather, I suggest that such city political leader’s 
strategy and leadership should be examined within the wider context such as Dome 
boom and inter-urban competition for gaining a higher city reputation. Thus, we 
might conclude that the Dome Baseball project was caused maninly by the context of 
the increasing pressure and imperatives of competition between Korean cities 
because not only Gwagnju but also other Korean cities made efforts to construct 
domed baseball stadium, to host mega-sporting events, and to obtain a higher city 
brand ranking. 
 
The city authorities needed a large amount of money since the aim of the project 
was to build a mega-scale new town with the Dome Stadium. It led them into a 
partnership with a private company (the POSCO). In the face of the economic 
recession due to the global financial crisis of 2008, the project was defeated because 
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of POSCO’s rejection of it. It resulted in Park’s failure at re-election as City Mayor. 
By examining this case, we might recognise that Gwangju marketing projects have 
been often shaped and influenced by political elites’ interests rather than by some of 
the critical issues related to the improvement of resident’s quality of life. Another 
important point of this example was to emerge as a recent symptom of Western 
marketing such as a private-led partnership between the city authorities and the 
POSCO which we have never seen in Gwangju marketing policies. There are other 
projects like the Urban Folly and the Summer Universiade 2015 in Gwangju which 
slightly resemble the characteristics of Western marketing. These could enable us to 
find out some of the social and political implications for place marketing. Firstly, local 
historic components are often employed as urban decoration within the context of 
the city marketing strategy. In the Urban Folly, though world class architecture was 
built along with the site of the Gwangju traditional town wall, they were only global 
artistic ornaments with no association to local place identity. As Kearns and Philo 
(1993:5) argue, the meaning of history in selling places led by a small number of city 
elites in neo-liberalised contemporary cities is very restricted and is quite different 
from that of other peoples. Secondly, we can identify a gentrified city centre for the 
international U games in Gwangju. As a result, some low-income residents were 
forced to move out of the area into other poorer residences and it might lead to a 
symptom of social and spatial polarisation in the city. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Way Forward 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
It seems that urban place marketing lies at an intersecting point of urban economic 
development and growth; the revitalisation of declining localities; cultural and 
historical components of such places; and the daily life of residents. There are two 
different perspectives on how policies of place marketing are evolving – place-based 
place marketing and marketing science-based. Every place has its own meaning 
drawn from culture and history, and interests around such places are also various. 
As in many local development projects, the meanings of place marketing are the 
product of a very complicated political process. However, a marketing science-based 
approach is a pragmatic way through which we focus on identifying the mental state 
of consumers who have purchasing power, and make an attempt to build an 
emotional relationship with them for their further consumption. Thus, such an 
approach has inherent limits in understanding the characteristics of Korean place 
marketing and the changing political context of it. Therefore, in the thesis, the 
perspective of emphasising aspects of place within place marketing was adopted to 
examine the evolving political context of urban place marketing in South Korea. 
Within the process, discourses and meaning-making of diverse actors were 
intensively analysed by a mixed use of multi-scalar and cultural politics approach as 
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we might assume that place is socially constructed and can be interpreted in a 
number of ways depending upon its related actors’ world views. 
 
The thesis investigated the changing political process of some marketing projects 
which are currently unfolding in Gwangju, South Korea. Specifically, the thesis 
sought to shed some light on this issue by analysing the evolving political context of 
place marketing within the broad transformation to neo-liberalisation in contemporary 
Korean cities. As observed in the case study of Gwangju from chapter seven to nine, 
employing a multi-scalar approach together with cultural politics one discloses the 
dynamics of the political context around its diverse dimensions and levels. In addition, 
as discussed, the political context of South Korea and its changing terrain of urban 
policy process are not same as those of Western cities. However, through the 
empirical evidence of the thesis, a more important finding, which we should take a 
careful look at, is that there might be a specific common trend between Western and 
Korean cities - an increasing deepening of uneven development in the process of 
place marketing policies. Within the context of this macro-level, now, Korean cities 
and their residents are facing a critical time that they have to choose whether to 
follow the way that Western cities went or not. 
 
Some essential arguments on research topics which were discussed in the previous 
9 chapters are very briefly summarised in the next section. Then, the third section 
examines the contribution of the thesis to academic knowledge. In the fourth one, I 
make a few suggestions to Korean politicians and policy makers for their 
improvement of urban policy, because it may be a social responsibility of mine as an 
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intellectual and public policy marker in South Korea. Finally, there is a brief 
evaluation and the limitation of the research, and a discussion of the direction for 
further research within this area of study. 
 
 
10.2 Main study results on research topics 
 
The thesis has dealt with the following five research topics through an expert survey 
and case study in South Korea: the reason why Korean city leaders have passion for 
place marketing projects; the characteristics of Korean place marketing and its 
Western- and Japanese-biased view; the existence of other people’s perspectives 
differentiated from dominant people’s on place marketing in Gwangju; the evolving 
process of Korean place marketing within the political context; and the social and 
political implications of this research for changing Korean place marketing.  
 
The reason why Korean city leaders have a passion for place marketing 
projects 
 
There might be various explanations about the reasons for Korean city leaders’ love 
for place marketing. However, the phenomenon is not only in South Korea, we can 
easily find it in many contemporary cities. Thus, one of the most important reasons 
suggested in the thesis is the globally neo-liberalised urban policy environment in 
contemporary cities. That might be closely connected with the essential 
characteristics of place marketing since, as Kearns and Philo’s (1993) argue, place 
marketing policies are often harmonious with the interests of political and economic 
elites. Indeed, during the last three decades, we have identified, in particular, the 
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process by which neoliberal marketing has been persistently diffused into the public 
sphere beyond market field. As already known in our society, one of the most 
important missions in the neo-liberal state is to build a good climate for business. 
Thus, the nation states have endeavoured to create the economic, social and 
cultural conditions for capital accumulation rather than for historic value, employment, 
housing, and social inclusion. In the field of urban policy, place marketing projects 
have been politically influenced by neo-liberal ideology and on the contrary, they 
have played a major role in the spreading of neo-liberal material effects, specifically 
more in urban space, such as gentrification, displacement, and spatial polarisation 
(Eisenschitz, 2010). The thesis suggested that an early symptom of such 
phenomenon might be discovered in Korean cities. In many examples, it has 
resulted from municipal political elites’ interests like Mayoral re-election.  
 
The characteristics of Korean place marketing 
 
Within the macro-context of place marketing, we might feel that Korean city 
marketing is little different from that of advanced cities’ since Korean marketing has 
rapidly moved toward entrepreneurial one. However, if we take a close look it, we 
could find a few distinctive characteristics. A few different features of Korean place 
marketing examined in the study are as follows. Firstly, Korean city marketing is less 
private-led than Western projects. Particularly in Gwangju, such a type of marketing 
has been introduced in recent years. Rather, some political city leaders such as the 
mayor are more active in employing the strategy of place marketing than business 
groups because of their political aims. The second point is related to the first in that 
Korean place marketing has often been much more influenced by political leaders’ 
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interests. In the thesis, we could identify the fact in some examples such as the 
Asian Culture Complex, the Dome Baseball Project, and Gwangju Universiade 2015.  
 
With regard to this, we can identify some facts about what makes city leaders in 
South Korea favour and ardently follow Western-biased place marketing in the thesis. 
According to my expert survey about Korean place marketing, most of the 
respondents thought political leaders actively introduced and referred to successful 
cases while they usually did not do this with failures. Many numbers of experts did 
not formally inform the public about bad examples and problems even though they 
knew of them. As a result, it might be evidence to express their biased behaviour to 
advanced examples of place marketing. Furthermore, it might influence many city 
leaders and policy makers in Korean cities to have Western- and Japanese-biased 
thought.  
 
In addition, for city leaders in Korean cities, they might be good models within the 
wider context of coercive force such as increased pressure of inter-urban 
competition by which to persuade citizens who oppose place marketing projects. 
Consequently, it seems connected to a tendency for homogeneity in the marketing of 
cities. As Eisenshitz (2010:84) argues, ‘a successful example inevitably breeds 
clones’ in place marketing. Many British cities have learned some of the law of 
success and growth myth in culture-led urban regeneration and place marketing from 
American cities (Evans, 2001; Hall, 2006). Likewise, Gwangju city leaders have 
endeavoured to follow and imitate the ‘success formula’ of advanced Western and 
Japanese cities shaping a cultural mix of concert halls and museums, domed stadia, 
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conference centres, and international aesthetic architecture in the city. Such copying 
behaviours have been endemic to urban places under a simplified global frame of ‘to 
compete with other cities in a global era’ and could be currently witnessed in many 
cities in South Korea. Thus, they might make diverse places into undifferentiated 
ones since they would apply very similar ways of promotion from principles in 
marketing science.  
 
The existence of other people’s visions and meanings in Gwangju marketing 
 
Within the process of Gwangju marketing, the rosy view on place marketing is 
usually dominant, however, also in Gwangju, we can identify other views on cultural 
marketing of places in city centre. In general, marketing science studies tend to 
assume the fact that place marketing strategies result in local economic 
development and growth through ardently attempting “to identify, articulate and 
mediate the ‘unique selling propositions’ of locations (Julier, 2005:869)”. However, in 
reality, such marketing and branding programmes automatically cannot bring local 
economic growth. Rather, in the thesis, I argue that there is little definite evidence for 
such an assumption.  
 
Additionally, in many cases, governments (whether they are central or urban) often 
tried to hide or dilute the ‘real’ values and meanings of many residents’ on place 
marketing projects. City authorities tend to situate other peoples’ visions on the city 
at the margin or outside of the discussion, simultaneously, creating a dominant, but 
manipulative, discursive frame on the reality. These dominant frames exclude other 
visions and meanings, strategically and rhetorically emphasising only specific 
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aspects of places (McCann, 2003). As a result, the politics of place can be 
understood within a process of conflicting and compromising various actor’s political 
frames and meanings. And also, we can clearly recognise a specific actor’s frames 
and meanings through inter-relation with other actors’ ones (Marston, 2000; McCann, 
2003). In addition, as McCann (2002:379) suggests, analyses of the cultural politics 
of local economic development, whether in the visions of dominants’ or others’, 
provide us with the opportunity to better recognise ‘strategies of power’ (Mitchell, 
1995:110) around the production of local space economies. It is the same in the 
politics of place marketing in which different scaled actors are involved since 
representing a place image within multi-scaled spaces is also the arena of conflicting 
power and social relations. However, it is so difficult for marketing science-oriented 
place marketers to find out such as political context. 
 
The evolving process of place marketing policy within the political context 
 
With regard to the evolution of place marketing, drawing on the perspective of 
marketing science, Kavaratzis (2007) argues that it has been changed from simple 
fragmented promotion activities of places to systematic place marketing strategies 
based on management science, and then to more holistic place branding techniques 
in recent years. However, such a change of promotional activities might not be 
essential since their promotional and entrepreneurial nature is very similar. They 
have changed a bit in their names and business techniques, but they all have a key 
common inclination for a specific class or group such as the city’s political leaders, 
business elites, and high income individuals. From this view, place marketing can be 
only a pragmatic and technical one to induce affluent customers to spend and to 
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serve the political and economic elite’s interests. Thus, I argue that place marketing 
is political since it is often inseparably associated with neo-liberal political settlement 
replacing places of the working or low-income classes with ones of new middle 
classes or affluent people (Eisenschitz, 2010). Therefore, its evolution should be also 
examined through changes of the political context rather than by manipulative 
improvements of marketing technique.  
 
Indeed, in the thesis, we can identify a few examples in Gwangju marketing policies 
that differently scaled actors have socially constructed and reconstructed within 
diverse power relations. In particular, we can recognise that Gwangju images have 
been politically formed by not only local inward relations but also broader relations 
with different scales.  
 
The socio-political implications of place marketing in Gwangju 
 
Korean place marketing does not share all the same features as that of post-
industrial cities in advanced countries. However, several similar signs were 
discovered in recent attempts at marketing Gwangju. In other words, even though 
Gwangju had different experiences of industrialisation and urbanisation, Western 
type neo-liberal symptoms of uneven development have gradually emerged in 
Gwangju marketing policy. These days, many city authorities are investing their 
citizens’ taxes in order to create spectacular landmarks. Of course, the iconic 
Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is already acknowledged as a well-known success 
case in Gwangju. As examined in Chapters 8 to 10, some symptoms of neo-liberal 
place marketing such as commercialised historic values, gentrification and 
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displacement, diffusing ornamental city architecture, and social polarisation has also 
gradually emerged in Gwangju. Thus, we might conclude some Korean cities like 
Gwangju have moved toward neo-liberalisation through place marketing strategies. 
We can recognise that, in the process, some pheonema such as increased urban 
competitiveness under globalisation, the active use of cultural means, and 
westernised policy transfer from advanced cities have also contributed to the neo-
liberalisation of Gwangju in association with place marketing policies. It would, 
however, be a major concern if the Gwangju city authorities give little attention to the 
wide-ranging negative effects that neo-liberal marketing projects of places have on 
the local residents since it can lead to a huge inequality and disintegration in the city 
(Eisenschitz, 2010).  
 
Original ‘real’ history and culture which comprise the place identity of Gwangju have 
been transformed into aesthetic ornaments for local growth and urban regeneration. 
To shape an international cultural hub city, authorities demolished the historic JPH 
(even though not completely) as a symbol of the Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement. For the Movement’s victims, the building was the place where their 
missing husbands and sons struggled and died against military dictatorship. And 
also, for them, the place was a space for memory which had reminded them of their 
dead family members in daily life, but it was torn down. Many shopkeepers might still 
endure strange architectural structures within which we cannot recognise their local 
place identity, in the name of local growth. For them, the places where the Urban 
Follly was established were spaces which they had employed as signboards to make 
a living. To be an international city, many low-income people who lived in Jugong 
341 
 
apartments (to be transformed into an athlete’s village for Summer Universiade 
2015) in Hwajung-dong are marginalised to the edge or out of town. For the 
residents, the places were shelters where they peacefully lived, enjoyed and slept 
with their family. These places were once spaces for their everyday lives.  
 
However, they are rapidly being reshaped for the global, tourism hub, and icon of 
cultural industry: Gwangju in Asia. In addition, some symptoms of neo-liberal 
Western marketing such as the private capital-led governance in the Dome Baseball 
project, have emerged in Gwangju, and many place marketing projects in Gwangju 
have developed to resemble Western marketing. Though they often promoted the 
interests of political and economic elites, they were rhetorically described as 
strategies for all residents. Thus, now, as we observe the material results of Western 
place marketing projects during the last two or three decades, Korean city leaders 
and policy makers should be given ‘real’ lessons rather than simply be transferred a 
programmed, often speculative and transitory principle of success. We also should 
re-consider the success stories of advanced cities as to whether they really create 
positive effects for all their population. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn to contribute to improving the place-marketing 
policies of Korean cities? To briefly sum up, this thesis suggested that Korean place 
marketing policies have moved towards neo-liberalisation, typically seen in Western 
advanced cities, and it is a very worrying sign for Korean cities. In addition, the thesis 
suggested that an approach from the perspective of politics can be more effective 
than a marketing-centred one in order to trace such evolving power relations. 
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Through this approach, I revealed the fact that there has been a tendency for Korean 
place marketing policies to often strongly depend on the political elite’s interest. Thus, 
most conclusions that I have found or inferred about place marketing projects 
suggest they might have negative effects.  
 
However, there may be some doubts in relation to these critical conclusions. For 
example, some people might trust the positive function of place marketing strategies 
since they are sensitive to success stories. It might enable them to argue the future 
of place marketing will never be negative. Someone might criticise the political 
approach on the evolution of place marketing which the thesis has employed 
because it is not useful to suggest pragmatic alternatives. The next section will deal 
with a discussion about these issues.  
 
 
10.3 Discussion 
 
Evaluation on the impacts of place marketing projects 
 
There is an argument for an appropriate place marketing strategy as some cities 
successfully seek to revitalise their declining inner cities. These proponents tend to 
concretise one or more of the following terms: pro-growth, pro-globalism, pro-
corporate, business-friendly governance, privatisation and anti-government 
regulation (Bitterman, 2008:11). They typically argue for place marketing help for city 
leaders and policy makers in order for them to form and suggest successful future 
visions of the city. For instance, in relation to the ACC case in chapter 8, some might 
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argue that Gwangju citizens must have a landmark cultural facility like the 
Gugennheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain to ensure urban economic development.  
 
However, drawing on the findings of the thesis, success should not only be 
evaluated by economic value.  
 
Firstly, it seems there is little need for the city authority to situate the ACC where 
they have, at the great sacrifice of destroying the old JPH as the historic site of the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement. We can think of other possible alternatives 
that would enable the central and city governments to construct the ACC elsewhere, 
thus conserving the historic site of democratic resistance. If not, they should have 
modified the ACC’s architectural design scheme along with completely preserving 
the old JPH.  
 
Secondly, the economic effect of the ACC suggested by politicians and public 
officials is very uncertain and suspicious in terms of its long-term results; its impact 
tends to just be ephemeral. Regarding state’s economic projects towards neo-
liberalisation, Harvey (2005:156) indicates that a few successful cases like Japan 
and the Asian ‘tigers’ (such as Hong-Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) of 
the 1980s and West Germany of the 1990s might hide a general failure for improving 
economic growth and welfare. Likewise, it seems place marketing policies in cities 
have often accomplished very unsatisfactory outcomes rather than secured 
economic success as the rhetoric suggested since its success might be transitory 
due to other cities’ rapid replication or emulation. Rather, some prestige projects 
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have shown negative effects on their cities by virtue of their excessive scale and 
speculative financing. Some of them have resulted in the financial poverty of city 
authorities and growing taxes for the city population.  
 
Thirdly, another important point of the thesis is that neo-liberal place marketing 
projects tend to severely erode the precious spiritual values, meanings, ideologies, 
and world views of city residents. According to Gramscian expression, neo-liberal 
place marketing policies have been diffused into the public’s cultural common-sense 
through slogans, language, and meanings. Then, their results might be to protect 
and strengthen the political and economic interests of city elites. The intention of the 
thesis is not to argue that there is no need for place marketing policies but to indicate 
that place marketing policies may not be universially successful. And also, the thesis 
sought to suggest some empirical evidence that they have often been employed in 
an uncritical manner. Consequently, we might recognise that place marketing 
strategies typically work as a significant catalyst for the neo-liberalisation of Korean 
cities like Gwangju.  
 
Usefulness of the political approach on the evolution of place marketing 
 
This thesis argues the character of place marketing policy and its evolving process is 
political rather than pragmatic. Regarding this argument, some may criticise it since 
the political approach is weak in suggesting practical tools and techniques for place 
marketing and branding. However, I want to suggest that a political approach’s effort 
to comprehensively understand the political context is much more important than 
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such a pragmatic approach, as it can closely scrutinise the nature of the marketing 
problems in cities. If we concentrate on only the efficiency of marketing projects, 
outside the social and political relations in urban places, it could ultimately reinforce 
the currently dominant interests of political city leaders and business elites. Recently, 
even though some authors from a marketing science perspective assert that place 
branding is now a more evolved area of knowledge and not just concerned with 
catchy slogans and new logos (Kavaratzis, 2007:703), Bitterman (2008:266) says 
that, “[c]ontemporary place brands are simply a concerted effort of place-making 
activities framed by a ‘slick’ logo, colo[u]r scheme, and promoted aggressively, and 
are not in fact, anything new.” Thus, a purely theoretical examination of marketing 
science as to how strategies of place marketing have evolved apart from social 
practices and contexts in reality might be an empty and fictitious interpretation. In 
this context, Chomsky’s following argument on the intellectual’s social responsibility 
is worthy of keeping in mind. 
 
“It is not difficult for members of the university community to delude 
themselves into believing that they are maintaining a ‘neutral-value-free’ 
position when they are simply responding to demands set elsewhere. In fact 
to do so is a political decision, namely to ratify the existing distribution of 
power, authority and privilege in the society at large and to take on a 
commitment to reinforce it (Chomsky, 1969 [This version is excerpted out of 
Chomsky, ‘For Reasons of State (1972)’]).” 
 
In this respect, thus, I argue that the literature of place marketing has more social 
relevance. A similar argument might be that neo-classical economists barely capture 
and suggest to us the fundamental reason for the global financial crisis, since they 
are absorbed in market principle-centred theory in Economics. As Brenner and 
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Theodore (2002) emphasize to examine ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, in contrast 
with theoretical ideology, I argue that we should look at and investigate ‘actually 
existing place marketing’ rather than superficial place marketing as a thoroughly 
scientific theory. In doing so, I hope the political approach to the evolution of place 
marketing in this thesis will be a contribution in this regard by developing socially 
relevant theories of place marketing.  
 
Another issue is whether the political approach can provide pragmatic tools and 
techniques for solving urban ills by offering advice to place marketing practitioners. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, it seemed the many city authorities and marketing 
professionals in Western advanced countries viewed place marketing as a panacea 
for all urban problems at once. However, it might not be possible to invent tools as 
complete solutions for city problems since those problems are interconnected and 
interwoven with each other and are continually changing over time. In addition, we 
are not sure contemporary cities have enough resources to solve them. Furthermore, 
as observed in the above chapters, neo-liberal ideology is not restricted to city elites. 
It has permeated into our daily life and thus, many city policy makers and even some 
residents have been affected by the mind-set of neo-liberalism. Providing solutions 
for urban problems can be drawn by precisely recognizing their nature. This might be 
a starting point for Korean policy makers to understand the serious urban situation 
within their own evolving political context. I sincerely hope that my endeavour to 
search for the changing political nature of place marketing might be a small help for 
Korean cities increasingly facing diverse problems from the wider political and 
economic conditions like neo-liberal transformation. 
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10.4 Key contribution to knowledge 
 
Concerning this thesis’s major contribution, five points can be suggested. 
 
Firstly, this thesis added a contribution to the literature of critical research about 
place marketing by undertaking a detailed examination of several Korean place 
marketing policies from a critical perspective. The existing Korean literature of place 
marketing has usually paid attention to a programmed success principle or to 
superficial economic effects since it was typically on the basis of pragmatic 
marketing science and behavioural approaches. There are few studies from a critical 
perspective in South Korea. Against the backdrop of a dominant technocratic and 
instrumentalist policy in South Korea, I have tried to offer a more critical and deeper 
interrogation of the causes and consequences of the place marketing policies. In 
addition, this study suggested some problems about marketing science approaches 
related to not only its methodological problems like pragmatic and value-free but also 
its exacerbating role of the zero-sum game between cities and homogenisation of 
places, its ephemeral results. Thus, this thesis contributed to enrich the critical 
literature of place marketing not only in the UK but also in South Korea, by carefully 
indicating a neo-liberal tendency of place marketing in contemporary cities.  
 
Secondly, this research examines a Western urban policy agenda at work in an 
Asian (specifically Korean) context and in so doing might contribute new sights into 
West to Asia policy transfers and mutations. The thesis introduced Korean urban 
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marketing to a Western-based academy. Even though some marketing projects of 
Asian countries such as Singapore, Japan and Malaysia have been introduced to the 
UK, there have been very few studies about the evolution of Korean urban place 
marketing policy. In particular, the case of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement 
and the Gwangju marketing projects has been rarely introduced in the UK.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis might give new insights into the Western-base academy 
since it is the first critical attempt to deeply investigate the political evolution of 
Gwangju marketing policies in a Korean (Gwangju) context. The perspective of 
‘others’ represented by Koreans might give some criticisms on the literature of 
Western-oriented place marketing since Gwangju marketing has evolved within the 
context of complicated legacies of colonial and authoritarian developmental state. 
Thus, some examples in Gwangju marketing (such as pseudo-local growth coalition 
of ‘Gigaehyeop’) might be used to make a broader argument in line with the 
emerging postcolonial critiques of urban theory and can also be used as an example 
of ‘variegated capitalism’. As a result, this research might provide a useful basis from 
which to address the gap in understanding non-Western place marketing policies.  
 
Thirdly, the thesis also added a contribution to the literature on the neo-liberal shift in 
urban politics at diverse scales and in diverse places. It has attempted to confirm the 
fact that the phenomenon of neo-liberalisation has influenced not just specific 
countries or areas, but has had a global reach. We could trace such neo-liberal 
tendency not only in Western countries but also in East-Asian countries like South 
Korea through the case study of Gwangju. The existing Western perspectives on 
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neo-liberalisation of urban place marketing are not sufficient to comprehensively 
understand the changing context of non-Western city marketing projects. In addition, 
there have been abundant studies usually employing a global-oriented approach on 
neo-liberalisation in the existing literature, however, this thesis deeply examined 
such macro phenomena in association with the process of an individual city’s spatial 
restructuring and evolving place marketing projects.  
 
Fourthly, in terms of methodology, this study operationalises a strategic relational 
methodlogy in a way which stimulates reflection on how relational methodologies 
might be operaltionalised in contemporary urban geography more generally. It was 
conducted by an operational using of nationwide expert panel survey and a detaied 
case study based on a mixture of multi-scalar and cultural politics approaches. 
Through this relational approach, this research might present the possibilities of 
using expert surveys as a means of being able to operationalise calls for more 
relational understandings of urban politics, and mixed the two approaches of multi-
scalar and cultural politics, which enabled me to multi-dimensionally examine the 
changing political context of marketing policies in detail. These approaches might be 
helpful to gain a relational understanding and deeply investigate diverse interactions 
of local political actors in the thesis.  
 
Particularly, regarding the mixture of two approaches, multi-scalar approach was 
useful to relationally investigate the changing process of local growth politics at a 
multi-level, since the urban politics of place marketing is not confined to a certain 
single scale such as a local one but is expressed as a complicated consequence of 
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interplay among different scales, including related national contexts and global 
processes. In addition, it offered a helpful means to explore contingent and 
situational relations and discursive frames within political conflict, co-ordination and 
power distribution between diverse policy actors. For the thesis, the cultural politics 
approach was also valuable, particularly from the perspective of non-elites, to 
understand contested meanings, which were not often uncovered by a superficial 
examination, around place marketing projects in Gwangju. A mixture of those two 
approaches can offer a way of investigating the dynamic of contestation, conflict, and 
struggle between diverse actors’ strategies, images, and meanings. As such it 
presents a useful lens through which to deeply understand the actual political context 
of diverse urban marketing strategies.  
 
The fifth major contribution of this empirical study is linking place marketing in South 
Korea with an urban political approach, in order to provide us with a deeper 
explanation and understanding for the evolution of place marketing in Korean cities. 
Indeed, most previous work on place marketing in South Korea has a narrow 
perspective since it has tended to be based on marketing science. Understanding 
the changing political context of urban place marketing is a long neglected area in 
South Korea. Thus, I think my study will be useful for Korean researchers who have 
an intention to politically explore Korean place marketing. In addition, I think many 
Korean authors still have a broadly positive interpretation of advanced cities’ place 
marketing, especially in the US, the UK, and Japan. However, this research might 
give them an opportunity to review Korean literature from a purely Korean 
perspective, and it is critical about Western place marketing.  
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Sixthly, the discussion on memory of politics in chapter 8 was rich, and it might have 
some potential to bring something new to the literature on place marketing. Drawing 
on Assman’s theory of cultural memory (transmission of ‘objectivized meaning 
beyond simple collective memory of a group), I argue that Gwangju Democratisation 
Movement’s collective memory has gradually developed into a cultural memory 
through citizens’ and artists’ diverse activities such as ‘Daedong’ (distribution and 
solidarity)-themed artistic works, pictures, films, and some informal ceremonies. 
Through unfinished resistant activities of Gwangju marketing example, I suggested 
the potential of how we can examine place marketing in association with the politics 
of memory.  
 
 
10.5 Policy suggestion for South Korea 
 
Some may argue that, over the last 30 years, Western place marketing projects in 
advanced capitalist countries have been successful in transforming their industrial 
image to post-industrial one. Nonetheless, it is very doubtful that the material and 
social results of such marketing projects in the long term have been successful for all 
their residents. Rather, they could be seen to have stimulated a further uneven 
development and social inequality in the city. Since the global economic crisis of 
2008, there has been an argument as to whether the Western neo-liberal model of 
place marketing will develop or not (Eisenschitz, 2010). Thus, it is a good time for 
Korean policy makers to critically review and reconsider their orientation towards 
using marketing examples from advanced capitalist cities as best practice.  
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Since the 1970s, South Korea has been often cited as a good example of a 
developmental state in terms of economic growth (Harvey, 2005). As we have seen, 
in urban marketing terms it has been greatly dependent upon foreign examples from 
advanced capitalist countries. We could even term this a catch-up strategy in the 
field of urban policy. However, now, it appears that this strategy has reached a limit 
in the pursuit of economic growth. Hitherto, Korean city policy makers might expect 
good performance to imitate or emulate the successful examples of advanced cities’, 
and this approach has led to the very rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of 
South Korea. However, now, I think such practice in urban policy should be changed 
since it might result in a transformation which typically exacerbates social 
inequalities. I want to suggest in the thesis that Korean policy makers should 
consider how neo-liberal (market-centred) place marketing projects really help to 
make their citizens’ daily lives better, and they have to reflect on them further and 
create new alternatives for more democratic and collective urban society in the policy 
process. In a sense, it appears that many Korean city authorities find themselves 
challenged with balancing their need to learn from real implications and lessons of 
cities in advanced countries while avoiding reckless emulation of managerial 
success principles.  
 
The evolution of place marketing might have different features in different cities and 
countries. However, I have also found commonality within the wider transformation 
towards neo-liberalisation. We need to firmly recognise that neo-liberal place 
marketing policies frequently promote uneven and contradictive urban development 
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such as gentrification at the expense of low-income and working class people. One 
of my intentions is to draw some attention to this for policy makers in South Korea, 
and I hope it will lead to a thorough reconsideration of current place marketing 
strategies in their cities. Many Korean policy makers in cities have still paid attention 
to place marketing based on marketing science approach. Unfortunately, however, 
this will lead to the pitfall of homogenisation, and polarisation in its social effect. If 
Harvey’s argument, in his book <A Brief History of Neo-liberalism>, that ‘neo-
liberalism is recognised as a failed utopian rhetoric masking a successful project for 
the restoration of ruling-class power (Harvey, 2005:203)’ is true in the contemporary 
urban policies of Korean cities, Korean city leaders and policy makers should rapidly 
turn their marketing policies to more egalitarian and collective political values. 
 
Therefore, in relation to Gwangju’s case in the thesis, Korean policy makers need to 
excavate and expand their citizens’ collective values like the ‘Daedong (distribution 
and solidarity)’ spirit, which meant voluntarily distributing their food and blood and 
mutually co-operating with each other at a difficult time within the city. In so doing, 
Korean city leaders and policy makers should approach local issues with an open 
mind. Then, I suggest that they need to democratically make more collective urban 
policies linked to their residents’ daily lives and encourage citizen participation. 
 
 
10.6 Direction of future research 
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The thesis has shown how Korean place marketing has evolved especially focused 
on Gwangju, and how the policies of Korean place marketing has increasingly 
moved towards the features of Western neo-liberal ones, albeit within a Korean 
context. However, the approach of my study cannot explain all practices of evolving 
place marketing in Korean cities. It just offers one lens to investigate the politics of 
the place marketing process. Thus, despite my earnest endeavour in the process of 
the research, this study still has some gaps which future research should fill in.  
 
Firstly, the limit of the expert survey can be indicated. In other words, there might be 
a problem caused from using a certain sample population for the survey since the 
survey in the thesis was confined to a Korean expert group from the area of place 
marketing policy. The perception of an expert is often not the same as that of the 
general population. Thus, future survey studies on Korean place marketing need a 
broader range of sample. For instance, possible future research on Korean place 
marketing might include general people such as residents. It might provide us with 
more trustworthy results in order to identify overall trends of Korean place marketing. 
Secondly, there is a difficulty in the generalisation of my findings from Gwangju. This 
is always a weak point of any case study, although Gwangju has offered an 
extensive example of urban place marketing. However, it might be not enough and 
other case studies from across South Korea would be beneficial. 
 
Nonetheless, this study has presented a national-scale expert survey, an extensive 
case study and varied documentary analysis. Findings from this research have 
enabled us to identify overall and common trends within Korean place marketing. 
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Through these mixed methods, the thesis has provided empirical insights into the 
political context of evolving urban marketing policies in South Korea. 
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Appendix 1. Research Consent Form 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT: The Evolution of Place Marketing 
 
PURPOSE OF STUDY: The purpose of this study is to explore how Korean place 
marketing is distinct from that in western cities and examine whether there are evolutionary 
processes of place marketing strategy. In particular, the researcher wants to investigate the 
changing structures and nature of urban governance in order to see how this has affected 
place marketing. In addition, the investigator wants to examine how western policies relating 
to place marketing are transferred to South Korea and what their effects are. The thesis will 
critically examine policy practices of Korean city marketing in which politicians and policy 
practitioners import western experiences. It could improve academic understanding of urban 
place marketing by comparative study between countries. Further, it could help Korean 
policy makers to have more balanced views of the nature and effect of place marketing.  
 
PROCEDURES: This study will require short interviews from key persons involved in place 
marketing and urban development in Gwangju in South Korea. The interviews will be 
recorded by a digital voice recorder. Recorded files will be heard by the investigator to assist 
in analysing information for the purpose of the study described. All identifying information 
will be deleted from files. Furthermore, the files will be used solely for the purposes above in 
accordance with the ethical standards of confidentiality that govern geographical research. 
All files will be destroyed within two years of completion of the study. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: The information participants provide which is recorded will be 
annonymised. All information will be identified by an identification code, not by their name. 
The participants name or other identifying information will never be associated with any 
research reports or publications that use the results of the interviews. 
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RISKS: The researcher will strictly observe the 
University ethical guidelines to protect informant’s confidentiality and privacy. No risks are 
known to the investigator at this time. 
 
WITHDRAWAL / INVITATION TO ASK FURTHER QUESTIONS: All participants 
are voluntary, they may discontinue at any time. Participants should ask any questions they 
have concerning this study before they sign the consent form. 
 
CONSENT: I provide my informed consent to participate in this study. I have read and 
understood the consent form. Upon signing below, I will receive a copy of the consent form 
from the study investigator.  
 
 
(Name)             (Signature)                      (Date)  
(Name)             (Supervisor)                     (Date)  
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Appendix 2. Survey Questions 
 
 
 
 
Expert survey for a study on the evolution of  
Urban place marketing in South Korea 
 
 
 
Dear respondent,  
 
Hello, my name is Myungseop LEE. I am currently undertaking research for a PhD 
at the University of Exeter. My research is investigating ‘The evolution of urban 
place marketing policy’, and is supervised by Prof. Mark Goodwin in the Geography 
Department.  
  
 This expert survey aims to examine the overall trends of the evolutionary process of 
Korean urban place marketing. I would like to focus on identifying broad changes 
during last a few decades in South Korea and exploring the characteristics of Korean 
urban place marketing.  
 
All your answers will be only used for this academic research and I will absolutely 
promise not to utilize them for other purpose. I really express my gratitude to your 
consideration and time in advance.  
 
February 2011 
 
Researcher: Myungseop LEE (Supervisor: Mark Goodwin) 
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1. What do you think of the most preferable activity in each time as urban place 
marketing tool during the 1990s and the present (2011), please write answers 
in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
 
A. Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum 
B. Active promotion and advertising city 
C. Holding festivals and events 
D. Developing and selling local product 
E. City branding (e.g. High Seoul) 
F. Attracting companies and inward investments 
 
 
2. What do you think about the most important background to the emergence of 
place marketing in Korea? (       ) 
 
 
A. The response of local government in order to overcome  
deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic 
restructuring 
B. The introduction of a local self-governing system and the expansion of 
autonomy in local government 
C. The postmodern socialisation and the increasing effect of visual media and 
advertising 
D. The effect of urban entrepreneurialism 
E. other, please specify (                                        ) 
 
 
3. What are the most primary purpose of urban place marketing during the 1990s 
and the present, please write answers in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
A. Revitalisation of local economy 
B. Improving physical redevelopment and infrastructure 
C. Improving the city image and city brand value 
D. Raising local identity 
E. Improving citizen’s quality of life 
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4. How have the degree of the utilisation of cultural tools in urban place 
marketing been changed during 1990s and the present? (       ) 
 
 
A. Sharply increase 
B. Gradually increase 
C. Steadily no change 
D. Gradually decrease 
E. Sharply decrease 
 
 
5.  How have the degree of the attention of cultural tools in urban place 
marketing been changed during 1990s and the present? (       ) 
 
 
A. Sharply increase 
B. Gradually increase 
C. Steadily no change 
D. Gradually decrease 
E. Sharply decrease 
 
 
6.  How has the relationship between urban place marketing and cultural tools 
been changed in urban policy during 1990s and the present? Please write in 
each blank. 
 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
 
A. Cultural tools have no connection with urban regeneration (and urban place 
marketing) 
B. Cultural tools are taken account for urban regeneration (and urban place 
marketing) as a part of strategies 
C. Cultural tools lead the urban regeneration (and urban place marketing) 
D. Cultural tools are the most important component in all urban policy 
 
 
7.  How are differently defined the concept of culture within urban place 
marketing between the 1990s and the present? Please write in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
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A. Culture = only art 
B. Culture = art + cultural economy(only tourism) 
C. Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) 
D. Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) + cultural 
welfare 
 
 
8.  Which actor is most influential within urban place marketing policy area 
during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
A. Central Government 
B. Mayor and City Government 
C. City Council 
D.  Partnership organisation 
E.  Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce 
F.  Civic groups 
G.  Artist groups 
H.  other, please specify (                                     ) 
 
 
9.  How is the role of Central government within urban place marketing policy 
area during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.  
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
A. Central government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy 
B. Central government is involved in only some parts of place marketing 
policy together with financial support to local government 
C. Central government don’t care about place marketing policy except giving 
some financial support to local government 
D. Central government never care about whole place marketing policy 
E. Other, please specify (                                      ) 
 
 
10.  How is the role of city government within urban place marketing policy area 
during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
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A. City government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy 
B. City government is involved in some parts of place marketing policy 
together with financial support to partnership organisation or agency 
C. City government don’t care about place marketing policy except giving 
some financial support partnership organisation or agency 
D. Central government never care about whole place marketing policy 
E. Other, please specify (                                      ) 
 
 
11.  How is the role of partnership orgqnisation within urban place marketing 
policy area during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
A. Partnership organisation lead actively whole parts of place marketing 
policy  
B. Partnership organisation is involved in some parts of place marketing 
policy 
C. Partnership organisation do not involved with place marketing policy 
except following command and control of city government 
D. Other, please specify (                                      ) 
 
 
12.  How are the degree of citizen’s participation changed differently within urban 
place marketing between the 1990s and the present? Please write in each blank. 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
A. Sharply increase 
B. Gradually increase 
C. Steadily no change 
D. Gradually decrease 
E. Sharply decrease 
 
 
 
13.  What activity is the most celebrated and positively echoed by citizen in urban 
place marketing during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each 
blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
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A. Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum 
B. Active promotion and advertising city 
C. Holding festivals and events 
D. Developing and selling local product 
E. City branding (e.g. High Seoul) 
F. Attracting companies and inward investments 
 
 
14.  Where are the ideas of place marketing activities from during 1990s and the 
present? Please write answer in each blank. 
 
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       ) 
 
A. Other city’s (including other countries) successful case 
B. Citizen’s suggestion such as idea challenge 
C. The result of institute research 
D. Private economic group or company suggestion 
E. Other, please specify (                                      ) 
 
 
15.  Do you think how often Korean cities consider and apply other country’s city 
marketing policies to their policy? 
 
A. Very often   B. Often   C. Occasionally   D. Rarely   E. Never 
 
 
16.  If they (Korean cities) consider and apply other country’s city marketing 
policies, do you think which country is usually examined by them?  
 
A. US     B. Japan      C. UK     D. Germany     E. Other 
 
 
17. If they (Korean cities) consider and apply other country’s city marketing 
policies, how much we need those examples?  
 
A. Very much   B. Much   C. Not much   D. A little   E. Never 
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18.  If they (Korean cities) consider and apply other country’s city marketing 
policies, which part is most helpful for us?  
 
A. Gaining new policy ideas 
B. Learning from good case (e.g. imitating best practice) 
A. Learning from bad case (e.g. preventing mistakes) 
B. Checking the feasibility of place marketing policies 
C. Other, please specify (                                      ) 
 
 
 
19.  How much effects of the application of other countries’ urban place 
marketing policies and examples to Korean cities? 
 
A. Very much            B. Much          C. Normal    
D. A little           E. Tiny          F. Nothing 
 
 
 
20.  What’s the most difficult point in the application of other country’s policies 
to South Korea? 
 
A. The difference of Policy makers’ marketing capability 
B. The difference of policy customers 
C. The difference of Policy conditions (e.g. finance) 
D. The difference of policy network 
E. Other (                                                  ) 
 
 
 
21.  Do you have experience of visit to West European cities for field visit related 
place marketing and urban development? 
 
A. Yes, I have 
B. No, but I have experience of visit to other Western cities 
C. No, but I have other advanced cities like Japanese ones 
D. No, I haven’t 
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22.  Do you have experience of hearing failure of Western place marketing? 
 
A. Yes (       )                   
B. No (       ) 
 
 
 
23.  Do you have experience of introducing or indicating failure of Western place 
marketing? 
 
A. Yes (       )                   
B. No (       ) 
 
 
 
24. Please select two biggest problems which Korean cities are facing related 
urban place marketing policy. 
 
(                                                              ) 
 
A. Emulating or copying other example 
B. Focused on large-scale projects without considering finance 
C. Focused on short-term performance rather than long-term one 
D. Authoritative decision making procedure 
E. The lack of citizen’s participation 
D. The lack of marketing mind-set of policy makers 
E. The lack of co-operation between policy actors and stakeholders 
F. Other (                                                  ) 
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< Background Questions > 
 
 
 25-1. [Occupation] What is your job? 
A. professor and lecturer 
B. researcher 
C. politician 
D. government official 
E. office worker (private company and agency) 
F. artist 
G. voluntary and civic group 
H. other, please specify (                                        ) 
 
 
25-2. [Working Year] How many years did you work in this field (city marketing, 
urban development and cultural policy)? 
A. Less than 5 years 
B. 5~10 years 
C. More than 10 years 
 
 
25-3. [Career field] What is your career field? 
A. Urban development and regeneration 
B. Marketing 
C. Cultural policy and strategy 
D. Other, please specify (                                        ) 
 
 
25-4. [Level of Degree] Your highest level of education and qualification is 
___________. 
 
A. Bachelor’s degree or equal qualification 
B. Master’s degree or equal qualification 
C. Doctorate degree or equal qualification 
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Appendix 3. Survey Results 
 
 
1. The most preferable activity in urban place marketing tool 
 
(1990s) 
 
Holding local festivals and events 18 (52.9%) 
Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum  7 (20.6%) 
Developing and selling local products  4 (11.8%) 
Attracting companies and inward investments  3 (8.8%) 
Active promotion and advertising city  1 (2.9%) 
Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)  1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul) 17 (50.0%) 
Attracting companies and inward investments  6 (17.6%) 
Developing and selling local products  4 (11.8%) 
Active promotion and advertising city  4 (11.8%) 
Holding local festivals and events  2 (5.9%) 
Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum  1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
 
2. The most important background to the emergence of place marketing 
 
The introduction of a local self-governing system and the 
expansion of autonomy in local government 
24 (70.6%) 
The response of local government in order to overcome  
deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic 
restructuring 
 5 (14.7%) 
The effect of urban entrepreneurialism which local authorities 
behave like private companies 
 3 (8.8%) 
In order to make achievement of city leaders since the introduction 
of local self-governing system 
 1 (2.9%) 
The postmodern socialisation and the increasing effect of visual 
media and advertising 
0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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3. The most primary purpose of urban place marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
Revitalisation of local economy 14 (41.2%) 
Improving physical redevelopment and infrastructure  7 (20.6%) 
Improving the city image and city brand value  6 (17.6%) 
Raising local identity  6 (17.6%) 
Improving citizen’s quality of life 1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Improving the city image and city brand value 21 (61.8%) 
Revitalisation of local economy  9 (26.5%) 
Improving citizen’s quality of life  4 (11.8%) 
Improving physical redevelopment and infrastructure  0 (0.0%) 
Raising local identity 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
4. The degree of concern for cultural tools in urban place marketing 
 
Sharply increase 22 (64.7%) 
Gradually increase 12 (35.3%) 
Steadily no change  0 (0.0%) 
Gradually decrease  0 (0.0%) 
Sharply decrease 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
5. The degree of utilisation of cultural tools in urban place marketing 
 
Gradually increase 23 (67.6%) 
Sharply increase 11 (32.4%) 
Steadily no change  0 (0.0%) 
Gradually decrease  0 (0.0%) 
Sharply decrease 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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6. The relationship between place marketing policy and cultural tools 
 
(1990s) 
 
Cultural tools are taken account for urban place marketing as 
a part of strategies 
24 (70.6%) 
Cultural tools have no connection with urban place marketing 9 (26.5%) 
No response  1 (2.9%) 
Cultural tools lead the urban place marketing  0 (0.0%) 
Cultural tools are the most important component in all urban policy 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Cultural tools lead the urban place marketing 24 (70.6%) 
Cultural tools are taken account for urban place marketing as a part 
of strategies 
7 (20.6%) 
Cultural tools are the most important component in all urban policy  2 (5.9%) 
No response  1 (2.9%) 
Cultural tools have no connection with urban place marketing 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
7. The concept of culture within urban place marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
Culture = art + cultural economy(only tourism) 20 (58.8%) 
Culture = only art 14 (41.2%) 
Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc)  0 (0.0%) 
Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) + cultural 
welfare 
 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) 18 (51.5%) 
Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) + cultural 
welfare 
16 (47.1%) 
Culture = only art  0 (0.0%) 
Culture = art + cultural economy(only tourism) 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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8. The most influential actor within urban place marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
Mayor and City Govrnment 23 (67.6%) 
Central Government 9 (26.5%) 
Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce    1 (2.9%) 
Artist groups 1 (2.9%) 
City Cuncil    0 (0.0%) 
Partnership organisation    0 (0.0%) 
Civic groups    0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Mayor and City Govrnment 17 (50.0%) 
Partnership organisation 15 (44.1%) 
Civic groups    2 (5.9%) 
Central Government 0 (0.0%) 
City Cuncil    0 (0.0%) 
Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce    0 (0.0%) 
Artist groups    0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
9. The role of Central Government within urban place marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
Central government don’t care about place marketing 
policy (except giving some financial support to local 
government) 
15 (44.1%) 
Central government lead actively whole parts of place 
marketing policy  
10 (29.4%) 
Central government is involved in only some parts of place 
marketing policy (together with financial support to local 
government) 
   9 (26.5%) 
Central government never care about whole place marketing 
policy 
   0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Central government is involved in only some parts of 
place marketing policy (together with financial support to 
local government) 
32 (94.1%) 
Central government lead actively whole parts of place 
marketing policy 
2 (5.9%) 
Central government don’t care about place marketing policy 
(except giving some financial support to local government) 
   0 (0.0%) 
Central government never care about whole place marketing 
policy 
   0 (0.0%) 
Total 34(100%) 
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10. The role of City Government within urban place marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
City government is involved in some parts of place 
marketing policy (together with financial support to 
partnership organisation or agency) 
14 (41.2%) 
City government lead actively whole parts of place marketing 
policy 
13 (38.2%) 
City government don’t care about place marketing policy 
(except giving some financial support partnership organisation 
or agency) 
   7 (20.6%) 
Central government never care about whole place marketing 
policy 
   0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
City government lead actively whole parts of place 
marketing policy 
22 (64.7%) 
City government is involved in some parts of place marketing 
policy (together with financial support to partnership 
organisation or agency) 
12 (35.3%) 
City government don’t care about place marketing policy 
(except giving some financial support partnership organisation 
or agency) 
   0 (0.0%) 
Central government never care about whole place marketing 
policy 
   0 (0.0%) 
Total 34(100%) 
 
11. The role of partnership organisation within urban place marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
Partnership organisation is involved in some parts of 
place marketing policy 
17 (50.0%) 
Partnership organisation do not involved with place 
marketing policy except following command and control of 
city government 
17 (50.0%) 
Partnership organisation lead actively whole parts of place 
marketing policy 
   0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Partnership organisation lead actively whole parts of place 
marketing policy 
20 (58.8%) 
Partnership organisation is involved in some parts of place 
marketing policy 
14 (41.2%) 
Partnership organisation do not involved with place marketing 
policy except following command and control of city 
government 
   0 (0.0%) 
Total 34(100%) 
 
371 
 
12. The degree of citizen’s participation within urban place marketing 
 
Gradually increase 18 (52.9%) 
Sharply increase 15 (44.1%) 
Steadily no change   1 (2.9%) 
Gradually decrease   0 (0.0%) 
Sharply decrease 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
13. The most celebrated and positively echoed by citizen in urban place 
marketing 
 
(1990s) 
 
Holding local festivals and events 18 (52.9%) 
Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum  8 (23.5%) 
Developing and selling local products  3 (8.8%) 
Attracting companies and inward investments  3 (8.8%) 
Active promotion and advertising city  1 (2.9%) 
Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)  1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
(The present, 2011) 
 
Attracting companies and inward investments  16 (47.1%) 
Developing and selling local products  7 (20.6%) 
Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)  4 (11.8%) 
Active promotion and advertising city   3 (8.8%) 
Holding local festivals and events  3 (8.8%) 
Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum  1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
14. The ideas of place marketing activities are from 
 
Other city’s (including other countries) successful case 26 (76.5%) 
The result of institute research 4 (11.8%) 
Private economic group or company suggestion   2 (5.9%) 
Citizen’s suggestion such as idea challenge   1 (2.9%) 
No response 1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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15.  How often Korean cities consider and apply other country’s city 
marketing policies to their policy 
 
Very often  16 (47.1%) 
Often 16 (47.1%) 
Occasionally   2 (5.9%) 
Rarely   0 (0.0%) 
Never 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
16.  The country is usually examined by Korean cities for the application to 
their place marketing policy 
 
Japan 19 (55.9%) 
United Kingdom 8 (23.5%) 
United States of America   6 (17.6%) 
Germany   1 (2.9%) 
Other country 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34(100%) 
 
 
 
17.  How much need other country’s success case for Korean cities 
 
Much need 19 (55.9%) 
Very much need 7 (20.6%) 
Some need   6 (17.6%) 
A little need   2 (5.9%) 
Very little need 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
18.  If Korean cities consider and apply other country’s city marketing 
policies, which part is most helpful 
 
Learning from good case (e.g. imitating best practice) 14 (41.2%) 
Gaining new policy ideas 11 (32.4%) 
Checking the feasibility of place marketing policies   7 (20.6%) 
Learning from bad case (e.g. preventing mistakes)   2 (5.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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19.  How much the effect of the application of other country’s success case 
for Korean cities 
 
Some effect 20 (58.8%) 
A large effect 12 (35.3%) 
Very large effect   1 (2.9%) 
Not very much effect   1 (2.9%) 
Very little effect 0 (0.0%) 
Total  34(100%) 
 
 
20.  The most difficult thing in the application of other country’s urban 
place marketing policy 
 
The difference of political, economic and social situation 22 (64.7%) 
The lack of marketing mind and policy capacity of public official 8 (23.5%) 
The difference of citizen’s (or customer’s) culture and taste   3 (8.8%) 
The difference of processing and organising related policy 
network 
1 (2.9%) 
Total  34(100%) 
 
 
21.  Any experience of visiting Western cities to look at their urban place 
marketing policy 
 
I have been to another Western city outside Britain 18 (52.9%) 
I have been to a British city 12 (35.3%) 
I have no experience of visiting a Western city, but I have been to 
cities in other developed countries like Japan 
  3 (8.8%) 
No response 1 (2.9%) 
I have no experience of visiting cities in a developed country 0 (0.0%) 
Total  34(100%) 
 
 
22.  Any experience of hearing failure case of Western city marketing 
 
Yes 21 (61.8%) 
No 13 (38.2%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
23.  Any experience of formally introducing or indicating failure case of 
Western city marketing 
 
No 29 (85.3%) 
Yes 5 (14.7%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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24.  The two biggest problems in developing urban place marketing 
policies in Korea 
 
(The first) 
 
Excessive focusing on short-term outcomes like increasing 
the number of tourists rather than on long-term goals like 
improvement of citizen’s quality of life 
22 (64.7%) 
There is no creativity, just imitation, in place marketing policy 7 (20.6%) 
Inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources 3 (8.8%) 
Authoritative and non-transparent policy formation 1 (2.9%) 
The lack of a collaborative network between policy actors like 
politicians, public officials, citizen and related stakeholders 
1 (2.9%) 
The lack of citizen participation 0 (0.0%) 
The lack of citizen support 0 (0.0%) 
The lack of a marketing mindset in policy makers 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
(The second) 
 
The lack of a collaborative network between policy actors like 
politicians, public officials, citizen and related stakeholders 
11 (32.4%) 
There is no creativity, just imitation, in place marketing policy 8 (23.5%) 
Excessive focusing on short-term outcomes like increasing the 
number of tourists rather than on long-term goals like 
improvement of citizen’s quality of life 
4 (11.8%) 
The lack of a marketing mindset in policy makers 4 (11.8%) 
Authoritative and non-transparent policy formation 3 (8.8%) 
The lack of citizen participation 3 (8.8%) 
The lack of citizen support 1 (2.9%) 
Inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources 0 (0.0%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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< Background questions about respondents > 
 
 
 
25-1. Occupation 
 
Institute researcher  9 (26.5%) 
Public official 7 (20.6%) 
Professor 7 (20.6%) 
Agency people 6 (17.6%) 
City marketing company people 5 (14.7%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
25-2. Working years 
 
More than 10 years  26 (76.5%) 
5~10 years 7 (20.6%) 
Less than 5 years 1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
25-3. Career field 
 
Urban development and regeneration 14 (41.2%) 
Cultural policy and strategy 9 (26.5%) 
Marketing 7 (20.6%) 
Architecture 3 (8.8%) 
History 1 (2.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
 
 
 
25-4. Level of degree 
 
 
Doctorate degree 21 (61.8%) 
Master’s degree 11 (32.4%) 
Bachelor’s degree 2 (5.9%) 
Total 34 (100%) 
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Appendix 4. Interview Offer (example) 
 
 
Name 
Organisation 
 
 
Sending date 
 
Dear Mr/Mrs 0000, 
 
I work at the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs in the South 
Korean Government and am currently doing research for a PhD at the University 
of Exeter. My research investigates the political changes of Gwangju marketing 
projects and policies, and is supervised by Prof. 0000 and Prof. 0000. 
 
I am studying the evolution of place marketing in South Korea, and I have selected 
Gwangju as a case study in South Korea.  I would be very grateful if you could 
spare an hour or so to discuss the involvement of your organisation in this activity, 
with particular reference to the Gwangju Biennale (or the Asian Culture Complex 
or the Dome Baseball Stadium).  I would be happy to travel to your office (or 
place) to meet at a time of your convenience. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you soon through my email and thank you in 
anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Name of researcher 
----------------------------------------- 
PhD candidate  
 
Address 
Email address 
Contact number 
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Appendix 5. Interview Schdule (example) 
 
 
1. Common questions  
 
 
[These general questions aim to identify how an interviewee understands place 
marketing and branding in Gwangju and why does the interviewee think like 
that.] 
 
 
First of all, I want to ask some general questions about Gwangju place 
marketing and branding. 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
1.1 What’s the image of Gwangju presented through place marketing?  
How has this changed over the past 15 years? 
 
 
1.2 Do you think place marketing and branding is important? If so, why 
cultural activities like staging art festivals and building flagship 
museums become important in Gwangju? 
 
 
1.3 Who mainly takes decision on Gwangju’s image-making? 
 
 
1.4 Would you change anything about current place marketing Gwangju, if 
you could? 
 
 
1.5 Do you think that place marketing policies have been successful in 
Gwangju? If so, why? Could you explain the reason? 
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1.6 What was the contribution of your organisation to Gwangju marketing 
and urban development? 
 
 
1.7 How do you think local history and distinctiveness should be handled in 
terms of place marketing?  
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2. Place vision of the Gwangju Place Marketing Projects 
 
 
[These questions aim to recognise how an interviewee thinks the vision of 
Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome Project) in Gwangju.] 
 
 
Now, I want to ask about the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, and then I 
am going to ask about the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, 
Dome) project. 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.1 What’s meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement to you? 
 
 
2.2 What’s the vision of Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, 
Dome) project? 
 
 
2.3 So far, do you feel it has been successful?  
 
 
2.4 What’s the vision of the project from the view of your organisation? 
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3. Related organisations, partnership and power 
 
 
[These questions aim to ascertain related organisations, the role of partnership 
and governance in association with Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture 
Complex, Dome) project.] 
 
 
Let me ask some questions about organisations and partnership for Gwangju 
Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.   
 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.1 What has been the position and role of your organisation within the 
project? And how has this changed? 
 
 
3.2 What are the key organisations involved in the project?  
 
 
3.3 How do these organisations work well together within the project? I 
mean they have regular meetings, steering group and administrative 
persons. 
 
 
3.4 How do you make decisions on the project? 
 
 
3.5 Who are the key agencies or individuals in your organisation? 
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4. Conflicts and co-ordination process 
 
 
[These questions aim to find out the process of conflicts and co-ordination 
within the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.] 
 
 
Let me ask some questions about the process of conflicts and co-ordination 
within Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.   
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
4.1 Have there been any disagreements and major conflicts in the process 
of doing the project?  
 
 
4.2 Where do you see the conflicts coming from? What’s caused them and 
who was involved? 
 
 
4.3 How were disagreements and conflicts resolved and who contributed to 
co-ordinate them? 
 
 
4.4 Have there any changes in the relationship between city authorities, 
business and local groups as the project has developed? 
 
 
382 
 
 
5. Policy transfer of place marketing 
 
 
[These questions aim to identify how an interviewee understands the policy 
transfer of place marketing and branding, especially from other country into 
Korea.] 
 
 
I want to ask questions about the policy transfer of place marketing and 
branding.   
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
5.1 In Gwangju, where do you think are the ideas about place marketing 
policies are coming from? 
 
 
5.2 Do you think Gwangju often considers and applies other country’s city 
marketing policies to their policy?  
 
 
5.3 When you consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies, 
which country is usually examined? Can you tell me a few examples? 
 
 
5.4 When you apply them to Gwangju, how much do you feel they are 
necessary and actually how much has other experiences been helpful for 
Gwangju? 
 
 
5.5 Have you had the opportunity to visit other countries in association 
with urban regeneration and place marketing? 
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6. Results of the project and Gwangju’s future 
 
 
[These questions aim to identify how an interviewee understands the result of 
the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex) project and think Gwangju’s 
future marketing and branding.] 
 
 
I want to ask questions about the result of the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian 
Culture Complex) project and the future of Gwangju place marketing and 
branding.   
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
6.1 So far, what have been the major changes for local residents as a result 
of such projects?  
 
 
6.2 Do you think these projects have been successful in helping to change 
Gwangju’s image? If so, why? 
 
 
6.3 In general terms, what have been the biggest problems for marketing a 
city like Gwangju? And what are the main challenges facing Gwangju 
marketing now? 
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